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Abstract
Western understandings of Central Asia have reflected the political concerns of both 
the time and the place in which they were carried out. The thesis reviews British, 
French and American writing on the area in the period 1950-1985, tracing the 
development of the Western understanding of the role of Islam in Soviet Asian society. 
It is argued that this understanding has been shown by events since 1989 to have been 
substantially erroneous. The direction of the development of Western scholarship is 
explained by placing it in a political and intellectual context dominated by experiences 
of anti-colonial revolt and concerns about militant Islam. Other factors having an 
impact on research outcomes, including the backgrounds of scholars and the means by 
which research findings are made public are considered. It is suggested that these 
factors combined to create a substantive bias in the Western understanding of the 
region which continues to inform approaches to the area. Awareness of the potential 
and often unconscious sources of bias is essential if research findings are to make a 
claim to represent ‘the real world’.
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................. P-l
i) Aims............................................................................................................................................P-l
ii) Structure.....................................................................................................................................P-4
iii) Texts..........................................................................................................................................P-8
Chapter I: Historical Contexts............................................................................................... p 12
l.i) Introduction....................................................................................................................... p. 12
1 .ii) The 1950s............................................................................................................................p.18
1 iii) The 1960s...........................................................................................................................p.26
l.iv) The 1970s & 1980s...........................................................................................................p.32
l.v) Conclusion.......................................................................................................  ..................p.37
Chapter 2: Colonialism and Central Asia.............................. .............................................. p.40
2.i) Introduction....................................................................................................................... p. 40
2.ii) What is Colonialism?...................................................................................................... p.42
2.iii) Colonialism in Central Asia...........................................................................................p.50
2.111.a) Political/Economic Imperialism............................................................................................p.51
2.111.b) Cultural Imperialism..............................................................................................................p.73
2.iv) The Consequences of Colonialism....................................................................................p.85
2.v) Conclusion...........................................................................................................................p.92
Chapter 3; Anti-Colonialism in Central Asia....................................................................... p.98
3.i) Introduction........................................................................................................................ p.98
3.ii) The Basmachis.................................................................................................................. p.98
3.iii) The Khodzhaev Trial..................................................................................................... p. 103
3.iv) The War Record p. 107
3.v) The Epics............................................................................................................................p. 109
3.vi) Elite Nationalism p. 111
3.vii) Conclusion........................................................................................................................p. 122
Chapter 4: Writing on Islam - The 1950s............................................................................ p. 125
4.i) Introduction......................................................................................................................p. 125
4.ii) Wheeler...........................................................................................................................p. 127
4.iii) Caroe............................................................................................................................. p. 129
4.iv) Monteil............................................................................................................................. p. 130
4.v) Hayit.................................................................................................................................. p. 135
4.vi) Pipes................................................................................................................................. p. 137
4.vii) Bennigsen........................................................................................................................p .139
4.viii) Conclusion.....................................................................................................................p. 153
Chapter 5: Writing on Islam - The 1960s........................................................................p. 156
5.i) Introduction..................................................................................................................... p .156
5.ii) Kolarz.............................................  ..............................................................................p. 157
5.iii) Krader.............................................................................................................................p. 169
5.iv) d’Encausse..............................................................................................................................p. 172
5.v) Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay................................................................................ p. 182
5.vi) Wheeler..............................................................................................................................p .189
5.vii) Conclusion...................................................................................................................... p. 196
Chapter 6: Islam and Opposition - The 1970s & 1980s................................................. p.200
6.i) Introduction...................................................................................................................... p.200
6.ii) Demography and Conflict...............................................................................................p.201
6.iii) Central Asian Distinctiveness........................................................................................p.208
6.iv) ‘"Official” Islam................................................................................................................ p.213
6.v) ‘"Parallel” Islam................................................................................................................. p.221
6.vii) Soviet and non-Soviet Islam........................................................................................... p.229
6.viii) Conclusion..................................................................................................................... p.240
Conclusion - Contexts and Outcomes: Towards a Genealogy of Ideas......................... p.246
i) Object..................................................................................................................................... p.248
ii) Observer................................................................................................................................ p.251
iii) Process................................................................................................................................. p.255
iv) Reception.............................................................................................................................. p.261
v) Closing Remarks.................................................................................................................. p.267
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................p.273
Notes:
Transcription:
The precise spelling of Arabic, Turkic, Persian and Russian words using the Latin 
alphabet has yet to be fixed. Throughout this thesis, I have used the most commonly 
recognised English spellings, subject to the following provisos.
i) The spellings used in original texts have been preserved where those texts have been 
quoted.
ii) The names of individual Soviet Central Asian Republics have been rendered in their 
-stan form using the most commonly accepted spelling viz Kazakhstan rather than 
Qazaqstan, Kirghizstan rather than Kirghizia or Kyrgyzstan.
iii) The terms ‘Tadjik’ and ‘Tadjikistan’ have been used throughout rather than ‘Tajik’ 
or ‘Tadzhik’.
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Introduction
i) Aims
During the Cold War the internal dynamics of the USSR, political and social, 
were a matter of intense interest to Western policy makers and academics. The 
majority of studies in this field concentrated on Russia itself. For most in Western 
Europe, North America and Australasia the terms ‘Russia’ and ‘Soviet Union’ were 
synonyms, with ‘Russia’ the term most commonly used. The most important republic 
of the Union, Russia overshadowed the debate on both internal and international 
Soviet policies to the virtual exclusion of all other parts of the USSR.
Non-Russian, or non-Slavic, areas were not totally ignored. The largest of these 
comprised the USSR’s Asian territories outside Siberia. This region, consisting of 
Kazakhstan and the four republics known in Soviet usage as Middle Asia (Srednaya 
Aziya),1 referred to collectively in the West as Central Asia, stood out from other non- 
Slavic districts from a number of standpoints. In his preface to the second edition of 
Central Asia: a Century o f Russian Rule, the American scholar Edward Allworth 
wrote
Central Asia has special significance for informed people everywhere, owing to 
its extraordinary human and cultural qualities... it also held and holds great 
importance for the foreign relations of the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of 
China, countries of the Middle East, and Southern Asia. In the short term 
Central Asia plays that role partly for geopolitical reasons by virtue of its very 
location between lands west and east, north and south.1
In addition to its geographic location, Central Asia was significant for a number 
of other reasons. It was the only part of the Soviet Union with a indigenous non- 
European majority, which was largely racially homogenous, being mostly of Turkic 
origin. The Indo-European Tadjiks, who in 1989 comprised four and a half million 
Soviet citizens, were the region’s only significant non-Turkic native group. Alongside 
ethno-linguistic homogeneity several other factors made Central Asia a distinct field for
1 Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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study. The region had been militarily conquered in a relatively short period of time and 
relatively recently, and was the only non-European area of the USSR to have had a 
sophisticated urban civilization prior to absorption into the Russian sphere which could 
be set against that of Russia.
Because of the apparent dichotomy between Central Asia and other regions of 
the USSR, the social and political dynamics within the region and between Central Asia 
and Russia proper contained the possibility of conflict which might threaten the security 
of the Soviet state. Such a situation had obvious implications for Western strategists 
and policy makers. Throughout the Cold War some analysts in the West concentrated 
on examining social and political issues affecting Central Asia.
This thesis traces the development of Western thought on Central Asia as it 
appears in the writings of British, French and American scholars. It will be argued that 
from a starting point rooted in the British and French experience of empire and 
assumptions concerning the nature of the colonial dynamic, a consensus developed 
regarding a fundamental conflict of interests between Central Asians and a Soviet state 
conceived of in terms of the Russian nation.
As the Cold War progressed this conflict came increasingly to be cast as a 
civilizational one between the two incompatible absolutes of Islam and Communism 
leading to a widespread understanding of the Muslim religion as being the single most 
potent challenge to the hegemony of Marxist-Leninist ideology within the USSR.
After the events of 1991 it became apparent that the strength of Islam as an anti­
colonial and anti-Russian factor in Central Asia had been over estimated. That the 
Central Asians did not see the necessity of conflict between being Muslim and being 
Soviet is illustrated by the fact that the Central Asian republics were the last to 
proclaim their independence from the USSR” Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev 
was among the first to propose renegotiating the political structure of the Union, and 
Kazakh independence was not proclaimed until 16th December 1991, after the creation
n As opposed to “sovereignty” which proposed the primacy of Republic law over all-Union, 
presupposing the continued existence of a federal USSR.
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of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A referendum in Uzbekistan on 17th 
March 1991 produced a figure of just 6% in favour of independence. By contrast, the 
Supreme Soviet of Latvia proclaimed that republic’s independence of the USSR on 11th 
March of that year.2
In addition to tracing the development of Western thought concerning Central 
Asia during the post-War period to the point at which it was widely held that political 
Islam in the region posed the single greatest threat to the Soviet state, this thesis seeks 
to illustrate how and why such a consensus came about by examining the political and 
intellectual context in which such thought developed. Dallin has written of “a hard core 
of persistent preconceptions which tend to bias the analysis of Soviet policies and 
trends,”3 and Waardenburg asserted that “such books use the facts to present 
ideological rather than scholarly views.”4 This thesis seeks to determine whether such a 
charge is justified.
The significance of this paper lies less in its analysis of the academic process than 
in the study of Western assumptions concerning Soviet Islam as a destabilising radical 
force within Central Asian society. The ‘Islamic explosion’ postulated by Western 
scholars up until the collapse of the USSR never occurred, however Western policy­
makers have in the post-Soviet era continued to fear a Khomeinist-style Islamic 
revolution in this strategic region. This is evidenced by reactions to the Tadjik civil war 
of 1992-94 which was initially understood by Western newspapers and by some 
Western analysts as a struggle between ‘militant’ Islam and secular influences. Leaders 
of other Central Asian states, notably President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, have 
been quick to play the ‘Islamic card’ in their search for credits from international 
financial institutions which normally carry provisos concerning human rights, typically 
using the argument that domestic repression is necessary to prevent Islamic revolution. 
I shall argue that the concept of an ‘Islamic threat’ to Central Asia is in itself a largely 
Western construct serving Western interests, and misrepresents the significance of 
Islam within Central Asia today.
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ii) Structure
This thesis comprises six chapters and a conclusion, each dealing with a different 
aspect of the development of attitudes towards Central Asian Islam. Each is sub­
divided according to one of the following criteria:
A chapter may be sub-divided chronologically in order to advance the 
development of the terms of the debate (Chapter 1).
A chapter may be divided by the names of scholars, examining individual 
contributions in the field and the evolution of personal opinions about Soviet Central 
Asia (Chapters 4 and 5).
A chapter may be divided synoptically by topic in order further to broaden and 
deepen the analysis of responses to certain key issues (Chapters 2, 3, and 6).
Chapters 1 - 3 can be characterised as “contextual,” setting the parameters of the 
terms of the debate on Central Asia from 1950 - 1985. Chapters 4 - 6 are analytical, 
describing the developing debate on Soviet Islam and considering the strengths and 
weaknesses of particular arguments and stances. The conclusion seeks to link context 
with content by examining the ways in which ideas concerning Soviet Central Asia 
were transmitted and the effect this had on their development.
• Chapter One presents a summary of developments on the world stage which 
affected attitudes towards Central Asia. Developments from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century up until the Second World War are described, showing how 
changing concerns were reflected in the presentation of Central Asia. It is hoped to 
establish the principal contention that the understanding and presentation of an issue is 
influenced by the concerns of the time in which it is put forward and the interests of 
those advocating a given point of view.
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The new power relations which developed after the Second World War are 
described. It is argued that the enhanced international status of the Soviet Union and 
the influence of radical nationalist/leftist ideas in the Middle East prompted a renewed 
interest in Central Asia. In Britain this focused on the assessment of developments in 
Soviet Central Asia as a means of ascertaining the attractiveness of Soviet ideology to 
those parts of the world over which Britain had relinquished direct control. French 
scholars appeared more concerned with examining whether the Soviet ‘colonial’ system 
could be adapted by France as a means of assuaging nationalist aspirations, allowing 
France to maintain direct control over her empire.
In the 1960s the development of the Non-Aligned Movement, the continuing 
Western withdrawal from Asia and Africa, the Sino-Soviet split and the Civil Rights 
movement in the USA influenced scholarship. Studies stressed the inability of 
Europeans to perpetuate their rule over non-Europeans and the undesirability of doing 
so. At the same time we see the development of the idea of the Soviet Union as a part 
of the Western, or European, world.
The 1970s and the 1980s saw the rise of the view that in the Muslim world 
Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ posed the principal challenge to European hegemony. It was 
during this period from the defeat of the Arab Powers in 1967 to the victory of 
Khomeinism in Iran that the concept of a dichotomy between European and Islamic 
civilisation was fully worked out, and the idea developed that Central Asians must 
ultimately rise in anti-colonial revolt.
• Chapter Two addresses the question of colonialism, why Soviet Central Asia 
was regarded as a colony and whether this assessment was justified.. The question of 
what is meant by the term ‘colony’ is analysed, drawing from sources of the 1950s and 
1960s to establish the contemporary understanding of this concept and establishing that 
Soviet Central Asia was perceived as a colony of the Russian State analogous to French 
or British Imperial holdings. Specific examples of Russian colonialism as it appears in 
the literature are discussed. Finally the anticipated consequences of colonialism, seen 
to be demands for political as well as cultural freedom, are considered.
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• Chapter 3 considers evidence for centrifugal tendencies within Central Asia. 
Western scholars concentrated on four instances which appeared to argue for the 
existence of anti-colonial sentiment. These were the Basmachi revolt, the trial of 
Faizullah Khodzhaev, the experience of the Second World War and the cultural 
struggle over the status of traditional epic poetry.
In the relative absence of concrete examples of actual anti-colonial movements, 
scholars considered the attitudes towards the Russians of the local elite which might 
lead to such a movement. Elite nationalism was imputed, and the absence of overt 
hostility to the regime was explained by contending that this was a function of 
circumstance rather than will. Anti-Russian sentiment was said to have been subsumed 
into the cultural realm. The maintenance of a distinct cultural identity was regarded in 
the West as an act of anti-colonialism. For some scholars the clearest marker of 
cultural distinctiveness lay in religion.
• Chapter 4 considers the Western understanding of Soviet Islam during the 
1950s. For British scholars the question of religious belief was largely irrelevant since 
the term ‘Muslim’ did not necessarily include religious content. It was primarily in 
French scholarship that religious practice was addressed. This chapter focuses on the 
work of two French scholars, Vincent Monteil and Alexandre Bennigsen, in particular. 
The work of Baymirza Hayit and of Richard Pipes is also addressed. Hayit proposed 
that there was a fundamental clash between Islam and Communism, and that the 
survival of the former in Central Asia should be seen as a conscious rejection of the 
latter, a view endorsed by Pipes. The rejection of Communism was perceived as a 
rejection of Russian tutelage, and thus anti-colonialism. Monteil and Bennigsen, 
explicitly linking the question of religion to that of colonialism, posed the question “Are 
the Central Asians still Muslims?”
The chapter ends with an examination of a Soviet study of Central Asian Islam 
which became well known in the West and which profoundly affected perceptions of 
the religion in that region.
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• Chapter 5 focuses on the 1960s. It begins with an examination of the work of 
Walter Kolarz, who introduced the idea that the strength of Soviet Islam could not be 
judged from the religious establishment.
Helene Carrere d’Encausse regarded Central Asian Islam to be in a state of decay 
to the level of superstition. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay argued that this 
retreat from formal religious institutions strengthened the religion as a channel for 
maintaining a way of life distinct to that of the Russians. The preservation of Islam was 
a reflection of awareness of national distinctiveness and failure to associate with an 
over-arching Soviet identity, an understanding reinforced by Geoffrey Wheeler.
• Chapter 6 reviews understandings of the 1970s and 1980s. It starts by 
examining the perceived likelihood of ethnic conflict arising from competition between 
different groups within the Soviet population. The potential for such conflict was seen 
as great, owing to a continued failure of Central Asians to identify with the regime and 
join Soviet culture. Aspects of Central Asian culture which maintained social 
distinctiveness are described. These were seen to be rooted in Islam, which was 
essential to national identity. The expression of Islam thereby came to be seen as an 
expression of nationalism.
The position of the Soviet ‘ulema is assessed. They were credited with 
preserving the institutions of the religion, maintaining a sense of consciousness of 
Ummah, and promulgating a ‘modernist’ version of Islam which the authorities had 
difficulty attacking and which was not dissimilar to that propounded by the social 
reformers of the early years of the century, who were regarded in the West as the 
precursors of nationalism in the region.
The ‘ulema were tainted by co-operation with the State and their numbers were 
inadequate to meet the religious needs of the population. For the mass of Central 
Asians, Islam existed as ‘parallel Islam’ under the direction of Sufi groups, which were
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seen as being violently opposed to Russian rule. Sufis were held to propagate a 
traditional Islam which was susceptible to ‘fundamentalist’ tendencies.
Finally the relationship between Soviet and non-Soviet Muslims is discussed, 
considering some of the channels through which ‘fundamentalism’ could enter the 
USSR. The understanding of the nature of Central Asian Islam as an expression of 
social discontent was predicated on the initial understanding of Central Asia as a colony 
of Russia and of the dynamics of colonialism and anti-colonialism described in the 
earlier chapters.
The conclusion addresses some of the reasons why a particular understanding of 
Central Asian Islam gained currency. By looking at the way in which ideas regarding 
the subject were generated, were transmitted in books and journals or by direct 
scholarly collaboration, and were received by an audience both within the discipline and 
in the wider world it is hoped to show how a concept can gain a life of its own so 
powerful as virtually to preclude dissent.
iii) Texts
A textual study such as this must justify its choice of sources. As a ‘meta-study,’ 
that is the analysis of the research of others, it could be argued that this work falls at 
the hurdle it has itself established - that of a partial treatment of the evidence. I have 
chosen to examine, with one major exception, writings generated in Britain, France and 
the United States. Although not the only countries in which Central Asia was studied in 
the West, it was from the three countries mentioned that the majority of writing on the 
region emanated.
In selecting texts for examination, I began by looking at some of the more recent, 
from the 1980s and early 1990s. Perusing the bibliographies and notes of such works, 
it was possible to establish a ‘canon’ of earlier works cited which were obviously 
influential, molding the development of thought on Central Asia.
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Within this canon, the work of Alexandre Bennigsen (1913 -1988) stands out as 
being of particular importance, and his contribution dominates this thesis. Other 
scholars have also been referred to as pioneers in the field. These include Carrere 
d’Encausse, Lemercier-Quelquejay, Rywkin, Hostler, Kolarz, Conquest, Wheeler, 
Caroe, Hayit and Rakowska-Harmstone. With the exception of Hayit, whose major 
works were published in German and who is included because of the number of 
citations he receives in the work of others, all wrote in English or French and all were 
based in Britain, France or the USA. A number of other scholars have also been 
referred to where their work serves to illustrate or expand upon points made by these.
Contributors from other parts of the world have been included only where they 
serve to clarify a point, and where their comments were made in English-language 
media which were read and contributed to by the ‘core group.’ Whilst aware that this 
leaves me open to charges of ‘Atlanto-centrism’ in that I have not attempted fully to 
explore other views of Central Asia,111 in an undertaking of this nature such a 
‘universalist’ approach would not be feasible. In the post-Soviet era an ‘Atlanticist’ 
position continues to dominate Western strategic and policy planning on the region. 
An understanding of the development of this position therefore has the most immediate 
relevance from the Western perspective.
Even concentrating on works published in Western Europe and North America a 
comprehensive survey of the literature from the period would be impossible. I have 
restricted myself to works dealing with Soviet politics as they related to the ‘colonial 
question’ within the USSR, and within this category works intended for a wide, that is 
not specifically academic, audience. Most of the ‘key texts’ I have examined, even 
those appearing in journals, were aimed at a non-specialist readership.
Works which primarily concern such matters as geography, economics or Soviet 
military policy have largely been ignored except in so far as they serve to illustrate the 
debate concerning Soviet colonialism. The substantial contribution of Edward 
Allworth to Central Asian studies has for instance been largely excluded in so far as this
m Indian scholars have expressed other concerns and are often more positive towards the USSR.
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focuses on literary and historical issues. I have occasionally referred to Allworth’s 
work where it serves to illustrate particular widely-held attitudes.
It has become a cliche of Religious Studies that “Islam is more than a religion, it 
is a way of life.” This is an attitude which informed the scholarly approach to Islam in 
the USSR. A thesis which limited itself to a study of the theology and ritual of Soviet 
Islam would be restricted in scope, since it is Islam as a “way of life” and the 
relationship between the Muslim and the Soviet modes of being which dominated 
debate on Soviet Islam. Western scholars of Soviet Islam were not by training scholars 
of religion but of politics and their works were aimed at a political rather than a 
religious audience. Because the understanding of Islam was coloured as much by 
attitudes towards colonialism and race relations as by purely religious considerations, a 
number of works concerning colonialism, ethnic identity and race relations in the USSR 
have been included in this survey.
My discussion of the concept of colonialism is drawn for the most part from 
material which appeared in the 1950s and 1960s, although to clarify certain points I 
have on occasion referred to certain later works. I have not attempted to generate a 
new theory of colonialism but describe opinions concerning colonialism at a given time 
in order to contextualise the development of Western thinking about Central Asia. By 
the same token, in discussing historical and political developments of the period I have 
concentrated on those events which can be seen to have impinged on attitudes towards 
Central Asia.
Although the focus of this thesis is on the period from the death of Stalin to the 
accession of Gorbachev, this has been further contextualised by an overview of 
developments in the field up to the 1950s and references to later concerns. These are 
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Finally, I have endeavoured to give due attention to countervailing opinions to 
the main thrust of analysis of the period, such as those presented by Nove and Newth, 
to the effect that Central Asians might be content with their position. Such views were 
however relatively rare, and an attempt is made to explain their unpopularity.
10
1 Allworth (1989) p.xv
2 All dates and statistics have been taken from Bremmer & Taras (1993). It should be noted 
however that precise timings and figures remain open to dispute.
3 Dallin (1973) p.566
4 Waardenburg (1987) p.52
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Chapter 1: Historical Contexts
l.i) Introduction
Scholars do not work in a vacuum. They are subject to a variety of factors 
which may affect the outcome of research. Developments in quantum theory have 
suggested that the result of a scientific experiment may be affected by both the 
structure of the experiment itself and by the presence or absence of the experimenter, 
making ‘objectivity’ a chimera. If this is the case with the natural sciences it is even 
more so for the social sciences in which a wide array of factors may influence both the 
findings of research and the subject and nature of the research itself. Amongst these is 
the historical context in which the research takes place.
The influence of historical factors on the way in which an area is approached for 
study and the way in which the results of that study are presented is seen in the case of 
Central Asia from the beginning of the systematic study of the region in the nineteenth 
century.
During most of the nineteenth century Britain was the pre-eminent World power 
with India its most important holding. The earliest Western reports on the region were 
compiled by British officers of the East India Company and concerned themselves 
primarily with strategic considerations. This tradition of the study of Central Asia 
outside Russia being carried out primarily by officers of the British Indian government 
or by other interested British parties and supporters of British interests was continued 
across the century.
In the first half of the century fears of French intentions towards British India 
resulted in the production of such works as The Dangers o f British India from French 
Invasion (1808) by an anonymous ‘Late Resident at Bhagulpore’ which examined the 
possibility of invasion via Persia and Baluchistan. Russia’s annexation of North 
Azerbaijan in 1828 and continuing involvement in Persia alarmed both London and 
Calcutta and prompted Colonel George Evans to return to the threat of invasion via
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Persia in his On the Designs o f Russia (1828) and On the Practicability o f an Invasion 
o f British India (1829).
As Russia advanced further into Central Asia, with Tashkent falling to General 
Chemyaev in 1865, the focus shifted to the threat of invasion from the north. This is 
particularly evident in writings of the 1870s, such as Burnaby’s A Ride to Khiva, 
written during the high point of Russo-British regional rivalry which has come to be 
known as ‘The Great Game’.
In describing his visit to Central Asia, which took place in 1888, G. Dobson, a 
correspondent for The Times, remained mindful of political considerations. 
Knowledge of Central Asia was necessary because of its strategic value.
[The Russians] argue that their advance into Central Asia, whether by railway or 
otherwise, has never been dictated by any unworthier motives than those of 
commercial cupidity... such as those which first led England to India. This... is 
fairly true as far as it applies to the time before Peter the Great; but we know 
well enough that another and powerful [motive] has since activated Russia in 
planning expeditions against India, and that is the desire for revenge against 
English opposition in Europe, especially at Constantinople.1
The future Viceroy of India George Curzon justified his description of Central 
Asia in a similar way by referring to the region’s strategic significance.
A record of a journey... through a country, the interest of which to English 
readers consists no longer in its physical remoteness and impenetrability [as had 
been the case in the first half of the century], but rather in the fact that those 
conditions have just been superseded by a new order of things, capable at any 
moment of bringing it under the stem and immediate notice of Englishmen, as the 
theatre of imperial diplomacy; possibly - quod di avertant omen - as the 
threshold of international war.2
These works focused on the newly built Trans-Caspian Railway, Dobson’s listing 
points of military significance such as the principle bridges, where water was available 
for locomotives, and the potential maximum traffic (how quickly an army could be 
moved along the route). Many later works such as Skrine’s and Ross’ The Heart o f 
Asia: a History o f Turkistan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Time 
(1899), almost half of which comprised a description of the region as seen from the 
line also focused on the new route.
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After the Russian conquest travel in Central Asia became relatively safe and easy 
and a new form of literature developed. This was the description of Central Asia based 
on first hand observation. One of the earliest such studies was written by the 
Hungarian Orientalist Armenius Vambery, who published his findings in London. 
Other notable names are those of the American consul Eugene Schuyler, the British 
missionary and prison inspector Henry Lansdell and perhaps most remarkably the 
pioneering British woman anthropologist A. Meakin. The latter donned a paranja and 
travelled as a native, visiting many people’s homes and leaving behind a fascinating 
account of Central Asian home life at the end of the nineteenth century. This body of 
work represents a first attempt to understand the internal dynamic of Central Asian 
society and remains a primary resource for understanding the Central Asia of the 
period.
Aside from the growth of Russian influence in Central Asia, another major 
development in world politics affected the way in which Central Asia was regarded. 
This was the intellectual revolution within Islam which led to an increased focus on the 
study of Central Asia for itself rather than as the staging post for Great Power politics.
Throughout much of the century the undisputed leader of Islam in British India 
had been Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), a figure who supported British 
governance on the grounds that majority rule would mean Hindu rule. Ahmad Khan 
advocated a form of assimilation into western ways as the best means of preserving 
Islam. His near contemporary Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) took a different 
tack.
Al-Afghani had spent part of his youth in India before travelling to 
Constantinople and Egypt where he began to teach not only the traditional Islamic 
curriculum but “the danger of European intervention, the need for national unity to 
resist it, the need for a broader unity of Islamic peoples.”3 This was to become the 
core of a movement known, in imitation of Pan-Slavism, as Pan-Islamism.
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Expelled by the Khedive, al-Afghani returned to India where he was interned 
during the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, travelling in 1884 to Paris where with 
his former pupil Muhammed ‘Abduh he founded the journal al- 'Urwa al-wuthqa (‘The 
Indissoluble Link’). In this he argued that Europe was not inherently stronger than or 
superior to Islam but that its success was attributable to the disunity of the Islamic 
community. Politically re-united and spiritually renewed, Islam could regain its former 
glory.
Al-Afghani’s journal became one of the most influential Arabic language 
publications of its day, and so seriously did the British authorities take the possible 
appeal of its message to Indian Muslims that its import into British territory was 
prohibited. This is not surprising, since “for Afghani Muslim renewal and reform had 
but one ultimate purpose, liberation from the yoke of colonial rule.”4 This was a 
serious threat to the British, who with the founding of the Indian National Congress in 
1885 were already beginning to lose their grip on India. The fear that an Islamicly- 
inspired revolt in Central Asia could spill over into India suddenly seemed real. This 
affected the way in which Central Asia was presented. Thus while Lansdell asserted 
“the people are not fanatical but rather indifferent to religion”5 and Vambery had it that 
“[Sufi] fraternities do not in the least bother themselves with secret political 
objectives,”6 at the end of the century Skrine and Ross warned that
Since the Russian invasion occult influence has increased, and it is not exerted in 
the invader’s favour. Throughout Islam, indeed, the mullahs are irreconcilable 
enemies to Western progress, and the recent rebellion in Ferghana1 has led many 
experts to doubt whether tenderness to indigenous institutions has not been 
carried too far.7
Skrine and Ross claimed that “a wave of sedition”8 was sweeping Central Asia. 
If such a threat could exist in Central Asia, where “the conquerors and the conquered 
are connected by the ties of blood, and there is a latent and unconscious sympathy 
between them which renders the task of government easy”, how much more of a threat 
was there to British India where “our dominion can never strike its roots deeply into 
the soil. But for the bayonets on which our throne is supported it would fall...”9 They 
warned,
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The forces of Islam are also equipped for a coming struggle. A Puritan 
movement, inaugurated by Wahabi (sic) missionaries eighty years ago, has 
spread far and wide, and the Mohammedans of India have formed secret 
societies.10
The end of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth 
represented a high point in the Western study of Central Asia which was not to be re­
attained until after the Second World War. With the outbreak of World War I and 
Russia’s alliance with Britain the immediate threat to India was removed and Central 
Asia lost its primacy in British strategic thinking. After the war, changed political 
circumstances meant that Central Asia was low on the list of priorities as America 
retreated into isolationism and Europe struggled with the aftermath of the conflict, 
Britain in particular also becoming increasingly concerned with the internal threat 
against its Indian hegemony.
Central Asia again became difficult of access and such information as there was 
consisted primarily of memoirs of the immediately pre-Revolutionary period such as 
Fox’s 1925 People o f the Steppe and the recollections and political writings of 
emigres, most of whom had come to be based in Istanbul.
These emigres represented a particular type of Central Asian, being in the main 
part former members of or sympathisers for the Jadidi reformist school1 imbued with a 
certain type of political vision which before the revolution had sought a degree of pan- 
Turkestani political and cultural unity in opposition to Russian dominion. Their 
political stance was initially not dissimilar to that of the Young Turk movement. 
Some, such as Mustafa Chokaev, came ultimately to fall under the spell of the Nazis.
Emigres represented just one fraction, and a small one at that, of Central Asian 
political opinion. However, as the only direct source on Central Asia available in the 
West they were able to present their opinions as typical of Central Asians as a whole 
without fear of contradiction. More radical Jadids remained in Central Asia to aid a
1A reference to the Andijan revolt of 1898.
n From Usul-i Jadid: ‘New Method’. On Jadidism see e.g. Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay 
(1960), Pipes (1964b), d’Encausse (1966), Allworth (1989, 1990).
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revolution which initially appeared to offer much of what they had been demanding, 
whilst much of the traditional conservative sector of society sought refuge in 
Afghanistan. The writings of the emigres carried weight since in the words of Caroe 
writing of Zeki Validi Togan’s 1929 Biigiinkii Tiirkili (‘Turkestan Today’),
It is rather to men of Central Asian stock, with a Russian education 
superimposed on their Muslim upbringing, that we must look for insight into a 
period of intense struggle, during which they themselves figured as founders or 
upholders of independent national states. These are they who not only knew the 
inspirations and capacities of their own peoples, but had sufficient indoctrination 
in revolutionary thought to aspire to give a new form to an old pattern.11
Works emanating entirely from the West tended to fall into two separate camps, 
pro- or anti-Communist. The anti-Communist stance, illustrated by the American 
Emhardt’s polemical 1929 Religion in the Soviet Union or von Mende’s 1936 Der 
nationale Kampf der Rufiland Turken had the upper hand according as they largely did 
with the views of the emigres and with the anti-Communist mood among the ruling 
classes of the time who were themselves fearful of the power of the Soviet Union. 
Countering such anti-Communist works, those produced by the European Left such as 
the British Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s Soviet Communism: a new civilization 
(1937) were no less adulatory than the former were condemnatory.
It can be seen that historical factors have had a profound influence on the 
presentation of Central Asia in the West, in the concerns of the studies (the likelihood 
of Russian invasion of India, the threat of Islamic revolt, the acceptability or otherwise 
of Bolshevik rule), who conducts the research (government officials, emigres, 
polemicists) and even the nationality of the researchers, from the British near-monopoly 
in the West during the nineteenth century”1 driven by concerns for India to the 
fragmentation to several centres after the First World War. The remainder of this 
chapter will examine some of the political developments affecting the way in which 
Central Asia was analysed in the period following the Second World War.
m A vast amount of information on Central Asia was generated in St. Petersburg. Much of this was 
translated into English at the expense of the Indian government, but such work is beyond the remit of 
this thesis.
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l.ifl The 1950s
Even before the end of the Second World War it was obvious that the state of 
detante between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was to have been no more 
than a temporary arrangement. The Yalta conference dividing Europe into Soviet and 
American spheres of influence was to lay the basis for a period of confrontational 
international relations which was to become known as the Cold War. Relations became 
increasingly strained as it became clear that the USSR had a far more ‘hands on’ 
concept of ‘influence’ than the Western allies, with the establishment throughout 
Eastern and Central Europe of Communist regimes. That the quadripartite 
condominiums established after the war in Germany and Austria, far from providing the 
basis for co-operation between the USSR and the West, were potential flashpoints was 
shown by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 which for a time threatened renewed 
hostilities. The change in international relations was reflected in the way the Soviet 
Union was written about in the West. Whereas in 1946 the then American vice- 
president H. Wallace was able to write
both the Russians and the Americans, in their different ways, are groping for a 
way of life that will enable the common man everywhere in the world to get the 
most good out of modem technology. There is nothing irreconcilable about our 
aims and purposes...12
by the opening of the 1950s such a sentiment was impossible. Wallace’s plea that 
“We must trade with Russia to prevent the world splitting into two hostile ideological 
camps”13 had already been pre-empted by the time he wrote the words.
The world at the beginning of the 1950s was very different to that of the inter- 
war years. The United States had been forced out of isolationism to take on a leading 
role in world affairs. The country’s great wealth in terms of money, natural resources 
and manpower made it the dominant partner in the Franco-British-American alliance. 
Although all three countries were accorded permanent seats on the Security council of 
the new United Nations Organisation, Britain and France had been financially ruined by 
the War and began increasingly to disappear as world powers.
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The Soviet Union emerged from the War with its prestige greatly enhanced. The 
traumas associated with the establishment and consolidation of socialism which had 
caused the USSR like the USA in large measure to withdraw into itself during the 
1930s had been resolved and the country had no longer to be concerned primarily with 
internal affairs. Moscow was the only serious rival to US hegemony, a position 
confirmed after 1949 when Soviet nuclear testing began. Moscow had a permanent 
seat on the Security Council as did its ally newly Communist China, and was exporting 
its revolutionary ideology into Europe. Furthermore, not only was there now a 
‘security cordon’ of compliant allies along its western flank but the USSR had itself 
grown with the annexation of Karelia, the Baltic States, East Prussia, Ruthenia, 
Bessarabia and Tuva. The USSR of the 1950s was militarily and industrially strong, 
internally secure and politically powerful.
Britain and France, the two major victors of the First World War, were in steep 
decline. Their mandates over the Middle East granted by the League of Nations had 
expired and Britain finally recognised that it was no longer able to control India, 
bringing India and Pakistan into being in 1947 and finally dismantling the Raj with the 
independence of Ceylon and Burma the following year. Meanwhile in 1954 the Arabs 
of Algeria rose in revolt against French rule, and there followed a prolonged and 
bloody struggle which did not end until Algerian independence in 1962.
The Algerian revolt represented a serious challenge to France. Whereas London 
had already accepted the inevitability of Indian self-rule, with Skrine and Ross 
describing the British as “sojourners” as early as 1899 and Lord Mountbatten the last 
Viceroy being specifically charged with ending British rule, France had formally 
annexed Algeria and large numbers of French migrants had made their home there. 
President de Gaulle made continued French control of Algeria a major part of his 
domestic policy.
These two events, British decolonisation and French reluctance to do likewise, 
affected the way Central Asia was discussed in the two countries during the 1950s. 
Whereas British authors tended to be concerned with the development of post-colonial 
societies, and particularly with the possibility of the spread of Communism to such
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societies, French writers tended to focus more on examining how two contrasting 
civilisations, the European and the Islamic, could co-exist within a single state. 
Vincent Montiel suggested that in the Soviet model of relations between metropolitan 
Russia and the non-Russian districts of the state a blueprint could be found for the 
preservation of the French Empire.
Communism was seen in the West as a very real threat and during the 1950s that 
threat seemed primarily to be directed towards the Middle East, an area which was 
perceived as being of vital strategic importance and which became a major area of 
competition between the West and the Soviet Union as various new governments were 
established, in Egypt with the 1952 Free Officers’ coup and the abdication of the pro- 
British King Faruq and earlier in Iran, where the new left-wing government of 
Mossadeq had shown its hostility to Western interests with the 1951 expulsion of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry.
The Soviet Union had exercised a ‘zone of influence’ within Iran during the 
Second World War and immediately after the cessation of hostilities sponsored short­
lived ‘independent’ republics in both Iranian Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan. Some 
recent scholars such as Malcolm Yapp have seen in this a primarily defensive intent, the 
establishment of a ‘buffer’ to protect the USSR’s external boundary akin to that in 
Eastern Europe. At the time however Soviet involvement beyond its own frontiers was 
seen as hostile, as evinced by the 1948 blockade of Berlin. The response to Mossadeq 
was a CIA-sponsored coup which in 1953 restored the Shah.
Western support for the status quo in the region increased the prestige of the 
USSR in the eyes of those who were beginning to agitate for local social and political 
change. Thus
The Iraq Communist Party had been insignificant before 1939 but it expanded 
rapidly after 1941 when Soviet prestige increased and socialism became 
respectable. The Communist Party played a prominent role in organising the 
first major street disturbances in January 1948.
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Disturbances continued on a regular basis throughout the 1950s, culminating in 
the Iraqi Free Officers’ coup of 1958 which put an end to the British-sponsored 
Hashemite monarchy.
That the new regimes coming into power in the Middle East tended to be 
favourable to the Soviet Union was widely commented upon and was ascribed to a 
number of factors. One of these was the nationalism of the new governments which 
expressed itself in anti-Westernism. Communism was not seen as Western, and 
adopting it or something like it was not seen as compromising nationalism. One report 
cited Faris al-Khoury, the head of the Syrian delegation to the UN, as saying that 
“Soviet broadcasts in Arabic were popular among Arabs because of their desire to find 
in the USSR a counterweight to Western influence.”14
Another factor was the perceived need to ‘modernise’ Middle Eastern societies. 
According to M. Halpem, Islam as a ‘third way’ between Communism and capitalism 
was bound to fail since its legal, political and economic structure was unsuited to the 
modem age. Although
A superficial and immediate reaction to our topic [the attractiveness or otherwise 
of Communism to Muslims] might be that obviously any spiritual, devout 
Muslim would reject outright the false promises of atheistic and materialistic 
Communism... the relation of contemporary Islam to the challenge of 
communism is vastly more complicated than that.15
According to Halpem conditions in the post-War Middle East were similar to 
those of pre-Revolutionary Russia. This was a state in which the political structure 
had failed to respond to social changes brought about by gradual industrialisation, 
where there was a pressing need for economic modernisation and where such industry 
as there was was controlled by foreign capitalists and bankers. Opposition to Western 
economic and military interests and a superficial congruity between the social teachings 
of Islam and Communism, a French scholar characterising both as essentially “anti­
capitalist,”16 IV led Halpem to the judgement that
1V Enayet (1982) gives a concise description of Muslim approaches to the compatibility of Islam and 
Socialism pp.139-159.
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It is becoming increasingly difficult even for a devout Muslim to avoid coming to 
terms with modem life. When the Muslim attempts to do so he may discover 
that, in the context of contemporary pressures and demands, orthodox Islam in 
several important respects has prepared him to yield more readily to Marxist and 
Stalinist propositions than to liberal democratic alternatives.17
The result of this situation was that
To many Easterners, the USSR and now possibly Communist China, represent 
both modemisation-in-a-hurry and revolt against Western imperialist 
exploitation. To secular Arab Muslims, the possibility of modernisation in a 
hurry may seem particularly fascinating as exemplified in the application of 
Stalinist methods... among the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia.18
This understanding was widespread. Monteil wrote of “the ‘dependent’ peoples, 
who look at - or have been shown - developments in the Soviet Union as a model, a 
hope... What is Communism for Muslims if not ‘the temptation of desperation’?” 19 
The Pakistani journalist Farid Jafri expressed the fascination thus:
Mossadeq is weak, and because of his weakness the communists are growing in 
importance. They go to the people and say “Look here, Islam is a social and 
economic movement; everybody is supposed to be equal and yet you have feudal 
lords and thousands and thousands of people starving. Most people have no 
homes, a few people have palaces; you go a few miles and you find a different 
picture. We in the USSR are also Muslims, but we have brought our life into 
tune with the Islamic concept of life; we are modem and we are happier.” People 
of course are impressed by that.20
Lieutenant-General H. Martin, a veteran of British India and latterly military 
correspondent for The Daily Telegraph declared that
Almost everywhere throughout the Middle East conditions favour the spread of 
Communism... though Communism is inconsistent with the Arabs’ highest 
loyalty - loyalty, that is to ‘hamuleh’ or blood kin - it is not contrary to the 
Quran.21
The Canadian journalist E. Downto, who unlike most commentators had visited 
Soviet Central Asia, also considered the Soviet picture to be attractive to others.
I have visited the Middle East, Africa, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Afghanistan.
Already the impact of the new Soviet Central Asia... is making itself very much 
felt in those vital peripheral areas... it is quite remarkable how many people one 
meets who have been taken - and I say this without disrespect - on the Red 
Cook’s Tour of Tashkent cotton mills and the opera house and to see the 
irrigation system in Tadjikistan and so on. It is significant how impressed these
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people have been... Asian ears, eyes and minds and hearts are certainly far more 
attuned to the message from Tashkent than perhaps we are ready to admit.22
After Stalin’s death the Soviet Union became more tolerant of local variants of 
the Marxist message. One of these was the ideology which became known as ‘Arab 
Socialism’, a nationalist, re-distributive and anti-Western movement not dissimilar to 
that being propounded in India by Nehru.v
Shortly after the Free Officers’ coup in Egypt, power was seized by Gamal abd 
an-Nasser, who pursued a tripartite policy of Socialism (land reform), pan-Arabism and 
nationalism. British- and French-owned banks were nationalised, British troops were 
expelled in 1955 and in the following year Nasser moved to nationalise the Suez Canal 
(it has been suggested that Nasser’s move on the Canal was in response to the 
withdrawal of American financial assistance in the construction of the Aswan High 
Dam).23 The subsequent Israeli and Anglo-French invasion was to prove disastrous to 
the Western powers. Lacking US support and threatened with Soviet intervention in 
favour of Egypt, which had already been buying arms from the USSR and 
Czechoslovakia, the allies were forced to accept the UN’s ruling in Egypt’s favour. 
Only Israel gained any of its objectives - free access to the port of Eilat. British and 
French regional prestige was mortally damaged. One scholar has stated that the Suez 
Crisis was “the last occasion on which Britain and France attempted to impose their 
will on a major regional power by force.”24 From this time on Britain and France were 
minor players. Egypt moved further towards the USSR. Furthermore, in the eyes of 
many Arabs Egypt was now the leading regional power.
The Suez crisis had made Nasser an Arab hero. Before his nationalisation of the 
Suez Canal Company and his purchase of arms from the Soviet Bloc, Nasser had 
been regarded by many Arabs as a strong but colourless moderniser, but weighed 
in Arab scales, Suez was Stalingrad, El Alamein and the Battle of Britain rolled 
into one. In the Arab view Egypt had stopped Britain, France and Israel and 
Nasser had defied the world and won.25
Suez gave credibility to Nasser’s Arab Socialism throughout the Middle East, and 
resulted in a growth in support for parties with similar programmes, notably the Ba’ath 
in Syria and Iraq. Throughout the 1950s “the strongest forces were those of
v Spear (1990) chapter 20
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Nasserism, Ba’athism and Communism.”26 It was not always clear what the difference 
between these was. This was most obviously demonstrated when the Syrian Ba’ath 
party, which in 1952 merged with the Arab Socialist Party and established links with 
Egypt and the USSR, petitioned Nasser for a union of the two states, leading to the 
birth of the United Arab Republic in 1958.
The position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was further enhanced by 
another development, the creation of the State of Israel and the ensuing tension 
between it and its Arab neighbours. According to Martin “Arab-Israeli enmity and 
Soviet penetration are the fundamental - and interconnected - problems of the Middle 
East that call for solution.”27
Although prior to 1948 the USSR had been favourable to the establishment of the 
Jewish State, once Israel had come into being Soviet policy backed the new country’s 
Arab opponents, providing arms and technical advice in the struggle against what was 
widely seen in the region as the creation of Western imperialist powers. The 
significance of this to the field of Central Asian Studies was made clear by Geoffrey 
Wheeler.
The increased interest now being overtly shown by the Soviet government in the 
Middle East makes the study of Soviet attitudes towards Islam of particular 
importance...28
The development of Soviet policy towards independent Muslim countries is a 
matter of great interest and importance, and is pregnant with possibilities. In 
their approach to these countries the Soviet government will no doubt draw to 
some extent on their experiences with the Muslim “nationalities” of Russia... it is 
interesting to speculate whether in the light of this experience the Soviet 
government will favour Arab or other Muslim federations in the middle East, or 
whether it will prefer to emphasise and play on cultural differences... and upon 
the much more marked differences in national aspirations.29
As Yapp put it, “Soon the USSR was well established as the ally of radical Arab 
nationalism in what was depicted as a struggle against imperialism and its regional 
allies.”30
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Wheeler repeated what had been said about the attractiveness of Soviet Central 
Asia as a model for other Muslim states to follow, stressing that the region could serve 
as a tool of Soviet foreign policy increasing Soviet prestige and influence.
There is another innovation in the methods which the Soviet government is using 
to implement its policy towards Asian countries. This is the greatly increased 
use of the eastern, and largely Muslim, republics of the USSR as a shop window 
with which to impress the outside world with Soviet achievements in areas which 
have many affinities with under-developed countries in the Middle East and 
South Asia... in their standard of living, in general and technical education, and 
in industry and agriculture they are far ahead of many independent eastern 
countries... hardly a day goes by but what some delegation from the Arab 
countries, from Pakistan and from Indonesia, is present in Central Asia... and it 
would be foolish to suppose that the delegations are not impressed, if only 
because they have been told by the western propaganda that conditions in Soviet 
Asia are deplorable.31
The study of Central Asia is thus presented as necessary as a means of 
discovering how political and social conditions in the Middle East and elsewhere might 
develop under Soviet influence. This was stated specifically by the German scholar 
Gerhard von Mende:
Turkestan was the first country in Asia to succumb to sovietisation. It provides 
therefore the best example for studying the methods, effects and counter-effects 
of sovietisation. On the other hand it is the Turkestan region rather than the 
Siberian region which caused the Soviet Union to become an Asian power, from 
which the soviet impact on the Islamic countries and the whole of Asia has come. 
Turkestan is the most obvious example the Soviets have to show how they strive 
to turn a country into [something] positive or negative under a strict political 
doctrine and central economic planning.32
The 1950s was a period in which the experience of Central Asia under Soviet rule 
was primarily studied in order to assess the success of Soviet policy in the region and 
its likely influence over the new secular, reformist and broadly left-leaning governments 
established in the Middle East and South Asia. Many Western studies, particularly 
those emanating from Britain and France, were broadly sympathetic to Soviet goals and 
achievements, if more condemning of Soviet methods. This is particularly so in the 
case of those scholars who themselves had experience of governing a non-European 
territory in the name of a European Power. In the following decade, this analysis was 
to be reversed. Rather than considering the influence of the USSR on world events,
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analysts began increasingly to consider the impact of world developments on the Soviet 
domestic scene.
l.iii) The 1960s
The 1950s can be said to represent the birth of modem Central Asian Studies. In 
the 1960s this early work began to be consolidated and a consensus regarding the 
current situation in and likely development of Central Asia began to emerge. The 
preceding decade had left a body of secondary literature which could be accessed, and 
following the brief loosening of the Kruschev years in the USSR a new body of primary 
literature frequently concerned with social issues became accessible. Part of this was 
made available to the non-Russian reader in the form of digests published by Geoffrey 
Wheeler in Central Asia Review, a magazine which he had edited from an address in 
Chelsea since 1953. The 1960s also represent the period in which for the first time 
American scholarship began to dominate the debate concerning Central Asia.
European withdrawal from Asia had began gradually at the end of the 1940s. In 
1957 Ghana became independent of Britain, the first sub-Saharan African state to 
escape European rule v‘ From then on the pace of decolonisation accelerated as a 
combination of force, persuasion and sheer exhaustion on the part of the metropolis 
forced the two principal Imperial powers, Britain and France, to withdraw from their 
overseas possessions. Force was most devastatingly employed against France, whose 
vision of empire, being more unitary than that of Britain, made her more reluctant to 
cede territory to nationalist movements. This was especially the case in Algeria and 
Indo-China, where a succession of crushing military defeats greatly damaged French 
prestige. British rule however also often faced the use of force, notably in the case of 
the Cypriot EOKA and the Mau-Mau of Kenya. In the long term it seemed European 
dominance over non-European peoples was not sustainable. The Age of Empire was 
giving way to a new international order of independent Asian and African nation-states
” Ethiopia was never colonised.
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to a large extent borrowing from and modelled upon European institutions. By the end 
of the 1960s only Portugal retained substantial overseas possessions.
One immediate impact of this development was that scholars in the West began to 
focus on the political dynamic between the central government of the USSR and the 
outlying republics, and between the Russians and the peoples they dominated. The 
purpose was to determine whether the Soviet Union could be described as a colonial 
empire analogous to those of Britain or France. If it could be shown that the USSR 
was indeed a colonial empire then there would be serious implications for the future of 
that state since the tide of history seemed to be flowing against such political 
arrangements.
This understanding appeared to be vindicated not only in the case of the 
European overseas empires but within the Communist bloc itself. Yugoslavia quickly 
split from Moscow’s supervision, followed in 1960 by Albania. Revolt against Soviet 
domination broke out throughout the 1950s across Eastern Europe, notably in Hungary 
(1956) and continued during the 1960s. In 1963, two years after the building of the 
Berlin Wall, protests occurred in East Germany which were mirrored across the region, 
most famously in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Despite its claims, Communism seemed not 
to have solved the ‘nationalities question.’ This was most forcefully brought home by 
the Sino-Soviet split of 1961.
The falling out between Moscow and Beijing had an immediate impact on 
discussions of Central Asia. Commentators were not slow to observe that the region’s 
strategic position, lying between two rival Communist superpowers, greatly increased 
its importance in world politics. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay wrote in 1968,
From now on the Soviet Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and their 
cousins in Sinkiang... find themselves positioned in the thick of the global 
political stage, between two great powers with different, indeed divergent 
strategic positions.33
Earlier Wheeler had suggested that “Chinese and Soviet fears of attempts to 
subvert each other’s Muslim populations are probably mutual... neither possibility can 
be altogether excluded34...The Sino-Soviet rift, if it continues, must have an effect on
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Soviet policy not only towards south-west and South Asia, but also towards the 
Muslim republics of Central Asia ”35
Besides the immediate concern of Soviet-Chinese relations and the role Central 
Asia might play in them, the split raised another issue. Previously, the only Communist 
countries to have escaped control by Moscow had been small and of limited strategic 
value. China was another proposition altogether. It represented another pole of 
aspiration and source of aid to national liberation movements. More importantly, the 
rift showed that not only was it possible to be Communist without being tied to 
Moscow, it was possible to be Communist without being Leninist. China was 
promoting its own brand of Communism, free of all vestige of the European tutelage 
Asian peoples were trying to throw off. Maoism was an Asian Communism adapted to 
meet Asian realities, by for instance replacing the proletariat as the vanguard of the 
revolution with the peasantry. Particularly in south-east Asia, new Communist anti­
colonial movements were taking a Maoist flavour and a more nationalist than 
internationalist stance.
The attractiveness of ‘Asian Communism’ to Central Asians as against the 
‘European Communism’ forced on them by the Soviet regime was an important topic 
of debate, especially so since Maoism was predicated on the expulsion of foreign 
invaders as an initial stage in the construction of Communism. Loyalty to Communism 
no longer implied loyalty to Moscow, and the possibility of what was called ‘National 
Communism’ developing in Central Asia and the effect this would have on both Soviet 
and World politics was seriously considered. As one American analyst put it,
Strong national ties often disappear to reappear unexpectedly. The Chinese,
Polish and Rumanian developments should remind us that, contrary to Soviet 
claims, the Socialist ‘transformation’ does not eliminate national loyalty but 
instead may revitalise it. In the Central Asian case, it is possible that advancing 
socialism may even create a new stimulus for the emergence of nationalist 
sentiment.36
At the same time, increasing recognition was made of the fact that a form of 
‘Asian Communism’ which advocated colonial revolution and national independence, 
which analysts sometimes referred to as ‘Sultangalievism’ after Sultan Galiev, its
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principal exponent, had already been developed within the Soviet Union. 
‘Sultangalievism’ was according to one authority “the only attempt [prior to Mao] to 
define the revolutionary process in the colonial world.”37 Galiev’s programme “to 
liberate the Orient from the grip of Imperialism”38 and to create “a Communism 
Orentalised and directed by Orientals”39 could be directly compared to Maoist doctrine. 
The similarity of Sultangalievism to Maoism was highlighted in Bennigsen’s and 
Lemercier-Quelquejay’s 1960 study of Sultan Galiev when they wrote that “the colonial 
revolution has triumphed over a wide area... the revolutionary strategy in the East is 
now close to the theses which Sultan Galiev defended in 1918.”40 In a later work of 
Bennigsen,41 the ideas of Sultan Galiev were explicitly linked to those of Ho Chi Minh, 
Mao and Ahmed Ben Bella, the leader of the Algerian Liberation Movement™ In fact,
Almost without exception, the main tenets of Muslim national communism as 
they were articulated by Sultan Galiev and his companions in the 1920s have 
been adopted in a like or slightly modified shape by virtually every present-day 
national liberation movement42
There might be seen to be a degree of continuity between events and ideas dating 
from the Russian Revolution and today. Maxime Rodinson, the noted French scholar 
of relations between Islam and Communism, observed that “people, or at least human 
groupings, tie their destinies to the great issues whose details are constantly changing 
but which remain nonetheless essentially the same over the centuries and millennia. 
‘The future resembles the past more than one drop of water resembles another’ wrote 
the great Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun.”43 The ‘issue’ Rodinson had highlighted he 
expressed as a conflict between tradition and modernity which was manifest in 
opposition to the vested interests of ruling groups. He continued to suggest that if in 
the ‘free’ world this opposition took the form of Communist or Socialist organisations, 
“perhaps in the Communist world oppositions will take as their rallying sign the 
national emblem.”44 Gerhard von Mende had earlier expressed the idea that indigenous 
reformist and anti-colonial movements in Central Asia had been overtaken by events, 
that as d’Encausse put it, “the Revolution came ten years too soon.”45 According to 
Michael Rywkin, “as has since been demonstrated, both Sultan Galiev and Ryskulov [a 
friend of Galiev] were about thirty-five years in advance of their time and
m Ironically, according to this source, Ben Bella leant of Sultan Galiev from Bennigsen’s own work.
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geographically misplaced.”46 If this had been the case, it seemed that now the 
conditions for an anti-colonial revolt were being met.
An anti-colonial movement assumes the existence of a colonial dynamic. The 
question of whether the Soviet Union operated a colonial system was not altogether 
new. Anti-Soviet propagandists had frequently described the country as an ‘Empire’ 
and some works of the 1950s had addressed the Soviet political dispensation, but in the 
1960s serious debate about the colonial dynamic became a commonplace as British and 
French scholars absorbed the lessons of their own countries’ retreat from empire. The 
language of this debate came ultimately to dominate all discussion of Central Asia as it 
was predicated on what came to be seen as an irreconcilable conflict between the 
European world and the non-European which demanded national self-determination for 
non-European peoples. The fact that since the creation in 1922 of the Irish Free State 
there had been no major separatist movements in Europe served to heighten this 
dichotomy between European and non-European which could be better expressed in 
cultural than racial terms and which ran through the USSR, making it seem likely that 
the primary conflict within that country would be that between Europeans and Asians. 
To this basic European - non-European divide events in the US added another 
dimension, that of a split between Christian and Muslim.
The American experience of Islam was quite different to that of Britain or France. 
Whereas the latter had governed large and varied Muslim populations and were aware 
of the wide variety of Muslim responses to Western rule and Western ideas, the 
American experience had been limited to the relatively insignificant Muslim population 
of the Philippines. This was to change with the founding in the 1950s of the first 
indigenous Western Islamic movement, Elijah Muhammed’s Nation of Islam, which 
rose to prominence during the campaign for Civil Rights.
As a movement for the empowerment of disadvantaged African-Americans, the 
Nation was as much a political as a spiritual movement, challenging the status quo in 
American society. African-American identity had traditionally been channelled into 
Evangelical Christianity, especially the Baptist Church, which had tended to support 
many of the values of the dominant White society. The Nation of Islam however
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proposed that since Whites refused to accept Blacks as their equals, the appropriate 
response was to reject a White culture symbolised by Christianity and adopt a more 
‘authentic’ non-European culture in place of the one forced on Africans under slavery. 
During the Civil Rights Movement, whilst Christian leaders such as Dr Martin Luther 
King called for the full integration of Blacks into American society, the Nation’s leaders 
Louis Farrakhan and Malcolm X increasingly advocated withdrawal from White 
America both as a culture and ultimately as a state. When a high-profile convert such 
as Muhammed Ali publicly made an issue of rejecting his ‘slave name’ or refused the 
draft to Vietnam, the perception of Islam in America was one of an indigestible ‘other’ 
which refused to integrate into the American ‘melting pot’.
The implications of such a view of Islam in a Soviet context are apparent when a 
development within the USSR itself is taken into account. Internal debates on inter­
ethnic relations conducted in 1966-1967 resulted in the promulgation of a new cultural 
policy. Sblizheniye, ‘coming together’, was to be replaced by sliyaniye, the fusion of 
distinct peoples and cultures into a single Soviet whole. At first glance this might seem 
similar to the American ‘melting pot’ theory in which different peoples unite to create 
an entirely new nation with a distinctive culture, and in fact one American scholar did 
directly compare the US to the USSR as being of similar age, forward-looking, 
impatient of their roots and Millennial in the sense of being predicated on the concept 
of an immanent ideal future. There was however a crucial difference. The majority of 
Americans were, or were the descendants of, recently-arrived immigrants for whom the 
attraction of America was precisely this new culture. By contrast, Soviet citizens lived 
in their historic homelands, “surrounded by places and monuments with strong national 
associations... in the one case we are dealing with a new nation created as it were 
through a voluntary multinational effort; in the other with an ordinary empire of many 
nations dominated by one.”47 If Islam was an indigestible other rejecting European 
culture in the USA, it would be more so in the Soviet Union.
This view of Islam as being essentially rejecting of Western beliefs was enhanced 
by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The stunning defeat by Israel of the Arab states was 
interpreted in the Middle East as indicative of the failure of Western methods applied in 
a Muslim context. The Socialist policies of Nasser and his reliance on the Soviet Union
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as a source of aid were seen to be lacking. America’s protege Israel was already 
perceived in the region as essentially anti-Islamic, and the failure of the Soviet Union 
to protect Muslim states from defeat contributed to an anti-European sentiment in the 
Middle East which was manifest in opposition to the Europeanising governing elites of 
the Arab world. One British scholar has expressed this change thus:
The prestige of the USSR was severely damaged [since] the Soviet Union was 
held partly responsible for the misinformation which had contributed to the 
outbreak of war and was blamed by the Arabs for failing to support them.48
The Western Powers were seen as pro-Israeli and thus as anti-Islamic. The 
paramount Eastern Power appeared to be no better. In its failure to support the Arabs 
it was no better than the ‘crusading’ nations which sought to emasculate the Muslim 
Middle East. If Suez had served to vindicate Arab Socialism, the Six Day War fatally 
damaged it.
The repercussions of the Arab defeat of 1967 were not to be fully worked out 
until a decade later, but its immediate impact was to undermine the secularist, 
Westernising impulse of the previous twenty years. According to Dilip Hiro, “the 
humiliating defeat that the Israelis inflicted on Egypt... dealt a grievous blow to the 
semi-secular Arab socialism of Nasser.”49 As John Esposito put it, “the complete and 
decisive nature of the defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967 shattered faith and 
confidence in the West and in Arab nationalism.”50 Neither Western democracy nor 
Soviet-sponsored Arab nationalism met the demands of the peoples of the Middle East, 
and in the next decade the region’s people were increasingly thrown back on their own 
resources in a development which had an impact on the Western perception not only of 
Soviet Islam but of Islam as a whole.
l.iv) The 1970s & 1980s
In 1975 Sayyid Qutb, the leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, expressed the 
Arab, and by implication Muslim situation, as being caught between two powerful 
factions neither of which was friendly towards Muslims.
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There are two huge blocs: the Communist Bloc in the East and the Capitalist 
Bloc in the West... it is clear that both the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc are 
fighting over the world... As for us, what is our own stake in this struggle? We 
have recently experienced in Palestine that neither the Eastern Bloc nor the 
Western Bloc give any credence to the values they advocate, or consider us 
ourselves as of consequence.51
Qutb had initially been a supporter of the Free Officers’ movement but had 
become disaffected with the Arab Socialism of Nasser and Anwar Sadat, seeing 
Egypt’s governors as having failed its people not only on the international stage but 
domestically. Islamic ideologies offered a ‘Third Way’ for the development of Muslim 
countries independently of the Great Powers which were at best indifferent to and often 
cynically manipulative of Muslims. The craving for a Third Way in the Muslim world 
was expressed in Iran at the time of the Revolution by the slogan ‘Neither East nor 
West but Islam.’
The growth of Islamist groups in the Middle East followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War, which was widely perceived as a victory for Islam. “The year 1973 proved to be 
decisive, providing a sign that Muslim fortunes were indeed changing.”52 The increase 
in oil prices resulting from the war forced home to the West its dependence on the 
Middle East and the imperative to retain friendly regional governments, governments 
which were increasingly being challenged by Islamist groups.
Few of the Islamic movements which came to prominence during the 1970s were 
new. The Muslim Brotherhood had originally been founded in 1928. Khomeini had 
spoken out against the Shah in 1964. It was only in the 1970s though that such 
movements began to be noticed in the West, which was wary of any Middle Eastern 
movement which threatened its interests in the region. In part as a the result of 
terrorist activity by the PLO which after 1967 took on an international aspect aimed as 
much against US citizens as against the Jewish State, the association of ‘Muslim’ with 
‘terrorist’ and ‘political revolutionary’™1 began to be formed in the minds of many in 
the West.
^  Monteil writes about Western perception of the Muslim world and hostility to Muslims in Les 
Musulmans sovietiques, pp.211-249
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The growth of Islamic movements was linked in one study to the earlier Muslim 
National Communism. Islamic trends were another manifestation of an anti-colonial 
strategy in the Middle East directed as much against Communism as against the West.
The early attempts by the Muslim national communists to “Marxify” Islam in 
recent years have been followed throughout the Islamic world by the inverse 
process of “Islamizing” Marxism...
The “Islamization” of Marxism suggests that many Muslim leaders have 
reversed the order of the two in their own minds in terms of the power of each to 
mobilize revolutionary energies. Islam is acquiring new meaning as a 
mobilization system in their eyes; radical Muslim ideologies, like the Ikhwan al- 
Musulmin (“Muslim Brothers”) or Muammer Khadafi’s neo-Jamaleddin al- 
Afghanist pan-Islamism are challenging - often victoriously - the spread of 
communism in the Third World.53
In 1978 this mobilising ability of Islam was co-opted by Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan 
when he announced the Islamisation of his country, reversing the secular socialist policy 
of his predecessor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Four years earlier Turkey had invaded Cyprus, 
prompting the US to impose sanctions on the former country despite the fact that 
previously it had been one of Washington’s few regional allies. Lebanon split along 
religious lines in 1976 into factions which gradually became more and more radical in 
their ideologies. It seemed that battle lines were literally being drawn between the 
Muslim and the European worlds, an impression strengthened when Sadat was 
assassinated by members of the radical Jama’at al-Jihad in reprisal for signing the Camp 
David accord, an act which “was viewed by Egyptian critics, as well as by most Arab 
Muslim governments... as a unilateral capitulation to Israel and, by extension, its 
American patron.”54
At the same time that Islamist movements were gaining momentum in the Middle 
East, new data appeared from the USSR which suggested that the relationship between 
Russians and Central Asians was about to change radically. The 1970 Soviet census 
revealed that the birth-rate of the Slavic population was in decline whilst that of the 
traditionally Muslim peoples continued to increase. This it was thought would shift the 
balance of political and economic power within the Soviet Union away from Europe 
towards Central Asia. The census also showed that Central Asians were unwilling to 
travel elsewhere in the USSR in search of work, creating a local labour surplus in an 
economically under-developed area. Rakowska-Harmstone noted that population
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patterns created an ethnic dimension to income disparities which could fuel nationalist 
resentments.
...urban areas tend to be dominated by nonindigenous national groups, mostly 
Russians. This fact imparts ethnic overtones to the antagonism over disparities 
in the quality of urban vs. rural life... This problem has been particularly acute in 
the southeastern portions of the USSR where a combination of high fertility rates 
and low skill-levels has created large rural labor surpluses even while there have 
been shortages of skilled manpower in urban-industrial centres... The deficiency 
in urban skilled labour has been filled by immigration... [which] contributed to 
urban-rural and ethnic conflicts.55
Rakowska-Harmstone cited Soviet sources which indicated that nationalism as an 
expression of political discontent was more prevalent in rural than urban areas, and that 
in many cases this was linked to religious identity.
In 1979 two events took place which again altered perceptions of Central Asia. 
On January 16th the Shah of Iran fled his country. Soon afterwards he was replaced by 
Ruholla Khomeini, who announced an Islamic Republic. In December Soviet troops 
entered Afghanistan in support of the ruling Marxist PDPA, which had seized power 
the previous year but had failed to consolidate control of a number of provinces where 
it was opposed by groups claiming an Islamic ideology. Although in terms of 
international law the Soviet presence was at the request of the Afghan government,“ it 
was presented in the West as a Soviet invasion of a neutral neighbouring country. 
Radical Islam had triumphed in one country at the expense of one of America’s closest 
allies. In another, Muslim opposition groups were waging war on the Soviet Union. 
This had an immediate effect on the Western approach to Soviet Islam.
The Iranian revolution and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
abruptly awakened the West to the revolutionary potential of Islam and focused 
attention on the long f^orgotten Muslims of the Soviet Union.56
Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s Western attention had focused on the possible 
influence of the Soviet Union over the Middle East, this was now reversed.
K In 1978 a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation had been signed between Moscow and Kabul. 
Article 4 of the Treaty stated that the two parties ‘shall consult with each other and take, by 
agreement, appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the 
two countries’. President Amin invoked this to obtain Soviet assistance after PDPA leaders had been 
killed in Kabul. See Hiro (1989) p.253.
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; A turning point in the history of Soviet Islam came in 1978, with two major
external events: the downfall of the Shah of Iran followed by the triumph of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran and the April (Saur) Communist revolution in 
Afghanistan... transforming this relatively quiet territory into a boiling 
revolutionary cauldron, whose upheavals may have unpredictable consequences 
all round, and first and foremost for the Soviet Union... the Middle East appears 
a potential source of trouble for the USSR, an area from which various 
subversive and radical ideologies may penetrate and contaminate Soviet Islam.57
The same source considered that
Soviet Islam, stultified by decades of conformity to stale Russian Marxism, has 
nothing to offer Muslims abroad at the political level. On the contrary, it is the 
Soviet Muslims who are likely to be influenced by the ideas (perhaps even by the 
political terrorism and guerrilla methods) adopted by the newly radicalised 
Middle East.58
Western scholars began to talk of a ‘spillage’ of ideas over the Soviet border 
from both Iran and Afghanistan resulting from the fact that with the invasion the Iron 
Curtain had been breached on its southern flank. The same peoples, Azeris, Turkmen, 
Uzbeks, Tadjiks, lived on either side of the border. Iran was actively trying to export 
its revolution. The fact that Soviet Central Asian troops had been withdrawn from 
Afghanistan to be replaced by Slavs suggested that what Bennigsen called 
‘contamination’ had occurred there, and at least one Afghan opposition group talked 
about taking the war into the USSR and on occasion claimed already to have done so.
Although Aijomand has presented a strong case for viewing Islamic 
‘fundamentalism’ as a new and radical religious movement responsive to very specific 
local conditions, it was easier and it might be argued more politically expedient to 
explain this otherwise seemingly inexplicable phenomenon as highly conservative quasi­
medievalism. “Look at the cover illustration of the German Spiegel magazine of 12th 
February 1979: a turbaned and bearded horseman with a sword displayed, carrying 
behind him a miserable creature entirely wrapped in black veils. The caption: ‘Return 
to the Middle Ages’.”59
Soviet Islam was also seen as being essentially conservative. The dust-jacket of 
Bennigsen’s and Wimbush’s 1985 Mystics and Commissars showed a photograph of a 
bearded and turbaned man in an image reminiscent of depictions of the Iranian
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j revolutionary leadership. It was in fact a portrait of the Imam Shamyl, the leader of the
| so-called Murid Wars against Russia in the 19th Century. The implication was that
I Soviet Islam had at least the potential to become a revolutionary anti-imperialist
movement like that in Iran. At the time of Brezhenev’s death, Islam was seen as the 
principle internal threat to the USSR.
l.v) Conclusion
Historical events have affected the way in which Central Asia has been discussed 
in the West from the Great Game onwards. They determined not only what was said, 
but who said it and where. The historical framework is the primary context in which to 
consider Western studies of Soviet Central Asia which were predicated on the West’s 
need to understand its Soviet rival in a world which had become dominated by two 
competing ideologies and its desire to find weak spots in the USSR’s defences. In the 
1950s the primary concern was with the threat of the Soviet Union expanding its 
influence, and the possible role of Soviet Central Asians as a conduit for Soviet 
propaganda in the Middle East. In the 1960s with the collapse of the British and 
French Empires discussion came to be couched in terms of colonialism, the anti­
colonial dynamic and the likelihood of the Soviet ‘Empire’ meeting the same fate as 
other European empires. Having placed the terms of reference within a colonialist 
discourse, the appearance from the 1970s of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ in the Middle 
East as a new expression of anti-colonialism fighting not overt Western power but 
Western ideologies made an anti-colonial revolt in Central Asia seem likely.
The Soviet union is a multinational empire that is susceptible to all of the divisive 
internal and external pressures that have destroyed other multinational empires.
The Soviet Muslim borderlands are the classic soft underbelly of the empire.60
...a Soviet Muslim and a Muslim from abroad feel completely at home with each 
other... [they] display the same attitude of deeply rooted mistrust toward the non- 
Muslim West (represented by Americans and Europeans in the Middle East and 
by Russians in Central Asia). In short they are brethren facing together a hostile 
world.61
The expectation of an anti-colonial movement and the search for a vehicle for 
such a movement was to provide the basis for the bulk of Western scholarship of 
Central Asia throughout the Cold War.
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Chapter 2: Colonialism and Central Asia
2.i) Introduction
The language of colonialism and concepts about colonial dynamics infused much 
of what was written about Central Asia after the War. Central Asia could be seen as a 
non-European area under European domination analogous to the overseas empires of 
Britain and France. Although geographer A. Nove and Soviet Studies lecturer J. 
Newth, both of Glasgow University, wrote, “there is no point in starting such a study 
[of Soviet Central Asia] with an already held conviction that these are colonies 
exploited by Moscow for its own evil purposes”1 such a conviction formed the 
underlying basis of the bulk of Western writing on the area.
Many analysts took it for granted that the relationship between Central Asia and 
Moscow was a colonial one. This is reflected in the titles of works such as British and 
Soviet Colonial Systems (1951); Russia and her Colonies (1952); Soviet Empire 
(1953); The Last Empire (1962); L'Empire eclate (1978) and Muslims o f the Soviet 
Empire (1985). This assumption informs one definition of colonies in the Soviet 
context as “ethnically non-Russian territories.”2 A part of the Soviet Union could be 
described as a colony simply by dint of its not being predominantly Russian.
During the 1950s and 1960s British works used the language of empire in 
referring to Central Asia in part because British scholars of the region were often 
veterans of the Indian Civil Service. The French tended to be more circumspect, using 
the terms ‘Soviet Union’ or ‘USSR’ in place of ‘Soviet Empire’. This did not prevent 
them writing of the Soviet Union in terms of imperialism or comparing Soviet policies 
in non-European areas with French ones. Structurally, the Soviet Union appeared 
similar to the French Union established in 1946 as a compromise between subservience 
and independence for non-Europeans. Writers such as Egretaud proposed the 
adoption of the Soviet ‘colonial’ system as a means of preserving France’s own 
empire. Monteil’s Essai sur I'Islam en URSS compared Soviet Central Asia to French 
Algeria and Senegal, contrasting ‘Soviet’ with ‘Colonial’ Islam and suggesting that,
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critically followed, Soviet policy could serve as the means by which France might 
preserve its African possessions.
If British and French scholars used a colonial framework for their analysis of 
Soviet Asia in part as a result of their own experiences of managing empires, in the 
case of the USA the use of colonial language had a more overt political purpose. 
‘Empire’ could be used to demonise the Soviet Union.
Anti-colonialism forms part of the US founding-myth. In the popular 
imagination the US defines itself as the defender of liberty against imperial oppression, 
giving that country a certain moral superiority, as Kohn observed when he wrote that 
“American thinking about colonialism has been largely influenced by emotional 
misunderstandings.”3 Empire in the American popular view is almost by definition 
tyrannical. If the US is the land in which there is ‘no taxation without representation,’ 
an empire in the American popular imagining is the precise opposite. The American 
expansion westwards, the conquering and annexation of territory from Mexico (1840) 
and Spain (1898) and the deposition of the Hawaiian monarchy are not popularly 
perceived as imperialist acts. This attitude gives the colonialist/imperialist discourse 
great propaganda value, since merely to call a state an empire is to imply that it 
embodies the negation of American values. In the popular television series ‘Star Trek’ 
the citizens of the ‘United Federation of Planets’ are characterised by rationality, love 
of freedom, respect for the rights of the individual and political non-interventionism. 
Their enemies, inhabiting a feudal and capriciously violent society, belong to the 
‘Klingon Empire’. Likewise, the enormously successful film ‘Star Wars’ (1977) pits a 
‘rebel alliance’ against a shadowy ‘Empire’ which is an embodiment of evil.
In the immediate post-War era this anti-imperial attitude was harder to sustain in 
countries which themselves maintained empires. As the pace of decolonisation 
accelerated as a result of both opposition in the colonies themselves and domestic 
public opinion, the ‘colonial’ epithet came more and more to be used as a term of 
opprobrium. The Swiss scholar Liithy wrote of the phrase ‘Soviet Imperialism’, “This 
easily becomes the childish game of throwing a slander back to the slanderer: 
‘Colonialists!’ - ‘Colonialists yourself!”’4
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Colonial discourse became a tool in the propaganda war between the Soviet 
Union and the West, a point alluded to by B.G.D. Folson when he wrote that “There 
is a tendency (fanned no doubt by the desire to bask in the sunshine of anti-colonial 
sentiment) to discuss the Soviet nationalities question in terms of colonialism and 
imperialism... This comprises the position ‘We are virtuous non-colonial people. They 
are evil colonial oppressors.’”5
2.ii) What is Colonialism?
Given that discourse on Central Asia throughout the Cold War period was 
intimately connected with the issues of colonialism and anti-colonialism, it might come 
as a surprise that few writers on the area directly addressed the question of what 
colonialism entailed. Colonial discourse was so embedded in the way the West 
thought about the multi-national state that it was not thought necessary to explain 
what colonialism was. This was true even of theoretical works. Liithy complained 
that “The Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania published 
a collective study on The Idea of Colonialism. I have read it carefully, but could not 
find what this idea was, or who ever held it.”6
The nearest the work got to a clear definition of what a colony was is to be 
found in Kuhn’s opening chapter.7 Kohn starts with the assertion that not every 
imperial relationship is a colonial one, although Liithy wrote “In its current use 
[colonialism] seems to be a synonym of imperialism.”8 ‘Empire’ to Kohn was the 
expansion of a state into a coterminous territory. He identified five types of imperial 
relationship, of which one was colonial. The non-colonial relations comprised the 
granting of autonomy within an empire (Habsburg Hungary or Romanov Finland), the 
annihilation of the indigenes (USA), the maintenance of natives in an inferior position 
(South Africa), and the granting of citizenship to the conquered peoples leading to 
their absorption, as was occurring to the Welsh. Kohn then defined a colonial 
relationship:
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a colonial relationship is created when one nation establishes and maintains 
political domination over a geographically external political unit inhabited by 
people of any race and at any stage of cultural development. It is terminated 
whenever the subject people becomes fully self-governing as an autonomous 
state, whether independent or as a voluntary associate within an imperial or 
commonwealth partnership from which it may withdraw at will. It is also 
terminated whenever a subject people becomes assimilated into the political 
structure of the colonial power on equal terms, or when their political unit is thus 
assimilated.9
This definition is confused. Later Kohn simplifies his argument: “Reduced to its 
barest outline, colonialism is foreign rule imposed upon a people,”10 a conception 
similar to Liithy’s “domination of one country by another.”11
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘colony’ as “settlement of settlers in a 
new country forming a community fully or partly subject to another state” and 
‘colonialism’ as “policy of maintaining colonies, alleged exploitation of backward or 
weak peoples.” The first definition illustrates the dual meaning of ‘colony’ as both a 
group of people and a territory controlled by but not annexed to another polity. The 
concept that this community is controlled by another state is important, implying as it 
does a political distinction between the colony and the ‘motherland’. It can be imputed 
that if no such distinction exists, and the two parts constitute a single political entity, a 
colonial situation does not exist. The second part of the definition suggests that such 
control is essentially exploitative in nature.
This comes close to Nove’s and Newth’s definition of a colony as a country 
whose economy serves to benefit an outside power. In this situation industry is 
underdeveloped, profits are exported rather than locally reinvested, and the colonised 
population is poorly educated, underpaid, and excluded from political power.12 This 
could be slightly modified by recourse to what they called “colonialism a la frangaise” 
in which conquered territories were annexed and regarded as an integral part of a 
single state.
There was a corollary to the French system. If what we might call ‘classical’ 
colonialisms ignored the educational needs of subject peoples, ‘French’ colonialism 
offered a type of equality achievable through a cultural assimilation which itself implied
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the denigration of local mores. Ross somewhat tartly explained, “French culture saw 
itself as something universal, the pinnacle of human society.”13 Seton-Watson wrote 
that “The French Empire went somewhat further [than the British] in creating an 
ideology. Its mission civilitrice included a more clearly understood concept of a 
French culture, and even a French nationality, which was to be accessible to all. There 
was the intention of creating Asian and African Frenchmen...”14 The governing Power 
is presented as in all ways superior to its vassals, not only in terms of technological, 
economic or military might but in its essence. Nadel and Curtis claimed,
Implicit in such phrases as la mission civilitrice or l ’amit6 protectrice was the 
assumption of a relationship of mutual advantage. France needed colonies in 
order to advance her grandeur, the colonies needed French manufactures and 
civilisation in order to enter the modem world.15
French colonialism had a cultural dimension absent from its British equivalent. 
It remained colonialism since it emphasised the superiority of the metropolis over the 
colony to the detriment of the latter. In both its economic and cultural forms the 
colonial dynamic involves the subservience of one people to the demands of another.
The idea of an unequal exchange being fundamental to colonial relations was 
stressed by Nadel and Curtis when they made their distinction between imperialism and 
colonialism. Colonialism, they implied, was a function of imperialism, however the 
former term had come to be used almost exclusively in a pejorative sense.
By Imperialism we mean the extension of sovereignty or control... by one 
government, nation or society over another... Imperialism is essentially about 
power... Underlying all forms of Imperialism is the belief - at times unshakeable- 
of the imperial agent or nation in an inherent right, based on moral superiority as 
well as material might, to impose its pre-eminent values and techniques on the 
‘inferior’ indigenous nation or society...16
Whereas ‘Imperialism’ enjoyed at least a genuine if fleeting respectability, 
‘colonialism’ is most commonly used today to connote the oppression, 
humiliation, or exploitation of indigenous peoples...17
Colonialism represents the dominance of one area over another, an imbalance of 
political, economic and cultural power.
44
Although imperialism had not historically been the exclusive preserve of 
Europeans, it “today means, above all, European rule over non-Europeans.”18 This 
was manifest in anti-colonial movements. Palmer observed that “since [colonial] 
situations have usually been characterised by Western (white) control over (coloured) 
Asians or Africans, it is perhaps natural that colonialism in Indian minds should be 
associated with peoples of white skins.”19 This idea that colonisers were white and the 
colonised non-white was powerful enough to re-emerge in a passage written twenty- 
five years later:
In the case of colonial society, there are always clear distinguishing marks 
between the colonisers or imperialists and the native people of the colony... sharp 
distinctions based upon appearance, history or ethnicity are drawn...
[Colonial societies include] a group from the metropolis who... exploit the 
racially distinct peasants.20
From these claims a picture of what colonialism is emerges. ‘Colonialism’ firstly 
means the domination of one society by another. In this situation the dominators 
remain aloof from the dominated. Plamenetz emphasised this in stating that
the Europeans remained aliens in Asia and Africa because they deliberately held 
themselves aloof from the natives...21
It was this aloofness which to Plamenetz distinguished British rule in India from 
that of any other conquer, such as the Moguls. The latter had become Indians in a way 
that the former had never done and had never intended doing. This was one of the 
features which set the British Empire apart as ‘colonialist’ in a way that the Roman, to 
use Plamenetz’s example, never was.
The Romans, in the process of establishing their empire, created a cosmopolitan 
privileged class recruited from all peoples in the empire. The members of this 
class had a double loyalty, to Rome and to the places of their birth. [Rome] 
allowed men of all nationalities to rise high in her service... [Romans] mixed with 
the powerful and wealthy among the natives to form a cosmopolitan class sharing 
a Graeco-Roman culture. They did this without detaching the members of this 
class from the countries of their birth; it was not only possible, it was easy and 
natural to have a double loyalty.22
In this respect, the Roman Empire differed from the French, which could not 
allow a dual loyalty, insisting rather on full association with metropolitan culture even 
to the extent of rejecting the aspirant’s own background.
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Many scholars made the claim that whatever the moral implications of European 
dominance of the non-European world, such dominance had occurred and had been 
instrumental in ‘modernising’ the colonised areas. This meant the introduction of 
European commercial and social relations. A corollary of ‘modernisation’ was the 
assumption by colonised peoples of European ideas of political freedom and of human 
equality. If these were denied, as was the case in a colonial environment, resentment 
might be expected. Plamenetz, discussing the possibility of ‘home rule’ for the 
European colonies observed that
if [a non-European] feels himself despised or excluded, he resents the treatment 
meted out to him...
...cold disdain begets hot resentment... it is absurd to put yourself forward as a 
foreign mler anxious to raise a subject people to full equality with yourself and 
still to treat those of them who have risen highest by your own standards as if they 
could not, whatever they did, become entirely fit for the company of people like 
yourself.23
Building on the theme, Plamenetz contrasted the old empires in which Europeans 
dominated other Europeans with the new-style dominance of Europeans over non- 
Europeans:
The Magyars, who hated Slav nationalism more than the Austrians did, were very 
willing to accept a Slav as an equal and as a compatriot if only he would behave 
appropriately... no such compromise is offered to the coloured man ruled by 
Europeans; he is treated as an inferior merely on account of his colour... The 
Europeans in practise refuse him equality whatever he may do to deserve it, and he 
is therefore condemned to perpetual inferiority while he lives in their society and 
under their government. To feel equal to them as a person, to regain his self- 
respect, he needs, as no white man does, to belong to a community quite 
independent to them.24
Colonialism comprises not only the domination of one society over another but 
the maintenance of that domination by denying certain rights to one group which are 
accorded the other. Palmer, returning to popular Indian conceptions of colonialism, 
placed political impotence at the hands of an outside power at the head of his list of the 
characteristics of a colonial situation.
In common Indian usage colonialism is variously defined as the denial of the 
‘right’ to self-determination and self government, the imposition of foreign 
control on a people without their consent, imperialistic territorial aggrandisement,
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or political or economic exploitation. Almost by definition it produces such by­
products as racial discrimination, despotism, and human and national 
degradation.25
The racial aspect of colonialism remains important in maintaining the dependency 
required of a colonial situation. Without a visible distinction it becomes impossible to 
treat the subject people as less than equals. They might become fully assimilated to the 
metropolis, acquiring the rights of the metropolitans, as did what we would now call 
‘indigenous ethnic minorities’ in European states such as the Cornish in Britain, or 
ruler and ruled might merge within the colony itself and develop as a state apart from 
the metropolis. This is what occurred in what have been called the ‘old empires’ in the 
Americas. In the ‘new’ empires of the Cl9th the ruling class as representing the 
‘mother country’ owed its authority to its difference from the native. As Plamenetz 
stated, “the Europeans in Asia had more to lose than to gain by social integration with 
the native people.”26
Racial and cultural distinction was essential to the colonial relationship. It 
followed from this that relations between European peoples were not of a colonial 
nature but relations between Europeans and non-Europeans could be. Within the 
British Empire a distinction was made between ‘Dominions’ and ‘Colonies’.
The Dominions established in 1926 were Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland. According to Stahl, all had “large 
settled white communities of British stock.”27 The Dominions were autonomous states 
within the Empire with their own political and legal institutions based on but distinct 
from the British, equal in status to Britain and voluntarily associated with her. In 
effect they were independent.
By contrast, Britain’s colonies had overwhelmingly non-European populations. 
They were characterised by the weakness of both their social and political institutions 
which necessitated the retention of a high degree of control by London. “Whenever 
the mother country considers that her vital interests are at stake, imperial 
considerations will if necessary over-ride purely local ones.”28
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A Dominion was in a position of strength because its political and social 
institutions were European, in other words they were a match for those of the 
metropolis. It is significant that Stahl described the Ukraine as a Dominion of greater 
Russia and Central Asia as a colony.29 Stahl made the equation of colonial status with 
being non-European explicit.
Within the Union, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic remains 
inevitably, like the Great Russia of the Tsars which it incorporated, the centre of 
power. Certain other republics by reason of their large settled white populations 
and economic strength carry authority... other republics on the perimeter in Asia 
are, beneath their nominal equality with the rest, dependent or colonial areas, as 
they were in the days of the Tsars. The five republics of Central Asia... 
represent areas of rule over indigenous peoples and compare, in fact, with the 
orthodox colonies of other Powers.30
A colony could only attain the strength necessary for equality by Europeanising. 
The Europeanising effect of the colonial experience and the consequences for both 
colonisers and colonised played a major part in the literature on the subject. At this 
stage we should note only the equations Dominion=European=Equal; Colony=Non- 
European=Subordinate.
Differentiation of this kind seems to be in operation even in those cases where 
European parts of the Soviet Union are described as colonies. In a chapter heading in 
The Last Empire (1962) Robert Conquest, formerly of the British Foreign Office, 
described the Baltic States as “The World’s Newest Colonies.” However, Conquest 
devoted just one chapter to the Baltic region, whilst the Caucasus and Central Asia 
merited two chapters each. When in the same work Conquest discussed the impact of 
Russian imperialism on the cultures and religions of subject peoples he ignored 
Europeans. Colonialism is essentially a question of European dominance of non- 
Europeans.
In the late 1960s Armstrong made a similar comparison when he categorised the 
relationship between the Russians and the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. 
He typified Ukrainians as ‘younger brothers’, a people “low in social mobilisation, yet 
close to the dominant ethnic group in major cultural aspects”31 comparable to lowland 
Scots in Britain, whose cultural difference was not great enough to impede their
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integration into all aspects of society or their identification with the state as their state, 
irrespective of whether they retained cultural distinctiveness. Armstrong’s other three 
categories of Soviet peoples included ‘colonials’. Of the fourteen European peoples 
Armstrong named, not one falls into this category. The Balts shared with the 
Georgians the category ‘state nations’. Conversely, the ten named ‘colonial’ peoples 
were all traditionally Muslim and with two exceptions (Chechen and Tadjik) speakers 
of Turkic languages. No culturally Muslim or linguistically Turkic group appeared in 
any other category. This shows the dual equation Colonial=Non-European; 
European=Non-Colonial in operation.
Armstrong defined colonials as
a subject nationality sharply differentiated from the dominant group in cultural 
background, physical appearance, and degree of social mobilisation. Typically, 
colonials are just entering the transition to modernised society. The traditional 
culture pattern of the colonials (frequently shaped by a religion very different 
from the dominant group’s) is regarded by the dominant elite as a barrier to 
modernisation.32
This statement recalls the French notion of the necessity of adopting French 
culture as a pre-requisite of social and political advancement.
‘Colonialism’ appears in the final analysis to comprise a collection of vaguely 
related phenomena connected with the exercise of power. In the first instance it is a 
situation in which one ethnic group exercises authority over another. The powerful 
group exercises this authority for its own material and economic benefit without regard 
to the needs or aspirations of the dominated. The powerful group is not indigenous to 
the area in which its authority is exercised, and is resistant to ‘indigenisation’ through 
social or cultural mixing or miscegenation. This group regards its own culture as 
superior to, and its social and political structures as more ‘advanced’ than, those of the 
dominated group and may seek to modify the latter’s culture and institutions in the 
interest of its own view of ‘progress’. In almost all cases the powerful group is of 
European origin. In no case is the dominated group European, since the necessary 
degree of inequality does not exist between European peoples nor between Europeans 
and non-Europeans to the former’s disadvantage.
2.iii) Colonialism in Central Asia
Mr Kruschev is not a Tadjik. He is a Russian. He issues orders from Moscow.
He bases his power on the unified Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which 
has a few thousand Russianised Tadjiks among its members, but is 
overwhelmingly Russian. What this man and his associates decide is law in the 
Tadjik mountains... in these circumstances how can sovereignty be said to signify 
anything? And in what way can the method of rule applied to it be thought of as 
anything but a variety of imperialism, of colonialism?33
This passage is typical of the Western approach to the issue of Russian 
colonialism in Central Asia. Its purpose is to give the he to the Soviet claim that the 
USSR was a voluntary association of sovereign states. The Soviet Union appears as a 
Russian Empire in which Russians impose their will on non-Russians. The passage 
itself however points to a more complex reality.
Although it is true that Kruschev was not a Tadjik, he was not Russian but 
Ukrainian, although Armstrong pointed out that Kruschev himself was apt to play this 
down.34 Of the three Soviet leaders since the Revolution just one, Lenin, had been a 
Russian, a consideration which might suggest that the Soviet Union was more than 
simply a Russian Empire. If it was true that Tadjikistan was dictated to by a non- 
Tadjik, it could be argued that Russia was dictated to by a non-Russian. It was also 
admitted that Kruschev ruled with the aid of ‘associates,’ including Tadjiks. Tadjik 
involvement in the governance of Tadjikistan is somehow discounted on the grounds 
that these people are ‘Russianised,’ that is to say that they are not ‘true’ Tadjiks. If 
Tadjiks who collaborate with the regime are ‘not true’ Tadjiks, the implication is that a 
‘true’ Tadjik does not co-operate with Soviet power. If this were not the case it would 
not be possible to claim that Tadjiks had no part in the running of their country. For 
such co-operation to occur non-Russians must be de-naturalised. This is reminiscent of 
the philosophical trope of the ‘No true Scotsman’ argument.1
' Proposition: All Scots are alcoholic.
Refutation: This Scot is not alcoholic.
Counter: He is not a true Scot, since all Scots are alcoholic.
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The presentation of Central Asia as a colony of Russia depended on two 
considerations, the political (including the economic) and the cultural. In practise until 
the end of the 1960s political issues tended primarily to concern commentators writing 
in English, whilst those writing in French concentrated on the cultural, the two strands 
becoming combined from the late 1960s with Islam, which had been seen as belonging 
to the cultural sphere, being awarded a political status. This is not a hard and fast 
division. Alexandre Bennigsen in his French writing on the ‘National Communism’ of 
Sultan Galiev made a valuable contribution to the political debate while the American 
Edward Allworth focused largely on cultural matters, particularly as reflected in Central 
Asian literature (it should be noted that one of Allworth’s earliest contributions 
appeared in French and that Bennigsen’s earliest presentation on Sultan Galiev was 
published in French just a year before its English translation). Some issues, notably that 
of language use, did not fall clearly into either camp.
2.iii:a) Political/Economic Imperialism
The primary political issue was that of how Russia exerted its authority over non- 
Russians. This brought attention to bear on the political structure of the Soviet Union 
and in particular to the Soviet claim to have ‘solved’ the nationalities problem. This 
problem was conceived in terms of race relations. Friction between the races was 
believed to be a consequence of the colonial dominance of one people over another of a 
different race or culture. Wheeler wrote,
Outside the Soviet Union racial problems and the tension resulting from them 
have for many decades been freely and often acrimoniously discussed wherever 
they arose, and the situation in some countries has been considerably eased by 
the grant of self-government to former colonial territories, sometimes willingly 
and sometimes under pressure. In the Soviet Union, which includes nearly half 
the total area of Asia, the authorities do not admit the existence of any racial 
tension or even of any racial problems.35
Most commentators noted that racism per se was not ingrained in Russian 
culture. Wheeler noted that the Russian language even lacked a term of its own for the 
concept of race. The word rasa was a loan. Although Russians might have feelings of 
cultural superiority this was not translated into a racist ideology.
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Kolarz observed that “neither official nor unofficial Russia knew any racial 
prejudice... Absence of racial pride and prejudice is thus for Russia not a revolutionary 
principle, but is the natural pre-requisite for the growth of the Russian Empire.”36
Leprince-Ringuet claimed that racial prejudice was proscribed by law in the 
USSR11 and observed that “certainly, Russia is tolerant of and by nature accommodating 
towards foreigners.”37 In 1953 Farid Jafri, editor of Karachi’s Civil and Military 
Gazette, stated that Communism’s ideological opposition to racism coupled with the 
apparent absence of actual racism in the USSR was one of the principle reasons for the 
attractiveness of Communism to the victims of Western colonialism, who were 
alienated from the West because of the typically hostile and arrogant attitude of many 
Westerners to Asians.38 In this he was supported by Frank Moraes of The Indian 
Express who maintained that the majority of Asians and Africans associated colonialism 
with the issue of skin colour and racism.39 Moraes asserted that skin colour did not 
appear to be a factor in Soviet society. Rywkin, a Pole bom in 1923 in Wilno (now 
Vilnius, Lithuania) who was exiled to Central Asia during the War before emigrating to 
the US, was consistently hostile to Soviet policy but admitted that “individual Russians 
were never granted the superior status which characterised the old European standing 
in Asian or African society.”40
The issue was raised by Bennigsen and d’Encausse, who said of the Russians in 
Central Asia that they were not ‘classical colonisers’ since Communism preached a 
racial equality “bom of a traditional Russian liberalism”41 contrasting with the strict 
‘isolationist racism’ of other colonisers. Equality was enhanced by the doctrines of a 
culture ‘national in form and socialist in content’ and ‘proletarian internationalism.’ 
These would allow for “the mutual transformation of two peoples and two civilisations 
in the Communist stock pot,” an event affecting both peoples equally and seemingly 
denying the unbalanced dynamic of a colonial situation. This might have been the case 
in theory, but in practise Soviet policy
has never questioned the superiority of Russo-Westem culture over the Muslim
Irano-Turkic cultures of Central Asia. Despite the official doctrine, it is the
u 1936 Constitution Art. 123
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Russian minority, with theoretically equal rights, which imposes its political and
spiritual culture on the Muslim majority.4,2
Despite the lack of institutional racism in the Soviet Union, there was one 
phenomenon which seemed typical of European colonial empires and obtained also in 
the southern United States which was replicated in Central Asia. This was a de facto 
social segregation along racial lines.
Wheeler, referring to an unnamed study by Richard Pipes, observed that 
intermarriage between Russians and Central Asians was extremely rare and that there 
was virtually no contact between the two groups in work, education or leisure. 
Effectively the two peoples led entirely separate, parallel, lives. This fact was 
commonly commented upon. Russians lived apart from natives in a way reminiscent of 
the ‘cantonment’ system. The traditional mahalla survived in Central Asian cities in 
parallel with a separate ‘European’ quarter which might effectively be a separate city, 
as Kagan or ‘New Bokhara’ was in relation to Bokhara (Kagan was not a Soviet 
foundation but dated from the Tsarist period as did many such ‘European’ quarters, a 
point which was rarely mentioned). Urban division was illustrated in an American 
study which published a plan of Tashkent showing the juxtaposition of a European- 
style city with wide straight avenues adjoining the original foundation with its narrow 
winding alleys, the two sectors designated in Russian ‘native part’ and ‘European 
part’.43 The plan dated from 1913 but it was obviously meant to be taken as 
symptomatic of the division between Russians and non-Russians.
In the southern Central Asian republics the European population was 
overwhelmingly urban, however even in Kazakhstan with its significant rural population 
of European origin physical separation still obtained. Individual farming communities 
tended to be ethnically homogenous as Russian, Kazakh, German or Korean, having 
little contact with one another.
It was possible for a Central Asian to live for long periods without coming into 
contact with a Russian at all, and in fact “in the great majority of cases the Muslim’s 
first contact with the Russians comes in the Army.”44 Nove and Newth went even
53
further, asserting that “It is probable that many thousands of the native population will 
never come into contact with a Russian.”45
Physical separation did not necessarily reflect poorly on the Russians, being the 
personal choice of the Central Asians themselves.
This situation does not reflect any particular discredit on the Russians - the
reluctance to intermingle is, indeed, on the native rather than the Russian side;
nor does it indicate any particular distaste for Russian and Soviet civilisation. It
is simply the result of a clash of differing civilisations in a typically colonial
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Emphasis on physical separation allowed for the development of the impression, 
never explicitly stated, that Russians were extraneous to Central Asian society, 
appearing as an imposition from outside lacking any ties to the region itself. A parallel 
might be drawn between the position of the Russians in Central Asia and that of the 
British or the French in their colonies as people who controlled, but did not form a part 
of, an Asian society.
This arrangement of living space along ethnic lines may be typical of colonial 
situations, especially when it is enforced by government policy. However, none of the 
commentators who cited it as evidence of a fundamental incompatibility of the Russian 
with the indigenous populations characteristic of a colonial dynamic considered 
whether it was unique to colonies. Examination of any modern multi-ethnic city in the 
West reveals a high degree of spontaneous segregation, with divisions into 
‘Chinatown’, ‘Little Italy’ and so on.
The division of rural communities along ethnic lines, rare in Western Europe, was 
until the Second World War common in Central and Eastern Europe and persists in 
parts of the Balkans and Romania. Historically it has been common for a rural 
community to be linguistically and in some cases religiously distinct from the urban 
population of multi-national empires of the type described by Kuhn as ‘non-colonial’. 
In such situations feelings of superiority expressed by urban populations towards 
country people can take on a quasi-racist flavour as a secondary characteristic.
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The fact that Russians in Central Asia were overwhelmingly urban whilst natives 
were preponderantly rural impacted on education and employment. It was noted that 
there was an effective ethnic stratification of labour, again a feature common to multi­
ethnic societies. Russians tended to dominate skilled labouring positions and managerial 
posts whilst Central Asians were typically employed in unskilled labour, agriculture or 
traditional industries.
Ethnic stratification of labour was in part dictated by the pattern of migration 
from Russia into Central Asia. During the Tsarist period Russians had come as 
soldiers, administrators or in connexion with the new technologies imported for the 
benefit of the Tsarist regime, notably the railway and telegraph. Wheeler noted that 
unlike the British in India the Tsarist Russians made no attempt to raise the educational 
level of the Central Asians or to recruit a native clerical class, in part because
they feared Islam as a sinister and secret force, and the fact that it seemed to
elude their control engendered a distrust of the subject races which coloured their
whole system of administration.47
As a result, despite the Bolsheviks’ stated intent of granting national autonomy to 
the formerly subject peoples, they were effectively unable to do so since there was no 
indigenous cadre available to staff an administration. This remained in Russian hands, 
“for the sudden abdication of paramount power over backward peoples unprepared for 
independence may prove a worse evil than its imposition.”48 Russians were to be the 
motor for the modernisation of Central Asian society and politics along socialist lines. 
This modernisation therefore took on a Russian hue. Inclusion in the political elite for 
Central Asians, the Bolsheviks’ stated goal, demanded a degree of acceptance of 
Russian norms, perpetuating the situation of Russian dominance.
The second wave of European immigration came during and immediately 
following the Second World War and was connected to economic changes affecting the 
USSR as a whole.
As the industrial heartland of Russia fell to or was threatened by the Nazis after 
1941, essential industries were evacuated to a previously lightly industrialised Central
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Asia. Lacking instructors and time to train a workforce for the relocated factories, the 
Soviet authorities moved the workers along with the plant. This gave the appearance 
of Central Asian industries, particularly those of greatest importance to the state such 
as defence, being in the hands not of Central Asians but of Russians. This appears to 
be an instance of colonialism - the resources of a country being managed and exploited 
not by natives but by immigrants.
It might though be asked in what way these industries were ‘Central Asian.’ 
They did not evolve out of any economic or social dynamic intrinsic to the region but 
appeared, fully formed, as if overnight. The fact of their being located in Central Asia 
was almost co-incidental. In the 1960s, when strong links were still assumed between 
industrial ownership and industrial location, non-native involvement in an industry 
would appear as colonialism, but in the age of multi-nationals with no allegiance to a 
particular locality this link is less clear. In a sense, Soviet heavy industry might be seen 
as a kind o f ‘multi-national’ which answered to needs not tied to any one place.
With regards the dominance of Russian technical cadres in the non-Russian 
republics which was a feature of industrial re-location and which was regarded as 
symptomatic of Russian control of the republics, Nove and Newth devised a table 
indicating the percentage o f ‘experts’, university graduates, of a given nationality within 
their own republic and their showing among the total number of ‘experts’ within that 
republic.
According to Nove’s and Newth’s model, the republics of what they termed the 
‘Soviet Middle East’ including Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Transcaucasia could be 
grouped according to three types. Type A included only Armenia. Only 52% of 
graduates of Armenian origin from the republic stayed in Armenia, but these comprised 
92% of the republican total of ‘experts’, creating a surplus for export elsewhere in the 
USSR. Type B included Georgia and Azerbaijan, in which most graduates remained in 
their own republic but there was still a need to import expertise. The Central Asian
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republics formed Type C, which was heavily dependent on imported technicians.111 
Russian technical supervision appears as a matter of necessity not policy. This could be 
compared to a situation in which a developing country invests in plant from the West 
which in the absence of qualified locals is constructed and initially managed by 
expatriates.
Nove and Newth suggested that this situation could theoretically change, since
The shortage of manpower in the European part of the country is likely to 
become aggravated as time goes on, while it will be more plentiful in the East. It 
may well be that the present dependence of the latter on Europeans for technical 
supervision will disappear quite rapidly as specialists of local origin or second 
generation immigrants with local sympathies become available.49
It became apparent during the 1970s and 1980s that such a personnel change was 
not occurring and that in addition trained Central Asians were not seeking employment 
outside the region, creating a local labour surplus. Rywkin50 pointed to a ‘demographic 
time-bomb’ of a large, young, educated and economically frustrated population which 
would resent the Russians who held them back from positions of economic 
advancement.
Agricultural changes also served to give the impression that Central Asia was a 
colony. Opposition to agricultural change, especially the growth of the area under 
cotton, was taken as a primary example of anti-colonial sentiment. Specialisation in 
cotton as a cash crop at the expense of food production, which began long before the 
establishment of Soviet power, reduced Central Asia to a position of dependency on 
food imports from elsewhere in the USSR and had political and demographic 
consequences since the traditional food crop, rice, which like cotton requires abundant 
water, came to be replaced with grain grown in Kazakhstan under the Virgin Soil 
scheme. This brought a large number of European immigrants into the steppe vacated 
as a result of sedentarisation of the Kazakh nomads, agricultural collectivisation and 
concomitant famine (a process Caroe described as “genocide”51), and led to the
m 95% of Georgian and 91% of Azeri graduates remained, making up 79% and 60% of their 
respective republican totals. 95% of Kirghiz graduates stayed in Kirghizia. They comprised only 
30% of the total number of ‘experts’. Figures for other Central Asian republics were comparable.
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creation of a Russian-speaking administrative Territory within Kazakhstan answerable 
to Moscow not Alma-Ata.
Nove and Newth insisted that this settlement followed an economic and 
agricultural imperative, and that agricultural specialisation was beneficial to the region. 
Climate and soil conditions favoured the cultivation of crops which could not be grown 
elsewhere and which commanded premium prices. They claimed rural incomes in 
Central Asia were higher than the all-Union average.
Oil was developed in Baku, and cotton was grown in Uzbekistan, not because of
nationality policy but only because these were rather obvious ways of using the
resource endowments of the areas concerned.52
Regional agricultural variation can also be seen in the United States, where for 
instance Vermont is associated with dairy products, Virginia with cotton and tobacco 
and the Mid-West with grain. Specialisation could be reversed. When during the War 
Central Asia’s supply of Ukrainian grain was cut off, the acreage under cotton declined. 
It could be argued that the Virgin Lands project, in establishing a source of food close 
to Central Asia, lessened that area’s dependence on Europe.
Most commentators placed emphasis on the scheme’s being carried out with 
European labour and imputed to this a political purpose having as its goal the retention 
of Russian control over the region. Rywkin claimed that European immigration was 
prompted more by “the possible desire to populate the area before the expected 
Chinese demographic explosion”53 and fear of Chinese expansionism than any special 
desire to swamp Central Asia with Russians.
A decade earlier, Caroe estimated that “the degree of Russian infiltration already 
achieved should suffice to paralyse any Kazakh nationalist or separatist movement 
originating in Kazakhstan54...there is no question, anywhere in Turkistan, of the Russian 
being a sojourner only, as is the British administrator in Nigeria or the Sudan.”55 
According to Conquest, migration had “weakened the national character of the Asian 
republics”56 to the extent that any talk of autonomy or independence was meaningless.
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Moraes by contrast suggested that Russification was not an aim of state- 
sponsored migration, arguing that “the Russians are more concerned with 
Communising their so-called autonomous republics... than they are with Russifying 
them.”57 To most commentators there was no meaningful distinction to be made 
between the two.
Many analysts maintained that it was easy to preach racial equality in a situation 
where Russians outnumbered indigenous peoples. Caroe stated that “where there is no 
question of Russians being left a small minority it is easy to assert that all men have 
equal rights.”58 In the same article in which Wheeler had noted the absence of a 
Russian word for ‘race’ he observed that Slavs collectively made up 80% of the Soviet 
Union’s population and 30% of Central Asia’s.
Stahl emphasised the size of the European, specifically Russian, population of the 
USSR. Of the 189 ethnic groups listed in the 1939 Soviet census, 179 collectively 
constituted just 9% of the population, with Russians alone comprising 58%.
The large preponderance of Europeans over Asiatics in the USSR as a whole 
makes the Communist solution to the racial question much simpler than it 
otherwise would be. Men of all races and colours throughout the Union can be 
made citizens with equal rights in all respects without the European population 
having to fear that they will be ousted and outnumbered.59
Kolarz claimed that the European population of Kazakhstan exceeded that of the 
whole of Africa, including Algeria, Kenya and South Africa, while Rywkin gave relative 
percentages of Europeans in non-European areas as follows: Central Asia including 
Kazakhstan 25%; Kazakhstan itself 65%; South Africa 21%; Algeria 14%. Not only 
were there more Europeans in Central Asia than elsewhere, but Europeans 
outnumbered all indigenous Central Asian groups. “The large European population of
Central Asia plays a decisive role in the political, cultural, and economic life of the
«60area.
The numerical dominance of Russians throughout the Union had a number of 
corollaries. According to Wheeler their sheer numbers made it impossible for a 
nationalist movement to develop.
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The Soviet Union’s ability to maintain military control over Central Asia was 
enhanced by the numerical superiority of Russians, although this military aspect did not 
receive as much attention as might perhaps have been expected. It was remembered 
that Bolshevik power in Central Asia had been established by a relatively small number 
of Russians. Wheeler observed that unlike the British or French Empires which 
required a locally recruited armed force to guarantee the security of overseas 
possessions, the Soviet Union maintained no force of ‘colonial levies’, preferring an 
integrated Union-wide army. This meant that in practice force of arms in Central Asia 
could remain the unique preserve of Russians, with non-Russian conscripts performing 
military service away from their homelands. The importance of this lay in Wheeler’s 
assertion that an anti-colonial revolt depended on the pre-existence of a native standing 
army able to usurp the dominant power’s monopoly on the use of force.
The fact that the Red Army in Central Asia was not composed primarily of 
Central Asians enabled some to present it as an army of occupation. At a meeting of 
the Royal Central Asian Society in London in 1960, Lord Cork characterised the 
Russian presence in Central Asia as one of “peaceful penetration with military 
backing.”61 This Wheeler accepted while denying that Russian control was primarily 
military. Although Red Army units stationed in Central Asia were not manned by 
Central Asians and might appear as an army of occupation, they were in practice 
confined to barracks. This situation was said to be analogous to that obtaining in East 
Germany, where Soviet troops although present were not visible.
Conquest was more emphatic in regarding the Red Army as an imperialist army 
of occupation. As an example of the Soviet Union’s hypocrisy in attacking the West as 
‘imperialist’, he stated that in Soviet eyes “The retention by Britain of a small base in 
Cyprus is ‘imperialism’. The stationing of a powerful army, the carrying out of H- 
bomb tests in Turkestan is not.”62
Such comparisons between the Red Army in Central Asia and East Germany and 
the British army in Cyprus are specious. To take Conquest’s comparison first, it can be 
seen that the situations in Cyprus and Turkestan were different. Cyprus had gained
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international recognition as an independent state in 1960 despite British opposition. 
Britain retained control of not one but two ‘Sovereign Bases’ in Cyprus covering 
ninety-nine square miles. Britain also retained the right to full control of the island’s 
only civilian airport in the event of an emergency, which would be defined not in 
Nicosia but in London. The Turkish invasion of 1974, although an emergency for 
Cyprus, did not affect Britain, which did not act. In this context it is hardly surprising 
that a later scholar described Cypriot independence as no more than “theoretical.”63
‘Turkestan’ was not an independent state whose territory was occupied by the 
army of an outside power. It was an integral part of the Soviet Union. The Red Army 
was the army of the Soviet Union. In Central Asia it was not the army of an outside 
power. Its purpose was not the subjugation of Central Asians but their defence. 
Where else would the USSR station its troops or carry out nuclear arms testing, if not 
on its own territory?
Kolarz noted that the ancient word ‘Turkestan’ remained in use only as the name 
of a Soviet Military District. This he ascribed to the fact that “the Soviet Army does 
not want to discard that traditional name which recalls the colonial wars... against the 
Central Asian people and their rulers,”64 a contention which although revealing of the 
West’s attitude to the Red Army presence in Central Asia cannot go unchallenged. The 
claim is that the phrase ‘Turkestan Military District’ was a deliberate evocation by the 
Russian high command of the Imperial past, stressing the subordination of Central Asia. 
Although Kolarz himself usually used the word Turkestan to designate an actual past or 
potential future political unit, this is not the sense in which Soviet strategists used it. 
Soviet defence was organised along strategic not republican lines into eighteen Military 
Districts. Turkestan covered a distinct geographical and strategic entity independent of 
political divisions, as did the ‘Western’, ‘Baltic’, and ‘Trans-Baikal’ Military Districts. 
The Turkestan Military District included Kazakhstan, which in Soviet usage was not 
considered a part of Central Asia. It would seem that rather than being motivated by 
ideas of colonial/imperial aggrandisement, the use of the word Turkestan was 
sanctioned by practical considerations. Alternatives such as ‘Southern’ or ‘Central
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Asian’ would be inaccurate, the former implying the inclusion of Transcaucasia, a 
District in its own right, and the latter the exclusion of Kazakhstan.™
This consideration of Central Asia as not being a foreign country from the Soviet 
perspective also reflects on the East German comparison. East Germany was not a part 
of the Soviet Union, and here the Red Army could be seen as an army of occupation. 
Unlike the British Army of the Rhine whose original political role had disappeared 
leaving only a defensive capacity, there could be no doubt that the Red Army would if 
necessary remind eastern European governments of their duty to the international 
proletariat, as it did in Germany, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Red Army 
here represented a veiled threat of the use of force to ensure political conformity. To 
compare its presence in East Germany with its presence in Central Asia is to imply that 
its role in the two places was the same. The army appears as an oppressor ensuring a 
political quiescence which otherwise might not obtain.
Had it been the case that Soviet rule in Central Asia was simply a matter of force 
backed by immigration, Bennigsen’s contention that “Soviet Russia continues Imperial 
Russia,”65 with its implied warning to recently decolonised countries not to have 
dealings with the Russians, would have been justified.
The Soviets claimed to have ‘solved’ the nationalities question and brought 
about an end to colonialism through the policy of ‘National Delimitation’ which from 
1924 divided the Soviet Union into ethnically based federal territories with varying 
degrees of autonomy. “The proved existence of a national entity has as its corollary 
the right of that national entity to territorial autonomy and to cultural and political 
development.”66
The ‘highest’ units in terms of autonomy, the Union Republics (SSR), were 
supposedly sovereign entities which ran their own affairs and were joined in voluntary 
union, retaining the right of succession. Western scholars devoted much energy to 
giving the lie to this claim, arguing that Soviet federalism was in fact no more than a
w In 1969 the southern republics of Central Asia were constituted into a new Military District 
independent of Kazakhstan called the Central Asian Military District.
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charade, that “Soviet nationalities policy appears simply as a new and materially more 
effective form of colonialism.”67
The Soviet political system itself was seldom addressed by Central Asia experts 
despite an abundance of literature on the subject, as previously the question of what 
constituted colonialism had been ignored. No author however could ignore the fact 
that Central Asia, with the USSR as a whole, was divided into republics which bore 
the names of differing ethnic groups and which were alleged to be the autonomous 
‘homelands’ of those groups. This division had somehow to be explained. As with 
much else in the study of Central Asia, the debate was obscured by political 
considerations. Wheeler warned,
The essential features of the nationality policy have been obscured by 
propaganda - Soviet propaganda extolling it as a great and enlightened act of 
justice to the subject peoples of Imperial Russia, and anti-Soviet propaganda 
condemning it as a new and monstrous instrument of human enslavement. It is 
also possible to look at it as a hard-headed administrative expedient devised to 
meet certain unforeseen developments which followed the collapse of the Tsarist 
regime.68
In Wheeler’s estimation Lenin genuinely supported the idea of Central Asian 
self-determination but was persuaded not to pursue this course by a number of factors 
including Russia’s need for raw materials, the presence of colonists who regarded the 
area as an integral part of Russia, and fear of British and Japanese intentions. Most 
importantly it was necessary for the survival of the Revolution to halt the centrifugal 
tendency of peripheral groups such as the Finns and Poles, a tendency being expressed 
in Muslim terms by Sultan Galiev.
Some people... maintain that the ‘plan of dividing Turkestan into tribal states’, 
that is, the territorial redistribution of 1924, was the direct result of Sultan 
Galiev’s attempted ‘counter revolution’.69
Wheeler considered that the National Delimitation was in large measure dictated 
by necessity. As he noted, according to Marxist theory nationalism and the demand 
for national self-determination were symptomatic of the period of developed 
Capitalism which would be superseded by the evolution of material equality under 
Socialism, obviating nationalist prejudices. The creation of nation-states or simulacra
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of nation-states was a necessary staging post on the path to Communism, under which 
the common demands of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie would overcome 
national sentiment.
It was believed that once material inequality had been eliminated, all bourgeois 
nationalist and separatist tendencies would disappear. Some writers maintain 
that this policy [of National Delimitation] was ‘conceived in honesty’;v be that as 
it may, it quickly encountered realities which showed that it could not be made to 
correspond to the will of the people, however much it might contribute to their 
material good.70
Wheeler was sympathetic to the aims of the National Delimitation, however he 
was doubtful about its viability in the long term as a means of ensuring continued 
Central Asian membership of the Union.
As a temporary political expedient, [Soviet nationality policy] could, indeed, be 
seen as the best one in the circumstances... Whether the Soviet nationalities 
policy can be said to constitute a permanent and ethical solution of the colonial 
problem and whether it has been applied with due regard to the will or spiritual 
requirements of the peoples concerned are entirely different but no less important 
questions.71
...if the Soviet government had ever entertained any idea of granting the peoples 
of Central Asia genuine independence based on ethnic and linguistic grouping, 
the national delimitation would have proved a useful interim measure.72
[National Delimitation was] not only an important administrative expedient for 
the restoration of law and order out of chaos, but it served as a spectacular 
renunciation of the whole imperial principle and by creating a whole new set of 
administrative terms strove to give the impression that colonialism had 
disappeared forever.73
In most cases Soviet federalism was interpreted as a policy of divide et imperia. 
Wheeler, whilst recognising some justification for this view, denied that the policy was 
entirely cynical. The republics were not seen as an attempt to meet the national 
aspirations of Central Asian peoples but as a means by which Russian control might be 
perpetuated. Despite having read Stalin’s Marxism and the National Colonial 
Question, Hostler, US Military Attache in Ankara before joining Air Force 
Headquarters in Washington DC, ignored the ideological justification for the division 
of Central Asia, stating that “the creation of individual republics is aimed at the
v This phrase was borrowed, uncredited, from Parks’ Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917-1927
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disintegration of the Turkish area and promoting local anti-pan-Turkist areas,”74 pan- 
Turkism being seen by Hostler as the single greatest threat to Communist (Russian) 
hegemony. This idea of the arbitrary division of Central Asia was one commonly held 
by emigre groups in Turkey and Germany.
Kolarz used this theory of divide and rule to contrast Soviet with British policy 
and to highlight the hypocrisy of Soviet claims to have ended colonialism, although 
Monteil did not consider that such a comparison could legitimately be made: “British 
rule was characterised as haphazard, pragmatic and flexible, the very opposite of 
Soviet ideological inflexibility... one cannot usefully compare Soviet ‘methods’ with 
what is, precisely and by definition, the ‘absence of method’.”75
According to Kolarz, British colonialism was only ever intended to be 
temporary. He contended that having created modem states in Africa and Asia the 
British left willingly.
Not even the most radical Gold Coast nationalist would assert that the British 
delayed the liquidation of colonial rule in his country, or that they yielded to 
violence. In fact the British did everything to facilitate the transition of the 
country from colonial status to fully-fledged nationhood.76
Historically speaking, die British came to Nigeria first as rulers and at a later 
stage they became advisors and helpers. Once their task was completed they 
left.77
In their rule over Nigeria the British had succeeded in uniting “a country which 
was tom by deep cultural cleavages and tribal conflicts, but which nevertheless forms a 
viable geographical and political entity.”78 The Russians had destroyed the unity of 
Turkestan in order to consolidate their own power. This could be seen both within the 
USSR itself and in the division of the Kazakhs between the Kazakh SSR and the 
Kazakh Autonomous Uyezd within the People’s Republic of China. The logic of 
national self-determination which the Delimitation supposedly guaranteed would seem 
to demand the union of all Kazakhs within a single state. In practise the Soviet and 
Chinese governments were striving to make such a union impossible, introducing 
different alphabets in each territory to hinder communication. The Communists called 
for the unification of the two Koreas, Vietnams, Cameroons and Somalias,
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Inside the Communist bloc, however, things are quite different. [Kazakh] 
national unity is made impossible by Russia’s and China’s conflicting power 
interests.79
Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay further illustrated the divisive effect of 
Soviet policy when they observed that in place of the three literary languages used by 
the Muslims of the Russian Empire before 1917 there were now twenty-eight. In 
Daghestan alone the pre-Revolutionary lingua franca, Arabic, had by 1945 been 
replaced by nine official languages in addition to Russian, with obvious implication for 
the possibility of the kind of pan-Muslim bloc against the Russians which seemed to 
have been developing in the early years of the century.
The seeming arbitrariness of the internal borders of the USSR formed an 
important part of the argument that the national delimitation was symptomatic of 
colonialism. The constituent nations of the USSR had not evolved as Western nations 
had, but had been devised by central planners.
To Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, a more ‘natural’ division of Central 
Asia would have been into three parts as its peoples were developing into “nations in 
the making”
the Kazakh-Kirghiz group, the Uzbek-Tadjik group and the Turkmen group.
Under the Soviet regime this natural process was given a further impetus, 
because the authorities favoured the consolidation not of three but of six Socialist 
nations (five Turkish and one Iranian) and of two stable narodnost ’, the latter 
provided with literary languages but not with territory.80
Soviet federalism served to further the aims of the central government rather 
than to meet the aspirations of the diverse nationalities. Conquest noted that
Communist theory regards... nations as ‘particles’ to be sacrificed for the good of 
the whole. The ‘whole’ is represented by the large Communist state: and in its 
interests any small nationality must, if necessary, be sacrificed.81
The function of federalism as a tool of Muscovite rule could be illustrated in a 
number of ways such as the deportation of nations and the destruction of their
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administrative units, and the ‘demotion’ of Karelia from Union to Autonomous 
Republic. As Kolarz observed,
An entire nation may play a so-called reactionary role, that is, a role harmful to 
the interests of the proletariat, its Party and its state, the USSR... from this it 
follows that no racial group in the Soviet Union can enjoy any rights 
automatically and perpetually, but only as long as their rights do not conflict with 
the interests of the Soviet state.82
Union Republics and other national-territorial units served not the interests of the 
minority peoples but those of the Russian-dominated State. This could be further seen 
in the administration of the federal system.
Although the Nationalities Policy as originally conceived had aimed at giving 
minorities territories in which they controlled the levers of power, in practise this was 
not the situation. Russia maintained a rigid control over Central Asia through the state 
structure.
On the federal level, the government of the USSR comprised a tripartite 
legislature. The lower house, the Soviet of the Union, was elected from constituency 
lists, delegates representing areas roughly equal in population. The upper house, the 
Soviet of Nationalities, comprised fixed numbers of deputies from each Union and 
Autonomous Republic in order to guarantee minority participation in government. 
Ukraine, a Union Republic, sent the same number of deputies (25) as the much smaller 
Estonia and fewer than Uzbekistan, which sent twenty-five as a Union Republic and 
eleven from the Autonomous Republic within its borders. These two assemblies 
comprised the Supreme Soviet and in fact met rarely. The day-to-day operation of the 
government was in the hands of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet elected by the 
two houses, an ‘inner sanctum’ comprising a chairman, the Presidents of each Union 
Republic and fifteen other members.
Below federal level republics had their own state structure, government and 
ministries. According to Rywkin, whose PhD thesis The Soviet Nationality Policy and 
the Communist Party Structure in Uzbekistan 1941-1946 formed the basis for his later 
work Russia in Central Asia, Lenin demanded federal control only over defence and
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foreign affairs, the republics being autonomous in all other areas. The 1936 
Constitution accorded republican authority only over education, social security and the 
local economy with all other areas of government reserved for all-Union organs.
Although delegates to the Soviets were elected, formally making the country a 
participatory democracy, the system had its limits. Hayit stated that elections were 
entirely controlled by the NKVD and as far as republican government went “The 
parliaments of the five Turkestani republics are in session once a year for two or three 
days; their sittings would be solely composed of Communists...”83
Power lay not in the parliaments established under the Constitution but in the 
Communist Party, which existed as an all-Union body guiding political decisions 
throughout the state rather than being divided into ‘republican’ parties. This allowed 
for the dominance of Russians and the promotion of Russian interests at the expense of 
those of other nationalities, since the dominance of Russians in the country as a whole 
was reflected in the membership of the Party which effectively formed the true 
government of the USSR, organs of state like the Soviets being little more than 
executors of the Party’s will.
The result of this was that Soviet self-government in the republics was a myth. 
Republican leaderships were not sovereign but subordinate to the decisions of the 
Moscow-centred, Russian-dominated Party. This was highlighted by Conquest who 
observed the seeming conflict between the needs of a federal state structure and those 
of a centralised Party which had the power to overrule the decisions of local 
administrators.
What is most striking is the fact that all decisions, whether more or less ‘liberal’ 
from year to year, are taken in Moscow. It is in the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, and its agencies, that the rules of language, of culture and of 
history are laid down for the Asian populations.84
There was an important sense in which Central Asians were not masters of their 
own homes but victims of a colonial dynamic. Bennigsen observed that “the 
instruments of power... [are] dominated by Russians.”85 Nove and Newth focused on
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the role of the Communist Party arguing “As so few Central Asians are in a position to 
influence the decisions of Moscow, there is an important sense in which they are 
subject to alien rule.”86
Seton-Watson, Professor of Russian History at the School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies, London, also argued that the role of the Communist Party ensured 
that Central Asia remained a colony. Although Russian supremacy was not an 
ideological target of the Party, the ethnic make-up of the USSR resulted in a situation 
in which government was carried out principally by and for Russians.
Central Asians have remained colonial subjects, with no right of self- 
determination, and they have been ruled by the same Communist Party as the 
Russians and the European subject peoples of the Soviet Union. But has this 
rule been exercised in the name of the Russian people or someone else? The 
answer must be that power has been wielded by a totalitarian state based not on 
nationalist but on Communist principles, but that there are also definite elements 
of Russification, which suggest some continuity with Imperial Russia... the 
domination of the Russians over [Central Asia] is a foreign domination, which 
certainly has its good features but remains foreign.87
In Kolarz’s estimation the role of the Communist Party “renders all national 
autonomy fictitious.”88 This could be seen in the events in Kazakhstan in 1954 when 
Zhumbay Shayakhmetov, the First Secretary of eight years’ standing, was dismissed 
and replaced by two ‘Russians,’ Panteleimon Ponomarenko and Leonid Brezhnev, 
which appeared to call into question who it was who actually ruled Kazakhstan, 
Kazakhs or Russians.
High officials of the USSR would still be posted at a few days’, perhaps hours’, 
notice to the capital of a non-Russian Soviet Republic where they at once took 
command of the entire economic and political life... Kazakhstan had to accept its 
new rulers without demur.89
The appointment of Europeans to high office in Kazakhstan Kolarz compared to 
that of Walter Bertsch as Nazi Governor of Bohemia-Moravia. This event forced the 
nominally independent Czech government to transact business in German rather than 
Czech, as the Kazakh government was now forced to use Russian. The idea of a 
‘power behind the throne’ in Central Asia was repeated throughout discussions of 
Soviet government. It was stressed that although formal leadership of republican
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governmental departments might be in the hands of a native, his deputy was invariably a 
Russian who was able to exert control over the organs of state. As Rywkin wrote, 
“Moscow has taken no chances... native Muslim ministers have had little chance to 
escape Russian control.”90 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay noted that “the 
distribution of positions in the republican Councils of Ministers obeys tacit rules, having 
the goal of giving the nations apparent authority whilst leaving certain key positions to 
Russians and other Europeans.”91 Russian ‘shadows’ existed at all levels of 
government beyond the village. They gave administrative assistance and ensured 
political conformity. As a result of this arrangement, Conquest felt able to write
The pattern that appears is of a great centralised empire, in which a few 
concessions are made to local feeling, but none which grant any of the substance 
of national self-determination.92
If Soviet federalism was no more than a charade covering Russian imperial 
control of Central Asia, what was its point? Two views were presented. Wheeler 
introduced the concept of the ‘homeopathic’ treatment of nationalism by making 
limited concessions as a sop to local aspirations whilst allowing the Imperial power to 
retain control. As Nove and Newth observed, the lack of local means of political 
expression was one of the factors behind the Algerian revolt. Leprince-Ringuet listed 
“the granting of a degree of autonomy to the different small Muslim republics”93 as 
among the reasons for the maintenance of Soviet control, and Monteil asked “if there 
is value in the Soviet experience, could it not be reached by other means [than 
force]?”94
It was this ‘homeopathic’ treatment, meeting the challenge of nationalism by 
making easy concessions, that led Wheeler to characterise Soviet rule as “a new and 
materially more efficient form of colonialism.” “By comparison with the independence 
enjoyed by such former colonial territories as Morocco, Ghana, India, Pakistan and 
Burma, the ‘full sovereignty’ claimed for the Soviet Muslim republics is a myth.”95 
Wheeler compared the status of the Central Asian republics to that of the Princely 
States in British India, technically independent but effectively controlled by the Political 
Resident and unable to act without the permission of the British authorities. The
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National Delimitation served to give the impression that the colonial era had passed 
although its dynamic persisted.
[Uzbeks] might have their national flag, their national language and some (but 
not all) of their national cultural traditions; but there was no question of their 
being Uzbek citizens or Uzbek patriots; their patriotism, their military service, 
their work and their productivity were due to the Soviet State as a whole.96
This passage brings us as close as any to what Wheeler understood by 
colonialism. It appears to lie in the Uzbeks, taking the above example, owing 
allegiance to a state other than their ‘own’. The Uzbeks’ state is presented not as 
being the Soviet Union but as only a small part of it.
This assumption required a focus on Central Asia to the exclusion of the rest of 
the USSR, which was conceived of not as a unitary state but as a single country, 
Russia, imposing its will on subject nations. Wheeler compared the USSR to Imperial 
British India not to other constitutionally federal states. To have done so would have 
been immediately to weaken the charge of colonialism. If in the above extract we 
substitute ‘Quebecois’ for ‘Uzbek’ and ‘Canada’ for ‘Soviet’ the passage is no less 
true.
Aside from the ‘homeopathic’ treatment of nationalism, Soviet federalism was 
said to have another function, propaganda. The theoretical constitutional 
independence of the republics was no more than a sham aimed at impressing foreign 
visitors. It served to present the Soviet Union in a favourable light to the independent 
states of Africa and Asia, showing that the USSR was the enemy of colonialism and 
therefore their friend. This was an essential consideration if the project of exporting 
Communism was to proceed and remain Moscow-led. It depended on “the gullibility 
of foreign guests and the ignorance prevailing in so many parts of the world as to the 
conditions of the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union.”97
As Kolarz, who was the most consistent and coherent exponent of the theory 
that the national republics served a primarily propaganda purpose, had it,
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the Kremlin sees itself compelled to push Asian communists into the foreground 
not only to persuade the former colonial peoples that the colonial question in the 
Soviet Union has been solved, but also to counteract the competition. It wishes 
to combat a widespread attitude which could be epitomised in the sentence 
‘Russia means Europe whilst China means Asia.”98
Propagandising was effected by means of what Kolarz dubbed the ‘Potemkin 
Visit,’ after the ‘Potemkin Villages’ of Catherine II’s reign. One such was Nasser’s 
1958 visit to Tashkent.
Nasser was accompanied by N.A. Mukhitdinov, a Central Asian Secretary to the 
Soviet Communist Party. At a mass rally in his honour the Egyptian President was 
introduced to Uzbek President Sharif Rashidov, Mufti Ziauddin Babakhanov, 
Khamrakul Tursunkulov, and a Ukrainian factory hand called Serezhenko. The 
intention was to show Central Asians as masters of their own home, but “by meeting 
both Tursunkulov and Mufti Babakhanov, President Nasser was made the victim of a 
particularly studied piece of deceit.”99
The deceit comprised a number of things - that the Presidency of Uzbekistan was 
comparable to that of Egypt when Rashidov could only fulfil Moscow’s orders (which 
as a member Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet he helped formulate. Kolarz ignored 
this); the subordinate position of the only European present; the presence of the Mufti, 
giving the impression that Islam was held in greater respect than was the case; and 
finally the position of Tursunkulov. Kolarz maintained he was not the head of a 
collective farm, as claimed, but a member of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, 
surely a far more impressive achievement for a ‘colonial.’ If the aim of the visit had 
been to show Central Asians to be their own masters it is hard to see wherein lies the 
‘deceit.’ Of the four named Central Asians, three held positions of the highest authority 
both within their own republic and over the whole USSR.
The ‘deceit’ could only be made real either by claiming that these men were not 
‘true’ Central Asians or by denying that they had actual political power. Seton-Watson 
observed the great changes which had taken place since the Revolution but denied that 
Central Asians had had any part in formulating or implementing them: “These great
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changes have been planned and executed on orders from above. The Central Asians 
have never had the slightest influence on policy.”100 Conquest stated, “it is hard to 
believe that constitutional provisions of so derisory a nature could really impress 
foreign observers with the ideas that a non-colonialist method of rule was involved.”101
2.iii:b) Cultural Imperialism
“The importance of Russian physical... penetration should not, however, 
overshadow the importance of the process of cultural assimilation.”102 Imperialism 
was not merely a matter of political dominance. Certain imperialisms demanded not 
only the political subjugation of conquered peoples but their cultural subjugation. 
Such, it was argued, was the aim of Soviet rule in Central Asia. Cultural subjugation 
was a strong feature of French colonial policy, which had sought to replace indigenous 
cultures with a conception of ‘Frenchness.’ In the twenty years after the Second 
World War a colony was conceived of as a polity in which members of one cultural or 
‘ethnic,VI group held political power over another. Such a situation was perceived as 
being untenable. Decolonisation was inevitable, and it could take one of two forms, as 
explained by Stahl.103 Either the imperial power could withdraw, granting home rule 
to the colony, or the colony could become assimilated into the dominant power. In the 
latter case, neither the formerly colonised nor the former colonialist perceives any 
dichotomy between ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’. The two have merged and a colonial dynamic 
no longer subsists. As Stahl put it,
both Britain and the USSR are ‘decolonising’ Powers in the sense that they do 
not seek to keep their colonial peoples in subjugation. Britain aims at teaching 
her colonies to stand on their own two feet and govern themselves, while the 
USSR aims at bringing her peoples in Central Asia up to the level of those in the 
more politically advanced Republics in European Russia.104
The term ‘cultural imperialism’ is in many ways unsatisfactory. If political 
imperialism can be defined as “the enforced rule of one people by another,” ‘cultural 
imperialism’ of the kind suggested by Stahl is a more complex issue. The term is itself 
of more recent coinage, not used during the colonialist and immediately post­
colonialist era. Like the word ‘colonialism’ it is to a certain extent a term of
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opprobrium used in the 1990s to argue that the imperialist dynamic does not 
necessarily lapse with the ending of political control but continues in the cultural 
sphere. The term refers to the dominance of one culture by another from outside. 
Cultural imperialism renders an indigenous culture less ‘authentic’ by introducing 
elements which result in that culture becoming more like the external influence and less 
like ‘itself. The difficulty with the term ‘cultural imperialism’ lies in that it can exist 
independently of political and economic control. This suggests that there must be a 
degree of complicity on the part of its ‘victims’. They must want for whatever reason 
- prestige, conceptions of what is ‘modem’, fashion, utility - to adopt the foreign 
culture.
Another problem with the concept of cultural imperialism is the question of what 
is meant by ‘culture.’ The Oxford English Dictionary gives the word’s primary 
meaning in the verbal sense of ‘to grow’ and only secondarily as a “particular form 
stage or type of intellectual development or civilization,” a purposely vague definition 
which does not address what culture actually consists of. This vagueness about the 
meaning of the word can be seen by the fact that in the nineteenth century it meant 
primarily ‘high’ or elite culture: literature, classical music, drama, the visual arts. The 
illiterate within society were, with non-literate societies as a whole, described as 
‘uncultured’. At the end of the twentieth century it is impossible to think in such 
terms. ‘Culture’ has come to denote the means of understanding and expressing one’s 
own group identity. Any form of group behaviour is understood as a culture, whence 
such concepts as ‘youth culture.’ The particular features which distinguish one culture 
from another remain however largely undefined.
Wheeler offered three definitions of culture.105 He stated that according to 
Ginsburg, culture was “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, law, 
custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” 
Mclver had it that “culture is what we are, civilization is what we use,” taking culture 
as “the expression of our nature in our mode of living and of thinking” and civilization 
as “the apparatus for the control of the conditions of life and of social order.” In the
w The terms were at the time not distinguished unless ‘ethnic’ was being used in the sense of ‘racial’.
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Soviet conception culture was “the combination of the material and spiritual values 
created and developed by humanity in the course of its history.” According to Soviet 
theory Socialism represented not only the most perfect economic order short of 
Communism but also the highest cultural form. Elsewhere Wheeler stated that
The Russians do not generally distinguish between culture and civilisation, and 
Soviet sociologists would not accept Prof. Mclver’s statement that “our culture 
is what we are, our civilisation is what we use.” But on the basis of such a 
distinction it can be said that whereas the use of Soviet civilization is now 
widespread in Muslim Central Asia and may even be firmly established there, the 
adoption of Soviet culture is still limited and superficial.106
This de-coupling of culture from civilization was a feature of Western writing. 
Although Bacon included technological change in her description of Central Asian 
culture, noting for instance the replacement of the horse with the bicycle as a means of 
transport as an example of cultural change, most authorities did not consider 
technology (‘what we use’) as an aspect of culture, preferring to focus on questions of 
self-perception as expressed in such fields as language and literature. The one 
exception was that of family life and social structure, which in Mclver’s thesis belongs 
in the realm of civilization (‘apparatus for control of social order’).
The questions of whether ‘culture’ can be meaningfully separated from 
‘civilization’, whether one is an expression of the other and in what either actually 
consists are not purely philosophical. If the two are linked, then a change in the one 
will generate a change in the other. If one’s ‘civilization’ - technology, political 
institutions - becomes ‘modem’, then assuming a linkage between ‘civilization’ and 
‘culture’ one’s culture will also become modem. If ‘modernisation’ means 
‘Europeanisation’, as it was largely understood by the scholars under discussion, then 
in certain respects one’s culture will become more ‘European’. Cultural change on this 
reading becomes not a measure of imperialism but of modernisation. This is an 
argument employed by Nove and Newth when they suggested that the changes which 
had occurred in Central Asia such as the growth of the power of the state at the 
expense of traditional groupings and realignments in family relations were not 
symptomatic of Russian imperialism but of modernisation, and were changes which 
had come about throughout the Muslim world.
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Some critics have made much of the destruction of the traditional Muslim way of 
life. Such a destruction has indeed occurred, but it is at least arguable that this is 
part of the price that one has to pay, inside and outside Soviet borders, for 
modernisation and development. One has only to examine the policy of 
Ataturk.107
This position was in large part accepted. Wheeler however noted that there was 
a crucial difference between cultural change in Soviet Central Asia and ostensibly 
similar phenomena affecting the rest of the Muslim world. This was that whereas 
elsewhere Westernisation had been to a large extent spontaneously generated, in the 
case of Central Asia it was the result of deliberate government policy backed with the 
force of law.
Russianisation is of course merely one form of the Westernisation which in 
varying degrees has affected all the Muslim countries of Asia. The difference is 
that except in isolated cases such as dress and language reforms in Turkey, no 
government of an Asian Muslim country whether nationalist or imperialist has 
ever proposed to enforce the introduction of Western culture by means of 
legislation.108™
The political and ideological structure of the USSR meant that cultural change 
was formulated, initiated and legislated for in the Russian-dominated environment of 
Moscow. Thus it could be described as ‘imperialist’. It was Russians not Central 
Asians who prescribed the nature of ‘who we are’ in Central Asia.
The influence specifically of Russian culture on Central Asia and the changes in 
Central Asian culture during the Soviet period were discussed as being symptomatic of 
the imperialist control of Russia over the area and were interpreted as being part of a 
deliberate plan to perpetuate that control. This understanding was reinforced by the 
fact that certain cultural changes which tended towards Russification were the result of 
deliberate state policy. Bacon observed other changes, such as the habit of the 
Kazakhs of eating flat naan bread rather than the Russian leavened bread which had
TO Wheeler’s contention that Westernisation was uniquely enforced by law in the USSR is not strictly 
true. Afghanistan, Albania and Iran also experienced enforced accelerated Westernisation. See e.g. 
Banuazizi & Weiner (1986), Owen (1992), Jelavich (1983).
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been introduced at the same time,™1 which had not been condoned by state policy and 
which were of Central Asian origin. These were seen as being more acceptable to 
Central Asians than habits enjoined by the Moscow-based government. The purpose 
of state policy was the transformation by force if necessary of the cultures of all the 
peoples of the USSR as a part of the project of building Communism.
The concerns of Western scholars were focused not so much on the extent to 
which Central Asian culture had changed, although this had been a primary purpose of 
Bacon’s work, as the extent to which it had become Russian, why it had become 
Russian and whether Russification was spontaneous or politically motivated. This was 
of particular importance to French scholars, since the French imperial project was 
justified by a ‘mission civilitrice’ which sought to replace indigenous cultures with that 
of France, the success or failure of French rule being gauged by the extent to which 
this had occurred.109
Although it had been observed that the Russians did not evince conceptions of 
racial superiority, Wheeler noted a tendency towards a belief in Russian cultural 
superiority. This derived in part from Russia’s history of self-definition against 
(particularly) Islam and an eastern expansion which brought Russia into contact with 
the ‘primitive’ peoples of Siberia and was reinforced by the official adoption of a 
Marxist, neo-Darwinian, theory of history which perceived social dynamics in 
evolutionary terms. The Russians as initiators of the Socialist revolution and the first 
to begin constructing Communism were in this scheme more ‘advanced’ than other 
peoples, particularly the Muslims whose societies on the eve of the Revolution were 
variously described as being still at the ‘feudal’ stage or just entering into capitalism. 
Russian culture was therefore more advanced than other cultures of the USSR. Whilst 
that culture was itself being transformed others had to ‘catch up’ with a Russian 
paradigm. Communist culture was essentially Russian. “The declared goal is a culture 
which is national in form but socialist in content. Since however the driving force
vm Bacon does not address what the Kazakhs had traditionally eaten. Small amounts of grain had 
been grown and more traded for by the Kazakhs before the arrival of the Russians. This was 
presumably transformed into some kind of bread.
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behind the revolution was and is Russian... russianisation seems inevitable.”110 “The 
ultimate Soviet goal was Russianization.”111
In effect the Soviet authorities have not been able - or have not wanted... to adapt 
Communism to the specific characteristics of each nationality (as Lenin 
nevertheless achieved in Russia or Mao Tse Tung for China). By an amazing 
paradox, the Soviets who are so liberal in racial matters evince an intransigent 
chauvinism as soon as their culture is concerned; this chauvinism is especially 
manifest in their relations with Muslim society.112
The ‘elder brother’ theory of relations between nations in which Russia 
appeared as mentor to less advanced societies was developed in order to ensure 
Russian hegemony. Western scholars noted that this theory, denigrating native 
cultures, was typical of an imperialist world-view. Kolarz observed that “it was 
customary in the United States to refer to the Filipinos as ‘little brown brothers’.”113 
The Dutch used the same formula in relation to the Indonesians.
Even before the Revolution the conception of Russians as elder brother to the 
subject nationalities and of the dominant position this accorded them had been 
expressed by Kuropatkin, then Governor-General of Turkestan, when in 1916 he 
claimed
To the Russian must belong the foremost role in all comers of Russia since they 
contributed more than all the others... The many peoples inhabiting Russia are all 
children of one father, the Great Sovereign Emperor. All of these many peoples 
are children of one mother, Great Russia. But in this numerous family the 
Russians must be the elder brothers of all the rest.114
Soviet cultural policies had undergone various changes since the Revolution. In 
the early years a policy of korenizatsiya, or ‘nativisation’ had sought to strengthen 
native cultures by such means as creating literary vernaculars. After the purges of the 
late 1930s this was replaced with the doctrine of sblizheniye, the ‘coming together’ of 
peoples, a formulation which, if it means anything, appears to imply the existence of a 
single ‘macro-culture’ allowing for slight regional variations. This formulation was 
itself replaced by sliyaniye, the ‘fusion’ of peoples into a new cultural formation, that 
of ‘Soviet culture’ under which conditions national distinctions would vanish 
altogether. These seemingly contradictory policies form parts of a single whole,
78
intended to force the ‘backwards’ peoples through the preliminary stages before the 
establishment of Communism by creating and then disbanding nation states as a 
precursor to the ending of class and all other distinctions under Communism.
To establish Communism it is... above all necessary to achieve a true cultural 
symbiosis of all the peoples of the Union by attacking the barriers which separate 
the Muslims from other human groupings and most especially the Russian 
people, the ‘elder brother’ of the great Soviet family.115
Cultural change took many forms, as culture itself has many expressions. 
Although taking cognisance of many of these, Western scholars focused on aspects of 
cultural change which tended towards the de-racination of Central Asians and their 
assimilation into the Russian whole which was the ultimate goal of Soviet policy. Thus 
while it was noted that new forms of cultural expression such as cinema had appeared 
these were not dwelt upon since they did not of themselves indicate the destruction of 
Central Asian culture which was said to be taking place.
Three specific aspects of culture dominated Western discussions. Religion was 
one. The Western interpretation of the role of Islam forms the bulk of this thesis, but 
the attack on Islam was not of itself evidence of forced Russification since all religions 
were under assault. Of greater interest in this context were the changes - or lack 
thereof - occurring to the languages and social organisation of Central Asia. I shall 
concentrate on language issues, since these attracted particular attention in the West as 
symptomatic of Russian cultural imperialism.
According to Bacon,
It has been written that ‘every language reflects, and is in some of its features 
linked up with, the culture of the people speaking it, and is likely to undergo 
changes in these particular features in accordance with changes in the culture of 
the people.’ A consideration of what has happened to the languages of Central 
Asia may thus give a clue to the degree and kind of change in other aspects of 
culture.116
Bennigsen and d’Encausse maintained that “in Central Asia culture and language 
are closely connected: they are two elements of the nationalism [by which they seem to 
have meant ‘national identity’ rather than a political project] of the Muslim peoples.
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What would become of that nationalism if it were deprived of its principle means of 
expression?”117 evincing the typically French view that language was the bearer of 
national identity. British scholars were more prepared to accept that language loss did 
not entail de-racination. Nove and Newth pointed out that Irish nationalism and the 
Irish language were most vigorously promoted by those who spoke only English. 
Nevertheless, Wheeler considered that “the Soviet regime regards linguistic 
regimentation as one of the most important instruments in the moulding of the new 
society.”118 Allworth noted that this was a result of Stalin’s theory of the nation which 
insisted that for a people to count as such it must possess its own language. “Stalin 
and his colleagues long insisted on the fact that the spoken language was an essential 
criterion of nationality.”119 Retention of a ‘pure’ native language could be interpreted 
as evidence for the preservation of an equally pristine culture.
Two aspects of linguistic development in the Soviet Union could be discerned. 
The first was the establishment and enforcement of standardised vernaculars and their 
extension into the literary sphere. This had an obvious practical use. The growth of a 
universal education system demanded a standardised language as it had elsewhere in 
the world where the establishment of schools was paralleled by growing intolerance of 
regional speech patterns. The use of national languages in administration and print 
demanded that these be reduced to writing. Most Western scholars however saw a 
political rather than a purely practical intent to these changes.
Standardising languages accentuated the differentiation between ethnic groups. 
There was no longer a gradual dialectal shift from one language to another but an 
abrupt change marked by republican boundaries. It was argued that the choice of 
language and dialect was politically motivated, as was shown by the change in 1937 
from the vowel-harmonising Yasi dialect of Uzbek as the official form to that of 
Tashkent which had, uniquely for a Turkic language, lost this feature. It could be 
countered that the dialect of the republic’s administrative centre was a more ‘natural’ 
choice than that of a town in a neighbouring republic.
The enforcement of vernaculars each possessing its own orthography as literary 
media in place of the written languages of Arabic, Persian and Chaghatay traditionally
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used across the region served to split what could be presented as a broadly 
homogenous bloc into disparate elements which could no longer communicate with 
one another or act as a single unit against the Russians. “These aims if achieved would 
have the effect of preventing the formation of a single Turkic literary language which 
might aid the creation of a united Turkic and Muslim national movement.”120
Linguistic change on this level could be presented as another aspect of the policy 
of ‘divide and rule’, an interpretation followed by virtually all Western scholars, 
enhanced by Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay’s belief that the speech patterns of 
Central Asia would ‘naturally’ have consolidated into three languages rather than the 
eight endorsed by the Soviets.
The second aspect of language change was Russification. This took two forms. 
One was the infiltration of Russian terms into Central Asians languages, partly to 
replace words of Arabic or Persian origin which were ‘purged’ and partly to introduce 
new concepts. Russian terms entered native languages as a result of editorial policy, 
so that “in Turkmenistan, the influx of Russian vocabulary is so great that in 
newspapers one may find whole sentences in which all the nouns are Russian,”121 and 
by “constant reiteration in school.”122 Despite these, “Most people continue to employ 
their regional dialects in conversation. In speech the ‘standard’ language appears to be 
limited to the intelligentsia... the gap between the standard and the spoken language is 
indicated by the fact that some Uzbek authors provide glossaries.”123
A study by Bennigsen suggested that even in literary language the take-up of 
Russian terms was slight. Examination of Tadjik dictionaries revealed that although 
the proportion of words of Russian origin had grown, these were overwhelmingly 
scientific and technical terms expressing new concepts. Although Bennigsen regrets 
that “whole groups of native words expressing complete concepts have disappeared 
altogether,” the example he gives is that of “measurements such as tanab, sang 
[which] have given way to gektar, kilometr etcetera.”124 These new words were 
neologisms in Russian, ‘international’ scientific terms which were becoming universal. 
Their adoption does indicate some cultural change but they are hardly symptomatic of 
imperialism. Although the technical vocabulary for Chemistry contained many Russian
81
and international loans, that for agriculture, a traditional activity, remained dominated 
by Tadjik terms. The impression gained is that Russian was being used where 
necessary as a supplement to rather than a replacement for Tadjik. This is underlined 
by Bennigsen’s examination of the use of the word sovyet. In Russian the word means 
both an advisory council and as an abstract noun, advice. Bennigsen observed that in 
Tadjik usage sovyet referred only to a government assembly, as Sovyet-i Oli (Supreme 
Soviet), the traditional terms majlis (assembly) and maslihat (sic - nasihat: advice) 
remaining in everyday use. It can be seen from the above example that Russian 
grammar had failed to make an impact on Tadjik.
For Bacon such superficial changes in vocabulary “do not suggest any 
disintegration of Central Asian culture or any wholesale acceptance of Russian 
culture.”125 In fact, although the consolidation of national languages may have 
prevented the development of a ‘pan-Turkic’ or ‘pan-Islamic’ anti-Russian movement, 
it tended to hinder rather than to help Russian cultural penetration since it facilitated 
the creation of distinct Central Asian nations where previously there had been none. 
“Parallel with linguistic parcelling out can be observed economic and cultural 
unification. In such circumstances is it possible to speak of the consolidation of stable 
‘nation-states’ firmly united by a SchiksalgemeinschaftT126
A more serious threat to Central Asian culture lay in linguistic Russification’s 
second aspect, the replacement of a native language by Russian. It had been suggested 
that the Soviet goal was that Russian, rather than being simply a lingua franca, should 
become the sole medium of discourse throughout the USSR:
Not only are the Russian people to be recognised as the leading and guiding force 
in the country, but the Russian language is assigned a position superior to that of 
all other languages spoken in the Soviet Union, and future Communist nations of 
the USSR are envisaged as merging into one culture with one common language, 
Russian.127
Under certain circumstances it was essential to speak Russian. This was the case 
in the Red Army, which required a single language of command. It was also necessary 
in all-Union bodies. There were instances in which it was fashionable or politic to use 
Russian as, according to Allworth, was the case in the Academies of Science where
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“Asian scientists, wanting to seem more patriotic than the Russians, use the Russian 
language to prove their loyalty.”128 In fact,
Between 1932 and 1959 the Kazakh academics at the Alma-Ata Academy of 
Science wrote their works chiefly in Russian. Only 26% of books and articles 
published by the Kazakh Academy of Sciences in non-technical and non- 
scientific subjects appeared in the Kazakh language.129
[the Academies of Science] where the Russian language has always been in 
vogue, present a flagrant example of foreign influence in the choice of language 
of publication.130
The use of Russian in these circumstances can be attributed to the desire to reach 
the widest possible audience. Allworth noted that books intended for domestic 
consumption tended to be written in local languages. In Turkmenistan, on a year-by- 
year average Turkmen publications outnumbered Russian by a ratio of 2:1. A large 
number of works also appeared in translation rather than their original Russian. 
Allworth was forced to conclude that “As a general rule, the most important among 
the Asian nations habitually use their native language very widely for those books and 
pamphlets which they themselves distributed.”131
Kolarz claimed that “practically every Soviet institution assists the regime in 
promoting the cause of the Great Russian people and the Great Russian language.”132 
As well as publishing, this included education.
“Soviet leaders had expected that through education the peoples of Central Asia 
would become Russianised.”133 The number of people educated in Russian was 
greater than the number of Russians, but this did not imply any great degree of or 
desire for linguistic assimilation. A good knowledge of Russian was an essential skill 
for economic and social advancement. Russian was “the road to prestige, power and 
material benefits.”134 Nove and Newth noted that the 480 extra school hours a week 
needed for the study of Russian in native-language schools provided a disincentive to 
attend such institutions. Many ethnic minorities were additionally obliged to attend 
Russian-language schools in the absence of schools using their own languages. The 
fact that educational provision met centrally approved targets rather than local demand 
enabled the authorities to insist on Russian-medium schooling. However, language 
change was not always in favour of Russian. Bacon noted that minorities whose
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culture was similar to that of the republican majority tended to adopt the latter’s 
language. Where it was feasible to use a non-Russian language assimilation into 
Russian did not to occur. As Wheeler had it, “there is no evidence to suggest that the 
Soviet Union actually succeeds in hindering the development of native languages. On 
the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability of the local languages to survive in 
the face of strong pressures.”135
Pipes claimed that native-language use was on the increase in some areas. 
Assimilation was strongest amongst speakers of other Slavic languages and among 
groups living outside their ‘ethnic homelands’.
If we next turn to the minorities with distinct cultures, living in border areas and 
with historic roots on their present territories, we find that Russification either 
has made little or no progress or has lost ground. The Turkic inhabitants... show 
an astounding loyalty to their native languages... of the twenty million Muslims 
(Volga Tatars excepted), only 200,000, or 1% have become linguistically 
russianised.136
This suggests that state coercion is not in itself enough to force cultural change. 
Utility is also a consideration. If a person cannot see the point of a change he will not 
adopt it, although under certain circumstances he might appear to do so if it will be 
personally advantageous either for protection or for promotion. “The oasis peoples 
quietly adhere to their own culture unless the advantages of change are obvious.”137
This attitude towards language change was noted by Bacon as being 
symptomatic of attitudes towards social change. In most cases assimilation into 
Russian culture had not occurred. “Such proffered elements as do not fit into their own 
patterns are rejected,”138 “only those features of Russian culture which accord with the 
Muslim society’s general evolution... seem to make a lasting impact.”139 As a result, 
“Muslim society has remained very nearly intact despite forty years under the Soviet 
regime. The Soviet way of life has hardly penetrated it.”140
The nuclear family promoted by the Russians was only gradually coming into 
being, people still tending to live in extended family groups dominated by a patriarchal 
figure. Despite Soviet insistence on women’s equality, traditional attitudes towards
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women’s roles persisted. Such practices as polygyny and female seclusion not only 
continued but were spreading as status symbols. Central Asians seemed adept at 
avoiding Russian cultural prescriptions whilst appearing superficially Russianised when 
necessary. In Pipes’ term, they presented a “crust of assimilation.”141
Examples Bacon gives are the custom of keeping two guest rooms, one 
furnished in European style as Soviet society demanded and another with traditional 
furnishings, and Central Asians’ avoidance of Russian food and eating habits by taking 
their main meal at home in the evening rather than in the works canteen. Employment 
choices also reflected a desire to avoid culturally uncongenial situations. Factory work 
in cities was avoided in favour of village life where it was easier to preserve traditional 
cultural norms. Even in the realm of higher education, Central Asians showed a clear 
preference for the Arts, where they could develop their own cultures via the medium of 
their own languages than for the Sciences, which were taught via Russian. What was 
occurring in the face of Russian political domination was a withdrawal into a private 
cultural world in the home, the family and the kin-group beyond the reach of Soviet 
supervision.
Central Asians in refusing to assimilate to Soviet norms were rejecting the Soviet 
Union itself. “The nationalism of the non-Russian peoples in the face of persecution is 
always finding new forms of camouflage, particularly by escaping into the cultural 
field.”142 If Russian political imperialism had succeeded in subjugating the peoples of 
Central Asia and forcing them under Russian dominance, the project of cultural 
imperialism had failed. “There has been some drawing together within the ethnic 
groups of Central Asia and, to a smaller extent, among the peoples of Central Asia, but 
there has been little sblizhnost ’ (sic) between Central Asians and Russians.”143
2.iv) The Consequences of Colonialism
Folson criticised the use of a colonialist discourse in studying the Soviet Union. 
If the preponderance of one ethnic group in a country constituted colonialism, then “it 
would be difficult to think of one major country in the world today that could escape 
the charge... If the mere fact of a dominant ethnic group in a heterogeneous country
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were to constitute colonialism, then many an African country would stand 
condemned.” 144 The idea of empire comprising the dominance of one people by 
another was central to the West’s conception of the USSR as an empire. As Pipes 
said, the Soviet Union was “an ordinary empire of many nations dominated by one.”145
Unlike most European and American scholars, who tended to separate Central 
Asia from the rest of the Soviet Union and consider the former region in isolation, 
Folson insisted that the Soviet political system “should not be interpreted as an attempt 
by European Russia to dominate the non-European nationalities. It is merely a feature 
of the same centralized, totalitarian control that obtains everywhere in the Soviet 
Union.”146 This was conceded by Nove and Newth when they asserted that
The transformation of Transcaucasian and Central Asian society is only a special 
case of the transformation of society throughout the Union... It is difficult to 
argue that the kinds of pressures exerted at the periphery were essentially 
different from those exerted in the heart of Russia proper.147
They then asserted that “it cannot be said that the sacrifices imposed on the 
peasants in the republics we are considering matches those borne by the Russians or 
the Ukrainians.”148
Despite these caveats the weight of opinion held that a colonial dynamic was in 
operation in Central Asia. The principle feature of that dynamic in the post-War era 
was that colonised peoples would gradually become Westernised, and, becoming 
Westernised, demand independence. Luthy saw colonialism as a part of a global 
Europeanisation which resulted not in identification with but opposition to Europeans. 
Plamenetz considered that under colonial conditions
the Europeans started among the peoples of Asia and Africa a process of change 
which those peoples now no longer wish to stop or reverse but which they aspire 
to control; and they cannot control it unless they are self-governing. This 
aspiration and the desire for self-government are themselves effects of the 
process started by the Europeans.149
Luthy insisted that “it is no paradox to say that the colonial peoples have shaken 
off European tutelage in order to acquire more quickly what their European tutors 
promised them.”150
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The argument is in essence that colonialism engenders modernisation which in 
turn creates nationalism, which as Marx observed and Hobsbawm has argued was a 
result of the social changes brought about by industrialisation and urbanisation. In the 
context of a discussion on colonialism and nationalism within the Soviet Union, Pipes 
argued that
By pulling into national life the mass of previously isolated and passive popular 
groups, the process of modernisation inadvertently promoted nationalism and 
national differences, because national identity is most deeply rooted in these very 
groups... Mass education and mass literacy also promote national distinctions by 
institutionalising local languages, histories, literatures etc.151
‘Modernisation’ consisted of the importation of European models of education, 
social, legal and economic relations from the metropolis, with the colony coming to 
resemble the colonial power. Colonies of France became ‘more French’, those of 
Britain ‘more British’ and those of Russia ‘more Russian’.
Whether local Muslims are happy to have paid this price is another question, 
since many of them clearly perceive the indivisibility of Sovietization, 
industrialization and Russification.152
The question of whether Soviet Asians were happy to have become Russified 
was an important one. The history of other colonialisms suggested that it was unlikely.
It is a common fallacy to assume that cultural benefits win the gratitude of 
colonial peoples... On the contrary, it is often the best things that colonial 
Governments do that bring them the most hatred. It is unlikely that the Soviet 
Empire is any exception to this rule. Annamese intellectuals owed their 
education to the French, Indian intellectuals to the British, yet this did not make 
them grateful admirers of British and French rule... it is unlikely that the attitude 
of the Uzbek intellectual is different.153
Few denied that Soviet rule had brought benefits on a material level to the 
peoples of Central Asia. Since the 1950s Wheeler had been chronicling the economic 
development of the region in Central Asian Review. Nove and Newth examined the 
material benefits of this development in some depth. Central Asia, they observed, was 
a net beneficiary of federal spending, receiving more in grants and subsidies than it 
contributed in revenues. Per capita income, less than the USSR average, was greater
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than Spain’s or Turkey’s. Although income disparity between Russia and Tadjikistan 
was on a ratio of 2:1, this was “about equal to the ratio between West Germany and 
Italy but much smaller than that, say, between West Germany and Portugal or 
Greece.”154 Non-monetary indices also pointed to the relative wealth of Central Asia. 
In 1928 the region’s rates of fuel consumption, urbanisation, literacy and infant 
mortality had reached a stage not attained by India or Pakistan until 1962, by which 
year Central Asia fell between Italy and Japan. Educational levels were high, as were 
the provision of social services such as pensions, benefits and health care. In 1959 
Central Asians were served by three times as many doctors as Turkey and six times as 
many as Iran.
Recognition of developmental disparity between Soviet Asia and other Asian 
states was not new. An anonymous contributor to the Journal of the Royal Central 
Asian Society stated that “whereas before the Revolution the material condition of the 
Muslim peoples of Transcaucasia and Central Asia was much the same as that of 
adjacent countries, it is now very much higher.”155 Wheeler observed that “in their 
standard of living, in general and technical education, and in industry and in agriculture 
[Central Asia is] far ahead of many independent eastern countries.”156
Economic progress however would not necessarily translate into support for the 
regime. Wheeler considered that
Although the material conditions of the peoples of Soviet Central Asia has [jic] 
greatly improved during the Soviet regime, their political and cultural 
development on national and traditional lines has been - and is still being - 
impeded.157
Kolarz highlighted this as a source of the kind of discontent which had led to 
anti-colonial movements elsewhere, stating that “good schools are no compensation for 
political freedom”158 and citing the Guinean leader Sekou Toure as stating that people 
prefer “freedom in poverty to slavery in abundance,”159 a proposition which has not 
been proven. Nadel and Curtis considered that “all the talk of civilizing missions and all 
the material improvements imaginable would never have convinced the majority of 
African, Arab, Indian or Asian peoples that imperialism was much more than a 
euphemism for exploitation.”160
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Seton-Watson set out this argument in some length both in an article published in 
Problems of Communism and in his book on nationalism and Communism.
Soviet spokesmen are entitled to point to the great material progress achieved 
under Soviet rule... Supporters of the Central African Federation have argued 
that it brought economic benefits to the Africans and that it would have brought 
more had it been allowed to continue. They may be right. But they have missed 
the point, which is that the Africans of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland want to run 
their own countries. It may be that they will run them badly, but they want to be 
their own masters. The Soviet government uses essentially the same arguments 
as Sir Roy Welensky. It has developed the resources of Uzbekistan. Some of the 
benefits of this development have gone to the Uzbeks, some to the Russians 
living in Uzbekistan, and some into the great maw of the totalitarian Leviathan in 
Moscow. But at no time has the Soviet government been willing to consider for a 
moment allowing the Uzbeks to run their own country... the fact remains that the 
imperialist-colonialist relationship is inherently artificial, humiliating and 
unacceptable. The colonial peoples would prefer to be free of tutelage, even if it 
is benevolent. If this is true of Western Empires, it is also true of the Soviet 
one.161
Asian and African nationalists claim... that self-government is more important 
than good government. [President of Ghana] Dr Nkrumah has declared that the 
keys of the political kingdom must be given first. But these keys have always 
been denied to Central Asians. It may be argued that Socialism is a better form 
of government than capitalist democracy, that Stalin and Kruschev have done 
their job of colonial development better than Welensky: the fact remains that it 
has been the same sort of job.162
Colonialism had as a logical corollary nationalism in reaction against it. Nove 
and Newth argued that this was not necessarily a mechanistic process, but that it 
depended on the
attitude of the people to their neighbours and to their own national status. One 
has but to contrast the relationship between England and Ireland on the one hand 
and England and Scotland on the other. Until 1921 they shared common 
membership of a constitutional multinational State, the United Kingdom. The 
differences did not lie in institutions but essentially in history and national and 
religious consciousness.163
A people could become assimilated, but the more separate their cultures the less 
likely this would be and the more likely that colonialism would end in the establishment 
of independent states. According to Hayit “the Turkestani people radically 
differentiate themselves from the Russians in culture, national characteristics, language
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and literature, values and customs, history, religion mentality, view on life and 
territory ”164 This would seem to suggest that the people of Turkestan were essentially 
unassimilable into a Russian cultural milieu, making independence the only way of 
ending the colonial relationship.
Central Asians were seen as being sufficiently different to Russians to make anti­
colonial sentiment inevitable, especially since anti-colonialism was the dominant 
movement throughout the world and “it would be illogical had the development of 
numerous national states in the orient met with Turkestani sympathy while at the same 
time failing to giver fresh impetus to a sense of national independence.”165
Rywkin quoted Pipes as stating that “the social and cultural processes occurring 
in Central Asia do not differ fundamentally from those taking place in other colonial or 
ex-colonial societies.”166 Kolarz was more forthright:
The colonial problem of Russia cannot be viewed in isolation from the colonial 
problem presenting itself in other parts of the globe, for the struggle for 
the fulfilment of national aspirations among the colonial peoples has 
proceeded everywhere on a similar pattern.167
If Central Asia was essentially the same as other areas of Asia and Africa, it 
should behave similarly, the more so since “While an African guest is admiring new 
Tashkent factories, his Uzbek host cannot help wondering why nationalism and self- 
determination are virtues abroad and sins at home.”168 The idea that an Uzbek might 
be a Soviet nationalist does not figure. As Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay put it,
Could not the contacts between the Muslims of the USSR and the young Asian 
and African states... favour the re-emergence of ideas close to those which Sultan 
Galiev put forward earlier, notably a wish to construct a Muslim Socialism 
without the Russians?169
Kolarz saw the development of a nationalist movement in Central Asia as 
concomitant on the region’s colonial status:
Colonialism cannot be destroyed in non-Communist Asia and Africa and remain 
alive in Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In the long run those 
parts of the world cannot remain outside the mainstream of international 
developments.170
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Even the granting of full rights to Central Asians could not prevent this 
development. Portugal and France had regarded colonial subjects as the equals of their 
European citizens, but it remained the case that “people who until a few years ago still 
considered themselves as ‘Black Frenchmen’ have proudly proclaimed themselves as 
Senegalese, Dahomeyans or ‘Ivorians’ ”171
Folson suggested that this might have been because the French and Portuguese 
governments’ claims “did too much violence to the facts... no-one believes that in 
metropolitan Portugal the African can expect to be treated on a basis of equality with 
the white Portuguese.”172 Kolarz himself admitted that “the colour problem which 
prevents the full integration of the American nation is absent in the Soviet Union,”173 
however these considerations did not concern Western scholars unduly, in part because 
for skin colour some different distinguishing characteristic, such as a cultural identity, 
could be substituted. What was of importance was not so much the nature of the 
difference between Russians and Central Asians but that this difference was not subject 
to a change which might reduce it.
The relationship between Russia and Central Asia was another example of the 
clash between European and non-European civilisations or between ‘white people’ and 
‘black people’ which formed the overriding characteristic of the post-War international 
order and which because of the “smouldering resentment of non-white people 
throughout the world”174 could only be resolved by a disassociation and constitution 
into separate states.
Although this resentment had in the first instance been directed against the West, 
leading some in the ‘black’ world to flirt with Communism, ultimately
this division between the ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ peoples will probably matter 
more in the future than the division between the Communist and liberal 
countries... the resentment of the coloured people against the whites, if it persists, 
will probably no longer be directed almost exclusively against the western
175nations.
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2.v) Conclusion
The presentation of Soviet Central Asia as a colony depended on several factors. 
Reluctance to examine precisely what was meant by the word ‘colony’ was one of 
these. Equally important was the psychological division between ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia,’ 
between ‘white’ and ‘not white,’ in the minds of Western scholars many of whom came 
from political traditions which depended for their survival on such a distinction.
This cleavage into ‘white’ and ‘not white’ as primary characteristics, also 
manifest in American domestic politics and seen to be expressed in white oppression 
and non-white resistance ran directly through the Soviet Union, splitting off Central 
Asia from the European republics. Central Asians were seen in the West as ‘not white.’ 
According to Hostler, “the Turkish regions of the Soviet Russian Empire historically 
and culturally gravitate towards the Middle and Near East, the centre of Islamic 
civilisation,”176 away from identification with the European/Russian aspect of the 
Soviet Union. The two were seen as fundamentally incompatible. Bennigsen and 
Lemercier-Quelquejay noted that it was the Kazan’ Tatar Sultan Galiev who formulated 
“the only attempt to define the revolutionary process in the colonial world”177 and that 
this demanded the independence of Asians from European control as a pre-requisite for 
establishing socialism.
The division between Russians and non-Russians was also aided by the common 
but inaccurate Western habit of substituting the word ‘Russia’ for ‘Soviet Union’, a 
habit which had its echo in everyday Russian usage. If the state as a whole was 
‘Russia’, it followed that the non-Russian areas were not part of that state but had a 
subordinate status. In the case of Central Asia this status was that of colony. The idea 
that a Central Asian might identify with and be loyal to the Soviet Union as his state 
was scarcely considered. According to Seton-Watson the apparent loyalty of Central 
Asians to the regime evidenced by the absence of groups analogous to the Indian 
National Congress or Egyptian Wafd “proves only that the Soviet security forces are 
efficient.”178 Commonly understood, the Soviet Union and Russia were not distinct 
entities. A non-Russian could hardly identify with a Russian state run by and for 
Russians.
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Although some scholars were unsure of the potential for anti-colonial (anti- 
white/anti-westem) revolt in Central Asia, the theoretical potential for such a 
development was almost universally acknowledged. Seton-Watson stated, “whether 
beneath the totalitarian surface nationalism is still strong among the non-Russian 
peoples of the Soviet Union is hard to say, but the historical experience of other 
Empires suggests that it is likely to be.”179 Only Nove and Newth dissented from this 
view. Uniquely, they denied that the white/non-white divide ran through the USSR. 
Instead they wrote that
If in the next generation or so opinion throughout the world polarises along lines 
of colour, with the Whites against the rest - which will mean the rich nations 
against the poor, the advanced against the primitive - the peripheral minorities of 
the USSR seem more likely to take their stand on the side of the North and West 
- which includes for this purpose the advanced region of the USSR - than on the 
side of the East and South.180
This opinion found no support. The idea that Asians could feel themselves closer 
to Europeans than to other Asians who were ‘closer in spirit’ to them was 
inconceivable. Caroe, Hostler and Monteil stressed the racial and cultural homogeneity 
of the peoples of Central Asia as a Turkic and Muslim bloc in order to contrast them to 
the Russians, differentiating ‘Asian’ from ‘European’ in a quasi-racist manner. The 
thesis that Russia was a colonial oppressor depended on precisely this division. 
Removing the racial argument about the fundamental incompatibility of Europeans with 
non-Europeans destroys the theory.
One result of this conceptual division between the European USSR and Central 
Asia based on assumptions about race and culture was that the study of Central Asia 
developed into a separate branch of Soviet Studies treated in isolation from the rest of 
the USSR. The dynamics o f ‘colonial’ society and of ‘metropolitan’ society differ and 
are studied in isolation of one another.
The majority of works on the USSR save those which specifically feature the 
words ‘Central Asia’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘nationalities’ (this last term a euphemism for the 
rule of non-Russians by Russians) in their titles either ignore Central Asia altogether or
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make only passing reference to the region. Conversely, works dealing with Central 
Asia present the region as a special case, seldom inviting comparison with other parts 
of the USSR. In general works with titles such as “Religion in the USSR” or “The 
Nationalities Problem of the USSR” Central Asia is treated differently to the European 
Soviet Union or Siberia. One study of Soviet religion attributes different motives to 
pilgrimage in the Baltic and in Central Asia, ascribing a political import to the 
phenomenon in the Central Asian case which does not feature in the analysis of the 
Baltic republics.
As Russia’s colony it was within Central Asia that nationalist opposition to 
Russian/Communist rule would arise. Evidence for the existence of anti-colonial 
sentiment could be derived from Central Asia’s history under Communism and the 
reaction of the indigenous Central Asian elite who would lead any revolt against 
Russia.
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[I Chapter 3: Anti-Colonialism in Central Asia
3.H Introduction
As a colony, nationalist movements were expected in Central Asia. During the 
1950s and 1960s scholars focused on events of the C20th which appeared to indicate 
the existence of such movements. The evidence was scanty despite Wheeler’s assertion 
that “There are many indications that the authorities are dissatisfied with and even 
apprehensive about the attitude of the Muslims towards the regime.”1 Ultimately the 
political case was not proven, but there remained a cultural argument to answer and 
this seemed more persuasive, in part because of a conflation of the terms ‘nationalism’ 
and ‘national identity.’
In this chapter I shall examine some of the evidence presented for an innate 
nationalist movement and discuss arguments for and against the existence of a 
nationalist elite before looking at the assumed reasons for Central Asian nationalism 
being manifest.
3.iO The Basmachis
‘Basmachi’ is commonly used in both Soviet and Western writings to refer to the 
guerrilla bands active in Central Asia at the time of the Revolution and the Civil War.
Caroe provided one of the first Western accounts of the Basmachi movement. 
Reviewing Caroe’s work in Problems o f Communism, British journalist Jules Menken 
stated that it was “the most authoritative book on his subject published since 1917... the 
first adequate English account of the Basmachi rebellion.”2 Caroe’s characterisation 
was highly influential. However, it presents several difficulties.
Caroe indicated that the word Basmachi derives from a Turkic root, however he 
fails to mention either that it was a root meaning ‘bandit’ or that it was a Russian 
coinage. The impression given is that the term was a self-appellation of the Basmachis,
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implying a unity of purpose and of organisation. The possibility that it referred to 
disparate groups of brigands, as it itself suggests, was not considered.
Caroe compared the Basmachis to the tribesmen he was familiar with on the 
Indo-Afghan border: “Their stamping ground was in the mountains and glens around 
the Ferghana valley, breeding a type of tribesman very like the Affidis and Waziris of 
the North-West Frontier.”3
Caroe’s comparison with the North-West Frontier, with which the Ferghana 
shares little, is revealing. The Frontier has long had romantic connotations in Britain, 
where it has been associated with mysterious but fiercely independent warrior peoples. 
Caroe devoted an entire chapter of his work to Enver Pasha, a romantic figure in the 
Western sense, whom some would regard as a minor player.
That the Basmachis cohered as a group is implied rather than argued. They not 
only had a common name in Caroe’s scheme, they had a common social structure. 
They were comparable to a tribe. This term implies some kind of blood link, unity 
through a relatively fixed and universally recognised leadership and means of 
transferring that leadership, a kind of ‘organic’ link to social structure and a name 
and/or symbols by which the tribe may be recognised and with which its members can 
identify.4 Although there were such groups in Central Asia the Basmachi ‘movement’ 
lacked any of these features. The conception of the Basmachis as a tribe was important 
for Caroe, since tribal unity might be supposed to survive material changes. Thus it 
seemed unlikely that the Basmachis would ever wholly vanish:
The Basmachi tribal cohesion was sufficient to enable them to continue as a 
menace to the Soviets long after the death of Enver Pasha... there was talk on the 
Peshawar border of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler’s 
invasion of Russia in 1941, and even today the fire may not be wholly quenched.5
It would be intriguing to know precisely what this ‘talk’ consisted of. Was it 
speculation, recollection, intrigue? Caroe, who as the Governor of the North-West 
Frontier Province should have known, does not say, and his conclusion is purely 
speculative.
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Whilst admitting there had been a failure of understanding between the Basmachis 
and the Jadids as regards aims, Caroe ascribed this to a failure of communication 
similar to that encountered by Nehru in his overtures to the Afridis and Waziris. Both 
parties sought the same end, independence, but they expressed their desires differently. 
However, if the analogy between the Basmachis and the tribesmen of the North-West 
Frontier may legitimately be made Nehru’s difficulties might shed some light on the 
actual nature of the movement. The frontiersmen were opposed to any central 
government control irrespective of whether it was colonial. The liberal democratic 
ideals of the Jadids might be supposed to have been as abhorrent to the Basmachis as 
were those of the Congress to the Afridis. In order for Caroe’s analogy to remain 
convincing it must be applied only sparingly.
The characterisation of the Basmachis as an organised and ideologically 
motivated group appears also in Hostler, whose main source of information about them 
was the anti-Soviet agitator Kayum Khan.
In spite of the rivalry of individual chieftains and tribal feuds the pan-Turkist
element of the Basmachi movement is clear since they grouped tribes and local
‘sub-ethnic’ units of Turkestanis in the fight against ‘foreign’ oppression.6
Hostler’s use of inverted commas is unusual. Is he implying that Russian control 
was not foreign? If this is the case then it would argue against the characterisation of 
the Basmachis as a national liberation movement.
The Basmachi movement also featured heavily in Hayit’s work. In his estimation, 
“In the history of the Turkestanis’ war of liberation, the Basmachi movement is of 
particular importance because it must be seen not only as a mere uprising, but also as 
an armed civil war against Soviet supremacy.”7
Unlike Caroe or Hostler, Hayit noted that the word ‘Basmachi’ was a Russian 
coinage, and he mentioned some other Soviet terms for the movement: 
“counterrevolutionary”, “pan-Islamic reaction”, “reaction of the capitalist element.”8 
Despite this he continued to use the term, although in general he refused to use Soviet
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terminology. Thus he consistently spoke of ‘Turkestan’ as an undifferentiated whole, 
ignoring both traditional and Soviet social or territorial divisions. This use of the 
collective term ‘Basmachi’, like ‘Turkestan’ allowed Hayit to present an image of a 
unity.
For Hayit, the significance of the movement was that
For Turkestanis, the Basmachi movement was a school in the struggle for the 
shaping of their national destiny that was to come. It shows that Turkestanis are 
not merely observers of world events, but also take an active part in them... the 
Basmachi movement shows that it is wrong to characterise Turkestanis as ‘a 
frightened and degenerate nation of religious fanatics’, as is done in many travel 
books and Russian references.9
For Bennigsen too the Basmachis represented a coherent challenge to Soviet 
hegemony, which affected Soviet attitudes to Central Asia even when he was writing: 
“Party polemicists have not forgiven the Muslims for having been the most doggedly 
opposed to the new regime. The venture of the Basmachis has not been forgotten, and 
Soviet writers never fail to recall the religious nature of the movement.”10
Conquest also described the Basmachis as an ideological movement. He linked 
them to a group of revolutionary independence movements, not all of them Central 
Asian or even Muslim, active around the time of the First World War. These included 
the Young Bukharans, the Alash Orda, the Kokhand government and groups in the 
Caucasus, the Crimea, Yakutia and Buriyatia. The purpose of mentioning these was to 
show that continued association with the Russians was not the wish of the Muslim 
peoples (although association was the declared goal of the Alash Orda).11
These national movements were relatively easily suppressed, but
Even after the [Bolshevik] conquest, the Red Army in Turkestan had to conduct 
protracted warfare against the national resistance movement which originated in 
the Ferghana Valley and spread through Turkestan under the name of the 
Basmachestvo. Early Soviet documents testify to the popular support enjoyed by 
this movement.12
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Thus the 1927 Great Soviet Encyclopaedia refers to “an almost mass movement 
of the dekhan population.”13
Again, the Basmachis are presented as a single movement, with a base and a 
name (Conquest does not mention the Russian origin of the word ‘Basmachestvo*), 
specifically aimed at the Russians and enjoying mass support, although it is hard to tell 
what an ‘almost’ mass movement might be nor where the dekhan (farming) community 
was situated: vast areas of Turkestan were not under cultivation. According to 
Conquest, this ‘movement’ continued for a number of years. As proof, he turned to 
another Soviet source, written in 1944:
Basmachi bands, entering into contract with bourgeois-nationalists and enemies 
of the people and infiltrating senior posts in the Soviet and Party apparatus, 
decided once again to invade Tadjik territory... During the first days of April 
1931 bands... numbering up to two thousand men crossed the frontier and 
advanced into the departments of Tadjikistan.14
The validity of these Soviet claims can be questioned, although Conquest took 
them at face value. The first point to note is that the text was written at the height of 
the War. It is as much a propaganda as a historical work, warning of the need for 
vigilance against infiltration by somewhat vague ‘enemies of the people’. We do not 
know precisely who these ‘bands’ were. They were not linked to any internal 
movement, although they had infiltrated the republican government (why did these 
‘infiltrators’ not assist the ‘bands’?), but were an organised external threat. The 
existence of a large organised opposition movement within Afghanistan seems unlikely. 
The country was just recovering from a period of instability under Emir Habibullah 
(Bacha-i Saqaw) in which such a group could have existed, but the authority of the 
central government was being restored. Further, there had recently (1929) been a 
Soviet invasion of the country, which “clearly intended to return [former Shah] 
Amanullah to the throne.”15
The conflation of the different political strands functioning at the time of the 
Revolution is shown in the work of Michael Rywkin,16 who described the Basmachis 
and National Communists such as Sultan Galiev as the military and political wings of 
the same movement which was essentially anti-Russian, a position given strength by
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Rywkin’s contention that fewer Muslims fought for the Bolsheviks than for the French 
in Algeria. The Civil War in Central Asia should be seen as being not about ideology, 
as in the rest of the former Empire, but about national liberation: “The struggle between 
the Basmachis and the Soviet Russian troops was not between Communists and anti- 
Communists, as in Russia, but between Russians and Muslims.”17
Politically, according to Rywkin, Galiev failed because he was “about thirty-five 
years ahead of [his] time and geographically misplaced”18 whereas the Basmachis failed 
partly as a result of disunity (seemingly contradicting Rywkin’s own contention that 
there was a single anti-Russian movement) and partly as a result of economic 
advantages given to locals by the Bolsheviks, who for instance halved taxes. This last 
echoes a claim by Hayit that during the famine years aid was extended only to 
Communist party members, providing a strong incentive to cease resistance.
3.iih The Khodzhaev Trial
Even after the Basmachis had been suppressed and Soviet rule firmly established, 
resistance apparently did not cease. The trial for treason in 1938 of former Jadid and 
President of Uzbekistan Faizullah Khodzhaev was regularly cited to show that at the 
time of the Second World War there remained considerable resistance to the Soviets 
throughout Central Asian society. The Khodzhaev trial was used as evidence that the 
pre-Revolutionary ideal of a united independent Turkestan had survived the creation of 
the national republics and that it was shared even by those who superficially appeared 
supportive of Soviet policies. The normally cautious Wheeler gave credence to this 
when he observed that
Hayit... says that Faizullah had always been secretly working for separation from 
the Soviet Union; but it is nevertheless not entirely established whether a real plot 
existed... In any event, there is at least a strong possibility that there was up to 
the outbreak of the Second World War a strong undercurrent of nationalist, anti- 
Soviet and anti-Russian feeling.19
A possibility is not hard evidence, but the idea of opposition is still not fully 
disproved. For unknown reasons, Wheeler rendered Khodzhaev’s name as Hoja, losing 
the Russian suffix and suggesting that Khodzhaev was personally less Russified than
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may have been the case. Wheeler’s suggestion that Khodzhaev was involved in an anti- 
Soviet plot also sits uneasily with his insistence in the same work that “there is nothing 
to prove that such measures [as the 1956 execution of the First Secretary of the 
Azerbaijan Communist Party] relate to any important national movement.”20
In a later work Wheeler returned to the theme of elite opposition within Central 
Asia at the time of the Purge, noting that
The Purge convulsed the whole of the USSR, but its effects were particularly 
striking in Central Asia where there had been many rumblings of discontent and 
where the authorities suspected the existence of nationalist opposition among the 
Muslim Communist elite.21
Concrete evidence either for discontent of for governmental fear is lacking from 
Wheeler’s text. No case is made for the Purge in Central Asia being motivated by 
causes other than those prevailing in the rest of the country, nor is there any discussion 
of what such causes were. Central Asia, whilst undergoing ostensibly the same 
influences as the rest of the Union, is sui generis. An event which occurs for one 
reason in one part of the USSR has on occurring in Central Asia a different cause. We 
are presented with shadowy ‘authorities’ about whom we know nothing save 
presumably that the Central Asian elite was excluded from them. What was the 
President of Uzbekistan if not an ‘authority’?
Conquest took the Khodzhaev trial as clear evidence of nationalist unrest. He 
made no mention of the extent of the Purge in Russia itself: the example of Khodzhaev 
is taken as indicative of the situation in the minority areas but not in Russia, creating a 
dichotomy between the two and implying that the Purge was an event perpetrated by 
Russians on non-Russians rather than something which affected all parts of the USSR 
equally. Khodzhaev was executed, and
similar killings swept the Communist leadership of the minority areas... Yet even 
these measures did not stamp out the national feelings of the Uzbeks or other 
nations.22
The evidence for Khodzhaev’s nationalist activities came from his own confession 
to the court:
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...we planned to develop agriculture in Uzbekistan so as to extend grain farming... in 
order to be independent of Russian grain; lastly, we had planned to develop industry, 
road building etcetera in such a way as to be more economically independent at the 
end of the First Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union than ever before.23
Whether or not this should properly be counted as nationalist activity is open to 
doubt, but a more serious criticism of the treatment of the trial as concrete evidence of 
opposition to Soviet rule comes from an independent source.
Scholars of the Purge are fortunate in that an eye-witness account of the 
Khodzhaev trial was written by a British diplomat. In 1938 Fitzroy Maclean was 
accredited to London’s Moscow Embassy. He was present at the trial and his 
recollections of it were published in 1949 in his memoir Eastern Approaches. This 
book became an almost instant best-seller. It is inconceivable that a British scholar of 
Central Asia such as Conquest, who at the time of publication worked in the Foreign 
Office, might not have been aware of it.
Maclean records that Khodzhaev was accused at a mass trial. Alongside him in 
the dock were Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, Kestinsky and Rosengolts.1 This evidence 
suggests that the Purge did not fall more heavily on Central Asia than elsewhere. The 
accused were all senior figures in the Soviet hierarchy, the architects and executors of 
the Stalinist policies they were accused of sabotaging. Maclean recorded the sensation 
at figures so close to the centre of Soviet power standing trial at all, and added that 
“the charges were equally sensational: espionage, sabotage, murder, high treason.”24
As incredible as the charges were the confessions obtained. Chernov, formerly 
Commissar for Agriculture, admitted to having “arranged for the destruction of tens of 
thousands of pigs and horses.”25
Khodzhaev, who was famous for his part in the Soviet Revolution in Central 
Asia, and who, while still in his twenties, had been President first of the People’s 
Republic of Bokhara and then, since its formation in 1925, of the Uzbek Soviet
1 Respectively formerly the Secretary-General of the Comintern, the Soviet Premier prior to Molotov, 
the head of the NKVD, the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the Commissar for Foreign 
Trade.
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Socialist Republic, announced that he had in fact been a clandestine ‘bourgeois 
nationalist’ ever since 1918; that his aim throughout had been to overthrow the 
local Soviet regime and set up an independent Central Asian state under British 
influence; that, with this object in view, he had deliberately sabotaged agriculture 
in order to cause discontent among the native population; and that for twenty 
years his apparent loyalty to Moscow had been no more than a blind.26
Such could not have been the case.
If what we heard in court was the literal truth, if, ever since the Revolution, the 
highest offices of the State had been held by a band of traitors, spies, murderers 
and wreckers, whose sole aim had been to overthrow the Soviet regime, if the 
whole regime had from the start been riddled with treachery and corruption, how 
was it that such a galaxy of talent, with such opportunities, had obtained such a 
small measure of success, how was it that their most important achievements had 
been to spoil a relatively small quantity of eggs and butter and to hasten the 
demise of an elderly litterateur, who for forty years had been suffering from an 
incurable disease? For five years Yagoda, a notoriously ruthless man, had 
controlled the all-powerful NKVD, had had under his command the Kremlin 
guards; had had in his power the doctors who attended Stalin and the other 
leaders of the Party and Government; had had his private laboratory for the 
preparation of special poisons Why had he not used all these opportunities to 
eliminate all those who stood in his way?27
It is an important question, and one which none of the writers who mentioned the 
trial considered any more than they questioned how a movement as well organised, 
highly motivated and popular as the Basmachis were supposed to have been could have 
failed where the Finns succeeded. If Khodzhaev was the nationalist he was alleged to 
have been, why did he spend so long establishing the Soviet regime? Whatever else the 
1938 trial may have been, it cannot be relied upon as evidence for nationalism. This 
however is how the affair was often presented. Kolarz compared Khodzhaev to other 
nationalist leaders entirely on the evidence of his trial:
...a man of similar stature to Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah, President 
Nasser, President Bourguiba and President Soekamo (sic)... had Khodzhaev’s 
political dreams materialised, he might have appeared at international 
conferences as the spokesman for a free country, but he faced the execution 
squad instead.28
There is however no firm evidence that Khodzhaev aspired to any more than the 
modernisation of his country within the Soviet framework.
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3.iv) The War Record
The record of Central Asians during the war featured early in reports of 
resistance to Soviet rule. Caroe devotes much space to the recruitment of Central 
Asians into the Wehrmacht by Kayum Khan, Nazi “Commissioner for Turkestan,” a 
man “endowed with the gifts of leadership and not without that singleness of purpose 
which enabled Jinnah to found a state in Asia not many years ago.”29 The comparison 
implies that Caroe approves of Kayum, suggesting that double standards are being 
brought into play when considering the Soviet Union. It would be interesting to know 
whether Caroe had approved of Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army, raised against 
the British in the same period.
Recruitment was carried out in PoW camps, where half a million Central Asians 
were held with their Soviet compatriots in appalling conditions. “Those in the prison 
camps had it put to them ‘Either stay where you are or come and fight against 
Communism’.”30 This seems like small choice given the conditions in which Soviet 
PoWs were kept by the Nazis. Mustafa Chokayev, who toured the camps with Kayum, 
contracted typhus in them and died in Berlin in 1941. Despite conditions in the camps 
the majority of prisoners preferred to stay where they were rather than fight the 
Soviets. Kayum succeeded, on Caroe’s count, in recruiting just 180,000 men of whom 
some three thousand promptly deserted to the Red Army or partizan groups. This 
hardly demonstrates a burning desire to fight Communism. Unlike Kayum or Chokayev 
the prisoners had actually lived under Soviet rule.
Monteil saw the War as being one of the great experiences binding Central Asians 
to the regime. Central Asians fought at Stalingrad, and although some joined the Nazis 
more Russians than Central Asians deserted the Red Army. In Uzbekistan alone the 
War produced 70 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 70,000 decorated soldiers and 15,000 
workers decorated for their contribution to the war effort.31 Questioned by Caroe on 
whether the “mass desertion” to the Nazis was indicative of Central Asian attitudes 
towards the regime, Wheeler also denied that this was the case.32
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The War record was not merely a matter of desertion to the Nazis, however. 
Mass deportations were also invoked as evidence for nationalist unrest. As Conquest, 
who devoted twenty pages of his 1962 work to the issue, wrote,
More striking even than the Soviet inhumanity and disregard for national 
feelings, was the admission that these peoples had almost unanimously been 
dissatisfied with the much-publicised Soviet nationalities policy... The Soviet 
press had rightly described the Nazis as monstrous oppressors. But so little did 
these peoples, after twenty years’ experience of Soviet rule, trust a word their 
rulers said that they were apparently not in the least impressed by this.33
Conquest was writing specifically about the Chechens, but his statement is 
intended to be universally applicable: “[the deportations] were a test of Moscow’s basic 
policy towards the minorities - a test in which Communism failed disastrously, and 
beyond all doubt.”34
The actual extent of Chechen collaboration with the Nazis remains in doubt, but 
this is not the issue here. The fact of deportation was taken by Conquest as indicative 
of the level of Muslim hostility to the regime and of the state’s inability to control this 
except by the most brutal of means. However, there are two fundamental problems 
with this characterisation.
Firstly, the deportations did not uniquely affect Muslims, nor were all Muslims 
deported. While the Chechens were banished, their neighbours and close ethnic kin the 
Ingush remained, as did many other Caucasian Muslim groups. Koreans and Kalmuks, 
neither a Muslim group, also suffered deportation, as did Soviet Germans. The 
deportations can hardly then be said to be typical of Soviet attitudes to Muslim 
minorities. If the Chechens were deported for collaboration, presumably many more 
Muslims remained loyal to the regime and retained their ancestral territory.
The second point of note is the location to which the deportees were sent. They 
were banished to Central Asia. If resistance to Soviet rule were commonplace among 
non-Russians, it seems odd that the authorities should have chosen to exile the arch- 
resisters to another non-Russian area where such resistance might be expected to grow.
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3.v) The Epics
Opposition to Soviet rule need not take the form of armed uprising or sabotage. 
The aim of the Soviet state was not merely to rule the peoples of Central Asia but “to 
achieve a true cultural symbiosis of all the peoples of the Union by attacking the 
barriers which separate the Muslims from other human groupings and most especially 
the Russian people, the ‘elder brother’ of the great Soviet family.”35 If such a 
symbiosis occurred there would be a single undifferentiated Soviet nation and 
nationalist opposition would be meaningless. Thus preservation of cultural 
distinctiveness becomes a form of opposition to the regime.
Evidence that Central Asians were intent on preserving their distinctiveness was 
provided in detail by Bennigsen. An expert on the epic verse of the Central Asian 
periphery (Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan), Bennigsen paid particular attention to the 
epic poems indigenous to Central Asia proper. That he regarded them as especially 
important is shown by the fact that a quarter of his extended essay in VAfrique et I ’Asie 
(1952/53) was devoted to them.
During the War there had been a revival of traditional literary forms, and of epic 
poetry in particular. However in 1951 an assault was mounted against the traditional 
heroic epics which were closely associated with the self-perception of many Soviet 
Muslims. This attack made possible some measure of the strength of opposition to 
Soviet rule.
By the strength of the means used, by the importance of the people who took part 
in it and also by its violence, this last campaign is the most spectacular of all 
those which were carried out against Muslim intellectuals since the War; it is 
also that which has provoked the strongest resistance and about which we are 
relatively well informed.36
Bennigsen traced the start of the campaign to the spring of 1951, when there was 
a change in attitude to the Azeri epic Dede Korkut. The 1949 Great Soviet 
Encyclopaedia had described this as one of the “remarkable monuments of the Azeri 
people’s culture, [speaking of] loyalty, honesty, love for one’s homeland, courage and
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heroism.”37 Extracts from the poem were published in the official Anthology of Azeri 
Poetry and a Russian translation appeared in 1950.
On 5th May 1951 Mirza Ibrahimov declared at a congress of Azeri writers that 
“Dede Korkut has nothing in common with the Azeri people: the life, the customs it 
describes are foreign to them. The men of whom it sings are not the sons of our people 
but represent the aristocracy of foreign conquerors.” In August of the same year the 
Turkmen variant of the poem, Kurkut Ata was attacked by Turkmenskaya Iskra as “a 
bloody chronicle of the Oghuz khans, a poem of religious fanaticism, of violence and of 
animal hatred.” Likewise the Uzbek epic Alpamysh, which had been called “a pearl of 
Uzbek poetry,” was described in Literaturnaya Gazeta as “impregnated with [a] feudal 
and reactionary spirit, which nurtures Muslim fanaticism and preaches hatred of 
foreigners and infidels.” There followed a regular pattern of events.
From all the evidence these purges were part o f a minutely orchestrated plan and 
followed a uniform pattern: the first attack is generally made by an organ in 
Moscow, Pravda or Literaturnaya Gazeta, more infrequently by a local paper.
It is repeated by the Central Committee of the Republican Communist Party, by 
the various cultural institutes, trades unions, the Komsomol and local 
Party organisations. The operation ends with accusing the guilty native 
intellectuals who practise self-criticism, criticise their colleagues and 
promise to change their ways.38
This pattern was broken in the case of the Kirghiz epic Manas. G. Nurov 
attacked the poem in the Russian-language Sovyetskaya Kirgizya, but rather than the 
new orthodoxy spreading through official organs, the cause of the poem became 
championed by the Kirghiz-language Qyzyl Qygyzstan. This, according to Bennigsen, 
was “the only [debate] of its kind in the Soviet Union.”39
Bennigsen traced the argument from Professor I. Chersyuk of Frunze 
University’s evocation of Engels and Gorky in favour of the poem to the final 
denunciation of Manas and its supporters by the Herald (Vestnik) of the All-Union 
Academy of Sciences. “Thus concluded the Manas affair which for five months raised 
a storm in Kirghizstan the violence of which might seem astonishing if you forget that 
the apparently trivial question of whether a thousand-year-old work is feudal or 
progressive in nature in fact hides a far more serious problem, that of the survival of the
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national culture of the Muslim people of Central Asia.”40 The question of the epics 
pointed to an unresolved conflict between indigenous Central Asians and their Russian 
rulers.
The examples cited above prove that there is a conflict between the Russian 
authorities and the native intellectuals which is less about the place o f national 
culture in ‘the great Soviet culture’ than about the future o f national culture 
itself... it appears that for the Party authorities the coexistence of Soviet culture 
with a national culture thoroughly impregnated whether one likes it or not with 
Islam does not seem desirable, to impose the former you must destroy the latter 
or at least severely purge it.
The reactions the new cultural policy after the W ar met from native intellectuals 
indicate that these last are highly combative and have a strong will to resist. It 
therefore seems that for citizens o f the Muslim republics of the USSR, above all 
for intellectuals o f the younger generation, forgetting the faith o f your ancestors 
is less distressing than abandoning your own culture.
The Soviet government, which succeeded in large part in its policy o f 
deislamisation and which easily enough liquidated its ‘feudal’ and ‘clerical’ 
adversaries now faces the opposition of a social stratum which it has created 
itself, that o f the indigenous cadre.41
This point is far from being proved on Bennigsen’s evidence. Only in 
Kirghizstan is there any evidence of substantial opposition to the attacks on the epics. 
Outside that republic Bennigsen leads us to believe that the campaign went smoothly. 
The idea that opposition to the changes came from Central Asians is also hard to 
maintain. Their names suggest that Nurov, attacking, was a Muslim and Chersyuk, 
defending, was not. Ibrahimov is also a Muslim name.
Bennigsen later again maintained that Central Asians were resistant to Russian 
literary forms, preferring to copy the subject matter and styles of Navo’i, Firdawsi and 
others. This claim was not substantiated. We should note too that during the 1950s, 
when Manas was under attack, the celebrated Kirghiz novelist Chingiz Aitmatov 
(b.1928), an agronomist by training, was a journalist for Pravda. This hardly argues 
for a rejection of Soviet cultural models by the Soviet-educated Central Asian elite.
3.vi) Elite Nationalism
The events described above might support the view that “Turkestan nationalism 
presents a real threat to the Soviet system... In Turkestan the ideological struggle
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between the Soviets and the Russian cause on the one hand, and the Turkish cause and 
nationalism on the other still continues, with every party trying to succeed.”42
Despite the apparently abundant evidence for opposition to Soviet rule, the fact 
remained that Central Asia had certainly since the War been a politically stable region. 
Asked why this might be, Wheeler offered the opinion that the absence in the 1950s of 
a discernible nationalist movement was due to two factors. Firstly,
the Russians have, particularly since the revolution, obtained such a stranglehold 
on this Central Asian area that it is not reasonable to expect the people to do 
anything about it. The only course they can follow is to be passive and as quiet 
as possible.43
This ‘stranglehold’ was manifest in various ways. The number of Russians in the 
region was a major factor. According to Caroe “the degree of Russian infiltration 
already achieved should suffice to paralyse any Kazakh nationalist movement 
originating in Kazakhstan”44
In the hypothetical case of a nationalist struggle for independence from Russia, 
the Russian settlers may not react too differently from their French-Algerian 
counterparts.45
The presence of so many Russians within Central Asia might be expected to 
result in a degree of resentment, however it was conceded that, outside military service, 
most Central Asians were unlikely ever to encounter a Russian in the flesh.
Wheeler’s second reason for it being unlikely that a nationalist movement might 
develop in Central Asia was that such a movement depended on the existence of a 
nationalist elite. In Wheeler’s eyes, not only was such an elite lacking but it was 
unlikely to develop in the near future.
In order to flourish, nationalism requires some kind o f indulgence on the part of 
the ruling power. The people of Central Asia and Transcaucasia have not been 
shown such indulgence in the past and it does not seem likely that it will be 
shown to them in the future.46
Wheeler observed that in the case of Africa and the rest of Asia, nationalist 
movements had depended on the presence of native independence leaders with a degree
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of freedom of speech and action, religious and cultural freedom, aid and encouragement 
from abroad, the existence of a native armed force distinct from the Imperial and the 
support of liberal opinion in the metropolis. All of these factors were lacking in Central 
Asia.
As long as a combination of all these circumstances and factors continues to 
prevail, any development of the undoubtedly existing national consciousness into 
active nationalism on lines familiar elsewhere can hardly be expected 47
Concerning the possibility of a nationalist movement developing in Central Asia 
Wheeler had earlier written that “such a phenomenon would not be without precedent 
in other empires. Generally speaking, however, the present attitude is one of passive 
acquiescence tempered with some satisfaction with increasing material well being.”48
That this was not in itself enough to forestall a nationalist movement was 
precisely the point made by Seton-Watson. Russian rule could not simply be imposed 
however. There had to be some kind of link between rulers and ruled. Wheeler 
commented that “like other Imperialist regimes the Soviet administration had to rely for 
the implementation of its policies on the recruitment of compliant collaborators.”49 It 
was the attitude and actions of these ‘collaborators,’ the elite of Soviet Central Asian 
society who were in contact with the Russians and who implemented policy, which was 
crucial in determining the likelihood of nationalist revolt. The history of other colonial 
empires had shown that it was from such a Westernised elite that the leadership of 
independence movements came.
The treatment of the Khodzhaev trial shows that there was a belief that a 
nationalist elite had in the past existed. Historical works by Bennigsen and d’Encausse 
compared the Central Asian leadership destroyed by the Purge to Galiev and the 
Jadids.50 The significance of this linkage was that in their goals, namely the 
modernisation of Russian Muslim society, Galiev and the Central Asian Jadids did not 
differ significantly from the Communists. This fact had enabled them to co-operate 
with the Soviets in the early years of the century. There was however a fundamental 
difference. Galiev and others were working from a nationalist stance. It was suggested
by Rodinson, among others, that nationalism was a necessary corollary of social 
modernisation. Pipes made the link explicit:
What is occurring may be described as a process of the emergence of modem 
nations within the Soviet Union... The practical conclusions which this evidence 
suggests have bearing not only on the Soviet Union but on all those areas where a 
nascent sense of national identity emerges simultaneously with a drive for 
modernisation. It is difficult to conceive how the contrary pulls implicit in 
modernisation... can be reconciled in any way than through the establishment of 
independent national states.51
As Bennigsen showed in his work on Sultan Galiev,52 being a Communist did not 
preclude being a nationalist, an understanding given a further boost by the Sino-Soviet 
split and the establishment of a Communist state independent of Moscow’s control. 
Kolarz went further, contending that ultimately nationalism always came to dominate 
over Communism.
As Yugoslav and Albanian communism (sic) has already capitulated to Yugoslav 
and Albanian nationalism, and Russian and Chinese communism to Russian and 
Chinese nationalism, it is reasonable to assume that in the end communism will 
have to capitulate to nationalism all over the world...53
Could not the Uzbek communist leaders like Mukhitdinov and Rashidov adopt 
the same attitude as the West African politicians, who turned their backs on 
Paris? It would indeed be in keeping with the whole world development if the 
Asian countries of the USSR would in the long run be dissatisfied with the role 
of the Kremlin spokesman and embark on the road of national communism.54
This theme was repeated by Donald Carlisle, who in his review of Bennigsen and 
Lemercier-Quelquejay’s Islam in the Soviet Union commented that “In the Central 
Asian case, it is possible that advancing socialism may even create a new stimulus for 
the emergence of nationalist sentiment.”55
The position of the Central Asian elite as both Communist and nationalist, and the 
ambivalence of that position, was described by Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay:
One can believe that, but for a few exceptions, [the new intellectuals] de- 
Islamised and Marxist, might also be proud of the regime’s successes and credit 
the Party with allowing them, occasionally by coercive methods, in a single 
generation to leap the gap which separates a traditional semi-feudal society from 
a modem society. But on the other hand they also show themselves 
impregnated... with national sentiment, and this sometimes takes the form of
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opposition to the Party line which is not without recollection of certain ideas 
previously held by Sultan Galiev...
Naturally it is vain to search for a direct link [filiationi] between the Muslim 
intellectual companions of Sultan Galiev and their successors of today. The first 
were nationalists come to Communism from all sides, but remained superficially 
Marxists; the second are convinced Communists for whom nationalism is no 
more than the survival of a ‘capitalist mentality’ or of pre-Revolutionary 
bourgeois trends, but by the expression of a political and cultural particularism 
they differentiate themselves from their Russian comrades and sometimes also 
oppose them.56
Central Asian nationalism is associated w ith ‘particularism ’ on a political and 
cultural level, a refusal fully to  integrate into a Soviet whole. Politically, one feature 
seem ed to  stand out as exemplifying this lack o f  integration, the tendency o f  Central 
Asian leaders to  prefer their ow n kind in m aking appointments.
K olarz referred to  the fact that in February 1954 Zhum bay Shayakhmetov, w ho 
for eight years had been First Secretary o f  Kazakhstan, w as dismissed and replaced by 
Panteleim on Ponom arenko and Leonid Brezhnev. According to  Radio M oscow  this 
w as because Shayakhm etov had chosen staff “not on the basis o f  efficiency and political 
qualities but according to  criteria o f  family and friendly relations and local 
favouritism .”57 To K olarz this w as not simply a m atter o f  nepotism. In prom oting 
Kazakhs over Russians Shayakhm etov w as asking a question which could only occur to  
a nationalist: W ho rules K azakhstan, Russians o r Kazakhs?
Rywkin also equated the favouring o f  a local cadre w ith nationalist sentiment:
The persistence and survival of Moslem Turkestani nationalism (sometimes 
called localism) is acknowledged by some of the leading Western experts in the 
field.58
The equation o f  ‘localism ’ w ith nationalism, which latter implies a political 
program m e tending tow ards ethnic exclusivity and political independence, also 
appeared in B ennigsen’s work.
The Soviet press reveals that it is in this field that conflict between Russians and 
natives shows itself most sharply. Thus in a work published in 1964 and devoted 
to the national problem in Kazakhstan, a Communist Party leader in this republic 
considered that one of the most dangerous manifestations of local nationalism is 
‘the willingness of Kazakh intellectuals to return to a new form of nationalism
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(korenizatsiya) which comprises refusing non-Muslims places in the
administrative apparatus o f the republic.’59
There appears to be a confusion in this passage between ‘nationalism* and
‘nationalisation’ as shown by the equation of ‘nationalism’ with korenizatsiya. This 
word which presumably appeared in the original Russian text, derives from koren’ 
(‘root’) and is related to the verb korenizirovaf (‘to place under local authority’).60 It 
is usually translated as ‘indigenisation’, referring to the early Soviet policy of involving 
native peoples in the administration, a sense in which Bennigsen and Lemercier- 
Quelquejay had already used it when they referred to “one of the dreams of the first 
Muslim Communists who struggled for the nationalisation (korenizatsiya) of positions 
of political leadership.”61 Nationalism is a political programme calling for the creation 
of an independent state for a people for which the usual Russian term, natsionalizm, 
was absent from the Russian text as presented by Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay.
Arguments from the political dynamic tended to lead away from rather than 
towards nationalist expressions. All commentators noted that senior Central Asians 
had Russian deputies who could ensure a degree of conformity to directives emanating 
from Moscow. This did not however mean that Central Asians had no control over 
their republics, which might incline them to nationalism. Nove and Newth compared 
republican leaders to British colonial governors. Formally, these had no independent
authority, being the executors of the demands of the Colonial Office in London. In fact 
within their own territories their opportunities for independent action were 
considerable. “Local Party and State officials frequently represent local vested 
interest... it is quite unrealistic to imagine that detailed orders in every issue can be 
drafted by an all-powerful, all seeing official at the centre.”62
Wheeler’s theory was that ‘homeopathic’ treatment for nationalism allowed local 
functionaries a degree of independence sufficient to satisfy their political ambitions 
without compromising the Union “to give the impression that colonialism had 
disappeared forever.”63
The result of the political dispensation was that
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The Central Asian republics are relieved of all responsibility in the settlement of 
minority and border disputes, as well as in a whole range of matters which are a 
constant burden to national governments elsewhere... this arrangement can be 
seen to have some practical advantages.64
O ne advantage w as gaining the benefits o f  gubernatorial office whilst avoiding 
the responsibilities.
Many of the cases of misconduct and abuse of authority were characteristic of 
colonial regimes where locally appointed officials do only lip service to Western 
methods of administration and develop a remarkable skill in adapting Western 
bureaucracy to their own private ends.65
The ‘private ends’ o f  the Central Asian political elite w ere highlighted by Rywkin. 
Ironically for an author w ho believed in the existence o f  a nationalist undercurrent in 
Central Asia, the issues he focused on provided reasons for not following a nationalist 
cause.
Most of the native Muslims belonging to the Party during then 1940s were 
members of the socio-economic elite... These people had living standards far 
higher than the average and enjoyed priorities and advantages commensurate 
with their position. They had, one can say, a vested interest in the smooth 
running of the system.66
The position o f  the elite depended on their fulfilling the Soviet norm. It also 
depended on genuine support from  the masses.
It would have been very difficult to administer the area properly had the native 
Communists been regarded by their own people as Russian puppets... Thus the 
Soviet authorities, if they were to avoid serious trouble, were obliged to overlook 
some of the less objectionable nationalist practices.67
The Muslim population tends to regard its own Party elite as its protectors 
against Russian chauvinism, the Western way of life and bureaucratic red tape.
Because of this attitude, abuses and ‘mutual assistance’., have never been easy to
68uncover.
This ‘mutual assistance’ represents the  localism associated by Rywkin and 
Bennigsen w ith nationalism. H ow ever, rather than being a reaction against the regime 
it can be seen as a function o f  the  regime. Political corruption w as manifest in the 
distribution o f  favours. Blat, the practice o f  patronage through unofficial channels, w as 
endemic and w as both  helped by and served to  preserve social links and traditional
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customs. Access to resources or favours was dependent on maintaining a client-patron 
relationship moulded by family/clan ties and manifest in traditional behaviour towards 
the local Party official who himself existed in a similar relationship to his immediate 
superior. The centralised Soviet system meant that the ultimate source of all favours 
was Moscow. The elite maintained its own standing, and its privileges, by means of 
patronising its clients. Access to the goods to be distributed depended on compliance 
with the Soviet system, with the goods themselves being distributed via traditional 
channels. This system also had a cultural effect. If goods were distributed via 
traditional channels, access to them required conformity to the traditional pattern of 
society, particularly for lower social classes. Thus social conservatism was not a 
reaction against but a function of the Soviet regime.
Social conservatism, or in Bennigsen’s terms ‘cultural particularism’, the 
apparent failure of Central Asian leaders to become fully assimilated into a Soviet 
(Russian) whole, was taken as one of the main indicators of Central Asian nationalism. 
This is particularly evident in the work of French and American writers who came from 
backgrounds in which cultural assimilation was regarded as a sine qua non of loyalty to 
the state.
Citizenship of the United States was at this time predicated on the loss of 
traditional cultural affinities. New immigrants were expected to attend classes where 
they studied not only the English language but the American constitution, American 
history and American cultural traditions. In Pipes’ words,
Having given up many of their own traditions for the sake o f modernisation, 
Americans and Russians are not inclined to show due respect for the 
traditionalism of other nations, especially when this traditionalism runs contrary 
to the requirements o f modem life. So they tend to deprecate nationalism and 
advocate assimilation.69
Pipes specifically equates failure culturally to assimilate with nationalism. 
Assimilation and nationalism are cast as opposites. The possibility of preserving 
cultural traditions without this implying rejection of the state is excluded.
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Similarly, the French experience in North Africa tended to the position that 
cultural conformity with the norms of the metropolis implied loyalty to the state and 
social conservatism its opposite. The Algerian supporters of French rule were those 
who had adopted the most from French culture and society, were in other words the 
most westernised. The argument of the rebels was that cultural incompatibility entailed 
political incompatibility and that Algeria should thus be independent.
The British position was significantly different. Never having attempted to 
modify local cultures within the Empire, the British were much more willing to allow 
for a diversity of cultures owing loyalty to a single state. The British experience in 
India was the opposite of the French in Algeria. Indian nationalist leadership came 
from the most westernised group in society, Oxford educated and imbued with British 
cultural traditions.1 Cultural conservatism did not imply nationalism in a state which 
did not seek to eradicate cultural peculiarities.
While Wheeler could write that
It seems perfectly possible for a Turkmen Party member holding an important 
and lucrative post to be a sincere admirer and supporter o f the Soviet regime, 
while at the same time being genuinely proud o f the qualities and achievements of 
the Turkmen people as the mainstay of the Turkmen SSR70
such a position was less open to French and American scholars, to whom pride in being 
a Turkmen and loyalty to a Russian-dominated regime seemed mutually contradictory. 
They therefore concentrated on the preservation of national identity as evidence for 
nationalism. Wheeler however made a strong contrast between the two when he wrote 
that “[there is] some confusion in the minds of casual students of Central Asian affairs, 
who imagine that such practices as child marriage and the seclusion of women are 
indications of nationalism”71 when they were in fact no more than indicators of cultural 
identity.
Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay appeared to concede this point when they 
wrote that “attachment to traditional customs... should not be regarded as evidence of
11 Nehru famously described himself as “the last Englishman to rule India”.
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conscious opposition to  the Soviet regime nor as p ro o f o f  hostility tow ards the 
Russians.”72 On the o ther hand opposition w as strongly to  be im puted from  the very 
preservation o f  such traditions:
[The elites] are strongly attached to their national culture not only in its form but 
in its content. They seem concerned to preserve the traditional religion and 
heritage even if this heritage is hardly compatible with proletarian culture; they 
idealise their people’s past even when it comprises a point of struggle against the 
Russians...
More than his predecessors in the 1920s and 1930s, the Muslim intellectual 
today seems - in a classic process seen in all colonial countries - to be the true 
representative of his people. His national conscience is at once sharper, more 
rational and in the last resort more hostile to Russian influence than that of all 
other social levels of the Muslim population.73
This w as w ritten  specifically with reference to  elite nationalism, and seems to  
imply precisely that this w as directed, via culture, against the Russians. A  similar point 
is m ade by Hostler.
The reactions the new cultural policy after the War met from native intellectuals 
indicate that these last are highly combative and have a strong will to resist. It 
therefore seems that for citizens of the Muslim republics of the USSR, above all 
for intellectuals of the younger generation, forgetting the faith of your ancestors 
is less distressing than abandoning your own national culture.
The Soviet government, which succeeded in large part in its policy of 
deislamisation and which easily enough liquidated its ‘feudal’ and ‘clerical’ 
adversaries now faces the opposition of a social stratum which it has created 
itself, that of the indigenous cadre.74
Cultural considerations played an im portant part in determining the attitude o f  the 
‘intermediary intelligentsia’, as Bennigsen and d ’Encausse called them, to  the  regime. 
Cultural attitudes could be used as a m easure o f  w hether this elite had becom e fully 
Sovietised, o r rem ained essentially nationalistic in outlook.
This is particularly evident in the w ork  o f  French writers. F o r Bennigsen the 
preservation o f  Central Asian languages w as vital to  the possibility o f  a nationalist 
movement. The study o f  language use and the extent to  which indigenous languages 
had becom e Russified com prises a m ajor portion in the body o f  his work. As the 
French language and French identity w ere linked to  the extent that a non-Francophone 
could not be regarded as truly French, so it w as possible to  determ ine how  Sovietised a 
people had becom e by studying the degree to  which Russian had supplanted local
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languages. Linguistic Russification would both diminish the distinction between 
Central Asians and other Soviet citizens and increase the distinction between them and 
the rest of the Muslim world: “[linguistic Russification] is regarded by the Soviet 
authorities as one of the best ways of isolating the Muslim peoples of the Union from 
their co-religionists abroad.”75
Conversely, opposition to language change implied an unwillingness to abandon 
traditional modes of expression and traditional culture and to adopt Russian modes of 
expression. This was taken as indicative of a degree of nationalism. According to 
Bennigsen such opposition was strong, and it evinced more than simple linguistic 
conservatism, although he gives no information as to how widespread or popular it 
was. “The opposition went far beyond the mere defence of ‘archaisms’, since the 
‘reactionary nationalists imbued with pan-Islamic and pan-Iranian ideology’ tried to 
prevent any borrowings from Russia by fabricating new words such as torikiston for 
cinema.”76
According to Wheeler in a reference to an unnamed study by Richard Pipes which 
related to other areas where ‘backwards’ groups had come into contact with the West, 
the usual pattern of development was for the upper classes to acquire the imperial 
language whilst local languages gradually developed as modem media. The Soviet 
government, whilst approving the former supposedly resisted the latter, but “there is no 
evidence to indicate that the Soviet regime actually succeeds in hindering the 
development of native languages; on the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability 
of the local languages to survive in the face of strong pressures.”77
Language provided just one example of the way in which Central Asians were 
maintaining their distinctness from Russians. Others included family structure,78 
historiography, literature79 and education. That cultural differences between Russians 
and Central Asians were not perceived as being a question of ‘Socialist in form, 
national in content’ is shown by Kolarz’s contention that “the nationalism of the non- 
Russian peoples in the face of persecution is always finding new forms of camouflage, 
particularly by escaping into the cultural field.”80
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3.viO Conclusion
There was in the West a reluctance to admit to any degree of co-operation by 
Central Asians in the Soviet system, as is manifest in Hostler’s work. He automatically 
mistrusted any evidence that Russians and Muslims were working together, ascribing 
shows of loyalty to the state to dissimulation. Of Gasprinsky he wrote “Most probably 
his pro-Russian writings were a manifestation of his tactics: to pretend to be friendly 
with the Russians, and to pay this price for a degree of freedom.”81 Similarly, of the 
1905 All-Muslim Congress which called for greater autonomy within the Russian 
Empire he claimed “This accent of loyalty was dictated by tactical reasons since the 
Tatars were afraid to speak openly of their pan-Turkist programme.”82
The idea that apparent loyalty to the regime may be no more than a mask was 
also found in Allworth’s work when he wrote
Politically, around 1930 the resistance through intellectual activity had earned 
most literary and national figures the ugly label opasiz (Kazakh) eki juzduu 
(Kirghiz) or ikijuzlamachi (Uzbek), each signifying a ‘two-faced person’ but 
carrying a political connotation ‘a nationalist who hides his true hostility while 
opposing the Party’.83
There were reasons why an apparent willingness to co-operate with the Russians 
did not imply a Machiavellian attitude to politics. Nove and Newth observed that the 
political dynamic in Central Asia was quite different from that obtaining in other 
Western empires, chiefly by dint of the fact that under the Soviet system there was a 
high degree of latitude in both political and cultural matters. They noted that for a 
French African to become a political force it was necessary for him culturally to 
assimilate with France. However, in the Soviet Union the situation was quite different.
Because Algeria, unlike the Soviet republics, had no political hierarchy of its 
own, politically ambitious Algerians had little alternative to turning to subversive 
forms o f nationalism.84
By contrast, in the Soviet Union each republic had its own hierarchy through 
which the politically ambitious could climb. Kolarz recorded that the presidency of any 
given republic was usually given to a member of the titular nationality. Achieving the
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highest office was not accomplished despite one’s nationality but because of it. 
Republican presidents, Kolarz conceded, sat on the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR and therefore directed not only republican but Union policy.
The argument for nationalism from purely political motives had severe 
weaknesses. Despite this, the expectation of a nationalist current in Central Asia was 
great. Although such a current was not immediately evident it was assumed to have 
been subsumed or internalised within a cultural milieu. The locus of national identity 
and of national resistance as defined in cultural terms came to be associated with Islam 
as the carrier of a non-Russian culture, and it is to this that I shall next turn.
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Chapter 4: Writing on Islam - The 1950s
4.h Introduction
The early debates on Central Asia’s colonial status all but ignored religious 
issues. Hostler says little about Islam except to link it to pan-Turkic sentiment:
The unusual character of nationalist trends in Russia is reflected in their strong 
mutual interdependence. They have blended into an amalgam of pan-Islamic, 
national-Turkish and pan-Turkish movements. This fusing of Turkism and Islam 
in Russia is profound and natural, and is based on the palpable fact that the 
Russian Muslims are 90% Turks, and more than 90% of the Turks of Russia are 
Muslims.1
In an article in Problems of Communism2 Pipes devoted one out of ten pages to 
religious issues although these received prominence in his conclusion. Consideration of 
Soviet aspirations in the Middle East demanded that at least some attention be paid to 
Soviet Islam:
The increased interest now being overtly shown by the Soviet government in the 
Middle East makes the study of the Soviet attitude towards Islam of particular 
importance. It seems that the Soviet authorities may experience some difficulty 
in reconciling the uncompromising hostility which they have so far shown 
towards the practise of Islam [with foreign policy goals].3
Many of those writing on Central Asia were not Islamists or students of religion 
but political analysts and civil servants. Their attitudes towards Islam reflected this. 
Egretaud remarked that
Some people worry about the position of religion in Central Asia. In this field 
more than any other the judgements set out by most foreign observers are 
contradictory and lacking in objectivity, as they are seldom independent of the 
opinions of their authors on the religious problem.4
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In the United States the level o f  understanding o f  Islam left much to  be desired. 
Pipes referred to  “the spring festival o f  Ram adan.”51 Park w rote “Islam is a syncretic 
religion”6 w ithout further expanding.
British and French w riters w ere less prone to  this kind o f  comment, but attitudes 
varied betw een the tw o countries in reflection o f  their differing experiences o f  Muslim 
societies. In British writings there was an awareness that the ascriptive term  ‘M uslim ’ 
referred not only to  a religious attitude but to  a cultural identity which did not assume 
any degree o f  devotion. Caroe and W heeler w ere familiar with the concept o f  the 
secular Muslim and with ‘M uslim ’ political activity based on cultural rather than 
religious identity. For them  the question as w hether Central Asias w ere still M uslim in 
a religious sense was irrelevant. To be Muslim did not demand any degree o f  devotion. 
This understanding is implicit in E gre taud’s criticism o f  French scholarship.
France took  the religious question in the Soviet Union m ore seriously. It was 
from French scholars that the bulk o f  writing on Soviet Islam came in the 1950s. 
M onteil related the Soviet M uslim experience to  Algeria and Senegal, explaining Islam 
both as a barrier to  assimilation into a single Soviet whole and as a possible focus o f  
resistance.
Bennigsen and d ’Encausse made the greatest contributions to  the study o f  Soviet 
Islam. Their scholarship w as to  have a lasting impact. B oth  w ere familiar with the 
Muslim w orld and largely sympathetic tow ards M uslim  society. How ever, their 
discussion could be said to  fall foul o f  E gretaud’s criticism that
Specialists o f ‘French Documentation’ superbly [refer to] the ‘Muslim Republics 
of the USSR’. Probably these assiduous readers o f the Central Asian press are 
more Muslim than the Muslims, since in my experience, many modem states 
which pay lip-service to Islam choose a less radical definition of it.7
Again we face the problem  o f  what is understood by ‘M uslim ’. In English the 
term  was often used w ithout religious connotations. In French the linguistic situation 
w as more complex. M onteil’s Essai sur I'Islam en URSS w as not primarily concerned
1 It is impossible to determine whether Pipes is referring to Ramadan which falls in different seasons 
in different years or the ‘Persian New Year’, Naw-ruz, which falls annually on 21st March.
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with religion w hereas Bennigsen devoted the first quarter o f  his Les peuples musulmans 
de rURSS et les Soviets to  this issue. In English usage the distinction betw een 
‘M uslim ’ as a cultural signifier and ‘Islam ’ as a religion w as m ore apparant.
Confusion betw een Islam as a faith and Islam as a social identity accounted 
som ewhat for the different emphases placed on the religion by British and French 
writers. While W heeler denied that political m ovem ents in Islamic garb w ere religious 
m ovem ents and Caroe specifically stated that the 1898 Andijan revolt was not 
religiously inspired8 this option w as less readily available to  French authors for whom  
no clear distinction could be made betw een the social and the religious. M onteil 
described the Algerian w ar as “this ‘critical time betw een France and Islam ’”9 and in a 
footnote called for “the civil and social equality prom ised to  Islam by France in Algeria 
in 1830 and again in 1947.” M onteil uses the term s ‘Islam ’ and ‘M uslims’ as 
synonymous not term s for a religion and a group o f  people respectively. In this respect 
the French position is probably closer to  the conceptual view  o f  many M uslims than the 
British. This attitude tends tow ards ascribing a political aspect to the religious and a 
religious attitude to  the political which need not be present.
The view presented by French scholars at the end o f  the decade, that Islam 
existed as an undercurrent divorced from or hostile to  accepted Soviet norms, remained 
a minority opinion. The prevailing attitude w as that secular influences w ere stronger 
than religious, as appeared to  be the case in the rest o f  the M uslim world. H alpern 
w rote
secular events rather than Islam will determine whether such a development [of 
new social organisations] is accompanied by a pro-Soviet, pro-Westem, or 
neutral orientation.10
4.ii) Wheeler
Geoffrey W heeler (1897-1990) was one o f  the tw o principal British scholars o f  
Central Asia o f  the 1950s and 1960s. The son o f  an infantry officer, in 1915 he joined 
the Q ueen’s W est Surrey Regiment, and in 1918 w as seconded to  the Indian Army. 
B etw een 1919-1925 he w as attached to  General S taff (Intelligence), covering India,
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Palestine and Malta. In 1926 he becam e U K  M ilitary A ttache in M ashhad. In the 
1930s he was posted to  Baluchistan and the United Provinces (U ttar Pradesh), joining 
the (Indian) External Affairs D epartm ent in 1940. In 1946 he returned to  the British 
M ission to  Iran as both Press and Oriental Councillor, before being returned to  London 
in 1950. In 1953 he left governm ent service and founded the Central Asian Research 
Centre which he ran until 1968, editing a journal, Central Asia Review , which provided 
a digest o f  the regional Soviet press.
W heeler’s 195411 exposition o f  Soviet Islam came in the context o f  w hat he 
called ‘cultural developm ents’ and lays its principle stress on Islam as a social force 
rather than an institution. Islam appears as a kind o f  social glue binding the peoples o f  
Central Asia to one another. This did not mean that Soviet M uslims should necessarily 
be considered as part o f  any w ider Muslim society.
It would be a mistake to regard the people of Central Asia, or even of each 
nationality, as part of a corporate Muslim identity... Nevertheless, in so far as 
there exists any social and even political bond among the peoples of Central Asia 
other than those of race, traditional language and culture it is probably Islam.
That the Soviet authorities are aware of this bond and of the resentment felt by 
the people at being cut off from the rest of the Muslim world is shown by their 
constant denunciation of such international movements as pan-Islamism, pan- 
Turanianism and the sect of Sufism.12
Although this passage might seem to  imply that Islam had political weight in 
Central Asia, W heeler was cautious.
It is often asserted that Islam is still a living force among the peoples of Central 
Asia, that it sustains them in their enforced subjugation to the Soviet regime and 
that in certain circumstances it would unite them in achieving real independence. 
I do not myself know how far this is true today, but it might be unwise to take it 
for granted that Islam is any more ingrained in the hearts and minds of the 
peoples of Central Asia than it is in other parts of the Muslim word where the 
practise of Islam is not discouraged but where it has failed to withstand the 
advance of westernisation and where so-called religious movements are often 
disclosed as being political movements in disguise... [it is possible that] the 
Russians regard Islam less as an ideological opponent than as an obstacle to the 
establishment of Russian cultural and political dominance.13
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4.iii) Caroe
O laf Caroe (1892-1981), born o f  a Scottish m other and a Danish father, w as the 
second o f  the great British scholars o f  Central Asia. H e too  joined the Q ueen’s W est 
Surrey Regiment, a year before W heeler, and was immediately sent to  India where he 
fought the Afghans. In 1919 he joined the India Civil Service, being based betw een 
1923-1937 on the N orth-W est Frontier, a period w hen tribesm en o f  the Afridi and 
W aziri clans w ere in revolt against British rule. During this time Caroe was awarded 
the Com m ander o f  the Indian Em pire Medal. In 1939 he becam e Foreign Secretary in 
Delhi, and in 1946 G overnor o f  the N orth-W est Frontier. In 1947, on decolonisation, 
he was retired against his wishes. B etw een 1951-1953 he ran the self-founded 
Turkological Centre, and in his 1951 book Wells o f  Power coined the term  ‘N orthern 
Screen’ as a reference to  the role o f  Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as buffers against Soviet 
expansion south. This later becam e the ‘N orthern  T ier’ doctrine, which seems to  have 
influenced Hostler.
Caroe ascribed a m ore active role to Islam than W heeler although his conception 
o f  the religion was m ore romantic:
a sedentary oasis population is particularly prone to the excesses of a morose 
clericalism such as flourished in Transoxiana... it is true in the broad to say that 
one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of 
each to religion - an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal set 
against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognise the immanence of God 
but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.14
In his eyes “in term s o f  ultim ate ideologies, the question is one o f  the faith which 
shall prevail in the end, Communism or Islam,” 15 casting the tw o as mutually
antagonistic ideologies. There seemed much evidence that Communism w as not
prevailing in its opposition to  Islam:
While the modem nationalists cannot sufficiently condemn the clerics... they are 
forced to admit, with a deep sense of emotion, that Islam lives on in the hearts of 
the people, far beyond the precincts of the mosque. As a Kazakh said in Mecca:
‘Since we have no mosques, no official clergy and no institutions that the 
Communists can abuse, this means that they can do nothing with us.’ It may be 
that the whole of Turkistan will come to Islam in this sense.16
129
Caroe did not explain what ‘sense’ o f  Islam  he had in mind, but he cited a 
complaint made by the K azakh Shaykhakhm etov in a Christm as speech to  the 
Kom som ol in 1951 to  the effect that religious practise w as alive, and concluded that
Under Bolshevik pressure, religious institutions have forever lost their old 
meaning and force... Yet Islam, cleansed of its theocratic accretions, lives as a 
spiritual possession in the hearts of the people... In fact Islam has become the 
spiritual core of the nationalist political creed.17
This sits uneasily w ith his earlier assertion that
[Islam may be] dismissed as a political force... [while] it is possible to speak in 
moving terms of Islam in the hearts of the people, far beyond the confines of the 
mosque or the conceptions of the ulema, as a political watchword it is regarded 
by the new nationalism as a mirage of imperialists.18
4.iv) Monteil
For the French scholar M onteil Soviet Islam was intimately bound up w ith the 
colonial question and much o f  what he had to  say about the religion was connected 
with this. This is due in part to  his view o f  Islam as being not merely a religion but a 
nexus o f  civilisational attitudes shared by people o f  a comm on cultural tradition 
irrespective o f  their level o f  religious practise. Islam can be as much an ethnic as a 
religious marker.
At the beginning o f  his essay, M onteil notes that “it could be said that Soviet 
Islam is, by 4/5, a Turkish Islam.” 19 The connexion betw een national and religious 
identity is m ade from the outset. Religious expression inevitably has elements o f  the 
national within it, and national feeling may be expressed via religion. It is primarily 
Islam or the Islamic elem ents o f  Central Asian society which differentiate the Turkic 
peoples o f  the Soviet Union from  the Slavic majority. As evidence for this M onteil 
quotes O. Yusupov, General Secretary o f  the U zbek Com m unist Party: “Islam is the 
m other o f  the U zbek people.”20
W hilst in C aroe’s eyes Islam and Communism could only be mutually 
antagonistic, M onteil noted that a 1942 Baku conference proclaim ed the tw o w ere not
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incompatible. Referring to  Ivan IV ’s forced conversion o f  the Tatars, M onteil 
concluded that Russian persecution o f  Islam w as not a purely Bolshevik preserve, nor 
had the Bolsheviks been uniformly hostile to  the religion. M onteil contended that 
relations betw een Soviet Communism and Islam had passed through five distinct 
phases. The years 1917-1920 represented a period o f  religious freedom  and political 
autonom y followed from  1920-1928 by continued relative tolerance o f  religion as an 
ally against ‘feudalism ’ tem pered by the fact that many ‘feudal’ practises had becom e 
associated w ith religious demands. 1928-1938 saw acute conflict arising from the 
struggle against pan-Turkism  followed by detente during the W ar, giving way in 
Stalin’s final years to  violent attacks on ‘deviations’, o f  which religion w as one. 
Explaining this apparent inconsistency in policy, M onteil patronisingly w rote “W e must 
not lose sight o f  the fact that we are in Asia, and that Cartesian logic does not hold in 
this country either am ong the Russians or the Turks.”21
That Islam and Communism need not be antagonistic was revealed in a single 
statement: “it has been said and freely written that Communist evangelism appeals to  a 
basic tendency in Islam, which is anti-capitalist.”22 D espite the shortage o f  accurate 
information about Soviet Islam, M onteil was in no doubt that some form  o f  modus 
vivendi had been w orked out betw een the religious authorities and the state. This w as 
illustrated by the fact that fatw as  w ere issued in support o f  such governm ent policies as 
land reform, and by the existence o f  four Spiritual D irectorates, o f  which M onteil gave 
the locations as well as naming their heads. H e further claimed that at 44,732 the 
num ber o f  registered ‘ulem a was four times the combined total o f  Rabbis and O rthodox 
priests.
The position o f  Islam could not be m easured solely by the situation o f  the ‘ulema. 
According to  M onteil
In Muslim society it is possible to distinguish laity - in other words the bulk of 
believers - from clergy, understanding that here it implies only ‘religious people’ 
in the vague sense of the word, characterised above all by their Islamic culture.23
The distinction is not clear, but it seems that M onteil is attem pting to  differentiate 
betw een those who are professionally involved with religion (he draws attention to  the
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Russian w ord dukhovnik which literally means a Father Confessor in the Christian sense 
but w as used in Central Asia as a term  for any religious functionary) and the mass o f  
people.
These seemed to  have an ambivalent attitude tow ards religion. On the one hand, 
there w ere ostensible atheists w ho held governm ent posts. In 1949, o f  83 members o f  
the Central Com m ittee o f  the U zbek Communist Party, 57 w ere Central Asians. On the 
o ther hand there w as evidence for the continuation o f  religious practice throughout 
society. Kyzyl Uzbekistan (24/6/50) had reported Young Pioneers praying, and being 
ignorant o f  Com m unist songs. Further, “it is probable that many M uslims continue to 
regard as illegitimate any child born o f  a marriage at which a mullah has not 
presided.”24 Later M onteil noted that “even ‘atheists’ are circumcised, get m arried in 
the m osque and are buried in Muslim cem eteries.”25
The reason for the observance o f  religious custom s M onteil gives as hatred 
tow ards the Russians. U nbelief he claimed led to  deracination which was to  be 
avoided.
It might be questioned, with Egretaud, w hether such custom s actually indicated 
religious life.
it occurs that one commits obvious errors in including traditional customs which 
are ‘religious' in name only. Contrary to what is currently thought, experienced 
theologians refuse to consider circumcision, refusal to consume pork or 
fermented drinks, wearing a veil... as religious imperatives... if the Muslim 
religion has been linked with these customs because of certain historical 
circumstances, their disappearance does not mean that the religion has 
disappeared with them... equally, the survival of these customs is not a criterion 
for judging religious feeling.26
It w ould be interesting to  know  who these ‘experienced theologians’ were, but 
E gre taud ’s remains a serious point, although taken to  its logical conclusion it would 
appear by this argum ent to  be impossible to  write about religious belief. M onteil 
m entions tw o phenom ena which are specifically religious in nature.
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The first w as pilgrimage. Hajj was impossible for the majority, although since the 
w ar limited num bers had been able to  travel to  M ecca. This did not stop the practice o f  
pilgrimage, since “they all have their holy places, venerated tom bs which traditionally 
the faithful visited to  pray.”27 M onteil named some sites, including the ‘Throne o f  
Solom on’ which people visited to  cure mental illness and sterility in w om en and to  seek 
a cure for blindness from  the nearby holy well. This was not the exclusive preserve o f  
superstitious villagers, as shown by a 1952 complaint in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda to 
the effect that even members o f  the Alm a-Ata Academy o f  Sciences m ade pilgrimages.
Secondly, M onteil w rote “one point on which m uch light has been cast is the 
question o f  congregations or M uslim religious brotherhoods (ishcin), w hose im portance 
in some countries, N orth  Africa for instance, is know n.”28
The ‘b ro therhoods’ had been abolished in 1921 and M onteil w as unsure w hether 
they w ere still extant. By 1957 he w as m ore certain. There w ere “some thousands o f  
dervishes... above all N aqshbandis and Qadiris according to  Soviet sources - which 
have not the slightest interest in exaggerating the significance o f  the brotherhoods.”29 
M onteil estimated that 7.5%  o f  Soviet M uslims w ere members o f  dervish groups. H e 
remained cautious though. W hilst Carrere d ’Encausse claimed that dervish groups “are 
actually mass organisations, totally alienated from  the ideology o f  the Soviet system,” 
M onteil asked “does she not arrive at this opinion rather quickly from  partial and 
incom plete figures?”30
M onteil’s ow n change o f  attitude tow ards dervishism resulted partly as a 
consequence o f  the w ork  o f  Hayit, Bennigsen and d ’Encausse. It is o f  im portance that 
he made an initial com parison with N orth  Africa, where dervish m ovem ents had shown 
them selves difficult to  control and had a history o f  spearheading political opposition to  
E uropean control.
An im portant aspect o f  dervishism is illustrated by another com parison with 
Africa. In a short section, M onteil followed Charles M onteil (no relation) in suggesting 
that traditional society had m uch in comm on with Communism in that there w as a 
highly developed system o f  collective ownership. This ‘Com m unism ’ had a religious
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specifically Sufi basis. “Am ong the Islamicised Blacks there is a collectivist 
organisation in which the ancient Sudanese Communism is transform ed by the 
intervention o f  Islam, itself assimilated. This is the sect o f  m urids...”31 This 
phenom enon w as also observable in Senegal. The significance o f  dervish-inspired 
‘Islamic Com m unism ’ lay in its com prom ise betw een the attractiveness o f  Communist 
teaching and traditional cultural norms. Applied to  Central Asia a synthesis o f  this kind 
could provide a means o f  being a Com m unist w ithout becoming subsumed into 
Russian-dom inated culture. A Central Asian dervish might support the goals o f  
Communism w ithout supporting the means. By implication support for, and assistance 
in implementing, Soviet policy did not demand acquiescence in the regime or with the 
norm s o f  Soviet life. A lthough it is not entirely clear from  his text, it is possible that it 
is this which M onteil had in mind w hen he w rote that “there undoubtedly exists within 
the U SSR  (and certainly within M uslim emigre circles), a middle way, at once 
progressive and anti-Soviet.”32
Concluding, M onteil stated that although public life had becom e de-Islamicised 
private faith persisted. The significance o f  this w as difficult to  determine. “W e do not 
fully understand [Islam ’s] precise situation. T rue it exists, it has come to  term s with the 
regime, but at w hat price? It does not govern society, nor morals, nor public affairs.”33 
The degree to  which Islam may have come to  term s with its secondary role in society, 
and the diversity within Soviet Islam itself is illustrated in tw o passages. In the first, 
M onteil makes a statem ent and then poses a question which is partially answered by the 
second.
It is a fact that there are Muslim Communists: in 1946 the head of the Soviet 
party of pilgrims to Mecca received, when passing through Cairo, the coveted 
degree of Doctor of Theology. What about militant Communists like Osman 
Yusupov. General Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, to what extent are 
they still Muslims?34
Let us take two young people (aged 29) who have emigrated to Paris. One is 
Kirghiz, the other Kazakh. The one comes from an old family and was a soldier 
in 1941. The other is a factory hand. The first, who left the Komsomol in 1939 
is detribalised and completely unreligious. But he retains the feeling of 
membership of the Muslim community, the Ummah, and this guides all his 
attitudes: on the Palestinian question for example. The other, the Kazakh, owns 
a pocket-sized Qur’an in Arabic, printed in Bulgaria and protected by a gilded 
metal box which he keeps safely by his heart.35
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4.vf Havit
H ayit’s Turkestan im XX. Jahrhwidert w as welcomed since in the w ords o f  
C arrere d ’Encausse “effectively nothing has been published in W estern Europe on 
Russian Islam save Professor von M ende’s ow n w ork ,11 the Essai sur I'lslam en URSS 
o f  Vincent M onteil and a few isolated articles dealing with problem s since the w ar.”36 
H ayit’s w ork focused on Soviet colonialism rather than on Islam per se, how ever on 
the subject o f  religion Hayit made a num ber o f  interesting claims which were to  find 
echoes in later writing.
Unlike m ost o ther emigres, Baymirza Hayit (b. 1917) had actually lived under 
Soviet rule. He w as born in the Ferghana Valley, traditionally one o f  the most devout 
regions o f  Central Asia, and was strongly influenced by Jadid ideas having studied 
under A bdurrauf Fitrat. He rose to  a senior position in the Uzbekistan M inistry o f  
Culture. Em igrating to  the Federal Republic o f  Germany in 1949, Hayit quickly m ade a 
name for himself as an authoritative eye-witness to  developm ents o f  the 1920s-193 Os.
H ayit’s starting point was to  characterise Islam as being fundamentally in 
opposition to  Soviet rule: “The ideas o f  Communism stand in opposition to  those o f  
Islam.”37 Any apparent Soviet tolerance o f  the religion should be seen as flannel to  
deceive newly independent Asian countries.
While Islam was attacked from within the country, outside there was talk of 
‘Islamic brotherhood’ and ‘the common aim of Communism and Islam’. Current 
Soviet policy on Islam does not aim for reconciliation but must be seen as a trap 
for those Islamic nations burdened with social and national problems.38
The incompatibility o f  Communism and Islam meant that rather than being able to 
evolve a system o f  com prom ise the tw o w ere doom ed to  a constant struggle which 
from  the side o f  Islam had to  take place outside the law: “w hereas up to  1929 Islam 
carried out an open struggle against Communism and Soviet pow er, since 1929 it has
1 Der nation ale Kampf der Rufdland Turken, Berlin 1936
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had to carry out an illegal struggle.”39 Thus Hayit equates the practise o f  Islam  with 
political opposition.
In H ayit’s eyes, Islam form ed the essence o f  Central Asian being, and the essence 
o f  Central Asian Islam w as dervishism: “Islam form ed the w orld- and life-view o f  
Turkestanis, their character and their thought... Turkestan w as a land o f  Islamic 
dervishism.”40 An assault on traditional Central Asian culture entailed an attack on an 
Islam w hose essence w as in dervishism and which w ould resist via that form.
Nineteenth century accounts o f  Central Asia m ake frequent reference to  
dervishism, usually as evidence for the decline o f  Central Asian culture and civilisation. 
Hayit suggested that this branch o f  Islam survived and w as spreading, and that this 
represented not the m oribundity o f  Central Asian culture but its resilience in the face o f  
the Communist threat.
Hayit listed four orders o f  dervishes as being active in Central Asia; the 
Naqshibandiyya, Qadiriya, Kubrawiyya and Kalendariyya. The prevalence o f  
dervishism w as illustrated by the fact that in 1935 thirty-tw o people had been arrested 
in Kokand for the perform ance o f  the zikr. Furtherm ore,
From 1934 to 1935 the clergy organised a religious activity among the 
population in order to revive the spiritual dynamics of Islam. They formed 
groups of five to six people and sent them from village to village and from town 
to town. These groups would mingle with the people riding hobby-horses 
\Stekenpferden], wearing turbans and colourful clothes, and in Turkestan they 
were generally known as Tiding Ishans’ (atliq eshanlar). At public meetings they 
would read Suras from the Qur’an and would start to move rhythmically in the 
dervish fashion under the zikr. Some from the audiences would join them. Thus 
the groups grew in number and enlisted new members. Soviet organs would call 
these people ‘madmen’ and would initially not credit them with any political 
importance.41
Hayit presents a w idespread, organised movement. That the authorities did not 
“initially” credit this with political im portance implies that later they did and indeed that 
it had such importance. This is significant when it is taken into account that although 
the ‘ulema, in the shape o f  M ufti Babakhan, had greatly impressed the French colonial 
officer General Tubert and through him M ontiel, Hayit dismisses Babakhan as a
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nonagenarian w ho could not even speak Arabic. Such an ‘ulema could not hope to  
preserve Islam. This w as evident in that although Islam “remained resistant, its public 
appearance within society was lost.”42
The im portance o f  dervishism lay in that it had no requirem ent for a public 
appearance to  survive. Adepts referred to  them selves as “K om som ol in this world, 
M urid in the next.” Hayit has introduced an im portant distinction. Islam survived not 
in its public institutions but as an underground dynamic m ovem ent o f  opposition.
Having said that, Hayit was cautious in his assessment o f  the future o f  Soviet
Islam.
It is difficult to see whether Islam can continue to exist or whether it will be 
removed completely from the minds of younger generations... it is equally 
difficult to see whether the spirit of Islam in its struggle for survival will shape 
itself to adapt to modem times or whether it will keep its old form.43
It appears that for Hayit the survival o f  Soviet Islam depends on the ‘adaptability’ 
o f  its ‘spirit’, something which w ould appear to  be precluded in the case o f  the ‘ulema. 
All H ayit’s evidence points to  innovation and genuine spirituality being the preserve o f  
dervishism. I f  Islam was to  remain strong, its strength lay here.
4.vi) Pines
W heeler com pared M onteil’s and Bennigsen’s early w ork on Islam to  that o f  
Richard Pipes, an American scholar w ho was particularly concerned w ith the Soviet 
political system and the position o f  minorities within this. “D r Pipes being less 
pessimistic about the survival o f  Islam than the tw o French w riters.”44 W hereas the 
first tw o had been reliant on printed Soviet sources, Pipes gained his inform ation from 
refugees whom  he interviewed in the United States in 1953. His findings w ere initially 
published in the M iddle East Journal in 1955 and in Problems o f  Communism in 1957.
Pipes linked the life or death o f  Islam to  the colonial question, suggesting that the 
loss o f  Islamic distinctiveness would be a precursor to  assimilation and
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Russification/Sovietisation. The m aintenance o f  cultural distinctiveness evinced by 
following Islamic precepts implied opposition. W hether assimilation or resistance was 
occurring was the heart o f  his essay. An accurate picture w as difficult to  arrive at, but 
Pipes made his view clear.
Some scholars feel that most of the minorities in the Soviet Union are gradually 
succumbing to Russification and losing their national identity in favour of a new 
'Soviet’ nationality. Others, among them the author of this essay, hold the 
opposite view and maintain that under the crust of assimilation and cultural 
Gleichschaltung virile national movements are taking shape. The evidence for 
either viewpoint is scanty and inadequate.45
Using the information he gained, Pipes drew  conclusions about the development 
o f  Central Asian society. Regarding Islam, “In general, under the extrem e pressure o f  
Soviet policy, Islam in Central Asia seems to  have undergone in a single generation the 
process o f  ‘secularisation’, a process well know n in w estern religious experience.”46 
This did not imply Russification however, since “only those features o f  Russian culture 
which accord with the M uslim society’s general historical evolution - that is to  say, 
those which tend tow ards W esternisation - seem to  make a lasting im pact.”47
The secularisation o f  Central Asian society w as one which w ould in any case 
have occurred. It did not imply support for Soviet policies, still less did it suggest that 
those policies, which Pipes characterised as being a drive to  enforce Russian/Soviet 
hegemony, had been successful. This was, ironically in view o f  P ipes’ characterisation 
o f  Central Asian society as secular, borne out in the field o f  religion, which w as the 
prime carrier o f  local cultural exclusivity.
While religious ‘survivals of the past’ are reported throughout the territory of the 
USSR, they would appear to be most firmly rooted in the Muslim republics...
The Communists have long waged a struggle against Islam in these republics; 
despite a certain success among the rising generation, they have run into 
innumerable ancestral habits and a religious fervour which still resists them...
To the extent that the press campaign reflects the actual persistence of 
superstition the Communists provide another instance of the failure of their 
ideology to fulfil man’s complex needs.48
The greatest o f  these Pipes implies is a spiritual one. This attitude might sound 
odd to  European ears, but in a society as religious as the United States such a position 
w ould seem natural. Communism, a materialist doctrine, is anti-spiritual. It follows
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that a spiritually ordered life, and in the Protestant United States religious behaviour is 
understood as being spiritually rather than socially m otivated, is an anti-Comm unist life.
If religious influences are merely ‘survivals of the past’ among the old, what is to 
explain the revival of interest among young people?...
The answer is in part the tenacity of faith itself, in part the natural reaction of 
peoples who have known little but suffering and privation... [religion] in a sense 
constitute^] an act of revolt - a revolt against the oppressiveness of Soviet life, 
against the dry and repetitive dogmas of ‘Leninism-Stalinism.’49
This them e o f  religious behaviour as a reaction to  the spiritual nullity o f  
Communism w as taken up and developed in later decades. Evidence o f  religious 
activity was provided by Bennigsen.
4.vii) Bennigsen
Alexandre Bennigsen (b. St Petersburg 1913, d. Paris 1988) was the most 
im portant scholar in the field o f  Central Asian Studies during the period examined in 
this thesis. It has been said that he “virtually single-handedly created the field o f  
Russian Islam in the p o s t-1945 period as one meriting serious study.”50 Bennigsen is 
the m ost frequently cited o f  all W estern scholars and has a legitimate claim to  being 
“one o f  [Central Asian Studies’] greatest pioneers and scholars.”51
Bennigsen’s father was a Colonel o f  the Russian Imperial H orse Guards who 
fought against the Bolsheviks during the Civil War. In 1919 Bennigsen and his mother, 
who like his father was o f  German ancestry, w ere evacuated to  Constantinople his 
father joining them  the following year. Bennigsen lived with his grand-parents in 
Tallinn (Reval) until the family joined the Russian diaspora in Paris in 1924. 
Com pleting his education in Paris he w ent to  the Cavalry school in Saumur, leaving in 
1939 as a lieutenant. Just before the German occupation o f  Paris, Bennigsen married 
another Baltic-G erm an emigre, Helene von Bildering, w hose father B aron Paul, had 
been executed by the Bolsheviks.
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During the W ar Bennigsen w as active in the Resistance. Although his parents 
w ere arrested by the G estapo, neither he nor his wife were. Their daughter M arie was 
born in 1944.
A fter the W ar Bennigsen followed a family tradition o f  learning non-European 
languages, studying Persian, Turkish and Kurdish. Additionally he held a post at the 
Precedence de la Consul, w here he first came into contact with newspapers w ritten in 
Central Asian languages. During this time he met the historian Chantal Lem ercier- 
Quelquejay, with w hom  he produced a num ber o f  im portant w orks on Central Asia’s 
history before the Revolution.
In the early 1950s he and his wife travelled widely in the M uslim world collecting 
oral records o f  recent history, folklore and epic verse before he returned to  Paris to  
take a Chair in the history o f  non-Arabic Islam at the Ecole Practique des H autes 
Etudes.
Bennigsen held this post as Em eritus until his retirem ent in 1983, but in 1969 he 
travelled to  the USA, w orking first at the Universities o f  Rochester and Indiana, before 
finding tenure at Chicago in 1971. For the rest o f  his working life he remained in 
Chicago, whilst also spending periods in Florida and W ashington DC.
A deeply devout man, the religious question excited Bennigsen from the first. 
The reason for this he explained.
When one compares the local newspapers of the Muslim republics with the press 
of the other Union Republics, one is struck by the profound difference which 
separates them in the matter of the religious problem. In Moscow, Kiev, Tbilisi, 
Yerevan or Minsk papers the religious problem is very seldom alluded to; and 
when by chance a specialist organ devoted to anti-religious polemic such as 
Moscow’s Komsomolskaya Pravda devoted an article to this problem, the tone 
stays moderate, with a clear effort to remain scientific. By contrast, in Central 
Asia and Azerbaijan, as in Lithuania (the only Union Republic with a Catholic 
population), the press publishes a large number of articles against religion, and 
their tone is extremely violent.52
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The seriousness with which the Soviets took  Islam should be m atched in the 
West. It related to  Bennigsen’s other reason for focusing on religion. Islam was at the 
root o f  the cultural differences separating Central Asians from Russians, and the 
attitude o f  the Central Asian intelligentsia tow ards religion w ould profoundly affect its 
relationship to  the regime. Returning to the colonial question o f  co-option or coercion, 
elite attitudes to  Islam and the place o f  Islam in Central Asian life could not but have an 
influence on attitudes tow ards the Soviet authorities.
Bennigsen’s treatm ent o f  Islam w as divided into three parts: the official position 
o f  religion within the USSR; the degree to which religious sentiment and practice had 
survived; and the actual attitude o f  the authorities tow ards Islam.
Regarding the legal status o f  Soviet Islam Bennigsen m entioned paragraph 124 o f  
the 1936 Constitution which guaranteed freedom  o f  religion, including freedom  o f  
religious association and ritual practice. Religious involvement in the affairs o f  state 
w as forbidden, as in Kemalist Turkey.
The strict division betw een religion and the state w as new in Central Asian Islam 
and it had consequences Bennigsen seems not to  have considered. For the first time it 
became possible not to  practise religious rites which in the past had been enforced by 
social pressure and in the Em irate o f  B okhara by a special police force. N ineteenth 
century accounts o f  Central Asia suggest that this might have been a relief to  many 
inhabitants. These reports suggest a relative indifference to  ritual, albeit one m arried to  
a strong self-identification as ‘M uslim ’. The fact that the m ost ‘fanatical’ city o f  the 
region required force to  maintain observance o f  the cult suggests that in the absence o f  
force, or if  force w ere to  be applied in the opposite direction, many w ould be content to  
let religious observance lapse.
Islam w as not ju st rem oved from  the legal sphere. The state took  responsibility 
for education and w as not concerned to  instil religious values. Private education was 
illegal and religious ‘propaganda’, particularly that aimed at children, w as a serious 
offence. Bennigsen m entions this but does not draw  out its implications. Forbidden to
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be propagated, it was difficult for Islam to be perpetuated, the m ore so if  in urban areas 
people w ere inclined to  religious indifference anyway.
Urban areas are im portant. A ban on religious education could not be fully 
enforced. In as far as it was it would tend to  be so m ore in tow ns than villages since 
the control o f  the state is always stronger in urban areas. W ithout him self drawing this 
conclusion, Bennigsen in highlighting the lack o f  legal o r educational force in Islam, 
suggests an urban environm ent indifferent tow ards and possibly ignorant o f  religious 
norms. It w as from  this environm ent that the new mediating intelligentsia would come.
Regarding Islam ’s official position, Bennigsen stated it was “tolerated but visibly 
no longer do m in a ted ] public life,”53 citing Pravda Vostokci to  the effect that it had 
becom e “a private affair.” This com plicated the task  o f  assessing its strength, which 
could only be m easured by the religion’s public aspects, the most obvious o f  which was 
the mosque.
The num ber o f  m osques was impossible to  determine. The English-language 
Soviet War News had given the figure as 1,312 m osques and 8,502 mullahs, a figure 
radically at variance with M onteil’s estimate o f  over 44,000. This figure Bennigsen 
com pared to  the 1914 number, as given in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, which 
claimed 24,562 ‘M uslim parishes’ for the Russian Empire. The 1942 total represented 
“a derisory num ber for the almost tw enty million people belonging to  groups entirely 
Islamised before 1914.”54
There are difficulties with these figures. Firstly, leaving aside w hat is meant by a 
‘Muslim parish ,’ the tw o sets are not strictly comparable. The Russian Em pire o f  1914 
w as not coterm inous w ith the Soviet Union o f  1942 or o f  1952, although Bennigsen 
implies that they represent the same entity. The figures, seemingly showing a rapid 
decline in m osque num bers during the Soviet period, take no account o f  frontier 
changes o r dem ographic changes due to  war, migration or famine.
The second difficulty with the figures lies in the proportion o f  ‘m ullahs’ to  
mosques. The 1942 statistics give a ratio o f  just over 6:1, which seems an unusually
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high figure. A m ore recent source55 gives a 1926 total o f  “mullahs, imams, ishans and 
others in the religious calling” o f  5,898, a level before the anti-religious drive less than 
Bennigsen’s for the W ar years. Additionally, although used as if  unproblem atic, the 
term s ‘mullah’ and ‘m osque’ are not clearly defined, making it hard to  see if  the tables 
are actually referring to  the same bodies.
By contrast to  the decline o f  m osques indicated by these figures, Bennigsen 
referred to Pakistani Socialist leader M ubarak Sagher’s 1952 statem ent that he 
personally had counted tw enty ‘Cathedral M osques’ and many minor ones in 
Samarkand alone. N o m ention is made o f  w hat counts as a m osque but Bennigsen, 
highlighting the difficulty o f  obtaining accurate information about Central Asia, 
suggested that “if these rather m ore optimistic levels are true, they show a veritable 
renaissance o f  Islam in Central Asia” adding the cavil that “they are not confirmed by a 
single Soviet source.” 56
Bennigsen next considered the question o f  links betw een Soviet and non-Soviet 
Muslims. Only three examples o f  direct contact presented themselves. In 1945 a 
poorly-attended Hajj had been organised. The following year a group o f  Shi’ite 
dignitaries visited the holy places o f  Iran. Todzhikistan-i Surkh is m entioned to  the 
effect that Ism a’ili D a 'is had infiltrated the Pam ir to  collect zakat on behalf o f  the Aga 
Khan. This would appear to  be new information unavailable to  M onteil, w ho claimed 
that although the Ism a’ili community had sent a caravan to  Bom bay (where the Aga 
Khan then lived) there had been no subsequent contact.
The role o f  the ‘ulema and the organisational structure o f  Soviet Islam is treated 
after this m ention o f  outside links. This might seem unusual, but the ‘ulem a’s position 
as tools o f  Soviet foreign policy w as a comm on concern. Bennigsen named the four 
Spiritual D irectorates which represented the formal leadership o f  the community, and 
noted that a 1943 conference had proclaim ed Shi’ism to  be a fifth madhab rather than a 
sect, but the D irectorates’ activity remained “extremely poorly know n by us.”57
Concerning the status o f  the ‘ulema Bennigsen referred to  the Soviet press to  
indicate that they w ere totally loyal to  the regime. F or instance the 1952 Zagorsk
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conference o f  Churches and religious organisations w as attended by the Sheikh ul- 
Islcim o f  Baku, the M ufti o f  the N orth  Caucasus and the vice-president o f  the Central 
Asian Directorate. At this conference the assembled religious leaders pronounced their 
hostility to the K orean War. The ‘ulema w ere for Bennigsen a tool o f  the Soviet 
authorities com parable to  the O rthodox hierarchy. This is an interesting comparison 
not so much because the M uslim authorities within the U SSR  w ere them selves in a 
similar position to Christian leaders but because Paris, w here Bennigsen lived, w as the 
centre o f  the Russian O rthodox Church in Exile which regarded itself as the true 
M uscovite Patriarchate, the clergy within Russia being regarded as spiritually dishonest 
collaborators w ho represented neither the True Faith nor true believers. Bennigsen’s 
analogy suggests that the Soviet ‘ulema be seen in the same light.
Given that there was a shortage o f  m osques and that the ‘ulema were little m ore 
than lackeys o f  the regime, Bennigsen found himself obliged to  ask “are the M uslims o f  
the U SSR  still M uslims?”38 To answer this question he turned to  the survival o f  
religious feelings amongst the traditionally Muslim peoples o f  the country.
There appeared to  have been a grow th in religious activity since the W ar. In 
Kyzyl Uzbekistan First Secretary Y usupov complained “the directors o f  kolkhozes and 
Party members tolerate manifestations o f  the ancient religious mentality under the 
pretext that the M uslim faith is the ‘M other’ o f  the U zbek people.”59 M onteil referred 
to  this statem ent, but cast it in such a way that Y usupov appeared to be affirming that 
Islam is a ‘m other’. Bennigsen’s quotation shows him to  be denying it.
Bennigsen affirmed that “the Soviet press is stingy w ith details and it is hard to 
say exactly what this ‘renaissance’ o f  religious activity consists of.”60 How ever, he 
attem pted to  describe three o f  them.
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda  claimed that mullahs played “a certain [unspecified] 
role” in rural life and had infiltrated the Party.
Certain folk-practises w ere followed. Kyzyl Uzbekistan and Todzhikistan-i Snrkh 
frequently condem ned the Fast. It is not clear why Bennigsen regarded the Fast, one o f
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the Five Pillars incumbent on every Muslim, as a folk practise. It is possible that he 
meant to  imply that it was observed for traditional and social rather than religious 
reasons. I f  this is the case it hardly points to  an Islamic renaissance. Bennigsen 
devoted three pages to the preservation o f  traditional social custom s such as kalym 
(bride-price), which w ere based on a continuing precedence o f  adat (custom ary law) 
over Soviet law, claiming that these w ere not evidence o f  religious sentiment.
The Soviet authorities include in the renaissance of religious sentiment the
reappearance of customs which they characterise as ‘clerical’ but which are in
reality the application to the new Soviet society of old social traditions.61
Bennigsen was later to  reverse this view and see traditional custom s as evidence 
o f  religiosity.
Finally the practise o f  pilgrimage to  the tom bs o f  saints was mentioned. Although 
Bennigsen cited many examples o f  this he had no claims or comm ents to  make about it, 
as if it were an insignificant phenomenon. Later he was radically to  re-appraise this 
view.
Bennigsen described the pre-W ar anti-religious campaigns. Citing tw o articles 
from  Pravda Vostoka and one from  Komsomolskaya Pravda on the incompatibility o f  
M arxism  and religion he stated that in Soviet eyes Islam w as primitive and fanatical, a 
chaotic m ixture o f  Christianity, Judaism and Paganism,"1 a foreign imposition and a tool 
o f  imperialist powers.
The Soviet attitude tow ards Islam is seen as being directly related to  the 
questions o f  colonialism and anti-colonialism. For this reason Islam attracted a 
relatively high level o f  Soviet polemic. Islam was attacked for its ‘cosm opolitanism .’ 
It was a world m ovem ent with its centres outside the Soviet Union, whose members 
partook  o f  a shared culture and identity distinguishing them  from  other Soviet citizens. 
A ttacks on Islam w ere a part o f  an attem pt to  create a single Soviet polity and culture.
1,1 This is a charge which has been levelled at Islam in the West also.
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To establish Communism it is not enough to deislamise the believers, it is also 
and above all necessary to achieve a true cultural symbiosis of all the peoples of 
the Union by attacking the barriers which separate the Muslims from other 
human groupings and most especially the Russian people, the ‘elder brother’ of 
the great Soviet family.62
Adherence to  Islam becam e a m atter not only o f  social convention, but a positive 
anti-Soviet, anti-Russian and anti-colonial activity. Having said this, Bennigsen was 
forced to  concede that the policy o f  deislamisation had been by and large successful, at 
least in parts o f  the country.
The anti-religious policy followed systematically up to the end of the War has not 
achieved the total deislamisation of the rural mass o f the ancient sedentary areas 
where according to the Soviet press religious sentiment remains strong even 
among some Party members. [It] is not the same in the ancient nomadic areas 
(Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan...) and in heavily industrialised and 
Russified centres (Baku. Ashkhabad...) where the young people seem to be more 
or less ignorant of Islamic matters...
Islam is not dead, at least not yet, despite the efforts employed. But the process 
of deislamisation continues inexorably, and there are firm grounds for believing 
that, barring exceptions, the native youth are just as little informed on Islamic 
matters as young Russians are of Orthodoxy.63
Bennigsen returned to  the question o f  Soviet Islam in an article co-authored with 
Carrere d ’Encausse which dealt w ith the interaction betw een Russians and Muslims, 
stressing the dom inance o f  the Russian ‘minority’ over the M uslim ‘m ajority’.
This w as characterised in spiritual term s as a new version o f  the encounter 
betw een Islam and the W est. The challenge for Islam under Soviet conditions was to 
arrive at an original response to  save its integrity or to  direct it in a new path. W as it 
possible both to  be a Muslim and a Communist?
The second o f  the sections into which the article is divided is entitled ‘The 
Ossification o f  Islam ’, signalling that the religion had been unable to  come up w ith a 
viable response to  the Communist challenge. According to  the authors there w ere tw o 
reasons for this. Firstly, the R ussians’ sense o f  their own cultural superiority precluded 
the possibility o f  Islamic culture impinging on Russian. Secondly, the debate was 
‘unequal’. It w as a dialogue betw een two conceptions o f  the universe, materialist and
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spiritual, which could never meet. N o synthesis revitalising Islam could be achieved 
given the wholly unequal resources available to  the com peting sides.
The campaign against Islam w as described as “a remarkable, subtle, adroit, and 
definitely effective propaganda”64 conducted via various means, initially violent and 
subsequently ‘scientific’. The reader was referred to  M onteil’s w ork for details o f  the 
campaign. Its ultimate goal could be said to  be the decoupling o f  Islam from national 
identity as shown by Klimovich’s polemic in Kyzyl Uzbekistan'. “Islam is a religion 
which is foreign to  the peoples o f  Central Asia, in the service o f  imperialists and the 
Arab... and latterly English and American invaders.”65 F or Bennigsen and d ’Encausse 
this went to  the very roo t o f  the problem  since Central Asians regarded Islam as “the 
m ost precious part o f  an ancestral civilisation... their comm on heritage.”66
For an insight into the results o f  the anti-religious drive the authors referred to  
Riaz Ali Shah, w ho w rote in the Karachi new spaper Dawn “in Kazakhstan Islam is in 
agony... the new generation o f  Uzbeks totally ignores the Q ur’an and does not feel the 
need to learn it.”67 From  this they concluded that “it seems the practise o f  Islam is 
essentially the affair o f  old people w ho still fill the roughly three hundred m osques o f  
Central Asia... W hat use are three hundred m osques to  a M uslim population o f  betw een 
fifteen and tw enty million?”68
D espite the seeming m oribundity o f  the religion, w hen asked w hether Islam was 
in terminal decline
The press and the Soviet leaders themselves bring a negative response to these 
questions in being angered by the vitality of Islam which remains for natives, 
even seeming unbelievers, the very basis of their society [and] the essence of their 
nationalism. It is this which separates them, which opposes them to the Russian 
universe and creates a Muslim community which transcends racial differences 
uniting Turks and Iranians in its melting-pot. Even when they are deislamised 
atheists and militant Communists, the natives of Central Asia distinguish 
themselves from Russians who remain ‘kafirs' in their eyes. Could it be that 
Islam in Central Asia is nothing more than the expression of native nationalism, 
which will survive as long as this lasts?69
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This is a confusing passage. On the one hand Islam shows vitality but on the 
other it is nothing. The problem lies in what is meant by ‘Islam ’. Clearly it here means 
more than ritual practise but if  for Central Asians ‘M uslim ’ means ‘not Russian’, which 
appears to  be what is being argued, this hardly evinces the religion’s vitality. ‘N ot 
Russian’ is a simple statem ent o f  fact not a statement o f  belief, how ever Bennigsen and 
d ’Encausse use the religious term  kafir to  describe Central Asian attitudes to  Russians. 
This is a highly charged w ord which, used by a Muslim, implies contem pt for the 
person described. It does not simply mean ‘foreigner’ but ‘unbeliever,’ specifically an 
unbeliever against w hom  it is perm itted to  w age jihad. It is hard to  imagine an atheist 
using a term  which in its strict sense refers to  himself. N o evidence is provided o f  any 
Central Asian so describing the Russians and it seems likely that this term  has been 
imported to give a political and religious colouring to  a distinction which could quite 
easily have had no such significance. Even if  a religious distinction w ere being made, 
the Russians as at least nominal Christians are not kafir but AM al-Kitah , ‘People o f  the 
B ook’ with w hom  M uslims are perm itted to  have friendly relations.
In addition to  this difficulty over the use o f  religious term inology is the question 
o f  the use o f  the w ord ‘nationalism ’ w ith which Islam is linked. The French w ord does 
not necessarily have the political connotations o f  its English equivalent but can mean 
simply ‘ethnic self-aw areness.’ I f  this is the sense in which it is meant, Islam as a 
religion or social regulator may be w eak whilst the conception o f  ‘M uslim ness’ remains 
strong. It does not follow from this that Soviet M uslims conceived o f  themselves as a 
single bloc as the passage implies.
Bennigsen and d ’Encausse emphasised that Islamic doctrine had been almost 
totally abandoned, leaving a residue o f  traditions and custom s such as celebrating 
traditional feasts and appealing to  a mullah to  settle disputes. Thus contrasted with 
other Muslim societies in which new ways o f  life evolved within the M uslim tradition in 
response to  such factors as increased education and urbanisation, resulting in the 
developm ent and reassessm ent o f  Islamic theology to  m eet the needs o f  the time.
148
Thus “the Islam encountered in Central Asia is an ossified religion, entirely turned 
tow ards the past... in ‘laicising’ M uslim society [the Soviet authorities] have hampered 
its evolution into m odern forms and condemned it to ‘archaism ’ to  avoid destruction.”70
Reducing the religion to  a series o f  custom s, the authorities had ironically slowed 
the developm ent o f  Central Asian society, since Islam as one o f  the main m arkers o f  
ethnic identity had come to  be associated with peripheral indicators. For instance 5% 
o f  Tashkent wom en w ere veiled, a higher proportion than in many other Muslim 
capitals, whilst w om en’s non-participation in society and especially in education was 
not only greater than in other M uslim countries but greater than in the past in Central 
Asia.
It therefore seems that the Soviet authorities have not yet managed to deracinate 
the world of habits and Islamic traditions which constitute the basis of ‘national’ 
culture in Central Asia. They have run up against a passive resistance of the 
natives who in order to defend [their culture] have revived the past in its most 
out-of-date forms. Just as they have latched onto their ethnic integrity, Central 
Asians have latched onto their religious integrity. They thus defend their 
civilisation which survives in the intellectual and cultural spheres.71
The concept o f  ‘passive resistance’ is interesting. N o resistance is wholly 
passive. It must be entered into. It is being suggested that in refusing to  accom m odate 
m odern ways o f  life, Central Asians w ere consciously opposing Soviet rule. According 
to  the authors, “in effect natives are reacting in exactly the same way to  defend their 
religion and their culture: in taking refuge in the past w ithout wanting, or being able, to  
bring it into the present.”72
The preferred traditional cultural norms were attacked by the authorities as 
‘bourgeois deviation’ because, according to  the authors, they encouraged an Islamic 
rather than Soviet world-view, w ere ‘pan-M uslim ’ in recognising non-Soviet Muslims, 
and in relating to  the past kept alive rem embrance o f  anti-Russian revolts. W e must ask 
ourselves who it was w ho were following these traditional norm s and why.
The evidence o f  Bennigsen’s and d ’E ncausse’s w ork  suggests that it w as likely to  
have been the rural population o f  the oases. It is possible that adherence to  the past
149
was a form  o f  resistance to  Soviet norm s but it should also be rem embered that village 
life was least affected by the changes o f  the Soviet era. To the people who adhered to 
traditional habits there need not have been any conflict betw een new and old since the 
new was less different in the villages than in the cities w here Soviet innovations seemed 
largely to  have been accepted in place o f  tradition. Bennigsen and d ’Encausse appear 
to  want the practise o f  traditional custom s to  be a disengagement from Soviet society 
prom pted by concern for national integrity. It may simply have been the indifference 
o f  a politically insignificant sector o f  society to  social norms which w ere irrelevant to  
their daily life.
This caution notw ithstanding, Bennigsen’s and d ’Encausse’s position can be 
summed up briefly: Islam in Central Asia had weakened almost to  the point o f  
vanishing. W here it did survive it did so as a form  o f  opposition to  Soviet rule. 
How ever, it appeared unable to  adapt itself to  the needs o f  the m odern age and 
remained at risk from Soviet policies.
Three years later Bennigsen produced an article which substantially revised this 
conclusion and seemed to  suggest not only that Soviet Islam was not ‘ossified’ but that 
Soviet religious policies w ere failing. W hilst maintaining that ‘orthodox’ Islam w as in 
terminal decline, Bennigsen stated that Islam  survived in form s beyond the reach o f  the 
state and as m ore than a predisposition to  certain types o f  food or styles o f  dress.
Bennigsen’s revision o f  his previously held view w as prom pted by the 1957 
publication in Sovyetskaya Etnografiya o f  an article by G.P. Snesarev entitled “ Some 
reasons for religious survivals am ong the Uzbeks o f  K horezm ,” one o f  four papers 
presented at a conference in Stalinabad (Dusham be) in 1956. The other three, which 
Sovyetskaya Etnografiya published only in abstract, w ere “The survival o f  ancient 
beliefs in the contem porary custom s o f  the  Tadjiks o f  Karategin and D arw az” by M .R. 
Rahimov, “Islamic survivals and ancient traditions among the Karakalpaks” presented 
by S. Kam alov and “Som e elem ents o f  Sufism connected w ith Shamanism” by O.A. 
Sukhareva. All four w ere prom inent Soviet Orientalists.
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Bennigsen noted that “all four o f  these reports acknowledge the extraordinary 
vitality o f  religious belief and criticise the official theory o f  the ‘natural disappearance’ 
o f  these beliefs.”7' H e quoted Snesarev:
Over the years the purely theoretical opinion has been formed that religious 
survivals in our times have lost their primary importance, that they are no longer 
deeply rooted in the people’s conscience and, having become matters of habit, are 
rapidly dying off.
This opinion is false, because though certain religious manifestations may have 
reached the disappearing stage, others survive and some are even at the stage of 
formation.74
Snesarev hinted at the possibility o f  an Islamic reform  movement developing 
which “strives to  adapt the religion to  present conditions [and]... attem pts to  modernise 
M uslim dogm a’.”75 N othing m ore is said about this movement, but the very fact that it 
is m entioned underm ines Bennigsen’s earlier view o f  the inability o f  Soviet Islam to 
adapt to the m odern world.
One adaptation is hinted at by Snesarev w hen he refers to  the existence o f  ‘non- 
official’, that is elected rather than appointed and state-registered, mullahs. Also, 
“Kamalov speaks o f  the ‘influence o f  the ishans (leaders o f  brotherhoods) in 
K arakalpakistan’ while Snesarev discloses the existence o f  feminine ‘b rotherhoods’. 
H e describes one which existed in 1956 in the Khanki district o f  the Khorezm  region 
and met periodically to  celebrate the Sufi djcihr (.zikr).”76
The existence o f ‘bro therhoods,’ reminiscent o f  H ayit’s atliq ishanlar, implies an 
organised religious life beyond the ambit o f  the state. This life Snesarev term ed 
‘popular Islam ’ as distinct to  the ‘official’ Islam o f  the Spiritual D irectorates. Snesarev 
defined this as “that peculiar syncretistic religion which resulted in form er times from 
the fusion o f  Islam with a complex o f  pre-Islamic beliefs.”77
‘Popular’ Islam consisted o f  four elements. Firstly, as in other M uslim societies, 
fetishism, the use o f  amulets, practise o f  ritual magic and the invocation o f  “barely 
Islamicised female deities”78 was practised.
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A nother feature w as a developed cult o f  ancestors which manifested itself in the 
veneration o f  stones, springs and trees associated with real or imagined figures as well 
as the custom  o f  making pilgrimages to  saints’ tombs.
Thirdly ‘Sham anist’ rituals w ere observed “which closely resemble and served as 
a model for the zikr,”79 M en and w om en travelled the country and held seances which 
w ere usually attended by women. In many areas it was com m on to consult a ‘shaman’ 
in the event o f  illness.
Finally, religion w as manifest in family rites. B irths w ere m arked by the reading 
o f  prayers by a mullah (registered or unofficial). Circumcision w as universal and 
accom panied by a toi (feast) at which a religious figure was present. Religious 
m arriage and its attendant toi w ere also widely if  clandestinely celebrated in the 
presence o f  a mullah. A ccording to  Snesarev, the secrecy o f  these rituals was less to  
do with fear o f  state disapproval than the desire to  avoid the Evil Eye.
W e are presented with a range o f  phenomena. It might be queried which o f  these 
are strictly religious. The status o f  traditional medicine as a religious manifestation is in 
particular doubtful. It must be noticed that the practices described are precisely o f  the 
archaic type which w ere in decline elsewhere in the M uslim w orld and which Bennigsen 
had previously described as ‘ossified’.
Snesarev linked the persistence o f  religious rites to  the continuing traditional 
social structure o f  village life, which he described in detail. This structure w as both 
informed by and reinforced Islamic norms and form ed “the barrier preventing new ideas 
and attitudes from penetrating into the families.”80 Rural social conservatism  might be 
expected, how ever “if the conservation o f  the traditional structure among the rural class 
is not particularly surprising, Snesarev’s information on the M uslim w orker’s milieu is 
actually sensational.”81
Snesarev contended that in cities religious rituals persisted in corporate 
associations resembling guilds. All ‘artisanal professions’ had rites o f  initiation marking 
the change in status from  apprentice to  usta (M aster). At the inauguration o f  an usta a
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mullah had to be present. Associations w ere maintained by the recital by the M asters o f  
collective prayers in honour o f  the g roup’s ‘guardian’ saint, Pir. This recital took  place 
on Thursdays, traditionally the day on which Sufis perform  zikr. Associations 
possessed statutes (risala) governing their m em bers’ behaviour which w ere transm itted 
orally and recited in Arabic collectively by the assembled M asters. Thus far Snesarev 
has described a traditional guild resembling those still in existence in Afghanistan. That 
such organisations should continue to  survive in traditional professions is unsurprising. 
W hat presumably is ‘sensational’ for Bennigsen is that Snesarev claimed taxi drivers in 
Khiva had form ed a new association under the patronage o f  H azrat Daud. A closed 
corporation, new members had to  be blessed by a recital o f  the Fatiha by an usta before 
they could comm ence work.
This showed that Islam was adapting to  new circumstances and that “Muslim 
society has remained very nearly intact despite forty years under the Soviet regime. 
The Soviet way o f  life has hardly penetrated it.”82 Previously Bennigsen, like W heeler, 
had suggested that Soviet M uslim culture and society had been all but destroyed, 
leaving a husk shorn o f  vitality. N ow  he w as suggesting that this w as not the case. 
Even in cities new M uslim  organisations, which Bennigsen had previously characterised 
as a form o f  passive resistance to  the Soviet state, could come into being and be 
perpetuated. M uslim society remained strong, indicating a degree o f  resistance to  and 
rejection o f  Soviet norms.
4.vii0 Conclusion
If  instances o f  active resistance to  Soviet rule seemed comparatively rare in the 
post-W ar era it did not follow that resistance was totally absent. Evidence appearing 
tow ards the end o f  the decade could be presented so as to  show a degree o f  escape 
from  state control which, since the state controlled everything it approved of, was 
necessarily anti-state. That there was a strong current o f  religious activity beyond the 
ambit o f  the state-controlled ‘ulem a was o f  especial importance. From  now on it was 
possible virtually to  discount official pronouncem ents and search for a m ore nebulous 
group o f  phenom ena which could be used as evidence o f  resistance to  Soviet rule. 
Although m ost o f  the hard evidence for religious activity was being put forw ard in
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France, it w as in America that the significance o f  the phenom enon was to  be m ost fully 
developed. The relative British indifference to  the religious question, which though 
manifest w as never fully explained in the texts, w as to  result in the 1960s with the 
contrasting argum ent, that religious activity did not imply political opposition, being 
ignored.
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Chapter 5: Writing on Islam - the 1960s
5.i) Introduction
During the 1960s an understanding w as developed concerning how  to 
appreciate the Soviet Union having a large M uslim population.
In this period US scholars began to  study Central Asia. A llworth becam e 
interested in the field as a result o f  a pre-existing interest in Turkic studies and as a 
teacher in the Central Asia Center at the D epartm ent o f  M iddle Eastern Languages and 
Cultures at Columbia University, others w ere attem pting to  understand what was in US 
term s a new field. American scholars did not attem pt to  hide a hostility tow ards the 
U SSR which could lead to  a romanticised portrayal o f  pre-Soviet Central Asia. 
Allworth claimed
In capitals made great by medieval princes a Central Asian who matured after 
the mid- nineteenth century was bom into a tradition still vital enough to 
provide him with the opportunity for extending his interests widely and 
becoming, if he had the drive and curiosity, a scholar and a kind of latter day 
Renaissance man... he engrossed himself in the magnificent old literature, the 
legendary history of the past and the geography of West Turkestan... outside 
the seminary he engaged in vigorous sports, practised techniques of irrigating 
arid land, or conducted foreign trade or travelled abroad. The talented Central 
Asian composed and performed original music, wrote elegant poetry employing 
a fine calligraphy and actively participated in the witty intellectual circles found 
in every important centre.1
This idealistic view o f  what Central Asia might have been but for Soviet 
influence typifies the US attitude tow ards Soviet ‘imperialism’. A llw orth’s judgem ent 
suggests that an almost perfect cultural situation had been totally destroyed. European 
studies suggested that not all had been lost. Islam, the defining characteristic which 
separated Central Asians from Russians, persisted.
Muslims were a people apart from the Soviet system w hose separateness was 
expressed and perpetuated by an Islam which, being beyond the authorities’ control, 
was not susceptible to  their manipulation. The Soviets w ere attem pting to create a 
single culture which M uslims resisted by preserving religious rituals. As the decade
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progressed a consensus came to  be form ed as to  the nature o f  Soviet Islam both as 
religious phenom enon and in term s o f  its relation with the regime.
5.ii) Kolarz
W alter K olarz’s 1961 Religion in the Soviet Union, w rittern by a form er 
citizen o f  A ustria-H ungary and fervent anti-Communist, covers religious beliefs 
throughout the Union and provides valuable information as to  the level o f  attention 
given to  the different faiths in the country. It highlights sometimes diverging 
interpretations o f  often similar phenomena. K olarz’s w ork on Islam presaged much 
that w as later to  be w ritten on the subject and w as to  gain what might be term ed the 
rank o f  ‘standard tex t’. I shall examine his description o f  Soviet Islam in some depth.
W ithin Soviet religion as a whole Kolarz ranked Islam third after Christianity 
and Judaism. The first eleven chapters o f  the w ork deal with Christianity, followed by 
one each devoted to  Judaism, Islam, Buddhism  and ‘scattered g roups’ including 
B aha’is, Yezidis and Zoroastrians. A Eurocentric attitude thus becomes evident at the 
outset, w ith Islam as the nominally second largest religious group being placed behind 
Judaism, a religion Europeans w ould feel m ore familiar with.
K olarz was a devout Christian for whom  religion w as essence o f  human 
existence. He viewed the suppression o f  religion as a denial o f  basic hum an rights, and 
saw freedom  o f  religion not only as a m atter o f  personal liberty but also o f  collective 
freedom. The suppression o f  a nation’s religion was a suppression o f  that nation. He 
illustrated his argum ent w ith reference to  tw o traditionally M uslim peoples.
Discrimination on religious grounds not only diminishes the rights enjoyed by 
the individual Soviet citizen but it also prejudices the collective rights of 
national groups. National rights and religious rights are inseparably connected.
The Tatar or Uzbek ethnic group cannot fully unfold itself unless Islamic 
teaching and the practice of the Muslim faith can proceed without any official 
impediment.2
This passage com es from the beginning o f  the chapter on Islam, claiming that the 
Soviet attitude tow ards Islam was sym ptom atic o f  a colonial dynamic. The suppression
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o f  O rthodoxy by Russians seems less objectionable than that o f  Islam, since in the latter 
case tw o breaches o f  human rights are occurring, the right to  religious freedom  and the 
right to  autonom ous national development.
At the outset K olarz characterised religious activity as being, in a Communist 
fram ew ork, an anti-state activity. “Throughout the history o f  the Soviet Union religion 
has remained the m ost visible ideological alternative to  comm unism .”3 Religion 
opposed Communism. It follows that in a Communist state religious activity is anti- 
state. To practise a religion is a revolt against the state. Kolarz did not mention 
Article 124 o f  the Soviet Constitution, which guaranteed freedom  o f  religion. It 
follows from the opposition o f  religion and Communism that religious leaders who 
negotiate with the state com prom ise their religious authority.
For Kolarz, a functioning religious hierarchy and observable perform ance o f  rites 
did not constitute an adequate m easure o f  religious belief.
Survival of religion is not a question of formal church membership and not a 
question of religious rites publicly performed. Religion survives in the hearts of 
men who believe in God, it survives in prayers said and in pious thoughts.4
A discussion o f  what constitutes ‘religion’ is lacking from  K olarz’s work. 
W hether ‘pious thoughts’ constitute religion is open to  doubt. On a m ore structural 
level, if  church membership and perform ance o f  rites are not reliable m easures o f  
religious belief, what is? Counting the num ber o f  churches and the size o f  their 
congregations may be an imperfect m easure o f  levels o f  devotion, but it is an exercise 
which can be carried out. By reducing the im portance o f  the only available objective 
data, Kolarz opens the way to  the acceptance o f  subjective claims. This is particularly 
pertinent to  his treatm ent o f  Islam.
None o f the numerous religious factors of Soviet Russia is as difficult to 
evaluate as Islam... Some have considered it a qucintite negligable no longer to 
be reckoned with; others have regarded it as a powerful anti-communist force.
What we do know about Soviet Islam from communist sources would tend to 
prove that institutionalised Islam has declined in the years of Soviet power, but 
this is not tantamount to a weakening of the Moslem religion. Mohammed did 
not found a church like Christ, he gave birth to a faith. Islam can, therefore, 
and does, exist independently of all institutional forms... in describing the fate
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of the Moslem religion in the USSR we must look primarily beneath the 
surface, where Islam continues to live without registered mosques and officially 
approved mullahs. It continues to live in the faith of the basic tenets of the 
Koran, in the observance of holy days, in the cult of saints and in many other 
ways... The division between official and unofficial Islam in the Soviet Union 
seems to be the only one which is of decisive importance.5
‘Official’ Islam can be discounted. The essence o f  the faith existed in ‘unofficial’ 
activity. D espite K olarz’s noting the absence o f  a formal hierarchy in Islam (apparently 
what is meant by describing Islam as a ‘faith’ rather than a ‘church’), there is clearly 
meant to  be some kind o f  parallel betw een Soviet Islam and the O rthodox Church, 
within which underground ‘cells’ w ere know n to  exist apart from and sometimes in 
opposition to  the hierarchy. This distinction betw een ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ Islam 
recalls that m ade by d ’Encausse.
Kolarz noted that Soviet interpretations o f  Islam varied over the years, as had 
state policy tow ards the religion. H e quoted Klimovich’s characterisation o f  Islam as
An anti-scientific reactionary world-concept, alien and inimicable to the 
scientific Marxist-Leninist world-concept. Islam is in opposition to the 
optimistic and life-affirming materialistic teaching; it is incompatible with the 
fundamental interests of the Soviet peoples. It prevents believers being active 
and conscientious constructors of the Communist society.6
Islam w as said by the Soviets to  be ‘conservative’, ‘reactionary’, ‘anti-scientific’ 
and ‘anti-Russian’. K olarz clearly agrees with this last.
Having given an example o f  a Soviet characterisation o f  Islam, Kolarz stated that
Originally the Russian communists used the word ‘Moslem’ in a secular sense - 
a meaning which this term has also acquired in other parts of the world. 
‘Moslems’ as the Soviets understood it, were simply people belonging to the 
Moslem world in a historical and cultural sense, but were not necessarily 
believers in Mohammed’s religion.7
M any points may be drawn from  this passage. Firstly there is the phrase ‘Russian 
com m unists.’ D oes their attitude tow ards Islam only apply to  Russian Com m unists or 
to  Com m unists generally? Are the term s ‘Com m unist’ and ‘Russian’ to  be taken as 
synonyms? I f  so, can it be taken that being Russian is a pre-requisite for being 
Communist and that conversely if  you are not Russian you cannot really be a
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Communist? If  Russian Com m unists ‘originally used the w ord “M oslem ” in a secular 
sense’, how do they now  use it? W as it true that everyone used the w ord ‘Islam ’ in the 
sense o f  ‘those w ho follow the teachings o f  the Q ur’an’? These questions are raised 
but not answered.
K olarz drew  a distinction betw een ‘Old M osque’ and ‘N ew  M osque’ movements. 
He was attem pting to  make clear a difference betw een religious and cultural 
conservatives and those who wished to  ‘m odernise’ Muslim society w ithout rejecting 
their faith. The term s drew  from  Russian usage. The ‘N ew  M osqueists’ 
(novomechetniki) represented the m odernising trend prevalent in Tatarstan. The ‘Old 
M osqueists’ {staromechetniki) w ere traditionalist and particularly prevalent in the 
N orth Caucasus. To Kolarz the staromechetniki represented the true face o f  Soviet 
Islam:
The conservatives were as extreme in their hostility to communism as the 
reformists were in their servility to the new rulers and their policy, but both 
invoked the Koran to support their attitude.8
The novomechetniki were ‘servile’, supportive o f  a regime which was hostile to  
them. Their position attem pting to  find religious justification for such Soviet changes 
as land reform, in K olarz’s eyes making an atheist policy a religious duty,1 gave rise to 
the “strange phenom enon,”9 the Muslim Communist. Kolarz does not use the term, as 
did Bennigsen discussing Sultan Galiev, to  denote a convinced Communist from  a 
M uslim cultural background. Kolarz m eant members o f  the Party active in the 
administration w ho practised Islam.
Those who wanted to be Moslem and communist at the same time stubbornly 
adhered to the theory that Communism and Islam were really identical... This 
view coincided with that expounded by the ‘New Mosque’ people... there 
existed a kind of alliance between the religious Moslem communists and the 
‘New Mosque' clergy. The ‘anti-religious’ activity of some Communist Party 
branches in Central Asia simply consisted o f appointing ‘progressive’ mullahs 
in place of reactionary ones.10
1 Kolarz seems to be implying that a policy can be characterised by the fact that it is being carried out 
by atheists. By this logic, the same policy carried out by a religious body would be a religious one. 
The idea of a policy being in religious terms neutral is excluded.
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Examples o f  the activities o f  M uslim Com m unists included Party meetings in the 
N orth Caucasus breaking for prayer. These might indicate the depth o f  religious 
feeling among Soviet M uslims and their unwillingness to  comprom ise with the regime. 
However, examining the sourcing o f  just one o f  the claims makes one disinclined to  
take it at face value.
Looking at K olarz’s claim that Soviet Ism a’ilis continued to  render zakcit, tw o 
features become apparent. His source is Antireligioznik in 1937. In the context o f  
K olarz’s own w ork it is apparent that this is an anachronism. Kolarz w as writing o f  the 
period immediately after the Revolution but the example dates from fifteen years later, 
the height o f  the Great Purge. The then Agha Khan, M uhamm ed Shah, was resident in 
India and could from the Soviet perspective be presented as a ‘lackey’ o f  British 
Imperialism. Intrigue w ith the friends o f  British Imperialism was amongst the charges 
laid on the Purge’s Central Asian victims. Taking this into account, and bearing in 
mind Attfireligioznik's purpose in disparaging religion and religious believers, the 
veracity o f  the claim might be doubted. Kolarz presents it as fact."
The post-Revolutionary years w ere followed by a period o f  concerted onslaught. 
This was necessary, since “in the long run the centralised Soviet Em pire could not 
afford to  have tw o religious policies, one m ore lenient for the M oslem s and another, 
m ore intolerant, for the Christians.” 11 K olarz implied that the policy developed was 
m ore intolerant o f  Islam than o f  Christianity. H e cited Article 156 o f  the U zbek Penal 
Code prohibiting ‘the exploitation o f  religious prejudices.’ N o com parable clause 
appeared in Russian statute.
Kolarz m entioned many o f  the changes introduced by the Soviets, from 
educational and legal reform  to the hudjum (w om en’s emancipation). A lthough aware 
that similar processes occurred throughout the M uslim w orld he w arned against the 
“comm on trap” o f  com parison and explaining these events through a theory o f  
modernisation. Soviet policy had to  be seen as a ploy against the M uslim  faith: “ Soviet
1 Important Isma'ili documents were recovered from Shugnan in 1959-63. Had there been links with 
the Agha Khan it seems unlikely that these would not have been removed to India for safe keeping. 
Dafitary makes no mention of any such links whist referring to the documents' discovery.
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pow er very cunningly m anoeuvred its M oslem  opponents into a pose where they 
defended not religion but an out o f  date reactionary point o f view about w om en.” 12
These moves provoked strong resistance. Unveiled wom en w ere attacked on the 
street as w hores or killed, a fate which befell the anti-religious campaigner Hakim -zade 
Hamza, who according to  Bezbozhmk w as literally torn  apart by a mob enraged at his 
attacks on the ‘Tom b o f  Ali’ in Shahr-i M ardan. For this crime fifty-four people stood
trial. The village was later renamed Hamzabad. In the Caucasus, according to  both
The Times and Bezbozhnik, resistance was frequently armed.
This opposition precipitated the Great Purge in Muslim regions.
[The NKVD] considered that the continued existence of religious life in the 
Moslem territories was only due to the connivance of Communist Prime 
Ministers, ministers and officials of Moslem origin who took mullahs and 
sheikhs under their protection and secretly favoured the survival of religious 
superstitions which they publicly condemned... Throughout 1937 and still in 
1938 the NKVD discovered one nationalist-clerical conspiracy after another 
and the alleged conspirators disappeared forever... some of these charges were 
quite fantastic and had no relation to reality.u
Evidence that the N K V D  thought like this was lacking from  K olarz’s work, 
unsurprisingly given that the files for the period w ere inaccessible. It is not clear why 
Kolarz links an event which shook the entire country to  the question o f  Islam. It is true 
that specific charges often w ere linked to  Islam ’s survival, but the fact that the Purge 
went beyond the M uslim  regions w ould suggest that the ‘Islamic facto r’ w as little more 
than an excuse for an event which w ould in any case have occurred. I f  the aim o f  the 
Purge had been to  eradicate Islam, if  Islam survived due to  the connivance o f  “officials 
o f  M oslem  origin,” why replace these w ith m ore such officials?
In addition to  a purge o f  cadres, religious figures were attacked. Village mullahs 
were accused o f  agricultural sabotage, anti-feminist agitation and joining anti-Soviet 
bands, possibly those same ‘bands’ m entioned by Conquest. W hether we conclude that 
the existence o f  these bands was factual or “quite fantastic” is unclear. It is possible 
that Kolarz intends to  imply the latter. His next list o f  charges, those levelled at the 
senior ‘ulema o f  espionage, industrial sabotage and terrorism  are plainly absurd.
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K olarz contended that the Purge had little effect on the strength o f  Soviet Islam,
since
Islam remained alive in many ways, tangible and intangible. Traditional places 
of pilgrimage in the open air replaced the mosque and ordinary farmers and 
craftsmen were venerated as 'religious elders’ and took the place of mullahs.
As the religious life could not find any normal outlet, devout Moslems became 
more and more interested in miraculous visions and apparitions.14
As evidence K olarz noted Pravda 's  complaint that religious influences w ere still 
to be found among the ‘backw ard’ part o f  the population o f  Tatarstan, both Christian 
and Muslim; a reference in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda to  “underground agitation for the 
reopening o f  m osques” ; and reports in Antireligioznik that there w ere believers in all 
Kirghiz villages and that a Pamiri had proclaimed himself deputy to  the Agha Khan.
The im potence o f  the authorities in subverting Islam w as due to  over-reliance on 
attacking the formal institutions o f  the faith. This resulted from the Communist attitude 
to  social organisation.
The communists probably overrated the significance of the persecution of the 
Muslim clergy as they had over estimated the impact of the closing of the 
mosques. Communists are naturally inclined to consider the strength of an 
opponent on the basis of the “cadres” at his disposal and the institutions over 
which he holds power. However a few shrewder Soviet observers... have 
given a timely warning that the hold of religion on a Moslem country could 
not be measured in terms of mosques and mullahs.15
In the Soviet U nion it is hard to  see how  it could be m easured at all, since
All attempts to size up properly the situation on the Moslem religious front in 
Soviet Russia [meet] with the strange Shiah Moslem principle of takiya [s/c], 
namely the obligatory concealment of religious opinions to escape harm, even 
at the price of assenting to improper words and actions.16
This fits K olarz’s view on the subjectivity o f  religion and allows him to  ignore 
evidence suggesting that Islam did not have an influence. A ccording to  this principle 
not only does absence o f  evidence for religiosity not argue against the strength o f 
religion but evidence against religious activity does not either. Absent or
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counterm anding evidence can be explained by an appeal to  taqiyya. ‘People are devout, 
they are simply concealing this in order to  preserve them selves.’
There are tw o problem s with the appeal to  taqiyya. As it is impossible to  show 
that taqiyya is not being practised, so it is impossible to  show that it is unless a 
practitioner confides that he conceals his faith. Kolarz provides no evidence o f  any 
Soviet M uslim admitting to  practising taqiyya. Secondly, by K olarz’s own admission, 
taqiyya is a Shi’ite principle absent from  the Sunni schools o f  law. According to  one 
authority17 it was developed specifically to  protect Shi’ites from persecution by Sunnis. 
90%  o f  Soviet M uslims were Sunnis, mostly Hanafi. This school enjoins jih a d  or 
hejira (migration) as legitimate responses to  persecution. The Constitution guaranteed 
freedom  o f  religion and many people took advantage o f  this provision publicly to 
proclaim  their faith. It was to these that K olarz turned first in his evaluation o f  Soviet 
Islam in the post-W ar period.
The ‘ulema had, Kolarz claimed, no real religious authority, being “almost 
entirely created by the Soviet propaganda services. They w ere generals without 
soldiers.” 18
K olarz described some o f  the M uftis’ functions. Abdul Rahm an Rasulayev o f 
U fa’s “purpose was to  propagate anti-Nazi statem ents during the W ar as a counter to 
the Grand Mufti o f  Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husseini’s pro-Axis and anti-Zionist 
pronouncem ents.” 19 Ahund Aga Ali Zade o f  Transcaucasia w as “used chiefly to 
propagate [the governm ent’s] point o f  view among the Shi’ite M uslims o f  Iraq and 
Iran.”20 There was
A loyal Moslem hierarchy spreading the legend about freedom of Moslem 
religion in the Soviet Union could itself play a most useful part in strengthening 
Russia’s influence in the Moslem world...
As Soviet and communist intrigues grew in the Moslem states, more services 
came to be exacted of the “Red Muftis”. They had to play their part in 
welcoming foreign guests from Moslem countries, they were sent on 
propaganda tours abroad, usually in the guise of pilgrimages, and the Imam of 
the Moscow mosque was even invited to certain diplomatic functions which 
Moslem delegates attended.21
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The ‘ulema w ere passive pawns in the hands o f  policy makers, w ith neither pow er 
nor initiative o f  their own. The result o f  this was that
As from 1941, when the new Moslem policy of the Kremlin started, Islam was 
allowed to vegetate by becoming an instrument of government policy forced to 
discredit itself in the eyes of believers.
The Islam which was resurrected in 1941 is an Islam of statements and appeals 
in favour of the atheist communist regime. It might be argued that the same 
might be said about the Russian Orthodox Church... To draw such a parallel 
would be unfair and incorrect.22
The reason for the inadmissibility o f  such a parallel was that the experience o f  
Soviet M uslims was qualitatively different to  that o f  Christians. The O rthodox Church 
had historically supported the Russian state. Russian Christians shared the Soviet 
victory o f  1945. Soviet Islam w as said to  have been ‘defeated’, as evinced by the 
deportation o f  Muslim Caucasians.
The validity o f  this distinction betw een Christian ‘victory’ and M uslim ‘defeat’ is 
dubious and indicates both an assum ption about the nature o f  the Soviet Union, that it 
was an essentially Russian state, and perhaps a lack o f  knowledge o f  and sympathy for 
Islamic history and theology. Islam has often supported regimes which by its own 
criteria are unjust, on the grounds that an unjust state is preferable to  anarchy.23 The 
Soviet victory o f  1945 was just that, a Soviet victory. Rasulayev called on Soviet 
Muslims to  pray for this and they shared in the victory as much as did the Russians. 
Muslims w ere present at the fall o f  Berlin. The deportations w ere not a defeat for 
Islam. The victims w ere selected not because they w ere M uslims but for their 
nationality.
Kolarz underm ined his own contention that Soviet Islam and Christianity w ere 
not comparable when he described Zia ud-Din Babakhanov, M ufti o f  Tashkent, as “the 
‘Muslim M etropolitan N ikolay’... as versatile and as active a collaborator w ith the 
Soviet regime as his O rthodox Christian opposite num ber.”24
If  the official ‘ulem a were simply tools o f  Soviet policy, irrelevant to  the needs o f  
Soviet M uslims, this did not mean that Islam was itself moribund, since an alternative 
hierarchy w as available. This w as manifest in the presence o f  the Sayyids,
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A class of people who consider themselves to be descendants of the Prophet and
who are therefore held in especial honour... they are frequently venerated as
saints ... .Against the Sayyids... the regime is more or less powerless.25
Sayyids are respected throughout the M uslim world, but it could be questioned 
w hether they constituted a counter to the Soviet state. Babakhanov was a Sayyid as 
well as being the arch ‘Red M ufti’.
Along with this pool o f  people w ho had religious authority by birth, Islam 
continued to  manifest itself in many ways, particularly in the Caucasus. According to 
the New York Times religion had all but vanished from Baku, but Bcichinski Rabochniki 
provided evidence for the survival o f  religion in Azerbaijan, speaking o f  “tenacious 
religious survivals.”26 From  this Kolarz felt enabled to  state that “the official evidence 
shows that Azerbaijan, years after W orld W ar Two, still remained the country o f  
takiya,”27
M oscow  Radio (in Arabic) claimed that the D erbent m osque, with a capacity o f 
5,000, w as full on Fridays. “ [Fjrom  this conclusions may be draw n as to  the liveliness 
o f  M oslem  religious feeling in the Daghestani m ountain villages.”28
A nother N orth  Caucasian phenom enon m entioned by K olarz was “a feature o f  
the M oslem  religion peculiar to  the Checheno-Ingush republic... a strange sect called 
the K unta Hajji people.”29 Kolarz provided no information about these people and the 
claim was unsourced.
I f  there was evidence o f  religious survival in Caucasia, the situation in Central 
Asia was harder to assess. Islam was w eakest in Kazakhstan. In the southern republics 
the num ber o f  m osques had declined massively, but those left attracted large 
congregations. TASS reported an attendance o f  10,000 at the Tillah Sheikh m osque in 
Tashkent on holy days, while P. Latour in Ausenpolitik claimed an attendance o f  3,000 
every Friday. 20,000 celebrated ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban Bayram) at Sam arkand’s Shah-i 
Zindah com plex in 1954 according to  TASS. M oscow  Radio, again in Arabic, reported 
congregations o f  6-10,000 at the Shah M ansour m osque in Stalinabad on holy days.
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M osque attendance seemed high in urban areas, but Islam also remained strong in 
the villages. “Unregistered but active m osques” w ere to  be found in every Tadjik 
village, served by “illegal/semi-legal” mullahs and wandering divines.30 R ather than 
mosques, “the main foe [o f the Communists] is the popular piety o f  the simple
31
M oslems, which expresses itself in countless religious observances and taboos.”
Chief among these w as the cult o f  holy places. “People attribute to  pilgrimage 
and to  the m azars [holy places] m iraculous effects”32 including the ability to  cure 
sickness or bring rain. The Soviets derided these beliefs as being o f  pre-Islamic origin 
(as did many W estern and M uslim scholars) but they remained significant. “Even in the 
late Fifties there w ere still about tw enty sheikhs living [at the M ount o f  Solomon] 
guiding the steps o f  pilgrims and advising them  how to  m ake the best o f  their visit.”33 
New holy places were constantly coming into being. Klimovich observed a shrine to 
som eone who had been struck and killed by lightening near Tashkent. “The most 
awkw ard aspect o f  the problem  o f  the ‘Holy Places’ from  the communist point o f  view 
is that it is not a ‘survival o f  the past’ which is doom ed slowly but surely to  die.”34
In addition to  the cult o f  holy places, the observance o f  holy days and other 
M uslim  custom s survived. ‘Id al-Adha was “supported by hundreds o f  thousands and 
even millions o f  Soviet M oslem s.”35 In a 1954 fatwa the Spiritual D irectorate had 
made observance easier by ruling that sacrifice was not essential to  the celebration. 
This is an unsourced and unusual claim, since sacrifice is at the heart o f  the festival. 
A ccording to  D. Kishbekov the D irectorate had also ruled that the Ram adan fast w as 
not incumbent on the sick, travellers, nursing or expectant m others or heavy labourers, 
thus “skilfully overcom ing” Soviet anti-religious propaganda which centred on the 
health risks attendant on the fast. It is a standard M uslim position that the fast is 
incumbent only on those physically able to  perform  it.36
These facts taken with other habits such as circumcision and avoidance o f  pork  
indicated a continuing vitality o f  Islam. How ever, K olarz appears to  be treating Islam 
differently to  other religions. In his chapter “M oscow  and Rom e” he described a 
Catholic pilgrimage to  Aglona, Latvia, stating that
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not all people going to Aglona go there to pray; some visit the place because it 
is a pleasant change from routine and others make the pilgrimage because it is a 
deep-rooted tradition.37
Pilgrimage need not be a function of devotion, although in Central Asia Kolarz 
implies that it is. In his chapter “The Secularisation of Russian Jewry” he observed that
A large proportion of Jews in Britain and the US have either withdrawn 
altogether from participation in Jewish religious life, or participate only for 
reasons of national heritage or family ties, and no longer from religious 
conviction.3*'
Muslims are treated differently to Christians and Jews, for whom Kolarz accepts 
that ostensibly religious behaviour may have non-religious motivation. In the Muslim 
case it is assumed that all such phenomena have a religious origin.
Concluding, Kolarz remarked that
If  one glances back over the many years during which the Soviet communists 
have fought Islam one easily discovers that much of the fight has been 
concentrated on the secondary aspects of the Moslem religion.39
These have included veiling, pilgrimage (which above appears as a primary 
indicator of religion) and the wastage incurred by feasts. Islam contained an 
unassailable inner aspect - the Qur’anic assurance that Islam will triumph over its 
enemies. In addition,
Moslem faith in Russia is able to derive nourishment from sources which are 
not only purely spiritual. Islam is a world religion and what happens in one 
part of the Moslem world cannot remain without effect on other lands and 
peoples with a Moslem background. The emergence of so many new states in 
which Islam is a powerful factor, the new role of the Moslem religion as a link 
between the peoples of Asia and Africa, the prestige which certain Moslem 
statesmen enjoy in the USSR notwithstanding their attachment to the faith of 
Mohammed - all this is pleasing to Russia’s religious-minded Moslems.40
This was said to be true of both the ‘religious-minded’ and atheist intellectuals.
They must ask themselves whether the Moslem religion, which supplies such a 
strong spiritual background to the various Affo-Asian nationalisms, can be so 
simply dismissed as a ‘reactionary’ ideology. These intellectuals may yet grow
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proud of their Islamic heritage and become prepared to accept Moslem religion
in a modernised and enlightened form 41
There is logically no reason why this should be the case. Kolarz assumes a 
propensity tow ards nationalism which he suggests could be channelled through an 
Islamic medium. H e alleges that liberation m ovem ents in Africa and Asia will have a 
knock-on effect in the Soviet Union due to  the Islamic factor. This is a new 
understanding o f  the situation, not extended to  Rom an Catholics who with their strong 
hierarchical links to  the Vatican and foreign broadcasts aimed explicitly at them  might 
be expected to be m ore prone to  influence from  outside. K olarz’s understanding o f  the 
Muslim religious dynamic in the Soviet Union appears to  be linked to  his understanding 
o f  the colonial dynamic. Islam, a ‘colonial’ religion, manifests itself in opposition to 
Communism and Russian rule. Islamic activity is directly linked to  nationalistic activity.
5.iii) Krader
Although Kolarz lived in Britain, his book was published both there and in the 
US. B orn in N ew  Y ork in 1919, K rader’s view whilst endorsing K olarz’s 
understanding also shows how  the French position might have found a willing audience 
in the USA.
The study o f  Central Asia and o f  Soviet M uslims remained in its infancy in the 
USA during the 1960s. H ostler’s w ork remained the primary exemplar o f  American 
analysis, how ever a new generation o f  scholars began to  m ake its contribution. Edw ard 
All w orth and Francis Bacon, an anthropologist, dealt primarily w ith the historical 
period. Lawrence K rader, also an anthropologist, treated on contem porary events.
K rader was particularly interested in Central Asian religion. Unusually, he 
addressed the issue o f  Islam as a faith, describing its doctrines and introducing doctrinal 
term s such as b id a ’a  (innovation) and institutional expressions such as w aqf (pious 
foundation) before categorising the differences betw een Sunnism, (Ithna-Ashari) 
Shi’ism and Ism a’ilism. A fourth category o f  Islamic experience w as Sufism, which
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peaked in Central Asia under Timur and represented “a significant aspect o f  Islam in 
Central Asia.”42 K rader listed five Sufi tariqat which had been active.
The question o f  how to assess the level o f  penetration o f  Islam also exercised 
Krader. This w as im portant, since
In the present era the religious activity is a gauge of the attitudes of the people 
of Central Asia towards the Soviet regime. The official position of the Soviets 
versus religion is well publicised. Therefore the prevalence of religious activity 
and organisation, other than officially recognised and sponsored, is a measure 
of anti-regime feeling.43
Tw o criteria struck K rader as being o f  significance: “the veiling and hiding o f  
females is a valid criterion for the degree o f  influence o f  Islam in Central Asia”44 and 
“the institution o f  the village priest or mullah is another im portant criterion o f  
Islam ization.”43 O ther scholars claimed that veiling and the presence o f  a mullah, or at 
least a Sayyid, w ere common.
K rader showed a historical consciousness, quoting Schuyler on the 
‘punctiliousness’ with which religious rites had been followed and Burns, who stated 
that “every tow n and village is ruled by the mullahs.” This historical consciousness 
how ever is also a weakness, since K rader changed tense from past to  present and back 
without warning. W hilst his text states o f  the traditionally sedentary population o f  
Central Asia that “they are all devout M uslims, and the less sympathetic observers have 
term ed them  fanatical,”46 implying that this w as the case at the time he was writing, an 
endnote attached to  the statem ent refers to  sources dating from  1890, 1879 and 1826.
K rader drew  a distinction betw een ‘sham ans’, or ‘folk healers,’ and Muslim 
religious authorities, quoting Snesarev’s article o f  1956. As he explained it,
The Shaman acts directly upon the spirits and on the forces of illness, good 
fortune, evil fortune; the mullah on the contrary acts only as an intermediary 
seeking to invoke the power of Allah.47
Sometimes though, particularly among the Kazakhs, a mullah could double as a 
shaman, performing healing as well as religious rites.
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The position o f  shamans K rader linked to  the veneration o f  ancestors and o f  
m ountains, which he said was generally in decline although the cult o f  ancestors 
remained strong in Khorezm , the area o f  Snesarev’s study. Belief in demons; Shaitan 
(the Devil), Jinns (personal spirits), Ajines (female spirits), Divs (male spirits) and 
Albostas (female spirits interfering with childbirth) was said to  be universal as was the 
cult o f  holy places, o f  which “there are a vast num ber”48 attracting pilgrims as a 
substitute for Hajj.
This might seem rather peripheral to an assessment o f  the strength o f  Soviet 
Islam. K rader listed the Spiritual D irectorates and m entioned some o f  their 
pronouncem ents, such as condem nation o f  US involvement in Korea, but it was not 
primarily in these institutions that Islam ’s strength lay. K rader took  as his starting point 
for examining this the issue o f  the seclusion o f  women, a phenom enon he had already 
associated with Islamic fervour. Seclusion seemed not to  be unusual in settled areas. 
K rader cited instances o f  Communist Party w orkers insisting on the veil, and concluded 
that “Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Uigurs and Dungans are heavily Islamicised and attach great 
im portance to  the veil and to  the seclusion o f  w om en.”49 Religion continued to  
regulate Central Asians’ private lives and through this the life o f  the community.
It is not only in the continuation of private and family rite, at birth, marriage 
and death that Islamic practise continues. The family rite is related to the 
community, the ancestor cult, and to all levels of social organisation. Recent 
Soviet literature has discussed ritual observance in the village, the clan or 
lineage, and the brotherhood or corporation... Snesarev has shown the relation 
between traditional social organisation and structure in the village, clan and 
lineage, and the continuity of Muslim rite.50
K rader drew  a distinction betw een rural religion surviving in clan relations, and 
urban religion. Crucial to  the latter w ere the ‘bro therhoods’, a term  K rader used in 
connexion w ith Sufis, w hom  he characterised as “institutionalised into organised 
brotherhoods... some politically active.”51 The evidence for the continued relevance o f  
these groups lay in that “the brotherhoods are active among urban craft guilds, 
including... m odern corporations, e.g., taxi drivers o f  Khiva.”52 Traditionally, however, 
they operated secretly.
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K rader concluded that although the Soviets w ere attem pting to  introduce 
E uropean mores, “the transition o f  the Asian peoples to  m ores o f  these origins is not 
easy; resentm ents are often sharp.”53
The result w as that M uslims were not involved in the political process, which 
seemed alien to  them. N ew  forms o f  social organisation could not be developed among 
Soviet M uslims since
Islamic life and thought in the world have changed sharply in the middle of the 
XX century, seeking a new adjustment to contemporary historical trends. But 
this cannot be accomplished in the USSR without the accompanying doctrinal 
changes, for which an intellectual community [destroyed by the closure of the 
madrasas] is a conditio sine qua non. Therefore, the future of Islam in the 
USSR must be considered as a problem apart. The fact that folk religion exists 
indicated a separation of the life in the farms and workshops from the centres of 
thought and political action. The Soviet school recognised this separation in 
1956, but has done little to overcome it...54
5.iv) (T E ncausse
K olarz’s w ork suggested a split in Soviet Islam betw een the ‘ulema and the 
religion’s true heart outside hierarchical control. Carrere d ’Encausse, bom  in Paris in 
1929 o f  mixed Polish and G eorgian descent, expanded on and named this ‘non- 
hierarchic’ faith in tw o articles at the beginning o f  the decade.
The first appeared in VAfriqiie et I ’Asie under the title “O rganisation officielle de 
l’lslam en U R SS” . The following year W heeler published a version o f  this translated 
and edited by himself as “Islam in the U SSR .” There w ere significant variations 
between the two, showing how  texts can change in transmission
d ’Encausse based her comm ents on Soviet sources and her ow n observations 
m ade on a visit to  Central Asia in 1958. The article ostensibly focused on the Spiritual 
D irectorates but m ade it clear that Soviet Islam w as not limited to  these outlets.
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d ’Encausse noted that the nominally M uslim population o f  tw enty-four million 
m ade the U SSR  the fourth largest Muslim country in the world. Only in India was 
there a larger body o f  M uslims not living in a M uslim state. Their numbers alone made 
the Soviet M uslim population o f  the utm ost importance.
She noted Article 124 o f  the Soviet Constitution (freedom  o f  conscience) and 
observed that under its term s Soviet M uslim affairs had since 1941 been supervised by 
the D irectorates o f  European Russia and Siberia, N orth  Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan. She listed details o f  these institutions, giving their 
location, administrative language(s), the names o f  their Presidents and V ice-Presidents 
and where possible the names o f  members o f  their Executive Committees.
Structurally, the D irectorates com prised an Executive Com m ittee o f  seven to  ten 
members elected every five years by a regional congress. The Com m ittee appointed 
regional representatives called Kadi or Imam-Khatib. These titles and their usages 
should be noted, since here we have term s comm on throughout the M uslim world being 
used in an uncom m on sense. Kadi/Qazi usually refers to  the judge in a Shari ’a  court, 
how ever there w ere none in the USSR. In the Soviet context the term  Kadi has a very 
specific meaning which differs from that usually intended. This is im portant since both 
Soviet and W estern scholars often used technical term s in a very loose way, often with 
misleading consequences. d ’Encausse makes it clear that a Soviet Kadi or Imam- 
Khatib is the local deputy o f  a bureaucratic administration which organisationally 
m irrored that o f  the CPSU, with secretaries and commissars at different administrative 
levels. Soviet Kadis and Imam-Khaiibs had a clerical as much as a spiritual function, 
representing the concerns o f  the local population to  the D irectorate and carrying out 
the la tte r’s demands.
The exact function o f  the D irectorates w as not entirely clear, although it was 
know n that they liaised with the Soviet governm ent via the Council for the Affairs o f  
Religious Cults.
Raghib Arsan. a Pakistani who travelled extensively in Central Asia, arrived at
the conclusion that ‘the mission of the Spiritual Directorates is not to propagate
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religion and give religious instruction, but to control religion in the name of the 
central government of the Soviet Union.’55
d ’Encausse did not challenge this view, so we m ust assume she shared it. She did 
how ever m ention tw o functions o f  the D irectorates which relate directly to  religious 
propagation and instruction. The first w as publishing. The D irectorates had a 
m onopoly on religious publishing and had produced a Q ur’an, calendars, “a kind o f  
M uslim  catechism and tw o periodicals in Arabic characters.”56 This represented a 
sharp drop in the level o f  religious publishing since the Revolution. W heeler’s version 
o f  the text, whilst neglecting to  note that the D irectorates had a m onopoly on 
publishing, observed that in the absence o f  an independent press Party  presses had to  be 
used, giving the Party effective control over w hat was produced.
The state o f  religious publishing in the Soviet Union was hard to  quantify. The 
fact that the D irectorates’ periodicals were in Arabic script implied that they w ere not 
intended for dom estic circulation. According to  d ’Encausse a Pakistani ‘alim had 
found a number o f  errors in the Soviet Q ur’an, a significant shortcom ing on the 
D irectorates’ behalf."1
Confusion surrounding Islamic publishing in the U SSR  is highlighted when 
considering the only other example o f  a M uslim religious text to  which reference had 
been found. Here the article, in W heeler’s translation, reads
Apart from the Koran, the only other religious work whose publication has 
been announced is a book called ISLAM-I (MUSUL’MANSKOYE) 
BOGOSLUZHENIYE (Muslim Form of Service) by Mufti Shakir ibn Sheikh 
ul Islam Akhballiddin (sic Iqballuddin?), Head of the Spiritual Directorate of 
the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia (1957) [the query as to the name 
is absent from the French text]... it is probably identical with a publication 
called ISLAM VE IBADAT (Islam and Worship) referred to by the Mufti of 
Ufa in 1957.57
The title proffered appears to  be a misprint, carried from the French into the 
English text, resulting in a Perso-Russian grammatical hybrid. Assuming this is the 
case, and that it should read Islam i (musulmanskoye) bogosluzheniye, it translates not
U1 It has been pointed out to me that it is not uncommon for errors to be found in copies of the Qur'an 
published in Pakistan and even in Saudi Arabia.
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as “M uslim Form  o f  W orship” but “Islam and (Muslim) W orship,” almost identical to 
the Turkic title. How ever, if  both refer to  the same text we are faced w ith the problem 
o f  why there should be this duplication. It is impossible to  tell w hether there w ere tw o 
editions, one in each language, or just one, the title o f  which had been translated by the 
M ufti for the purpose o f  his announcem ent. I f  there was a Russian edition it might be 
supposed to  have had a w ider circulation than a book presumably w ritten in K azan’ 
Tatar, since the num ber o f  people who understood the latter w as comparatively small. 
W ithout knowing w hether w e are dealing with tw o separate editions o f  the same text or 
with tw o separate texts, it is impossible to  gauge the influence o f  this w ork on Soviet 
M uslims or the influence o f  the D irectorates’ publishing efforts as a whole.
I f  publishing existed on a low level, Islamic education was in an even w orse state. 
d ’Encausse entitled her section dealing with this “W eakness o f  Religious Education.” 
W heeler’s version implies that educational affairs were in better shape, dropping the 
w ord “weakness” from  the title. His rendition draws parallels with other Muslim 
countries which the original text does not allow for. W hen examining the Mir-i Arab 
m adrasa in Bokhara d ’Encausse w rote “ [the] syllabus... shows that religious education 
given in the U SSR  is utterly conservative and traditional.”58 W heeler states that “the 
curriculum is much the same as in any other m edrese in Dar-ul-Islam , except that the 
instruction appears to  be on a very low level.”59
These are different things. W heeler places Soviet Islamic education in the 
evolving mainstream, but d ’Encausse suggests that it has becom e outm oded. C airo’s 
al-Azhar for instance w as reformed by M uhamm ed ‘Abduh to  provide its graduates 
with an education better adapted to  the demands o f  the m odern world. d ’Encausse’s 
point was that Soviet Islamic education w as inadequate in its content and in the 
num bers o f  students exposed to  it. On her estimate there w ere only one hundred 
students at the M ir-i Arab at any time.
The consequence w as that “liturgical Arabic, the indispensable language for the 
M uslim cult, is less and less know n.”60 There were fewer people technically able to  
serve the cult, and those who remained “closely resemble the Russian O rthodox
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clergy”61 in their conservatism, the result o f  their traditional education. How ever, if  the 
professional ‘ulema w ere inadequate, there w as an alternative.
It seems that ever since the Revolution the custom has persisted of electing 
unofficial mullahs from among those of the faithful who have some knowledge 
of Arabic.62
This is standard practice throughout the M uslim world. How ever, in the Soviet 
context the fact o f  local election is im portant since it w as illegal to  practise religious 
rites w ithout a licence. Licensed ‘ulema w ere appointed and controlled by the 
D irectorates but there existed a num ber o f  religious authorities who operated beyond 
their control.
It is not possible even approximately to guess the number of these elected 
mullahs over whom the spiritual authorities exercise no control, since these 
underground operators [ces clandeslins] are in fact nearer to wandering fortune 
tellers and shamans than to traditional servers of the cult.62
“Underground operators,” a term  which implies a degree o f  secrecy and invites 
com parison with the “underground O rthodox” in Russia, seemed a defining 
characteristic o f  Soviet Islam. It appeared that the phenom enon was not restricted to  
isolated cases but was organised. d ’Encausse w rote that
[We] are no longer dealing with orthodox Islam but with a popular syncretist 
religion... which has always existed in Central Asia alongside Islam but at the 
moment, it seems, possibly as a result of a certain decadence of Islam, to be 
particularly flourishing.64
Popular syncretism included elements o f  shamanism and ritual magic. “M ore 
im portant and complex is the problem o f  Muslim brotherhoods (or tariqa)”65 occupying 
a grey area betw een faith and superstition. The idea o f  Sufism as a syncretistic 
phenom enon beyond the bounds o f  Islamic orthodoxy was not new. A  Sufi group 
could be m ore or less Islamic in nature, as d ’Encausse illustrated in contrasting Sufi 
groups in different areas o f  the country.
It is hardly possible in the current state of our understanding to place the 
brotherhoods within Soviet Islam. It seems however that if, in the region where 
muridism was strong before the Revolution - the North Caucasus and 
Daghestan - the tariqa have maintained purely Muslim traditions, in Central
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Asia where they were clearly decadent, they are getting closer and closer to 
Shamanism.66
This did not preclude the revival of Central Asian Sufism. Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda warned that “the revival of Muslim religious orders has been noticed, in 
particular of the Khultun Khidja (a branch of the Yassawiyya).”67 Organised Sufi 
groups existed. d’Encausse listed both indigenous and introduced orders. They were 
evidently seen as a threat, to be suppressed rather than co-opted like the ‘ulema. 
Soviet law allowed any religious body with twenty members to operate and own 
property, but Sufi groups continued to be attacked.
That Sufism was attacked in the state press is not surprising. All religion was. 
However, Sufism was also apparently a threat to the ‘ulema.
In 1950 the Mufti of Tashkent replied to some Algerians who asked him 
whether there were any zawiya (brotherhoods) in Central Asia “we regard 
maraboutism as a religious aberration.'’68
Sufism existed in opposition to the state-sanctioned hierarchy, outside the sphere 
of registered and quantifiable religious activity. Islam clearly survived less as a formal 
cult, but as a nexus of popular, unregulated, activity and an awareness of ‘Muslimness’ 
which could be expressed in many ways.
This brief outline of the official fabric of Islam in the USSR shows that the 
religion has an incontestable right to existence, but that its power and 
possessions have dwindled to almost nothing. Although the exact number of 
practising Muslims is not known, it is certain that the number of mosques and 
official clergy is not enough for their requirements. This aspect alone gives rise 
to fears for the future of Islam. It is however necessary to observe that the 
closing of mosques and the disappearance of the clergy, however regrettable it 
may be, do not have the same effect on Muslims as the closing of churches and 
the disappearance of priests would have on Catholics. As long as there is 
somewhere in the world a man who remembers that his ancestors used to say 
“la illaha illallah”, the possibility will remain that Islam will rise again from its 
ashes.69
d’Encausse expanded on religious expression beyond the ambit of the ‘ulema in a 
1961 article which closely followed Snesarev and began by quoting him:
We are dealing not only with orthodox Islam, but above all with that specific 
syncretistic religion which developed in the past from the fusion of Islam with a
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pre-Islamic structure... Islam superimposed itself on many more ancient layers 
of religious concepts... it took on certain characteristic traits which distinguish 
it from the Islam of other peoples. Certain pre-Islamic beliefs were never 
established in Islam and existed in parallel with it.70
d’Encausse added that
to this original peculiarity, Russian Islam adds a second due to the current 
situation: for forty years it has lived and evolved in a socialist society. This, 
for religious sociology, provides a unique subject of study: to know how Islam 
reacted in an exceptional political and ideological setting: in other words what 
had become of orthodox Islam or pre-Islamic practices.71
The phenomena mentioned featured at the 1956 Stalinabad conference: fetishism, 
ancestor cults, the cult of saints, shamanism and ‘brotherhoods’. d’Encausse 
concentrated on these last three, seeming to imply that they were linked. Starting with 
the veneration of holy places associated with saints, d’Encausse wrote
This cult, a truly popular religion which was unknown in Islam in the first 
centuries of the Hegira, conceals the remains of ancient pre-Islamic cults, of 
which Mazdaeism - the cult of ancestors to which Islam slowly gave support - 
is one, thanks above all to the activity of the brotherhoods.72
This is reminiscent of the language used by Soviet scholars, with its emphasis on 
the cult not being ‘authentically’ a part of Islam but associated with another earlier 
religion, itself erroneously characterised. Another example concerns descriptions of 
particular holy places:
[the tomb of] Jumart-Kasab could very well be a Mazdaean sanctuary of 
Gaiomart, the ‘first man’ of the Avesta, confused with the biblical patriarch 
Seth (Sis Pajghambar) and he in his turn with Samson. It is the same with the 
sanctuary of Bavaris-Baba in Khiva, which scarcely hides the Avestan deity 
Bivaraspi...72
The linkage between ‘Gaiomart’ (Avestan Gayo-maretan),74 Seth and Samson 
seems contentious. No effort was made to justify it, nor is it clear who the Avestan 
‘deity’ Bivaraspi might be. The Avesta names one god, Ahura-Mazda, and an anti-god, 
Angra-Maynu. Bivaraspi should possibly rather be identified with Vishtaspa, the king 
who adopted Zoroastrianism during Zarathustra’s lifetime, or his chief counsellor 
Jamaspa.75 This vagueness is unimportant if the purpose is to discredit Islam by
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associating ‘Islamic’ practices w ith the period o f  jahiliyya , or ignorance, but it does not 
advance an understanding o f  religious life in the Soviet Union.
The cult o f  saints and holy places was linked to  Shamanism. This linkage was 
made by Snesarev76 though neither he nor d ’Encausse addressed the issue o f  what 
shamanism is. This seems surprising in a French w ork on religion published ten  years 
after M ircea E liade’s influential Le Chamanism et les techniques archaiques de 
I 'extase. Shamanism was also connected with Sufism.
On holy places d ’Encausse’s study is reminiscent o f  K olarz’s.
It is clear that the cult of saints and of their mazars, as it survives in the Soviet 
Union, is closer to Shamanism than to orthodox Islam. Excepting the rare 
instances where they are under the authority of the Muslim Spiritual 
Directorates, the mazars are served by people who escape all control of the 
religious authorities, such as the Sheikhs who are part of the Sufi brotherhoods, 
and even by Shamans who sometimes organise zikr sessions there.77
d ’Encausse stressed that the im portance o f  shrines lay in the popularity o f  
pilgrimage, which although denounced by the Soviet authorities was not banned.
It seems that this kind of activity [has] become increasingly favoured as the 
official Muslim cult loses its hold on people’s consciousness... Some Soviet 
observers - such as Snesarev - think that ‘‘the mazars have for a long time taken 
the place of mosques in popular piety.”78
Visiting shrines and contact w ith an organised ‘underground’ (“ Sheikhs w ho are 
part o f  the Sufi brotherhoods”) is presented as a substitute for worship in a mosque. 
How ever, examining the reports o f  nineteenth century travellers in Central Asia reveals 
that pilgrimage played a m ajor role in religious life even then. Throughout the Muslim 
world pilgrimage has been carried out alongside formal prayer as a supplement to 
required rituals.79 It should therefore not be seen as an alternative form o f  worship as 
d ’Encausse seems to  be implying but rather a complimentary expression o f  faith.
Visiting shrines is particularly associated with ‘healing m agic’ and beliefs 
connected with childbirth which d ’Encausse associates with shamanism. Snesarev 
introduced the concept o f  shamanism in connexion with this healing function, including
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ritual magic in the class o fperezhitki ( ‘survivals from the past’ - in Soviet usage a term  
o f  opprobrium ) which had to  be eradicated if  Communism w as to  be built. In 
d ’Encausse’s estimation rituals connected with healing w ere m ore than ‘alternative 
m edicine’ or even superstition. She connected shamanic healers w ith Sufism. The 
rituals o f  ‘sham ans’ w ere said to  resemble those o f  Sufis. d ’Encausse uses the same 
term, zikr, for both. Unless zikr is uniquely to  be understood as meaning ‘ecstatic 
trance’, the connexion seems hard to  explain. The implication is that Central Asian 
shamanism is in fact Sufism, an impression strengthened when it is asserted that 
‘sham ans’ are organised like Sufis into “genuine brotherhoods o f  Shamans, some 
itinerant, others established near to  holy places which are frequented by pilgrims.”80 In 
the context o f  shamanic practice presented by Eliade this phenom enon w ould be 
unique. In justification o f  the claim d ’Encausse quoted Kommunist Tadzhikistana. “a 
troupe o f  sorcerers, wandering dervishes, divines and other charlatans wander 
throughout Tadjik villages going from kishlak to  kishlak seeking the sick and the 
ignorant, predicting their future and exorcising dem ons.”81
W hat is interesting about this extract is the lack o f  specific detail. It is not from 
an academic journal but a daily newspaper. The purpose seems to  be to  increase a state 
o f  vigilance against a shadowy organisation which preys on the w eakest in society. In 
essence it is agitprop. d ’Encausse did not challenge the apparent equivalence o f  
‘sorcerers’, ‘dervishes’ and ‘divines’. A ‘b ro therhood’ or ‘troupe’ appears as a 
religious group which the Soviet authorities oppose.
This insistence that a ‘bro therhood’ is religious and beyond the control o f  the 
‘ulema is o f  significance in the light o f  Snesarev’s claims concerning the survival o f  
trade guilds in Khorezm. Like healing magic and pilgrimage, a trade guild (kustarno- 
promyslovye ob"edineniye, ‘artizanal union’ in Snesarev’s w ords) represents a 
perezhitok , or ‘survival’ from the past which should have passed away to  be replaced 
by a Trades Union (profsoyuz).
The im portance lay less in trades guilds surviving as in their apparent religious 
basis. “Even here,” w rote Snesarev, “as in the rural population, many religious
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survivals remained intact .”82 The p ro o f that trades guilds w ere religious survivals lay in 
their structure and activities.
The corporations piously preserve the cult of their patron saint {pir)\ every 
week, on Thursday night, collective prayers unite the members of the 
corporation and occasionally the masters assemble to read their religious 
statutes (riscila). The risala, composed in Arabic, is usually transmitted orally. 
Sometimes relationships between apprentices and masters are regulated not by 
Soviet law but b> the ancient corporate statute.83
d ’Encausse repeated Snesarev’s assertion that in addition to  guilds o f  smiths and 
potters a guild o f  taxi drivers had emerged, and asked w hether guilds w ere connected 
with Sufism. Snesarev did not posit a connexion with Sufism but d ’Encausse 
concluded that the guilds w ere essentially Sufi organisations, a claim based on 
similarities betw een the guilds and Sufi tariqat. These included the fact that the guilds 
w ere closed groups whose members had to undergo an initiation ritual before joining, 
following which they w ere sworn to  secrecy and silence. The cult o f  the p ir  and 
absolute dedication to  the m aster w ere other points o f  similarity, as was the fact that 
the guilds met on Thursday evenings, traditionally the time o f  the zikr.
In conclusion, d ’Encausse rem arked that
Islam in Soviet society has undergone a development similar to that of other 
religions. Like them, Islam has for forty years been a superstructure placed on 
a pre-capitalist society and from this gap probably results its constant loss of 
hold over the great mass of believers both as a religion and as a way of life, 
thus a phenomenon of regression from the original religion towards pre-existing 
‘superstitions’ can be seen... In the case of the Muslim religion this sliding 
towards superstition above all manifests itself as a return to the very ancient 
beliefs inhibited and dominated by Islam at the time when it governed the whole 
life of the faithful and which is reviving thanks to its weakness.84
W hereas d ’Encausse w rote o f  a grow th o f  superstition as a substitute for formal 
religion, which had becom e irrelevant under Soviet conditions, Bennigsen saw the 
phenom ena described above not as pre-Islamic but as fundamental to  Islam as it is 
lived. By replacing ‘superstition’ with ‘parallel Islam ’, w hat at first seemed to  be the 
kind o f  folk-belief in decline throughout the M uslim w orld could be re-cast as evidence 
for the vitality and resilience o f  Soviet Islam.
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5.v) Bennigsen & Lem ercier-O uelqueiav
These scholars w orked closely together throughout the 1960s, concentrating 
during the first half o f  the decade on historical works, relating to  the developm ent o f  
Muslim nationalism in the Russian Empire, Lem ercier-Q uelquejay’s particular interest. 
These w ere overshadow ed by their 1967 Islam in the Soviet Union. Significantly, 
while their historical w orks have not appeared in English, this book, with its immediate 
relevance to  political events o f  the time, appeared simultaneously in London and N ew  
Y ork a year before its first French edition.
W heeler’s preface m arks the connexion betw een Islam and anti-colonialism and 
highlights the im portant departure being made by the authors.
The history of the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union is, or ought to be, of 
great interest to all who are concerned with the history of Russia in general and 
that of Communism as much within as beyond the borders of Russia. It also 
allows an appreciation of the phenomenon of contemporary imperialism, finally 
it highlights the power of resistance and vitality of Islam.85
This resistance in Soviet Islam is the principle them e o f  the work. It must be 
assumed that this is resistance to  the Russians and Russification. M uslim and national 
identity are perceived as being inextricably linked and necessarily opposed to  Soviet 
ideology. Further, not only is no distinction m ade betw een the concepts ‘M uslim ’ and 
‘not Russian/Soviet’, no distinction is made betw een ‘M uslim ’ as a cultural identity and 
‘Islam’ as a belief system. In this schema, identifying oneself as ‘M uslim ’ implies a 
positive, rather than an indifferent, attitude tow ards Islam. The fact that there are 
people w ho so define them selves becom es evidence for the strength o f  Islam, and 
identification with Islam implied rejection o f  Soviet Communism. W heeler continued,
[the work reveals] the unique phenomenon of Muslims preserving their religion 
and their way of life under a regime which neither hides its contempt for past 
practices nor its determination to destroy them. The days of Jihad, of Holy 
War against the 'infidels’, may be over, but the Soviet Muslim intellectual of 
today - a product of Communism - puts up a more subtle, more skilful and 
more determined resistance to the Russians.
The Muslim intellectual might be - most often is - a scientist, he can even be a 
convinced Communist, but he remains as a general rule a Muslim, a Muslim 
technically, intellectually and spiritually better prepared to take on the 
responsibility of the independent government of his people than the leaders of
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many ex-colonial Muslim countries to which the Soviet government lends 
support today. This silent but tenacious resistance is felt even if it is not 
entirely understood by the Soviet authorities and it is fascinating to analyse its 
development. Less spectacular it is true than the triumphal march of the Arab 
and Ottoman armies in the period of Islam's temporal grandeur, it illustrates in 
an equally striking way the vitality of Islam’s powers of resistance and could, 
in the long term, show itself just as effective.80
The link betw een M uslim identity and nationalist aspirations is explicit. 
W heeler’s preface illustrates some underlying assum ptions not only about Bennigsen’s 
and Lem ercier-Q uelquejay’s work, but about much o f  the W estern debate. The first is 
the equivalence betw een ‘M uslim s’ who preserve their religion and way o f  life, and ‘the 
M uslim intellectual’ who retains a sense o f  being M uslim  as his salient characteristic. 
As a Muslim, we must suppose that he preserves his religion and way o f  life (these are 
not separated). This preservation is identified as the defining quality o f  Muslims. Thus 
the M uslim intellectual has m ore in comm on with M uslim non-intellectuals than with 
non-M uslim intellectuals.
The second assum ption is that self-identification as M uslim precludes 
identification with the Soviet governm ent, even if  the M uslim is a part o f  that 
government. Identification as M uslim is a form  o f  resistance as identification as 
Ukrainian is not. Taking the tw o together the conditions for nationalist unrest appear 
to  be present.
Bennigsen’s and Lem ercier-Q uelquejay’s book is divided into four sections, the 
first three being historical and the last dealing with contem porary issues. O f these, the 
last, at seventy pages, is by far the longest, reflecting the im portance attached to  the 
immediate situation. The totality o f  Central Asian history up to  the revolution attracts 
sixty pages, the five year period o f  the Revolution and Civil W ar, 1917-1923, scarcely 
less at fifty. The bulk o f  this is devoted to  Sultan Galiev, giving his ideas o f  the 
necessity for an ‘A siatic’ anti-colonial Communism prominence.
The w ork covers a wide range o f  topics, not all overtly connected w ith Islam. 
These include language, historiography, and the Soviet M uslim  family. ‘Islam ’ appears 
as a synonym for ‘M uslim s,’ an association betw een an ideology and a people
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reminiscent o f  M ontiePs use o f  the w ord to  refer in a general sense to  a shared cultural 
ambit rather than to  a particular ideology. These passages re-state Bennigsen’s earlier 
research findings, and represent a compendium  o f  his thought up to  the time o f  his 
departure for the United States. The final section’s long chapter entitled “The 
Religious Problem ” is a departure from Bennigsen’s previous work. In many ways it 
synthesises the w ork o f  Kolarz and d ’Encausse and logically follows on from  their 
position.
Discussing Soviet Islam, Bennigsen and Lem ercier-Q uelquejay began by posing 
the question first put by M onteil a decade earlier: are the Soviet M uslims still Muslim? 
The points taken into consideration in deciding this resemble d ’Encausse’s findings. In 
term s o f  traditionally held belief the Soviet Union is by population the w orld ’s fifth 
(rather than the fourth) largest M uslim country after India, Pakistan, Indonesia and 
China. Article 124 o f  the Constitution is cited. The location, language and structure o f  
the Spiritual D irectorates are given. M osques are enum erated and publications listed. 
Raghib Arsan is again quoted on the function o f  the D irectorates as tools o f  the 
governm ent. The authors conclude that “the activity o f  the Spiritual D irectorates 
therefore seems derisory.”87 There w as also a severe shortage o f  religious leaders:
The greater number [of mullahs] are survivors of the pre-Revolutionary period,
old people of more than sixty, and the feeble number of young graduates of the
Mir-i Arab mcdrcsse cannot restore their numbers.88
Despite this institutional weakness, anti-Islamic propaganda had continued, 
increasing after Stalin’s death. This was true o f  anti-religious activity in general, a 
point the authors did not mention. H ow ever Bennigsen and Lem ercier-Quelquejay felt 
constrained to  observe that “despite impressive statistics... anti-religious propaganda 
remains insufficient.”89
Religious activity took  complex forms. On the surface little remained o f  Islam. 
Zakat was banned, Hajj had all but ceased to  exist, the fast though not banned was 
difficult to  perform, forms o f  prayer w ere all but unknow n and the shahada 
(proclam ation o f  faith) “is expressed by the believer in the silence o f  his ow n heart and
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escapes the control o f  the authorities.”90 This recalls K olarz’s insistence on the practise 
o f  taqiyya.
Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay maintained that attendance at Friday 
prayers was at a very low level. Popular religious feasts w ere by contrast widely 
observed. The tw o Bayrams ( ‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr) w ere attended by mass 
festivities. Turknmiskaya Iskra noted that five hundred Shi’ites celebrated the principle 
Shi’ite festival, Ashura, in Ashkhabad in 1965. Bennigsen and Lem ercier-Quelquejay 
rem arked that “if  one excludes women, who are not admitted to  Ashura ceremonies, 
and minors, the percentage o f  faithful seems impressive.”91
Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay admitted that such feasts might be observed 
for social rather than strictly religious reasons. The Soviet explanation for the 
popularity o f  such occasions was precisely that they represented social rather than 
religious expressions. In fact, despite what was said in the preceding paragraph about 
the strength o f  religious sentiment, the authors went on to assert
Despite these instances which are perhaps more ‘national’ than religious, the 
practice of Islam seems to be declining slowly... at best Islam relates to [the] 
national past and as such remains an object of respect, but the world view of 
the young intellectual is that of the ‘scientist’ for whom the practice of a 
religious cult is an anachronism, if not dangerous. It is not the same for the 
rural masses. Deprived of ‘official’ religion due to the lack of mullahs and 
absence of mosques, their belief is rapidly regressing from the position of Islam 
towards archaic forms of primitive cults close to Shamanism. The Soviet Press 
provides innumerable examples of this regression from pure religion towards 
fetishism.92
Tw o points stand out. The first is that religious activity is predom inantly 
confined to  the rural population. This represented the sector o f  the population least in 
contact with Russians and Europeanising influences, and in cultural term s could be 
represented as m ore ‘authentically’ representative o f  Soviet M uslim society (the 
majority o f  Soviet Muslims lived in villages). The second is that religious life was 
becoming less associated with theological Islam and instead w as taking ‘unorthodox’ 
forms. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay call this ‘regression’, implying that it was 
symptomatic o f  decay, but what is im portant is that it represents a process o f  change,
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the development o f  a new form o f  Islam beyond the reach o f  the state-controlled 
‘ulema.
Two aspects o f ‘regression’ received particular attention. These w ere the cult o f  
holy places and respect for ‘w andering mullahs’. By contrast to  w hat had been said 
concerning the decline o f  religion, both  phenom ena w ere said to  be increasing. This 
emphasised that it w as not religious belief itself which was in decline but a certain type 
o f  religious expression, the structured formalism o f  the Spiritual D irectorates ultimately 
controlled by the governm ent.
According to the Soviet Press, the cult of holy places, not controlled by the 
Spiritual directorates, far from decreasing has seen a constant popularity over 
the last few years.9’
Holy places w ere often associated with saints’ tombs, showing that members o f  
Sufi orders retained a degree o f  importance. This was significant w hen it came to  
considering the ‘w andering m ullahs,’ people w ho knew some Arabic and w ere able to 
perform  religious rites. Bennigsen and Lem ercier-Quelquejay suggested these were 
often members o f  the same Sufi orders as the saints whose shrines w ere venerated.
These errant mullahs are often members of Sufi brotherhoods... the Soviet 
Press abounds with often spicy details of this phenomenon...
The Soviet Press has revealed to us in the last few years that aside from 
itinerant mullahs and shamans, this ‘non-official Islam' is equally represented 
by the Sufi brotherhoods (tariqat), which although forbidden by Soviet law 
have experienced an unexpected renaissance over the last few years.94
The source for this claim w as Snesarev. Nauka i Religiya was also cited as 
listing three groups in Chechenia and D aghestan linked to  the Naqshibandiyya. That 
these ‘errant m ullahs’ w ere not simply mavericks is important. I f  they w ere Sufis it 
followed that they w ere organised. Sufism existed beyond the control o f  the authorities 
as a ‘non-official Islam ’. Bennigsen and Lem ercier-Quelquejay asserted that
A religious movement is in the process of being bom under our eyes in the 
areas where [Islam] was once prevalent. This movement seeks to adapt religion 
to current conditions: it accepts all compromises and tries to modernise Muslim 
doctrines.95
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This they com pared directly with Jadidism, suggesting a historical link with a 
movem ent described by the Soviets as ‘bourgeois-nationalist’ in character.
It was almost impossible to  judge the strength o f  Islam. Identification with Islam 
as a religion existed on a number o f  levels. A  study o f  a mahalla in Tashkent which 
appeared in Nciuka i Religiya in 1965 had found that while a majority o f  respondents 
aged over fifty-five described themselves as believers only 10% adhered to  the 
prescribed rites. How ever, even those who described them selves as atheist began to 
perform  some religious rituals when they turned fifty-five. This they did for three 
interconnected reasons: tradition, ‘national spirit’ and fear o f  rejection by the 
community.
Asked why they believed, residents provided three answers: “because an 
unbeliever would be laughed at,” “because my parents did and they should not be gone 
against,” and the curiously tautological “because I am a M uslim .” ‘M uslim ’ appears as 
much as a social and ethnic m arker as a religious one, a position reinforced by the 
marking o f  rites o f  passage such as marriage and burial w ith religious ritual. These rites 
helped to  cement M uslim solidarity as a community and ham pered interm arriage with 
Europeans.
It seems that the most de-Islamised Muslims, who have totally adopted the 
Soviet way of life including official atheism, do not wish to break completely if 
not with the religion of their ancestors, then with their community.96
Community membership was best expressed in family relationships. A  discussion 
o f  these filled a chapter o f  the book. In essence this repeated an earlier article97 which 
drew heavily on Snesarev’s w ork concerning elat relations in Khorezm. This was 
repeated along with examples o f  other traditional practices
of which the local Soviet Press cited fairly frequent examples and of which the guilty 
parties are not only ‘backwards* elements but sometimes also the new notables: 
academics, Komsomols, indeed even Party members.98
The persistence o f  the traditional family structure w as the result o f  its patriarchal 
nature which kept w om en subservient. This allowed for the preservation o f  religious 
ritual and religious sanctions in the home. Snesarev pointed out “ [women] continue to
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live in an isolated w orld impermeable to  all outside influences.”99 This was particularly 
true among the elite w ho could afford to  keep their wives secluded at hom e rather than 
active in the w orkforce.
As Bennigsen had contended in 1959, in so far as M uslim  families had changed it 
was to  strengthen the nuclear unit as a source o f  identity at the expense o f  the tribe. 
The decline o f  the tribe as a source o f  identity meant that w ider identity had to  be 
sought elsewhere.
The evolution of the family is not an isolated problem, it bears on a coherent 
whole which is the evolution of a society, of its modes of thought and its 
aspirations. The problem of the Muslim family connects to another problem, 
that of the national consciousness of the Muslim peoples of the USSR... all 
which obstructed the birth of national consciousness in traditional society, 
feelings of clan or tribal loyalty, local particularisms, has been destroyed. Thus 
the evolution of the Muslim family towards identification with the Western, viz.
Russian, family does not end in the Russification of Muslim society but quite 
the opposite, in reinforcing national sentiment makes it more uncertain than
A circular dynamic is in operation. The Islamic basis o f  the family ensures its 
distinctiveness from the Russian family structure. This encourages a focus on national 
identity, expressed through Muslim mores. The Soviet authorities w ere powerless to  
control this: institutional religion w as moribund but ‘non-official Islam ’ was flourishing 
and encouraging Central Asians’ sense o f  distinctiveness from the Soviet mainstream. 
The consequences o f  this understanding w ere to  be m ore fully w orked out in the 1970s 
and 1980s when the sense o f  ‘distinctiveness’ engendered by Islam w as presented as 
precluding the possibility o f  being both  Soviet and Muslim. At this stage the equation 
o f  religio-cultural distinctiveness w ith nationalism has yet to  be made.
Attachment to traditional customs... should not be regarded as evidence of 
conscious opposition to the Soviet regime...
Attachment to the Muslim faith should neither be considered as a proof of 
‘nationalism’. One finds in the USSR pious Muslims who are totally loyal to 
the regime, just as the Russian Orthodox can be faithful to an ostensibly atheist 
regime. Is it possible to conclude from this that the Soviet regime is 
wholeheartedly accepted by the Muslims? Absolutely not.101
It cannot be assumed that M uslims support the regime because o f  their resistance 
to  assimilation.
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The desire of the Soviet authorities to see the development of a ‘pan-Soviet’ 
culture has definitely been settled. At least for the time being that assimilation 
of the Muslims into the Russians or into a standard type of ‘Homo Sovieticus’ 
might be a long term ideal but it has certainly yet to be realised.102
Muslims were not becoming assimilated precisely because they w ere Muslims. 
5.vi) Wheeler
W heeler’s w ork o f  the 1960s indicates the change in attitude tow ards Soviet 
Islam. At the beginning o f  the decade W heeler focused on the history o f  Central Asia 
and the colonial question, making little reference to  Islam. In answer to  the question o f  
whether religion played a part in the failure o f  Russians and Central Asians to  mingle, 
he replied
In my view it is not so much a matter of doctrinal belief, it is simply that the 
people have established a way of life, a way of diet, a way of behaviour in 
general... which keeps them apart from the Russians. I am sceptical about the 
role Islamic belief plays .102
Seven years later he appears to  state that religious belief remained a factor in the 
differentiation o f  Central Asians from  Russians.
The vast majority of indigenous inhabitants of the Muslim republics still readily 
admit to being Muslims, and as recently as 1966 a Soviet writer could state that 
the proportion of religious believers in these republics was higher than in any 
others.104
The im portance o f  this is that if  Central Asians followed traditional cultural 
norms purely out o f  habit these could be changed, w hereas if  their behaviour was 
inspired by religious considerations acceptance o f  Communist m ores would be difficult. 
That traditional norm s could change without too  m uch hardship w as shown by the fact 
that in the army “M uslims are greatly in the minority and find them selves obliged to 
conform  to a predom inantly Russian way o f  life,” 105 reverting to  traditional habits on 
demobilisation when conscripts returned to  a traditional social environment.
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The irrelevance o f  religion to Russian-M uslim  relations was stated in another 
w ork from the beginning o f  the decade.
It is often asserted that Islam is still a living force among the people of the 
Muslim republics, that it sustains them in their enforced subjugation to the 
Soviet regime and that in certain circumstances it would unite them in achieving 
real independence... It can hardly be taken for granted that Islam is any more 
ingrained in the hearts and minds of the Muslims of the USSR than in other 
parts of the Muslim world where its practise is not discouraged but where it has 
failed to withstand the advance of westernisation and where religious 
movements are often little more than political movements in disguise.106
Perhaps thinking o f  the secular political goals o f  the Muslim League in India, 
W heeler appears unwilling to  ascribe religious content to politico-religious movements. 
H ow ever, it could be argued that if political dissent cannot be expressed via political 
media it will manifest itself via alternative channels, one o f  which might be religion.
W heeler hints at the possibility that such a manifestation might have been 
developing in the Soviet Union. The only specific aspect o f  Islam he m entioned was 
Sufism. Although saying little about this, and citing no sources, W heeler asserted that 
the Soviets were strongly hostile to  Sufism and suggested that “the special suspicion o f  
the Sufi sects... is perhaps due to fear o f  them  as a possible vehicle o f  secret 
communication among anti-Soviet elem ents.” 107 This statement was later to  appear in 
the w ork o f  Bennigsen.
The Modern History o f  Soviet Central Asia  and The Peoples o f  Soviet Central 
Asia  focused on the colonial dynamic in the context o f a process o f  W esternisation 
which w as far advanced. Although Central Asian self-identification as Muslim 
remained common, this lacked religious content: “the outw ard observance o f  Islam is 
probably less than in any other part o f  the M uslim w orld.” 108 N onetheless Central 
Asian society remained distinct from Soviet society as a whole.
The defining feature o f  Central Asians, their culture, remained Muslim. This was 
reflected in the title o f  an article which appeared in Problems o f  Communism. 
Previously W heeler had written o f  ‘the peoples’ o f  Central Asia but this w as entitled
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The Muslims o f Central Asia , putting an emphasis on ‘M uslim ness’ as a defining 
characteristic, and hence on what this term  means.
It has become clear that particularist consciousness among the Muslims, far 
from dying out, is actually increasing. This phenomenon is not of course 
confined to the Muslim republics, but elsewhere its scope is limited to single 
nationalities that have no positive bond of union with one another. Islam, on 
the other hand, is a potential connecting link not only among die Muslim 
peoples living along 3,000 miles of the Soviet Union’s vulnerable southern 
frontier, but also between them and the peoples of the adjoining Muslim 
countries.109
‘M uslim ’ no longer appears as a cultural construct but is specifically connected 
with Islam. Although W heeler seems to  suggest that many traditional cultural habits 
were not ‘Islamic’ the thrust o f  the argum ent implies the opposite. On the one hand 
such practices as polygyny and female seclusion “are among the so-called ‘Islam ic’ 
practices... [which] have little to  recom m end them  and are tending to  die out elsewhere 
in the Muslim w orld under the pressure o f  enlightened Muslim opinion,” 110 on the 
other the adjective ‘M uslim ’ is used to  differentiate Central Asians from  Russians, 
emphasising that Islam provides the social fault-line.
The link betw een the assimilation o f  M uslims and combating Islam is made 
explicit. Failure to  assimilate may be linked to  a failure in the fight against Islam. In 
this context the issue o f  Russian colonisation o f  Muslim territories is raised. W hereas 
earlier W heeler suggested that this had resulted in a high degree o f  W esternisation o f  
indigenous populations, he now doubted w hether this w as the case:
colonisation does not seem to have produced any higher degree of 
westernisation than exists in many non-Soviet Muslim countries where there is 
no European colonisation at all.111
W heeler repeated the distinction betw een civilisation and culture and asserted 
that although Soviet civilisation had been adopted, culture - ‘who w e are’ - had not. 
This w as due to  the strength o f  w hat W heeler called ‘native ideology’, Islam, and the 
fact that, in W heeler’s eyes, it w as harder for a Muslim than for a Christian to  accept 
Marxism.
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The extent to which an alien ideology can be imposed on a subject people 
depends on a number of factors, such as time, the staying power of the native 
ideology...
The adjustments which the new ideology demanded of them were much greater 
than those demanded of the non-Muslim majority...
There is little doubt that communism, as imported from Europe, is much more
acceptable on a permanent basis to non- Muslim than to Muslim...112
Islam has certainly not been superseded by communism as an ideological concept...113
Islam had not given way to Communism as an ideology, but remained the well- 
spring o f  Soviet Asian identity. This them e W heeler w as to  develop in his final 
publication w ritten before his retirement in 1968. This w as reminiscent o f  Bennigsen’s, 
Lem ercier-Q uelquejay’s and d ’Encausse’s w ork and also calls to  mind much o f  what 
Kolarz said.
The article appeared in a collection entitled Religion and the Soviet State: a 
Dilemma o f Power under the heading National and Religious Consciousness in Soviet 
Islam 114 The book’s title implied a conflict betw een religion and the state. W heeler’s 
own contribution suggested a link betw een religion and national consciousness which 
had been lacking from his earlier work.
W heeler implies that there is no meaningful distinction to  be m ade betw een 
‘historically M uslim ’ and ‘presently M uslim ’: “Islam occupies second place among the 
religious communities o f  the U SSR as regards the num ber o f  its adherents...the total 
number o f  people who can historically be regarded as M uslims is betw een 25 and 30 
million.” 115 Furtherm ore the fact o f  being M uslim separated these peoples from  all 
others in the USSR.
The traditional Islamic way of life, although to some extent affected by 
Westernization... remains as a whole far more distinct and particularist than 
that associated with any other religion or ideology; the Muslim peoples of the 
USSR have much closer cultural, social and biological affinities with the non- 
Soviet Muslim peoples living adjacent to them than with any of the non-Muslim 
Soviet nationalities.116
The article began by giving some general information about who the Soviet 
Muslims were - w here they lived and what their racial characteristics were. This was
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followed by a section entitled Islam as a Bond o f  Union. W heeler characterises some 
o f  features o f  the religion o f  relevance in the Soviet context:
Islam, being like Judaism a non-sacerdotal religion, depends less for its survival 
on the regular conduct of religious ceremonial worship by qualified clergy than 
the various Christian sects...
the confession of faith required of every Muslim has to be made in the heart 
rather than openly...
the persistence of such rites and practices as circumcision and the giving of 
Muslim names... serve as a tacit admission that God existslv...n7
W heeler noted that most Central Asians regarded them selves as M uslim but that 
Russians did not regard them selves as Christian unless they w ere active church-goers. 
W heeler raised the idea o f  culture being a ‘way o f  life’ rather than a set o f  tools but 
moved on from the idea o f  a simple difference betw een M uslim and Soviet culture to  
claim that the form er w as “inimicable to ” 118 the latter. O f Jadidism and 
‘Sultangalievism’ W heeler w rote
Together they convinced the Soviet authorities that Islam constituted a fourfold 
danger: it was not only, like other religions, ideologically objectionable; it was 
culturally, socially and politically dangerous as well,119
Culture, society and politics are here all linked with religion.
The next section reinforces the sense o f  the all-pervasiveness o f  Islam. The 
Soviets were guilty o f  “gravely underestim ating the staying pow er o f  Islam” 120 since it 
“is m uch more strongly entrenched than they had been led to  believe.” 121 This w as in 
part due, explained W heeler in a passage which to  m odern eyes appears almost racist, 
to  the fact that “particularly among eastern peoples, religion is not just a tissue o f  
superstitions which militates against progress and productivity, but a powerful influence 
in social and political behaviour.” 122 This resulted in a situation in which “Islam is still 
- perhaps more than ever - a pow er to  be reckoned with in the U SSR .” 123
W heeler devoted a short section to  a discussion o f  the relationship betw een 
Islam, nationalism and Communism. He suggested that there had been a degree o f  
confusion both in the U SSR  and the W est which had led to  Islam being connected with
,v Presumably the giving of Christian names, as practised by the Russians, did not.
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nationalism. That Islam was strong he no longer doubted, but this did not mean that 
nationalism was equally strong.
Islam undoubtedly constitutes some sort of bond of union among the Soviet 
Muslim nationalities, and also between them and non-Soviet Muslims, but this 
does not necessarily mean that there is such a thing as Muslim nationalism, or 
Turkic nationalism, or Turkestani nationalism.124
The equation of Islamic/Muslim consciousness with nationalism was the result of 
an analytical failure.
This is partly due to a failure to distinguish between national consciousness and 
nationalism. The former is a kind of group solidarity not unlike that of tribe or 
caste; nationalism on the other hand has the positive aim of creating a nation 
state with a government peculiarly its own. The term national consciousness 
can be applied to the feeling of common cultural heritage among the Soviet 
Muslim peoples; but its essence is negative in the sense of common resistance 
to Russianization rather than positive in the sense of creating a Muslim nation­
state.125
This distinction was not made in French writings, which frequently use the term 
‘nationalism’ to denote what Wheeler called ‘national consciousness’.
Confusion between ‘Islamic’ religious and national consciousness was 
symptomatic of Soviet usage. Wheeler cited the Soviet scholar A. M. Bogoutdinov’s 
equation of the opening of new mosques in Tadjikistan with nationalism. However, in 
certain respects this equation seems to have been justified since
The Soviet equation of Islam with nationalism is largely due to the fact that 
Islam is quite correctly considered a greater obstacle to assimilation than any 
other religion.126
In other words it was adherence to Islam which made Soviet Muslims a people of 
a different order to other Soviet citizens. Wheeler cites Bennigsen ostensibly to show 
that Islam was not impermeable to Russian influence, but ending with a claim that 
Soviet Muslims, rather than abetting the Russians in destroying Islam, would seek to 
throw off Russian influence.
The confusion between Islam and nationalism current in the West, and to some 
extent in the non-Soviet East, stems from the belief that Islam stands as an 
impregnable bastion against communism. That this is not so has been
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forcefully shown by Alexandre Bennigsen in his various writings on the subject.
In the Muslim republics there are many convinced Muslim communists who, so 
far from collaborating with the Russians in the extirpation of Islam, dream of 
the time when they will be able to assume control of their own affairs.127
Local Communists are qualified as ‘Muslim’, implying that they differ from 
Russian or Ukrainian Communists. They are stated not to be fighting against Islam. In 
fact they ‘want to assume control of their own affairs.’ This would presumably include 
a policy on religion which would differ from that of the Russians. Wheeler stated that 
Islam could only survive as long as the Muslim republics lasted, but that given their 
continued existence
their political and economic stature is likely to increase, perhaps to the degree 
of their acquiring some degree of genuine independence, and of reestablishing 
contact with the non-Soviet Muslim world. Even if  they remained socialist, 
which is highly probable, they would, with some possible exceptions, adhere 
even more closely to Islam... Whether such a development would result in a 
revival of Islam as a religion, as a mainspring of life, is hard to say. A return 
to Islamic piety as practised, for example, in Pakistan, is perhaps unlikely; but 
the strength of Islam as a bastion against atheism, if not against communism 
would certainly be reinforced. In Alexandre Bennigsen’s opinion... “Russian 
Islam is emerging slowly from its isolation and this movement seems to be 
irreversible.”128
Wheeler’s thought had undergone a certain transformation. In his early works 
Central Asian Muslims were seen as colonised peoples who by and large acquiesced in 
their colonisation and for whom Islam was an irrelevance. Later Wheeler suggested 
that they were not entirely acquiescent in their fate, that because of their faith which 
linked them to peoples outside the USSR they were resisting 
Russification/Sovietisation. Muslim self-awareness might result in their seeking their 
own path independently of the Russian ‘elder brother’.
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5.vii) Conclusion
The profound influence o f  Snesarev’s article on W estern thought should be clear 
from  the above. By the end o f  the decade the scholarly consensus on Soviet Islam w as 
that
a) The official ‘ulema w ere hopelessly weakened, com prom ised and irrelevant.
b) Despite this, Soviet Islam remained strong
c) This strength rested on ‘clandestine’, ‘popular’ or ‘non-official’ Islam which 
manifested itself primarily in the cult o f  saints and pilgrimage to  holy places 
controlled by Sufi organisations
d) Non-official Islam survived in opposition to  Soviet social policy since it 
supported social norms at variance w ith those approved by the governm ent
e) Rejection o f  Soviet norms implied rejection o f  the Soviet Union. Soviet 
M uslims w ere m ore akin to other M uslims that to  other Soviets.
Adherence to  Islam appeared as the principle manifestation o f  anti-Soviet and 
hence nationalist sentiment, a view which w as reinforced by developm ents in the 
Muslim world and particularly the M iddle East after E gypt’s 1967 defeat which 
discredited the Soviet Union and socialist ideology and allowed for a resurgence o f  
Islamically-motivated political ideologies which w ere to  becom e the centre o f  the 
W est’s attention. This view o f  Islam as the primary m anifestation o f  Central Asians’ 
rejection o f  the Soviet system was readily embraced in the U SA  w here Bennigsen was 
to  carry it at the end o f  the decade.
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Chapter 6: Islam and Opposition - the 1970s & 1980s
6.i) Introduction
The picture o f  Soviet Islam which had developed by the end o f  the 1960s 
remained largely unchanged until G orbachev’s accession to  power. Islam separated 
Central Asians from other Soviet citizens, preventing their integration into the Soviet 
whole. Islam was sustained by underground Sufi groups which perm eated society. At 
the same time dem ographic trends in Central Asia w ere seen as tilting the balance o f  
pow er away from the Russians in the M uslim s’ favour and providing the conditions for 
ethnic unrest in M uslim  regions.
Concom itant w ith this w as the rise in profile o f  Islamicly-inspired movements 
outside the USSR, which it w as felt w ould have a profound influence on Soviet 
Muslims. As the ‘Period o f  Stagnation’ ended, many scholars o f  Central Asia w ere 
pressing the view that the primary threat to  the Soviet state was that o f  an Islamicly- 
inspired, Sufi-led revolt.
A  num ber o f  books and articles appeared, especially during the Andropov- 
Chernenko ‘interregnum ,’ concerning Islam and nationalism in Central Asia. M any 
appeared under Bennigsen’s name, often w ith a co-author. Because o f  the high degree 
o f  consonance betw een different w orks this chapter has been arranged thematically 
rather than grouping together the w orks o f  individual scholars.
One change w as a shift in the centre o f  Central Asian studies to  the USA. The 
‘old colonials’ w ere gradually losing their authority. One article by W heeler appeared 
in 1975 in Canadian Slavonic Papers and in 1982 M onteil’s Les Musulmans 
sovieticjiies o f  twenty-five years earlier was re-issued, but these w ere overshadow ed by 
the output o f  a new generation o f  scholars, many o f  w hom  had studied under 
Bennigsen. The few w orks challenging the orthodoxy o f  an ‘Islamic/M uslim th rea t’, 
such as those o f  Akiner or M onteil, mostly came from outside the USA.
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6.ih Dem ography and Conflict
In 1985 one scholar rem arked that
The nationality problem in the USSR is one of and perhaps the most important 
long term problem the Soviet leadership must resolve if it is to maintain the 
stability of its far flung empire.1
The 1970 and 1979 Soviet censuses illustrated why this problem  had come to  the
fore.
Following the Second W orld W ar it w as commonly asserted that Central Asia 
was being ‘sw am ped’ by Europeans. The result o f  this was that Central Asia’s 
political and econom ic centres w ere overwhelmingly o f  European, usually Russian, 
population. Kazakhs had becom e a minority within their own republic.
This migration, which w as com pared to  the French settlement o f  Algeria, was 
taken as indicative o f  the colonial nature o f  the relationship betw een Central Asians 
and Russians. The num bers o f  settlers led to  a substantial dilution o f  the native 
element o f  the populations o f  the Central Asian republics, giving the lie to  the claim 
that Central Asians w ere m asters o f  their own homes. In the 1970s this was to  change, 
with far-reaching effects on the way in which Soviet Islam w as perceived.
The 1970 census showed a stark contrast betw een the grow th rates o f  the 
Russo-Slavic and the M uslim  populations. d ’Encausse believed this
shows above all that the Soviet community is not a single homogenous nation, 
but that national divides are continued in demographic splits, thereby creating 
imbalances which in the near future could be the source of considerable 
problems.2
The Soviet U nion was not a single nation but a colonial empire. Paul Johnson 
claimed, “One o f  the lessons o f  the tw entieth century is that high birth-rates in the 
subject peoples are the m ortal enemy o f  colonialism.”3 D em ographic pressure would 
lead to  political unrest.
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“Intense dem ographic pressures are developing in Central Asia among the 
Turkic-M uslim  population.”4 One source5 claimed population grow th in Central Asia 
was three times the national average. W hilst the M uslim population evinced a high 
grow th rate, that o f  Russians and other Europeans was static or in decline. This was 
comm ented on in 1971.
If we consider the fertility rate or child-woman ratio... we observe that it is far 
from equal... Russians have a very low ratio, one of the lowest in the world... 
Compared to the low Slavic rates, all Soviet Muslim groups have rates which are 
among the highest in the world... If this trend continues, in the year 2000 the 
Soviet Union would probably have a Turkic and Muslim majority and a Russian 
and even a Slavic minority.b
A nother estim ate7 put the M uslim share o f  the population in 2000 at one third. 
Projections for population grow th based on census data varied. According to  
Rakow ska-H arm stone (b.1929 in what w as then Posen, Germany, now  Poznan, 
Poland: at the time Professor o f  Political Science, Carleton University, O ttaw a) the 
population o f  Central Asia and Azerbaijan w ould double in the thirty years to  the end o f  
the cen tu ry .8 A later estim ate9 suggested that this w ould occur in tw enty years and the 
period 1970-1990 w ould see a tripling o f  Central Asia’s population. Furtherm ore,
the natural increase of local population has come to replace migration as the 
major source of population growth east and south of the Urals in the last decade, 
thus dimming the prospects for “internationalizing” the population of the national 
republics by the migration of other nationality groups, predominantly Russians.10
“Internationalization” w as defined as
efforts to dilute ethnic separateness and increase the sense of common identity 
among the diverse peoples of the USSR.11
Rywkin asserted that “A ccording to  the 1970 census, the proportion o f  
Europeans fell to  about 63 percent in Kazakhstan and to  ju st over 21 percent in Central 
Asia proper,” 12 and spoke o f  the “M uslim  ‘reconquest’ o f  Central Asia.” 13 
D em ographic trends w ere radically altering the relationship betw een Central Asia and 
M oscow  and at the same time increasing the international im portance o f  Soviet 
Muslims. The self-described ‘W elsh-Am erican’ W imbush, w ho in 1978 w orked for the 
Rand C orporation and later becam e D irector o f  the Society for Central Asian Studies, 
Oxford stated,
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Perhaps more than any other internal Soviet development, the rapid increase in 
Muslim numbers underlines the potential for new pressures on Soviet domestic 
and foreign policies. The USSR is now the world’s fifth largest Muslim state.14
Later he asserted,
By the end of this century, Soviet Muslims could number as many as 100 Million 
(Soviet estimate) or as few as 65 million (American estimate). Whether one 
accepts the larger or smaller estimate, the USSR at that time will begin to 
assume a significant, if not yet dominant, Islamic profile.15
By contrast to  the dem ographic strength o f  M uslim peoples, other non-Slavic 
groups evinced a population decline.
The prospects for the Balkan nationalities do not seem bright. The 1979 census 
reported that Estonians made up 65 percent of the population of their republic, 
Latvians 54 percent of theirs. Both figures had fallen substantially since 195 9.16
Baltic peoples were losing the dem ographic battle. Their numbers in their own 
republics were declining in the face o f  Russian migration even as those o f  Central 
Asians increased. Rywkin contrasted the Baltic with Central Asia.
Because the three Baltic nations are small and present no visible threat to 
Russia’s future, the most serious problem is in the Muslim republics, with their 
large territories, [and] rapidly growing populations...17
This contrast w as alluded to  by Karklins in a study based on interviews with 
Soviet Germans.
The most evident contrast is between the Baltic republics where the indigenous 
nations are seen to be losing in power, and Central Asia and Kazakhstan where 
the opposite is seen to occur.18
In the Baltic republics assimilation o f  the ‘titu lar’ nationalities by the Russians 
seemed inevitable. This was not the case in Central Asia.
Census data suggested a number o f  trends. M uslims w ere becoming m ore 
powerful through their num bers and the concentration o f  those numbers. “Russian 
[political] representation in Uzbekistan will shrink proportionately.” 19 One authority
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stated, “The results o f  this expanding grow th rate... have already been reflected in the 
change in proportions betw een the titular nationality and the Russians.”20 The 
increased numerical im portance o f  Central Asians w ould be reflected in increased 
political importance.
Although demographic trends affect the standing of the non-Russian nationalities 
in many ways, the dramatic growth of the Soviet Muslim population is most 
consequential since it adds a strong quantitative pressure to native claims for a 
larger share o f the educational, economic, and administrative sector of their 
republics.21
M ore M uslims would hold positions o f  political authority, challenging the Russo- 
Slavic dom ination o f  the organs o f  power. Rakow ska-H arm stone drew  attention to  the 
presence o f  Central Asians in the Politburo,22 noting that K azakh First Secretary 
Dinmukhammed Kunaev w as a close associate o f  Brezhenev. O thers played down the 
im portance o f  Central Asians at federal level. Rywkin considered that
the participation, for example, of Soviet Muslims in key Party, government, army 
and security positions in Moscow has always been minimal. Membership of 
such entities as the Supreme Soviet are of too limited a value to be considered.23
The corollary w as that politically ambitious Central Asians w ere obliged to  w ork 
through republican-level channels.
Deprived of an effective voice in the decision-making process in Moscow, 
individual republics have no choice but to press for increasing roles at home and 
to avoid giving more than lip service to officially promoted concepts of “fusions” 
and “integrations.”24
M any analysts noted that as Central Asians becam e better educated and more 
socially mobile, m ore entered the republican adm inistration where they could advance 
their own interests. Karklins in particular emphasised a perception from  within the 
U SSR  that Central Asians w ere consolidating pow er against the centre whilst other 
non-Russian peoples w ere losing power.
While 67 percent of [Soviet Germans] who lived in Kazakhstan thought that 
native power there was increasing, 59 percent of those who lived in the Baltic 
perceived it as being on the decrease.25
The factor mentioned most frequently as a sign of increasing native power is the 
indigenous nationality holding more and higher positions.26
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W estern observers spoke o f  a return to korenizatsiya, the reservation o f  posts for 
natives. This developm ent w ould both create and reinforce tensions betw een Russians 
and non-Russians and betw een the centre and the republics as Central Asians with 
political pow er used this to  establish patronage netw orks which excluded Russians.
In the majority of cases. Central Asian Muslims with equal or even lesser 
qualifications are given priority in their own republics and this causes a great 
outer}7 from European job seekers. Warnings directed from time to time against 
those Muslims who object to the use of Russian cadres within their own 
republics are aimed at discouraging those who would like to ‘Muslimize’ the 
economy as a step towards achieving political control.27
Soviet Muslims are quietly but steadily reclaiming small parts of the power and 
authority that the Russians stripped from them in the 1920s... We should be alert 
to this trend and to the political implications of Soviet Central Asians in general 
using the established system to wrest control over many aspects of their lives 
from the dominant Russians. Our evaluation of their progress should be 
tempered with the knowledge that history is replete with examples of 
‘"committed” colonial peoples turning on their masters when the moment is 
opportune.28
A nother concern arising from the disparity in birth-rates betw een Slav and 
Muslim was the effect this w ould have on the Red Army. The pool o f  people available 
for conscription was becoming m ore ‘M uslim .’ W imbush cited complicity with the 
Nazis to  suggest that M uslims w ere “almost certainly thought to  be o f  questionable 
loyalty”29 by the Soviet military. For reasons including lack o f  technical training and 
language proficiency, Muslim conscripts w ere seldom assigned to  combat regiments. I f  
this system were maintained severe strains w ould be placed on the efficiency o f  the Red 
Army as a fighting force. I f  M uslims were employed in combat units this would, 
according to  some argum ents, threaten governm ent control over one o f  its primary 
instrum ents o f  power.
M ore im portant than the military impact was the economic impact, which bore on 
the political situation as it brought Central Asians into direct conflict w ith Russians. 
Three factors were at play: the condition o f  the rural economy, the role o f  Central 
Asians in the urban economy, and patterns o f  migration. The combination o f  these was 
felt to be conducive o f  conflict.
205
One result o f  the population imbalance within the U SSR  w as a labour shortage in 
Siberia and Europe and a surplus in rural Central Asia, which w ould be exacerbated by 
Soviet attem pts to improve the efficiency o f  the cotton sector in agriculture by 
increasing m echanisation/10 Unem ploym ent and under-em ploym ent w ere endemic in 
rural Central Asia, a situation unlikely to change. “B etw een 1959 and 1970, the 
num ber o f  rural inhabitants per sown hectare in Central Asia increased by roughly 
25% .”31 Such grow th might be expected to  continue. Owing to  the need for 
agriculture to  be irrigated, and a shortage o f  w ater supplies, the possibility o f  expanding 
the area under crops was limited. It w as to  alleviate this shortage that the scheme to 
divert the Siberian rivers was mooted.
D eveloping industry as an alternative to  expanding agriculture was not seen as a 
possible solution. The industrial skills o f  Central Asians w ere inadequate. This caused 
a m igration o f  Europeans into Central Asian cities despite the already existing local 
labour surplus. Central Asia was too  far from  principal Soviet m arkets in the w est o f  
the country to make industrial developm ent attractive.32 Large-scale industrialisation 
would give the region too  much economic, hence political, pow er.33
The obvious solution to the labour surplus was m igration to  other areas o f  the 
USSR. Lewis, Roland and Clem working together at Columbia, N ew  York, saw this 
developm ent as probable, but warned that w ith it w ould come ethnic tension, since it 
would take the form o f  a movement o f  unskilled farm w orkers to  m ajor Russian cities, 
comparable to  the movem ent o f  South Asians and W est Indians to  Britain or o f  Puerto 
Ricans to  the US.
The implications of the migration of the Central Asians to Russian cities cannot 
be overemphasised... Similar experiences in world history certainly would not 
lead one to expect increased harmony between the two groups.34
M ost scholars did not foresee large-scale m igration o f  Central Asians. The 
evidence suggested that Central Asians w ere unwilling to  leave their hom e republics. 
There w as how ever the possibility o f  m igration from rural to  urban areas within Central 
Asia, which would carry its ow n risks o f  ethnic tension. Rakow ska-H arm stone 
comm ented,
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if they do not emigrate the demographic pressures within the region cannot but 
inflame the ethnic conflict, given the fact that the Moslems are largely rural, the 
non-Moslem immigrants urban.35
In an urban environment, Muslims and non-M uslims would come into direct 
com petition for jobs. The ‘m odern’ sectors o f  the economy were held by outsiders. 
Lewis et.al. did not consider Central Asian cities capable o f  absorbing excess rural 
labour, leading to  a situation in which new m igrants becam e economically frustrated. 
Econom ic grievance could easily come to  be expressed as ethnic grievance, a situation 
exacerbated by the fact that the rural-urban antagonism  characteristic o f  many societies 
was m atched by an ethnic divide.
The potential foi* conflict is magnified by the fact that the urban and more 
modem sector of the economy is dominated currently by outsiders. Therefore, 
out-migration can be expected to raise not just the plaint that the loss to the 
family’s membership is attributable to the unfair allocation of developmental 
investments but also the charge that the loss is aggravated because aliens hold the 
relatively few desirable positions that are available within the homeland.36
Ethnic groups become economic interest groups, and economic and ethnic 
tensions tend to be synonymous.37
In m ost cases this situation was seen as contributing to  tensions betw een 
Russians and non-Russians.
Even if econom ic frustration did not manifest itself directly in anti-Russian 
sentiment, it served to  heighten ethnic self-awareness and ethnic self-confidence in 
pressing demands.
U rbanisation was seen as a function o f  m odernisation. This generated its own 
tensions within society, especially as m ore Central Asians w ere completing higher 
education. One result o f  this w as the creation o f  urban indigenous elites for whom  
traditional types o f  employment w ere no longer attractive, and who came into direct 
conflict w ith a Russian ruling class which discriminated against natives. The resulting 
dichotom y betw een aspiration and opportunity w as a potential source o f  conflict.
As they improve their educational levels, their aspirations grow, and they often 
become increasingly discontent because the dominant group is reluctant to share
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the socioeconomic advantages of development with them, especially if they 
belong to a different nationality or ethnic group.38
Modernisation in a multi-ethnic context is volatile even if the dominant group 
allows for a degree of economic and social equalisation since the new elites 
usually perceive that their relative position is changed insufficiently and 
expectations rise. ’9
Economic and social change is occurring, accompanied by the same frustrations, 
questioning and dissatisfaction which has accompanied similar changes and 
upheavals in other areas of the world. Tensions are growing, and becoming 
increasingly ethnically charged among Asians and Russians alike.40
The ethnic tensions arising from a growing population and increased social 
mobility could be defused only if  Central Asian M uslims m ade com m on cause w ith the 
Russians, if  they identified with the Russians and the Russians with them. Rywkin 
asserted that “if  the M uslims o f  Soviet Central Asia shared a kind o f  all-Soviet identity 
with and allegiance to the Russians, the dem ographic and geopolitical developm ents in 
the area would turn purely to  M oscow ’s advantage.”41 In the absence o f  such an 
identity, growing Central Asian frustration w ould lead to  greater national self­
assertiveness, leading ultimately to  calls for independence.
6.iii) Central Asian Distinctiveness
Social and cultural integration was the declared policy o f  the Soviet government. 
In effect the U SSR  w as to  cease to  be multi-ethnic and becom e a nation-state peopled 
by what W estern scholars dubbed Homo Sovieticus. Cultural unity w as essential to  this 
project, and
it is on the cultural front that the new integration efforts have been concentrated.
Two aspects of these efforts are of great importance in Central Asia: the new 
drive for linguistic Russification, and a major effort to introduce new “Soviet 
customs and traditions” as a replacement for the old “reactionary” ones.42
There w as evidence that such a m erger w as not occurring in the case o f  Central 
Asians, w ho had high levels o f  cultural distinctiveness and thus o f  ethnic awareness. 
Research into multi-ethnic societies in other parts o f  the w orld suggested that such a 
situation w ould provoke conflict if  the aspirations o f  a distinct and subordinate group 
were not being met: “especially thought-provoking in the Uzbek context is D eutsch’s
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theory... that when the rate o f  social mobilization exceeds the rate o f  assimilation - 
clearly the Uzbek position - conflict arises.”43
Central Asians maintained their distinctiveness from other Soviet citizens in a 
variety o f  ways, many o f  which had been m entioned during the 1960s. Language, 
which Bennigsen had taken as one o f  the primary m arkers o f  ethnic identity, was one 
o f  these.
Central Asians w ere not becoming linguistically assimilated.1 M any scholars 
doubted w hether even if  such assimilation occurred this would necessarily diminish 
ethnic self-awareness. “Glazer and M oynihan have observed in the N ew  Y ork City 
context that disappearance o f  language and other national traits is less apt to  reduce 
ethnic awareness among groups with visible biological differences, or where religious 
differences are a factor.”44 Lubin also stated that “linguistic assimilation need not lead 
to  a grow ing feeling o f  unity and solidarity.”45
The behaviour patterns o f  Central Asians continued to  occupy a large proportion 
o f  W estern writings as they emphasised the difference betw een M uslim and Russian. 
The M uslim  way o f  life w as radically at variance to that o f  the Russians.
In the pattern of' everyday life the overall influence of the Russian material 
culture has been considerable, but “most of the time, the Muslim does not 
respond to a Russian substitute unless it is more convenient, and even then he 
tries to effect a compromise between tradition and innovation.”46
Customs that can be practiced (sic) under modem living conditions without much 
difficulty are well observed. Among them are universally practiced circumcision, 
marriage, divorce, and burial rites, avoidance of public places and ceremonies 
during Ramadan, Muslim dietary prohibitions against pork, wearing a tubiteika 
(skullcap), and the chaikhana (teahouse) style of “cafe life.”47
One o f  the m ost obvious cultural differences was the M uslim s’ high birth-rate, 
seen as a function o f  the traditional Central Asian family structure.48 From  this 
structure flowed a num ber o f  types o f  behaviour unique to  the Muslim social
1 According to Rywkin, in 1970 14.5% of Uzbeks were fluent in Russian. Rywkin (1982) p.97. This 
is repeated by Rakowska-Harmstone (1977) p.282, who considered lack of fluency in Russian to be a 
major contributor to de facto discrimination against Muslims in employment.
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environment" which were reinforced by the family’s patriarchal nature, expressed in 
respect for elders.
Obedience towards parents, and a pronounced respect for one’s elders [are] a 
distinguishing trait of young Muslims... reverence towards older people is not 
only significant in itself it also has major repercussions on the Islamic 
community and the survival of traditions... it strengthens their general 
communitarian tendencies.49
The strength o f  the traditional family affected the position o f  w om en in society. 
The Soviets had seen traditional attitudes to  w om en’s roles as a major obstacle to  
building the new society. Evidence suggested that efforts to  emancipate the ‘surrogate 
proletariat’, as M assell1" dubbed Muslim women, had failed. This was shown by the 
low  level o f  w om en’s participation in employment and the high num ber o f  girls o f  
m arriageable age leaving education.
Karklins listed a num ber o f  practices associated with the family, mainly rites o f  
passage, which served to  set M uslims apart from non-M uslim s.50 The maintenance o f  
such traditions was perceived as being o f  the greatest im portance since as one 
interviewee rem arked, “if  one doesn’t observe one’s traditions one insults one’s 
nation.”51
Rakow ska-H arm stone asserted that
Traditional life cycle rituals and ceremonies are widely observed in the Muslim 
community, in rural areas as well as in the cities, even among the intelligentsia 
and party members in responsible positions.52
Circumcision and traditional burial w ere almost universal.53 A number o f  
scholars comm ented on the fact that Muslims, including Communist Party members, 
w ere buried in their ow n cemeteries according to  traditional rites, separating them  
from Europeans in death as they had been in life. Circumcision was seen as a symbolic 
m arker differentiating Central Asians from Europeans. Being circumcised was a m ark 
o f  national identity.
" This is discussed in Bennigsen & Wimbush (1975) pp. 142-144.
11 Massell, G. (1974) The Surrogate Proletariat, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press
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In all areas the statement that “he who is not circumcised is not an Uzbek” (or a 
Turkmen, or a Tajik, etc.. as appropriate) is heard not only from illiterate elders, 
but from educated young men."4
Community events also followed traditional patterns. The feasts o f  ‘Id al-Adha 
and ‘Id al-Fitr w ere widely observed, as was the ancient Iranic spring festival Now-ruz. 
Ram adan retained a social significance. “An American reporter asked some Uzbeks, 
just before the annual com m em oration o f  the O ctober Revolution, to  name the most 
im portant holiday in the USSR. The invariable reply: the end o f  Ram adan.”55
Soviet attem pts to  replace these festivals with m ore ‘progressive’ equivalents 
failed, as did attem pts to establish new rites o f  passage. It w as widely rem arked that 
the so-called ‘K om som ol’ wedding which utilised Soviet ritual w as regarded as having 
less social validity than a traditional ceremony.
Most marriages are now conducted at a legal age and are registered in marriage 
registration offices (ZAGs), but in most cases they are solemnised by a 
subsequent marriage ceremony. Marriage is not considered valid otherwise...56
The significance o f  the preservation o f  cultural traditions in Central Asia lay in the 
fact that had their roo ts in Islam. Rakow ska-H arm stone referred to  “shar 7a/-based 
social norm s.”57 d ’Encausse dealt with social custom s in Central Asia under the heading 
“H om o Islamicus in Soviet Society,”58 arguing that as essentially Islamic beings, Central 
Asians could never be fully assimilated into Soviet life. Rywkin devoted a chapter o f  his 
1982 book to “the national-religious symbiosis.”
Islam, which bears on identity, behaviour, attitudes, and way of life of the 
peoples of Soviet Central Asia, penneates all the social, political, and economic 
aspects o f their lives...
There is hardly a problem in Soviet Central Asia devoid of a Muslim component.
The demographic explosion would not have occurred without the influence of 
Muslim tradition on family life. Similarly, Islam divides the natives from the 
Russian settlers, has an impact on the division of labour along national-religious 
lines, curtails social contacts between the two communities, and inhibits the 
Muslims from migrating outside their areas...59
Bennigsen ascribed the failure o f  Central Asians to  assimilate to  their remaining
attached to Islam. That means by remaining attached to a corpus of customs, 
habits, social traditions and psychological attitudes which constitute the ‘Muslim
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way of life ... [This] makes the biological or cultural symbiosis with the Russians 
difficult or even impossible.011
Although it was commonly asserted that the term  ‘M uslim ’ related to  a group 
cultural identity rather than to  a religious identity, it was not always easy to  separate 
the two.
For the Muslim Turkic peoples of Central Asia, group identity vis-a-vis the 
European, mostly Russian settlers, has been based on feelings of Muslim 
religious identity.11
...it is impossible, in real life, to separate Muslim religion from the Muslim way 
of life, including national-cultural traditions that were shaped by the Quran,
Sunnah, and Shariah..62
Islam was the force separating Central Asians from Russians: “Islam continues to 
provide a basic cultural linkage among Soviet M uslims, and to  create an invisible 
barrier separating them  from  the ruling Slavs.”63 The national identity o f  Central 
Asians w as intimately linked to  their religious identity. In a situation o f  competition 
which w ould heighten ethnic self-awareness and assertiveness, the articulation o f  
‘Central A sianness’ w ould be expressed via Islam.
If one accepts the classical definition that a nationality is “a state of mind 
corresponding to a political fact,” then in Soviet Central Asia the state of mind of 
the Muslim population is cemented by feelings of Islamic community, standing in 
opposition to the political fact of Western. European, Russian, Soviet (used 
interchangeably) domination.64
Individuals who share these fears [of assimilation] consider the preservation of 
Islam crucial to the preservation of their identity... even for a contemporary 
Muslim the basic attribute that divides or unites representatives of one or many 
nations is largely the profession of faith.65
Islam becam e an expression o f  national identity in contradiction to  state-led 
assimilationist policies. “In the final analysis the religious character o f  Muslim 
nationalism is a ‘natural’.”66 Islam provided “a spiritualised form  o f  nationalism.”67 
“The Soviet Muslims them selves see Islamic practice as part o f  their national culture.”68 
Islam inhibited assimilation and at the same time lack o f  assimilation increased 
M uslim s’ self-awareness as a distinct community, thereby strengthening Islam. Given 
the im portance o f  Islam to  the preservation o f  national identity and resistance to 
Russification, the ways in which the religion w as articulated w ere o f  great importance.
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The articulation o f  Islam was divided by W estern scholars into ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
or ‘parallel’. The relationship o f  these groups to  the state, to  the people and to  each 
other formed a subject o f  intense debate.
6.iv) “Official” Islam
‘Official’ Islam meant the Muslim Spiritual D irectorates and the legally- 
sanctioned body o f  ‘ulema. The existence o f  this body had been observed in the 
1950s, when the administrative structure o f  Soviet Islam was sketched out. During the 
1970s and 1980s, greater attention was paid to  the functioning o f  the D irectorates in 
the U SSR as a whole and in the Muslim regions.
The Spiritual D irectorates established during the Second W orld W ar were in 
many ways unique in the Muslim world. Bennigsen pointed out, “Since Islam lacks... 
regular “clergy” , it is impossible to  talk about a “M uslim Church.”69 In many respects 
however the Muslim administration resembled such a body, with a ranked hierarchy, a 
recognised and regulated body o f  servants o f  the cult and designated places o f  
worship, a situation “which has no parallel in the rest o f  the M uslim w orld.”70 
d ’Encausse com pared the Muslim religious administration to  that o f  the M oscow  
Patriarchate.71 Bociurkiw  also made the comparison with structured churches:
While alien to the Muslim tradition the new organisational structure imposed 
upon Soviet Islam a structure which was obviously devised for the much more 
institutionalized, “churchly” religions, like Orthodoxy, and was clearly designed 
to facilitate central state control over Muslim religious activities , by having them 
centralized and entrusted to the hierarchically organized, professional “clergy.”72
This situation arose as a result o f  the unique conditions prevailing in the USSR:
The Soviet state, due to its ideology, does not recognise the existence of 
individual believers. It allows a religious life to these believers, and for this 
reason institutions, the Muftiates [exist].7’
As the perm itted channel for the expression o f  Islam, the D irectorates regulated 
the affairs o f  believers and represented their interests to  the governm ent via the 
Council o f  Religious Affairs, a body within the U SSR Council o f  M inisters which had
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branches within each republic. “These D irectorates not only provide a channel for 
discussions with the Soviet governm ent but, m ore importantly, they are the instrument 
for organising the religious life o f  the believers.”74 In R akow ska-H arm stone’s 
estimation, “The D irectorate perform s only a few o f  the traditional functions o f  the 
Muslim clergy,”75 there being no w aqf  lands or Shari'a courts to  administer. 
Bennigsen and W imbush noted that
The four spiritual directorates are empowered by the Soviet government to 
control the religious life of all Muslim believers. All the “working” mosques, 
medressehs, and religious publications are placed under their strict supervision.
Under Soviet legislation, any kind of religious activity outside the working 
mosques is illegal and strictly forbidden. All Muslim clerics must be registered 
with the directorates as well as with the Council for Religious Affairs of the 
Republic and are paid and nominated by them... The directorates and their 
registered clerics alone are entitled to represent Islam vis-ci-vis the Soviet 
authorities.76
M ost writers w ho dealt w ith the official face o f  Soviet Islam listed the 
D irectorates, stating their locations and in some cases noting their administrative 
language. Three such lists, Bennigsen’s and Lem ercier-Q uelquejay’s o f  1979,77 
A kiner’s o f  198378 and Bennigsen’s and W im bush’s o f  1985,79 are o f  especial interest 
for the volume o f  data they gave. Except in the spelling o f  personal names, these 
correlate closely, although some differences are noticeable.
The D irectorates were those o f  Central Asia and Kazakhstan; European Russia 
and Siberia (Akiner m ore accurately said D irectorate o f  European U SSR  and Siberia: 
it also had jurisdiction over Lithuania and Belorussia); N orth  Caucasus and Daghestan; 
and Transcaucasia. The first three w ere described as Sunni and the last as jo int Jafari 
Shi’i and Hanafi Sunni.
The m ost im portant was the D irectorate o f  Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which 
according to  Bennigsen had been created in 1943 (Akiner has 1946). 75%  o f  Soviet 
M uslims,v lived under its jurisdiction. The only M uslim theological schools fell under 
its control, it possessed the only m ajor Islamic library in the U SSR  (Akiner p .34), and
IV Bennigsen 1979 p. 150. 1985 p. 15 - “more than half' according to Akiner p.34
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was the only source o f  Islamic publishing (Bennigsen 1979 pp. 150 & 154; 1985 p. 15). 
Akiner (p. 34) has it the source o f  “nearly all” Islamic publication.
The senior staff o f  the D irectorate, based in Tashkent, w ere named. The 
chairman, or Mufti, in 1979 and 1983 was named as Zia ud-Din Babakhanov 
(Bennigsen) or Ziauddinkhan ibn Ishan Babakhan(ov) (Akiner). In 1985 the M uftiate 
w as held by Shams ud-Din Babakhanov w hose father and grandfather Ishan Babakhan 
ibn Abdul M ajidkhan, had preceded him. Shams ud-Din was identified as M ufti by 
Rakow ska-H arm stone in 1983.80 The disparity betw een her information and Akiner’s 
may be due to  differing lengths o f  time in preparing their respective w orks for 
pub lica tion /
The Vice-Chairman, designated by the title Sheikh, was Yusufkhan Shakirov. 
Akiner added a second, Abdulgani Abdullayev. The D irectorate was represented in 
each republic by a single Kazi (Akiner), or according to  Bennigsen a Kaziyat 
(delegation). Senior staff w ere formally elected by the ‘ulema and confirmed in their 
posts by the Council o f  Religious Affairs.
Below the D irectorate, Islam at m osque level w as organised differently, and to 
read from the available W estern sources, confusingly. The basic principle was local 
democracy. According to  Bennigsen, “A M uslim parish (sic), com pared to  its pre­
revolutionary predecessor is a curiously dem ocratic body.”81 M osques were registered 
on the request o f  at least tw enty believers. The m osque was administered by a group 
called the mutawalliyat (Akiner) or “a com m ittee o f  parishioners (M ute a liw at) which 
deals not only with the financial and administrative business o f  the parish, but also, 
since W orld W ar II, w ith the purely intellectual and spiritual problems which might 
arise.”82
Akiner states that the mutcrwa/liyat, comprising three members elected from  the 
local community, “is responsible for the m aintenance o f  the m osque and is em pow ered 
to  represent the comm unity o f  believers in m atters involving dealings with state
v Shams ud-Din's election was noted by Akiner in a footnote.
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organisations o r other groups o f  M uslims.”83 The mutawalliyat reported to  the 
community and its finances w ere regulated by an accountancy body o f  a further three 
people. The mutawalliyat employed the Imam, who was responsible to  it. Bennigsen 
gives examples o f  occasions on which the mutawalliyat had expelled an Imam, finding 
his teaching uncongenial.84 According to  Bennigsen, the Imam, or Imam-Khatib as he 
was known, w as “no m ore than a technician, a paid employee.”85
This seemingly dem ocratic system had its limits, since only an ‘alim accredited by 
the Spiritual D irectorate and the Council o f  Religious Affairs was legally entitled to 
seek the post o f  Imam-Khatib. Candidates had to  conform  to  the demands o f  the 
Directorate. Thus the Soviet political principle o f  ‘dem ocratic centralism ’ was 
preserved in the religious realm. Although formally democratic, Islam faced the same 
restrictions as o ther spheres o f  Soviet society.
Akiner asserted additionally that the D irectorate comprised a Council o f  ‘Ulema 
which issued fatwas (fetve) on m atters o f  im portance to  Soviet M uslims, and an 
International D epartm ent responsible for organising Hajj. The D irectorate also 
provided religious training for all Soviet ‘ulema irrespective o f  rite.
Bennigsen asserted that “the so-called four Spiritual D irections are not spiritual 
but purely administrative institutions.”86 Shortly afterwards, the same author claimed 
the Soviet ‘ulem a “resembles a highly intellectual ‘General S ta ff  which guarantees the 
preservation o f  the purity and integrity o f  Islam at its peak.”87 In governing the 
M uslim com m unity the D irectorates were not purely administrative. By determining 
the content o f  serm ons and issuing fatwas, they controlled the content o f  Soviet Islam. 
W hat that content w as w as a m atter o f  debate.
In 1977 Bennigsen claimed that “ Soviet Islam is an intellectual desert, a perfect 
void,”88 although the same article in many ways seemed to  contradict this judgem ent. 
Gradually, a new  picture o f  the ‘ulema emerged. By 1979 Bennigsen w as asserting 
that “the intellectual and cultural level o f  the young ulemas (sic) is excellent, often 
outstanding.”89
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Bennigsen drew  a distinction between the Spiritual D irectorate o f  Central Asia 
and that o f  the N orth  Caucasus. Whilst the latter was seen as conservative, the form er 
was “m ore progressive and m odernist.”90 This estimation was supported by 
R akow ska-H arm stone.91 The Central Asian D irectorate represented by its size and its 
control o f  educational institutions the dominant trend. The modernism o f  the Central 
Asian ‘ulema w as predicated on admitting the practice o f  ijtihad, interpreting the 
Q ur’an by independent reasoning. Allowing ijtihad is perhaps the defining 
characteristic o f  all Islamic m odernist movements, and it linked the ‘ulema to the 
Jadids. In B ennigsen’s words,
present-day official Islam is also the inheritor of the brilliant pre-revolutionary 
jadid  movement which had dominated entirely the intellectual life of Russian 
Islam and had exercised a deep influence on the entire Muslim world, and whose 
influence is not completely forgotten.92
The Soviet Muslim leaders of today are executing the liberal programme of the 
Islamic renaissance, which was established a century ago by the greatest of the 
Tatar reformers., they are advocating the refusal of the taqlid - blind obedience 
to scholastic authorities; the restoration of the ijtihad - the right to interpret the 
meaning of the Koran, and. more broadly, the necessity to replace “blind” faith 
by a “reasonable” faith, thus reconciling Islam with science and progress and 
guaranteeing its survival in the modem world.93
One o f  the defining characteristics o f  Jadidism, beyond reformism and 
modernism, w as its pan-Islamic nature, manifest even in the Communism o f  Sultan 
Galiev. The D irectorates represented the only institution available to  Muslims beyond 
the federal governm ent and Party which transcended republican and ethnic boundaries. 
The ‘ulema w ere therefore instrumental in preserving Soviet M uslim s’ group identity. 
W estern scholars stressed the concept o f  Ummah or Islamic community as an 
integrative factor am ongst Soviet M uslims differentiating them  from  other citizens.
It is obvious that the “collective character” of Islam, backed by a tradition of 
thirteen centuries, could not be spirited away by a decision of the Soviet 
agitprop. The inborn sense of the Umma. of the solidarity between Muslims, 
even when they do not profess their religion, remains as strong as ever. Recent 
information shows that religious authorities are endeavouring to use this 
collective character of the Islam (sic) in order to prove that it is better adapted to 
the socialist system than any other religion.94
The Islamic leaders in the Soviet Union were accorded the right o f unifying and 
regulating their Muslim communities; of shaping a coherent umma in the Soviet 
Union...9:1
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The ‘ulem a was able to  preserve Central Asian exclusivity, especially since their 
legal rulings strove to  lessen the points o f  conflict betw een Islam and the sta te’s 
demands. This meant that self-identification as Muslim did not necessarily exclude a 
person from Soviet society, allowing Islam to perm eate that society and fuelling Central 
Asians’ ethnic self-confidence. d ’Encausse observed that the ‘ulema stressed the 
compatibility o f  Islam with the social, if  not the spiritual, goals o f  Communism, and 
m entioned an ‘alim who castigated the Baptist church for not allowing full participation 
in Soviet society.
At present Muslim leaders are promoting the political and social integration of 
Muslims. The journal Musulmcme sovetskogo vostoka continually stresses the 
need for such integration, which would give social and political weight to Islam.96
It was made possible for M uslims to  function within Soviet society by 
reinterpreting some o f  the ritual demands o f  the religion. For instance, in place o f  
prayer five times daily, once was acceptable. Various people w ere exempted from  the 
Ram adan fast, and those who were to observe it were not required to  do so for the 
entire month. Some com m entators returned to  the principle o f  taqiyya, stating that this 
w as permissible.vl R einterpretating doctrine made the anti-Islamic drive w eaker, since 
this had in the past been directed against many o f  the traditional aspects o f  the religion 
which w ere being dow n played or rejected by the ‘ulema.
Such statements as the one issued by Velizade Sharif, the Mufti of 
Transcaucasia: “ It is high time for us to understand that many things in the 
shariat have become obsolete and even rebuke believers” were politically 
irreproachable - and helped people stick to Islam.97
The ‘ulema ensured that Islam w as able to  survive. There w as however a price to  
pay in term s o f  co-operation with the government.
The Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Tashkent is 
thus the party’s instrument for control of religious life in the republics... It is 
known that the Directorate is closely supervised by the KGB through the Council 
for Religious Affairs (staffed largely by retired KGB officers)... It is not 
surprising therefore that the official clergy... are politically loyal and faithfully 
support official Soviet policies, the price that had to be paid for their very
V1 e.g. Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay (1979) p. 156, Bourdeaux (1984) p. 18, Imart (1986) 
p. 3 64
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existence... The official Muslim hierarchy... is perfectly loyal and obedient to the 
Soviet regime. It is certainly the most obedient of all the ecclesiastical 
administrations in the USSR.9S
Loyalty took  the form o f  supporting Soviet policy at hom e and prom oting Soviet 
propaganda abroad, particularly via the medium o f  Islamic conferences in Tashkent and 
elsewhere which w ere seen in the W est as being m otivated by foreign policy 
requirements, putting forth the idea that Islam was free in the U SSR  “whatever 
evidence there is to  the contrary,”99 in order to  curry favour for the Soviets in the 
M iddle East.
Such loyalty could backfire on the government.
When the imam-katib of the Moscow mosque states, in a sermon against 
"imperialism’ that ""it is the right of every Muslim to revolt” or when mufti M.
Gaji Kurbanov, head of the Northern Caucasus Department of Spiritual Affairs 
declares “The Almighty has created all people free and there is no greater sin 
than to oppress anyone,” he is sure to be approved, but maybe not as expected by 
his sponsors.100
'U lem a loyalty, although recognised as essential to  the preservation o f  the 
institutions o f  Islam and regarded as in the main m ore beneficial to the Muslims than to 
the governm ent, had its disadvantages.
State control over the ‘ulema, the dilution o f  the teachings o f  Islam to avoid 
conflict w ith the state, and unswerving support for the sta te’s actions, made it possible 
to present the ‘ulema as puppets o f  the state and not representative o f  the w ider Islamic 
community, “well-educated, sincere M uslims w ho nevertheless are not spokesm en for 
the real Islam .” 101 The organic link to  the community on which any true claim to 
leadership must rest w as lacking.
The failure of the Spiritual Administrations to defend the legitimate interests of 
Muslim believers against the Soviet violations of their constitutional “freedom of 
conscience”, and especially their attempts to deny any such violations at various 
international forums have served to undermine the credibility of the official 
Muslim leaders in the eyes of the faithful.102
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M ore serious than the ‘ulem a’s role as spokesm en for official policy w as their 
small number. A lthough d ’Encausse w arned that counting the num ber o f  m osques was 
not an accurate way o f  determining the strength o f  Islam, because Islam could only 
legally be practised in m osques and since m osques w ere the ‘w orkplace’ o f  the ‘ulema, 
such a count in the Soviet context could serve as a m easure o f  the ‘ulem a’s strength.
The exact num ber o f  m osques in Central Asia was almost impossible to  
determine. “It is impossible to  know  how many m osques are now  open for worship, 
since Soviet sources are curiously evasive on this point.” 103 According to  Bennigsen104 
their num ber was given by the M ufti in 1979 as 200 ‘cathedral’ (congregational) 
m osques and an indeterm inate number o f  smaller mosques, but other sources cited by 
Bennigsen give the figure variously as 1,200 or 143. O ther figures included 450, 
although it is unclear w hether this is for the U SSR  as a whole; 145 for Central Asia 
alone; o r around 344. again in Central A sia.105 Bociurkiw  claimed that 300 m osques 
were registered in Central A sia,106 although he noted that numbers varied, falling at 
times o f  attacks on Islam and growing again in m ore ‘liberal’ periods.
Several features o f  ‘official’ m osques stood out. Bennigsen noted that m osques 
w ere concentrated in urban areas, “because there are not enough ‘registered’ clerics to  
run the rural m osques.” 107 The M uslim population w as how ever predom inantly rural. 
Congregations tended to  be large. It was commonly asserted that five hundred or m ore 
regularly attended the Friday prayers, suggesting a high level o f  demand for the services 
o f  the ‘u lem a.108
Given the high level o f  religiosity im puted to  Central Asians there appeared not 
to  be enough m osques or ‘ulema to  meet their needs. Rakow ska-H arm stone spoke o f  
the “ridiculously small num ber o f  m osques and trained clergy.” 109 Although in A kiner’s 
estimation, “most Soviet M uslims who wish to  attend m osque today will find that the 
only real obstacle is one o f  distance,” 110 this could prove insurmountable. Bennigsen 
estim ated that “There are probably less than 1,000 ‘registered clerics’ who are paid and 
controlled by the muftiats - too  few  to satisfy the religious needs o f  the population.” 111
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It is obvious that official Islam alone could not maintain religious feeling among 
masses of believers. There are too few mosques left, and too few ‘‘registered”
clerics to satisfy the spiritual needs of the believers and to perform the necessary
1 1 ">rites. "
How ever, Islam is a non-sacerdotal religion. The shortage o f  ‘ulem a did not 
make it impossible to  practise the faith. The void was filled by practitioners o f  
‘unofficial’, ‘out-of-m osque’ or ‘parallel Islam .’
It should be noted that the four spiritual Muslim administrations in the USSR are 
actually legal in character and can be by-passed by the devout Muslim... The 
“official” Islam, which these administrations purport to represent thus fails to 
satisfy that important proportion of the Muslim population which still adheres to 
Islam... It should not be surprising, therefore, that a “non-official” Islam has 
arisen to challenge the “official” hierarchy.113
As the official clerics placed under the control of the Four Spiritual Directions 
(sic) do not suffice for the religious needs of the Muslim population of forty-five 
to fifty million, they are supplemented by unofficial mullahs... who escape all 
control of the official hierarchy .114
‘Parallel’, or ‘unofficial’, Islam was seen as m ore vibrant, m ore widespread, m ore 
‘authentic’ and m ore o f  a challenge to the Soviet authorities than ‘official’ Islam could 
ever be.
6.v) “Parallel” Islam
Without the activity of parallel Islam, religion in the Muslim republics of the 
Soviet Union would long since have collapsed into ignorance, indifference or 
shamanism.115
The term  ‘parallel’ Islam, which appeared in Soviet sources from the mid 1960s, 
requires definition. As a minimum it covers religious activity carried out in the absence 
o f  a registered mullah
The term “unofficial Islam” designates those activities of Soviet Muslims that 
take place outside of the control of the four Spiritual Directorates. Most of the 
activities that are considered unofficial Islam seem to be just basic Islamic 
ceremonies such as prayers...116
Islam has no priesthood. Anyone can perform  its rites, but ‘unofficial’ Islam was 
conceived as having a distinct organisation which made it possible to  talk o f  a religious
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movement in parallel to  the ‘ulema. Bennigsen spoke o f  “tw o opposite trends” 117 
within Soviet Islam, and characterised parallel Islam as a “surrogate o f  official 
Islam.” 118 Rakow ska-H arm stone w rote that
The almost universal character of religious rites and customs in the family and 
social life of Central Asian Muslims requires the daily presence of a clergyman, 
which cannot be provided by the pitifully few registered “servants of the cult.”
The need for a vast network of “unofficial” clergy is therefore manifest and its 
existence, albeit illegal, is acknowledged in Soviet sources.119
This conception o f  parallel Islam as an organised body w as repeated elsewhere.
Islam in the Soviet Union has developed along parallel, unofficial and 
unregulated lines - hence the Soviet-inspired catch-phrase “parallel Islam.”
Parallel Islam is supported in all regions of the Soviet Muslim world by the 
constant activity of “unregistered” clerics...120
almost anyone with some knowledge of Islamic tradition can conduct the 
prescribed rituals (birth, burial, circumcision, and so on). Parallel Islam, which 
is condemned by Soviet authorities and by the official Soviet Muslim 
establishment in Tashkent, provides these services to the millions of practicing 
and nonpracticing Muslims in the USSR who find it impossible to have their 
spiritual and cultural requirements satisfied at one of the officially sanctioned 
mosques or by clerics licensed by the Soviet state. For millions, a parallel 
network of itinerant clerics... replaces these servants of the state-approved 
Muslim organisation.121
Because the perform ance o f  ceremonies not organised by the D irectorate was 
illegal, it followed that parallel Islam was a clandestine phenomenon. “Parallel Islam is, 
essentially, underground Islam .” 122 “ [it] has its own clandestine organisations.” 123
These organisations were associated with Sufis. “ ‘Non-official’ Islam is based on 
the Sufi brotherhoods.” 124 “The dynamic ‘parallel’ or non-official Islam - m ore 
powerful than official Islam - is based on the Sufi brotherhoods.” 125 This represented a 
new development. Previous discussions o f ‘unofficial’ or ‘popular’ Islam concentrated 
on folk beliefs and family rites. N ow  however, ‘parallel Islam ’ was described as having 
an organisation and, increasingly, an ideology.
The term s ‘parallel Islam ’, which at its most basic meant such activity as private
prayer at home, and 'Sufism ’ w ere often used interchangeably. Broxup, Bennigsen’s
• 126daughter, w rote o f  “ Sufism or Parallel Islam as it is called in the Soviet Union.”
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Alternatively, “ Soviet Islam has been split into an official religion, represented by 
sanctioned and co-operative administrations, and an unofficial one grouped around the 
Tariqatsr™
Sufi groups, described as ‘clandestine’ or ‘underground’/ 11 w ere seen as being all- 
pervasive, “secret or semi-secret mass organisations.” 128 “The Sufi orders are not small 
‘chapels’ but mass organisations (despite their clandestine character).” 129 According 
to  Bennigsen, in Chechnya - not in Central Asia - over half the population belonged to 
such groups, far m ore than belonged to  the Communist Party.
G roup secrecy, which prevented infiltration by the KGB, w as maintained by 
several means. One was limiting membership to  specific clans, resulting in a position in 
which “adepts are subject to  the dual loyalties o f  brotherhood and clan.” 130 The same 
solidarity could be achieved through craft guilds like those m entioned by Snesarev. 
“ Sufi orders control the surviving Muslim guilds and new guilds organised along 
traditional lines. Such is the case, for example, o f  the guild o f  taxi drivers in 
Tashkent.” 1’1
We witness a curious and little known, but nevertheless successful effort of the 
non-official, popular Islam (especially of the Soufi [sic] brotherhoods) to 
penetrate the Soviet system... generally it consists in superimposing an Islamic 
organization - often secret, based on traditional initiation - on the existing Soviet 
structures: collective farnis. professional trade unions, etc.132
R akow ska-H arm stone noted that “religious community rituals connected with 
traditional crafts also apparently survive,” 133 w ithout linking this to  Sufism.
Coupled with this ‘clannic’ aspect o f  Sufism was the principle o f  taqiyya: “ [Sufi 
g roups’] underground developm ent appears as the expression o f  a kind o f  socio­
political darwinism, probably enhanced by the taqiyya tradition.” 134
Caucasian highlanders are naturally more aggressive and less cautions than the 
Turkestanis: the latter are more inclined to mistrust and secrecy, and often 
practise taqiya (sic)... the inner life of the brotherhoods is difficult to penetrate... 
because they have at their disposal the generalised practise of taqiya... the 
sanctioned right to apostasy or dissimulation.135
v“ Wimbush (1986) p.228. Rakowska-Harmstone (1983) p.55, Bociurkiw (1980) p. 19
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An example o f  such behaviour w as the form ula “Kom som ol in this world, M urid 
in the next,” a phrase which often occurred in W estern tex ts .136
A nother source o f  strength was internal structure. Sufi organisations usually 
consist o f bodies o f  disciples grouped around a teacher w hose prescriptions regarding 
spiritual or physical exercises are followed complicitly. In Rakow ska-H arm stone’s 
w ords, “Each ishati (o r Sheikh) form ed the nucleus o f  a group o f  followers known as 
imtrids, bound to the m aster by intricate rites, blind obedience and a dance ritual know n 
as z ik r”1*1 The discipline imposed by the teacher-pupil relationship w as among the 
Sufis’ greatest assets.
Sufi tariqcis are tightly-knit religious organizations with a strong leadership and 
a disciplined apparatus... they are well-suited to clandestine activity and have 
survived all attempts by the Soviet regime to infiltrate them, to win them over or 
to destroy them.1'’1'
The tariqa represent perfectly structured hierarchical organisations, endowed 
with an iron discipline which is certainly stronger than that of the Communist 
Party.139
Sufi groups in certain ways resembled the ‘cells’ o f  the Communist Party, a claim 
m ade by Bennigsen and W imbush in relation to  a group known as the Hairy Ishans, an 
offshoot o f  the Y asaw iyya.140 Com paring the experiences o f  the Afghan and Soviet 
Communists, Roy noted “ [Sufis’] aptitude for clandestine activity, their discipline and 
team  spirit, their capacity to  organise a parallel clergy” which rendered them 
“dangerous” since their tight-knit groups m eant that they w ere “easily transform ed into 
com m andos.” 141
Sufis were held responsible for maintaining a netw ork o f  unregistered institutions, 
notably m osques and madrasas. W imbush m entioned “thousands o f  underground 
m osques that dot the countryside o f  Soviet M uslim regions,” 142 Bennigsen “a large 
netw ork o f  clandestine m osques... and o f  underground religious schools.” 143 “The 
existence o f  unofficial mullahs also means the existence o f  unofficial mosques, and it is 
well docum ented that many such m osques exist, particularly in the rural areas.” 144
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Bennigsen identified several categories o f  unofficial mosque. These included 
redundant mosques illegally reopened; “prayer houses” usually in a cem etery or near a 
shrine; “ ‘private’ clandestine prayer-houses, open to  all believers, which are located in 
the hom es o f  Sufi sheikhs” and secret meeting places used only by Sufi adepts.145
As well as performing religious rites, Sufis propagated Islam via tw o main media. 
The first was the underground school where Arabic was taught. This w as essential for 
the perpetuation o f  the cult, since Arabic could otherwise be studied only at university 
and religious instruction only obtained at the tw o colleges in B okhara and Tashkent, 
which had a low intake and a high entry requirement. A description o f  the Sufis’ 
educational activity was given by Bennigsen and Wimbush.
Since religious instruction is forbidden in Soviet schools... parallel Islam has 
quite naturally come to assume an educational as well as a religious role... A full 
page article in Sovet Ozbckistom published on 26 September 1982 complained, 
for example, that an illegal “religious learning course” taught by a “false mullah” 
was attracting believers “as light attracts moths”; in this activity we may assume 
that Sufis are particularly important... In Tajikistan and in Kirghizia Sufis are 
identified openly as being responsible for the establishment of religious and 
Quranic schools.146
It w as uncertain how  effective such education was; W im bush147 suggested that 
unofficial mullahs had a limited knowledge o f  doctrine and K ocaoglu w orried that 
“knowledge o f  true Islam is diminishing.” 148 The present w riter has spoken to  a 
Turkm en academic w ho as a child on a collective farm during the W ar was taught the 
prayers, which he partially rem embered but which held no spiritual significance for 
him.vl" M ost repons stated only that religious education w as undertaken. By 
implication it was organised.
A nother medium for the propagation o f  Islam w as the custom  o f  pilgrimage. 
K ocaoglu noted that “the Soviet governm ent sends only 18 to  20 persons out o f  50 
million Soviet M uslims annually to  M ecca.” 149 Pilgrimage to  a holy place within 
Central Asia was an alternative to  Hajj. A  num ber o f  holy places existed, usually 
associated with the tom bs o f  saints, clan ancestors, biblical figures, or mythical and pre- 
Islamic figures. Sufi activity w as supposed to  be centred on these sites. According to
vm The same source denied that his teacher had had formal religious training, or was a Sufi.
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Rakow ska-H arm stone, “Mazars usually have a guardian, in most cases an unofficial 
mullah or ishan, an influential member o f  a local community who dispenses religious 
‘propaganda’.” 150
Sufis in the Soviet Union control and maintain holy places... The location of holy 
places in the territory' of the Muslim republics represents a kind of religious 
geography of nationalism which can be charted according to the location of the 
Sufi brotherhoods... today more than ever. Muslim holy places controlled by Sufi 
brotherhoods, and not the few officially sanctioned “working mosques”, are the 
real spiritual centres of Islam.1'''1
The cult o f  sainl s and its associated custom  o f  pilgrimage was “probably the most 
im portant element o f  popular Islam in Central Asia.” 152 Because o f  this it provided the 
principle location for the dissemination o f  religious teaching by Sufis. Holy places were 
“an excellent forum  for the brotherhoods to  influence the Muslim m asses.” 153
Because of this strategic position. Sufis have unique and unlimited access to non­
adepts who observe the cult of saints. They stand therefore at the critical 
juncture where popular belief meets clandestine organisation, where ordinary 
Muslims come into contact with the highly motivated and rigidly disciplined 
Sufis... Soviet sources agree that during a pilgrimage, the holy place is the main 
contact place between the “Sufi fanatics” and the population - believers and 
unbelievers alike.154
Because o f  this direct contact with the M uslim masses at shrines, “sufi 
brotherhoods, w hatever the content o f  their teaching, continued to  be felt by the people 
as closer to  their w orries and needs [than the ‘ulem a].” 155 Sufis had “deep roots in the 
comm unity” 156 and “they enjoy solid, and possibly even growing support from the 
M uslim m asses.” 157 “It is clear in areas where Tariqats exist, they hold the actual 
authority over the social g roup.” 158 Given that “The tariqas thus exercise a deep 
influence on public opinion,” 159 their teachings w ere o f  importance.
Religious observance did not necessarily imply opposition to  the Soviet regime, 
but co-operation with the state involved m aking a num ber o f  religious compromises. 
This Sufis w ere thought unwilling to  do; “the goal o f  the secret organisations is to 
maintain the true faith.” 160 “They are struggling to  build a world which is sanctified by 
faith, in which Islam penetrates every aspect o f  public and private life.” 161 This brought 
Sufis into direct conflict with the state. d ’Encausse believed that “the Tariqats are in
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fact mass organisations utterly estranged from the ideology o f  the Soviet system.” 162 
Bociurkiw  described them  as “strongly nationalist, anti-Soviet.” 160 Bennigsen and 
W imbush stated “members o f  the tarika are openly hostile to  the Soviet 
establishm ent.” 164
The Sufi brotherhoods appear to have no other “ideology” apart from a very 
conservative form of Islam: and their goals are those of the traditional jihad, or 
“Holy W ar”, which fights against sin. the infidel rulers and the “bad Muslims” 
who serve them.100
Their ideology, a legacy of Shamil's jihad, is a vague but powerful appeal to 
build a world entirely sanctified by faith, which implies, of course, the expulsion 
of the Russian Kafirs.166
Sufism was presented as inherently anti-Russian, a situation which some saw as a 
natural feature o f  this branch o f  Islam. “ Sufism has always played a big role in anti­
colonialist m ovem ents.” 167 M any shrines w ere the tom bs o f  leaders o f  C l 9th resistance 
to  the Russians. W hereas previously the anti-Russian revolts o f  the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, such as the Basmachi movement, were depicted as being o f  
nationalist inspiration, these were now  interpreted as religious revolts.
All movements of armed resistance to the Russian conquerors from the late 
eighteenth century to the last Chechen uprising in 1942-3 have been led or 
supported by Sufi brotherhoods.108
These m ovem ents had been inspired, it w as held, by the Naqshbandiyya, an order 
which remained strong in the region and “which from the eighteenth century has 
represented the hard core o f  M uslim resistance to  Russian conquest.” 169 O ther groups, 
notably the Hairy Ishans,,x had developed which also evinced an antipathy to  the 
Soviets.
Broxup suggested that Hairy Ishans w ere responsible for the assassination o f  
Sultan Ibrahimov, Chairman o f  the Kirghiz Council o f  M inisters.170 W imbush, noting 
calls for the elimination o f  “religious terrorists,” conceded that there was no evidence 
for such a link. He did how ever consider Sufi groups a natural haven for political 
dissenters.
LX Kocaoglu (1980) p. 151 attributed the expression "Komsomol in this world, Murid in the next" to 
this group.
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Sufi organisations, as in the past, are natural poles toward which dissident Soviet 
Muslims can gravitate. The Sufis alone can offer clandestine organizations, 
whose followers are characterised by their zealous commitment to Islam and their 
rigid discipline, to the Soviet Islamic dissident. In times of crisis, the 
brotherhoods have been the catalysts for potent anti-Russian and anti-Soviet 
movements, and they could become so again.171
Sufism preserved Central Asian distinctiveness by encouraging and facilitating 
behaviour patterns linked to Islam, and was itself an integral part o f  Central Asian 
culture. W estern readers were reminded that the term  ‘parallel’ Islam was a misnomer 
since Sufism did not depart from Islamic orthodoxy. This explained the half-hearted 
condem nations o f  ‘parallel’ phenom ena by the ‘ulema. One source even claimed that 
the M ufti o f  Tashkent was a member o f  the N aqshbandiyya.172
Central Asian culture, defined by Islam, remained strong in rural regions and was 
being rediscovered by urban elites in the process known as mirasism. Sufism served to 
strengthen the internal dynamic o f  Central Asian society as it articulated itself as 
distinct to  the Soviet whole.
Islam colours the content of the socialisation of Central Asian youth and provides 
the link between the traditional past and contemporary self-assertion and between 
the modernized elites and the still conservative masses. In so far as it is the 
identifying characteristic of the new elites, Islam legitimises the political system 
which is the elites' power base.173
The basis o f  political action in Central Asia was Islam. The developm ent o f  
Soviet Islam, particularly w hether it w ould take on a ‘m ilitant’ aspect, becam e a crucial 
com ponent in predicting the future shape o f  the USSR.
If the issues surrounding Soviet Muslims in the next few decades can in any 
sense be considered to be “Muslim issues,” then they must be thought of as 
issues of import to the entire Muslim world rather than as isolated regional 
trends. How Soviet Muslims themselves respond to the variety of political and 
social pressures upon them in this period will go far toward determining the 
future of the Soviet Union as the last great multinational empire. The response 
of Muslims abroad to these same issues could have a major impact on the quality 
of the dialogue between the Russian centre and the Soviet Muslim borderlands.174
The relationship betw een Soviet and non-Soviet Islam came under scrutiny.
228
6.vi) Soviet and non-Soviet Islam
A number o f  articles bore exclusively on relations betw een M uslims inside and 
beyond Soviet borders. A ttention was paid to the potential influence o f  the U SSR 
over non-Soviet M uslims and the part the ‘ulema played in Soviet propaganda. 
Increasingly though it w as the flow o f  ideas the other way, from  the M iddle East 
inwards, which attracted W estern interest.
Central Asia’s role in Soviet foreign policy as a stepping stone into the 
developing world w as expressed by Rakow ska-H arm stone.
The new importance of Central Asia in Moscow’s foreign policy came to the fore 
in the sixties and seventies, with the quest for influence in the Third World, 
specifically in the Muslim Middle East, and with the quarrel with China. Central 
Asia is a part of the Third World, Muslim and Asian, which in Soviet eyes can 
serve as a model for all others.175
Others averred that
[After 1967] For the first time Moscow began to project the Soviet Muslims as 
representatives of a different Soviet Union; not an atheistic and Marxist Soviet 
Union, but one which was partly Muslim.176
The Kremlin plan presents the USSR to the Muslim world not only as Islam’s 
‘best friend', but as a great Muslim power.177
The ‘ulema w ere instrumental in this project, projecting Central Asia as a model 
for developm ent and increasing M oscow ’s international standing. They were charged 
with convincing M uslim societies that the position o f  Islam w as safe within the Soviet 
system.
They must testify by their presence, by the beauty of their Khalats [traditional 
robes] and of their well-trimmed beards, as well as by their excellent knowledge 
of Arabic that Islam is alive and happy.178
Rakow ska-H arm stone observed that
The Muslim clergy’s activities abroad aim at three important objectives: firstly, 
to convince fellow believers abroad that Soviet Muslims have indeed achieved 
both prosperity and religious freedom under socialism; secondly, to gain a 
position of influence in the international Muslim community (basing their claims 
to leadership on the medieval glories of Central Asian Islam); and thirdly, to 
mobilize support for Soviet foreign policy.179
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Foreign trips by senior ‘ulema aimed at inducing a pro-Soviet stance among non- 
Soviet Muslims. Akiner described Babakhanov as an “am bassador o f  the Soviet 
governm ent.” 180 Bennigsen asserted that “Religious leaders are... itinerant ambassadors 
abroad... As propagandists they are certainly m ore effective than the official Soviet 
Russian propagandists.” 181 Dawisha and d ’Encausse counted thirteen foreign trips 
made by Soviet ‘ulem a betw een 1972 and 1978.182 Conferences on Islamic themes, 
such as the contribution o f  Imam al-Bukhari to  Islamic civilization, w ere organised. 
A ccording to  Bennigsen and Broxup, six w ere held betw een 1970 and 1979.183 The 
limitations o f  this policy w ere revealed in 1980, when the majority o f  delegates invited 
to  a Tashkent conference refused to  attend in protest at Soviet involvement in 
Afghanistan. Leaders o f  the Spiritual D irectorates, excepting Babakhanov, were 
subsequently dismissed. This was taken as a sign o f  governm ent control o f  the ‘ulema.
The irony o f  the governm ent’s use o f  the ‘ulema as a propaganda tool w as that it 
forced M oscow  to to lerate Islam at home, and even to  support it by for instance 
subsidising the restoration o f  historic m onuments like the tom b o f  Ahmed Yassawi - a 
Sufi holy place. “Official Islam contributes to  the rehabilitation o f  the national culture 
o f  the M uslim nationalities.” 184 Soviet Islam was “a double-edged sword ” 185 The 
international standing o f  the Soviet ‘ulema increased Islam ’s dom estic prestige, 
strengthening the concept o f  Ummah as a community m ost o f  w hose members lived 
outside the U SSR  and deepening the rift betw een Russians and Central Asians.
Soviet Muslims are deeply conscious of belonging to the P ar ul-Islam.186
A lthough China continued to be seen as a potential threat to  Soviet hegemony in 
Central Asia,x m ore attention was paid to  relations betw een Central Asia and the 
Middle East.
Central Asia w as closed to  visitors from  China but not those from the M iddle 
East. Soviet foreign policy tow ards the region had brought large numbers o f  people to
x e.g. Bennigsen & Broxup (1983): Wimbush (1985), (1986). Bennigsen & Wimbush (1979) p.122 
quotes, in Russian, a saying ‘from the bazaar of Central A sia’: “Wait till the Chinese come, they’ll 
show them.”
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Central Asia both as m em bers o f  official delegations and as students. The Iron Curtain 
was permeable.
Central Asia in particular has become an important training centre for political 
and military cadres from abroad... The dropping of the Iron Curtain and the flow 
of foreign Muslims into Central Asia also presented an unexpected but serious 
danger. Middle Eastern radicals who visit the USSR may be great admirers of 
the Soviet Union, but they are dubious Marxists.187
There are now approximately 25.000 Afghan students in the USSR.... Many of 
these Afghans are admittedly communists, but there are also large numbers of 
Muslim fundamentalists among them. These Afghan students, some of whom are 
Uzbek speakers, have been able to explain the actions and motivations of the 
Afghan Mujahideens.188
The opening of Central Asia... to outside Muslim influences offers Soviet 
Muslims an alternative both to Russian socialism and to Chinese socialism. The 
natural and logical source of Muslim inspiration lies in the Muslim Middle East 
rather than in China.189
The ‘Muslim M iddle E ast’ was in the later 1970s in a state o f  ferment and 
according to  Bennigsen, “It is inconceivable that Soviet M uslims can remain unaffected 
by the turm oil just across their borders.” 190 Afghanistan and Iran w ere seen as sources 
o f  destabilising influences. The linkage betw een Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia 
was explicit in the title o f  Bennigsen’s Mullahs, Mujahidin and Soviet Muslims.
Though the change is hardly yet noticeable, a turning point in the history of 
Soviet Islam came in 1978, with two major external events: the downfall of the 
Shah of Iran and the April (Saur) Communist revolution in Afghanistan....
Before 1978, as far as the USSR was concerned, the Middle East was a 
relatively stable area... the revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, followed by the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, changed dramatically this peaceful picture. They 
destabilised not only their own countries but the entire Middle East, transforming 
this relatively quiet territory into a boiling revolutionary cauldron... an area from 
which various subversive and radical ideologies may penetrate and contaminate 
Soviet Islam.191
That ideas informing the M uslim w orld might be attractive to  Soviet M uslims was 
confirmed by the sense o f  Islamic Ummah already asserted and by cross-border links. 
The U SSR was, in W im bush’s phrase, a “borderland Em pire” 192 As many, sometimes 
more, members o f  Soviet nationalities lived beyond the borders. This was illustrated in 
an article in which photographs o f  Iranian and Soviet Turkm en w ere juxtaposed. Both
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w ore the same w oollen hat, the same robe and similar beards. The pictures were 
entitled ‘ethnic brethren.’193 The text beneath read
the sense of kinship among Soviets. Iranians and Afghans is reinforced by the 
fact that members of the same tribe are separated only by mere political 
frontiers.194
It w as thought that people o f  similar ethnic, linguistic or tribal origin w ould make 
com m on cause. This understanding seemed to  have been borne out following the 
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.
M any Soviet troops who moved into Afghanistan in 1978 w ere o f  Central Asian 
origin. These had rapidly been w ithdraw n and replaced by Slavs. A lthough Olcott said
there is little reason to assume that Soviet Muslims were hesitant to support the 
spread of Soviet-style government into Afghanistan... Many Soviet Muslims have 
undoubtedly found the Afghani resistance disconcerting and difficult to 
understand, since they do not perceive the same tension between Islam and 
communism that the rebels do.195
to  most, the w ithdrawal o f  Soviet M uslims illustrated the dangers to  the Red 
Army o f  a Muslim majority, emphasising M uslim ‘unreliability’. Bennigsen alleged that 
“ Soviet M uslims w ere submitted to  systematic religious and political ‘intoxication’ by 
the Afghans,” 196 suggesting that they w ere susceptible to  anti-Soviet ideologies 
emanating from  outside the USSR.
That the Afghan mujahidin’s m essage o f  Islamist resistance to  Communism 
should find resonance in Central Asia was explained by several factors. Cross-border 
ethnic ties w ere one. A nother w as the supposedly extrem e conservatism  o f  Soviet 
Islam as preserved in its ‘parallel’ Sufi variant. A lthough French Islamist Olivier Roy 
drew  a distinction betw een ‘traditionalist’ and ‘Islam ist/fundam entalist’ (used 
interchangeably) camps within the mujahidin, such niceties w ere rarely observed. 
Islamic ‘fundam entalism ’ or ‘revivalism’ was perceived in the W est as being 
backw ards-looking and conservative in character. The traditionalism  o f  Central Asian 
Islam m ade it susceptible to  fundamentalism:
232
i
i
i
One of the key sets of ideas which could strike responsive chords in Central Asia 
is a fundamentalist religious revivalism which would reinforce the already 
existing trend in Central Asian republics.197
Rural Muslims' commitment to Islam as a religion is much stronger [than that of 
the urban elite] and thus their degree of responsiveness to the fundamentalist 
Islamic message is much higher.198
Soviet Muslim territories - with their long Islamic tradition - are similar to other 
parts of the Muslim world where a new upsurge of Islamic awareness is 
evident... it would be a mistake to believe that events in Afghanistan and Iran are 
contributing to the closed society of Central Asia something that was not already 
there in substance.199
Com parisons w ere also draw n betw een the Afghan mujahidin, the Basmachi 
m ovem ent and the M urid W ars.xl Although Rywkin insisted that “The Basmachi 
cavalry is not about to  descend into the valleys and cities o f  Central Asia to  challenge 
the Russians,”200 Roy suggested that the Afghans were giving a new life to  the concept 
o f  armed Islamic resistance and a new  social dynamism to Islam which the Basmachis 
lacked.
The Afghan resistance does possess a political, military and even cultural 
dynamism which is making its mark in the contemporary process of Islamic 
revival - sufficient to distinguish it from the basmachi movements of Central 
Asia which, faced with the triumphant bolshevism of the 1920s, could only be 
seen as representing the last stand of an ossified society.201
It w as now  Islam which w as seen as dynamic, while Communism was ‘ossified’. 
Imart, w ho studied politics in Algiers and frequently com pared Soviet Asia to  French 
Algeria, w rote o f  “the generalized loss o f  the Leninist faith” resulting from  “the 
grow ing corruption due to  economic chaos, civic licentiousness and ‘I-couldn’t-care- 
less’ attitudes [which] induced disillusioned people to  turn to  religion as an 
unshakeable, absolute moral code o f  behaviour.”202 R o ’i talked o f  “disillusionment”203 
with M arxism-Leninism, characterised as “stale” , “sterile” or even as 
“pseudoculture.”204
After decades of enforced conformity to stale Russian Marxism, Soviet Muslims 
have nothing to export in the political domain. To the contrary, it is they who are 
likely to be influenced by ideas, programs, and ideologies - perhaps even by
X1 e.g. Bennigsen & Broxup (1983) p. 114: Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay (1984) pp. 182-206
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models of political warfare and guerrilla activity - moving northward from a 
“destabilized"’ and radicalized Middle East.205
After decades of enforced conformity to the Russian Marxism-Leninism, Soviet 
Muslims live in an ideological void and are likely to be influenced by ideas and 
ideologies from abroad - from the most conservative religious conservatism of a 
Khomeini or a Gulbuddin [Hekmatyar, leader of the Afghan Hizb-i Islami] to the 
revolutionary radicalism of an ‘Ali Shariyati... or the doctrine of the Egyptian 
Ikhwan al-Muslimin.200
Ideas imputed to  the Afghans and Iranians w ere thought to be entering the 
U SSR  by several means. Fraternisation betw een Afghans and Central Asians at the 
beginning o f  the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was said to  have resulted in the 
rapid withdrawal o f  Central Asian troops. This channel o f  “infection” had been closed 
but others remained. Bennigsen and W imbush observed that the Sufi orders in 
Afghanistan, which Roy described as instrumental in resisting the Russians, w ere the 
same as those o f  Central Asia. This would aid the transmission o f  ideas across the 
border from Afghanistan into the USSR.
is it possible to identify contacts between Soviet Sufi organisations and the same 
Muslim brotherhoods across Soviet borders? If such contacts do exist, they are 
probably across the Afghan border with the Afghan Naqshbandis and Qadiris. 
Initiative for such contacts would almost certainly lie with the Afghans.207
Hizb-i Islami and Jamiat-e Islami both claimed to  have members within the 
USSR. Bennigsen and W imbush asserted that such claims w ere probably m ore than 
rhetorical. A lthough Hizb-i Islami had an uneasy relationship with Sufi groups, the 
Jamiat was according to  Roy infused with Sufism. B oth parties w ere ‘fundam entalist.’ 
Imart w rote o f  “an ‘afghan m inded’ minority, centred on, or linked to, sufi sects [with] 
the potentiality for the implem entation o f  a pre-insurrectionary mentality.”208 Broxup 
stated Jam iat-e Islami claimed 2,500 members in Tadjikistan alone.
Even if the claim is exaggerated (which there is no reason to suspect) and Jamiat- 
e Islami has only 25 instead of 2,500 members in Tadzhikistan, they could still 
provide the nucleus for an active nationalist-religious resistance movement inside 
the USSR which could threaten Russian control over the Muslim borderlands.209
Soviet sources praising the border guards and reports o f  attacks on frontier 
positions leant credence to  the allegation.
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Perhaps m ore im portant than direct links betw een Central Asians and Muslims 
elsewhere was the influence o f  printed m atter and o f  radio. A num ber o f  authors stated 
that copies o f  the Q ur’an had been obtained from  Afghanistan by Central Asian troops 
which w ere traded in an “active” black m arket.210
Hayit asserted that Central Asians had obtained Q ur’ans in exchange for medicine 
and added “Sometimes the w ar passw ord w as given to  the Afghans in return for 
religious books. At times even w eapons w ere used as payments for religious 
literature.”211 He gave no evidence or sources for these claims, which appeared 
elsewhere,212 and it w ould prima facie seem hard to  understand what use Central 
Asians, who were unable to  read Arabic script, could have for literature produced in 
Afghanistan. How ever, there seemed to be a considerable demand for Islamic materials 
within the USSR.
Dawisha and d ’Encausse mentioned the im portation o f  Q ur’ans from Afghanistan 
and asserted that an illegal publishing house in Tashkent had issued “thousands o f  
copies o f  an unauthorised book ‘about the Islamic faith’.”213 This may be the pamphlet 
w ritten in Arabic and Uzbek identified by Bennigsen and W imbush, which they 
suggested w as issued by Naqshbandis: “ ‘Islam dini haqida’ (About the Islamic Faith) 
advises believers to  avoid contact with ‘non-believers’ (which implies w ith communists 
and Russians).”214 This information, which Bennigsen and W imbush sourced to  Sovet 
Ozbekistom, appeared in The Observer, w hence Dawisha and d ’Encausse had it.
As well as the traffic in Q ur’ans and the local production o f  texts, Bennigsen 
drew  attention to  the production in Afghanistan and Pakistan o f  books specifically 
aimed at a Soviet audience and smuggled across the border. Hizb-i Islami in particular 
was involved in this activity. Bennigsen reproduced the covers o f  three w orks written 
in Russian.215 These included a life o f  M oham m ed and a w ork by the Pakistani founder 
o f  Jamiat-e Islami, M awlana M awdudi. Such literature it was alleged penetrated far 
into Central Asia, although exactly what its reach was is impossible to  determine.
The content o f  this literature “focuses primarily on Islam rather than on current 
political issues, nationality problems, or ‘Soviet colonialism’.”216 Bennigsen continued
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by stating that the mujahidin w ere attem pting to  connect their w ar against the Russians 
to those o f  nineteenth century Caucasian and Central Asian leaders. As evidence o f  
this he reproduced the front page o f  a Peshaw ar new spaper w ritten in Uzbek and Dari, 
using Arabic script throughout, which featured a picture o f  Shamyl, who it described as 
“the first to lead a guerrilla Holy W ar against the infidels.” “There is no doubt as to the 
target o f  publications o f  this kind... we should not be surprised if  this material 
eventually turns up in Soviet Central Asia.”217
If ‘fundam entalist’ ideas entered the U SSR  from Afghanistan via personal 
contacts and literature, they entered from Iran in a form which w as harder for the 
authorities to  control, radio. “W here once Iranians listened to  propaganda broadcasts 
from Radio Baku, today it is the Soviet Azeris and Turkm ens w ho follow with interest 
the broadcasts from Tabriz, Tehran and G organ.”218
Iranian broadcasts, particularly those featuring speeches by Khomeini, were 
reportedly recorded inside the USSR, with cassettes distributed among the faithful. 
A lthough such reports exclusively related to  Turkmenistan, the information was 
presented as being applicable over a wider area.219 Little was said o f  the languages 
broadcasts were m ade in, though Bennigsen stated that in addition to  Farsi, 
program m es existed in Azeri and Turkm en.220 Rakow ska-H arm stone asserted that “Air 
w aves carry foreign program m es in familiar languages and with familiar cultural 
content, and there are listeners in rural areas.”221
Evidence o f  the influence o f  Iranian radio came from  Azerbaijan, where Gaidar 
Aliev, head o f  the republic’s KGB before becoming republican First Secretary, called 
for increased vigilance against ‘ideological sabotage’. His successor as KGB chief, Zia 
Y usuf Zade (or Iusuf-zade), warned o f  infiltration o f  the republic by ‘agents’ from 
abroad.222x11 Olcott observed that “This single report from Azerbaijan is the only 
evidence o f  any short-term  political impact o f  the Iranian revolution or Islamic 
fundamentalism on political life in the M uslim regions,” and suggested that “it may have 
been nothing more than camouflage for an attem pt by First Secretary o f  the Azeri
N" That both men were Azeris weakens the view that Russians dominated non-Russians.
236
Communist Party Aliev’s faction to further strengthen its hold on the local
*■>223apparatus.
Several w riters comm ented upon the attractiveness o f  Khomeinism for Central 
Asians. This was set forth by Bennigsen in a 1980 article in Problems o f  Communism, 
repeated almost w ord for w ord three years later in The Islamic Threat to the Soviet 
State. Bennigsen believed “The influence on Soviet Islam o f  the events in Iran may be 
deeper and, in the long run, m ore dangerous than the guerrilla w ar in Afghanistan.”224
Khomeinist Iran was similar to what Bennigsen called the ‘theocratic sta te’ 
established in the N orth  Caucasus by Uzun Hajji during the Civil W ar which had left an 
“indelible impression” amongst Soviet M uslims.225 Bennigsen even asserted that 
Khomeini bore a physical resemblance to U zun.226 Although U zun represented a purely 
Caucasian phenomenon, a them e running through much o f  Bennigsen’s w ork  is the idea 
that the Chechens, as devout, Sufi-inspired and the m ost anti-Russian o f  Soviet 
Muslims, had by their exile to  Central Asia acted as a conduit o f  N orth  Caucasian 
religious concepts into the region. This w ould aid the spread o f  Khom eini’s ideas, 
which would also be given a boost by the ‘fac t’ that “Iran has always enjoyed, and still 
enjoys, an immense prestige in the Turco-Iranian world, not only because o f  its unique 
and advanced culture but also because o f  its long tradition o f  statesm anship.”227
Four aspects o f  Khomeinism were seen as being especially attractive to  Central 
Asians. The first w as its anti-imperialism. In the case o f  Iran this w as directed against 
the USA, but “it is easy to  draw  a parallel betw een the ‘foreign imperialism’ o f  the 
Americans in Iran and the ‘imperialism’ o f  the Russians in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia.”228 “It is highly likely that many Soviet M uslims interpret the Iranian events... as 
an increase o f  local authority against outside influences - and it is not much o f  a leap to 
transfer the lesson to  the context o f  the multinational empire that is the Soviet 
Union.”229
The suppression o f  the Tudeh illustrated the strength o f  Islam against 
Communism. “Some Soviet Muslims, in fact, saw the repression o f  the Tudeh Party,
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Ione o f  the oldest communist parties in the Muslim world, as evidence that communism 
could be defeated by militant Islam.”230
The Iranian Revolution was an anti-imperialist, anti-Comm unist and populist 
movement “to  replace the old corrupt bureaucracy and to  bring to  pow er a new 
category o f  younger leaders o f more popular origin... Iran presents the picture o f  a 
‘revolutionary’ country where ‘something is on the m ove’,”231 contrasting with the 
inertia o f  Soviet society.
The search for cultural authenticity which was an essential com ponent o f  the 
slogan ‘N either East nor W est but Islam’ chimed with the Central Asian urge to 
preserve indigenous culture in the face o f  Sovietisation, and the search for cultural 
roots expressed by the term  mirasism.
The details o f  Khom eini’s ideology, particularly his concept o f  Vilayet al-Faqih, 
the political supremacy o f  a senior ‘alim, running against Central Asian tradition which 
had subordinated the 'ulem a to the tem poral authorities, w ere not discussed. Although 
Khom eini’s teachings arose from a Shi’ite doctrinal base and had only been successfully 
exported to  other Shi’ite communities, this “would not be a great obstacle”232 to  the 
spread o f  such ideas into Central Asia since in the U SSR  the dividing line betw een 
Shi’ism and Sunnism had become blurred. “The differences betw een Sunni and Shi’a 
M uslims in the Soviet Union have dwindled to  insignificance, while Islam has survived 
and flourished.”23'’
It was enough that the Iranian revolution w as m otivated by ‘Islamic 
fundam entalism ’ and form ed a part o f a continuum  o f  religiously-articulated political 
action embracing such groups as the Ikhwan al-Musulmin, the Afghan mujahidin and 
Pakistan’s Jam a’at-i Islami which was sweeping the M uslim world o f  which Central 
Asia w as a part.
While Olcott suggested that “the argum ents o f  a Khomeini or even o f  the Muslim 
Brethren are likely to  be very difficult for [Soviets] to  understand, let alone endorse,”234 
the general view w as that Soviet Muslims w ere the same as those beyond their borders,
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m ore M uslim than Soviet. The articulation o f  Central Asian identity was a Muslim one. 
The ‘fundam entalist’ m essage which rejected W estern ideologies spoke to  Central 
Asians directly in a way that Marxism, the acceptance o f  which was essential to  Soviet 
patriotism , could not.
Western analysts have argued that this revival of Islamic fundamentalism is seen 
by the Soviet leadership as a threat to the security of their multinational state, 
and that the quiescent religious identity of the Soviet Muslims will be awakened
2^5by the resonance of the religious revivals on their borders. ~
Although O lcott w arned that “such argum ents are unsubstantiated,”236 hers was a 
minority view.
The only conceivable future is one of conflict, given the totally contradictory 
world view and the continuing mutual suspicions, compounded by the political 
implications of the Soviet Muslim population's adherence to its Muslim identity.
Until now the Islamic fundamentalist revival seems to have had no direct contact 
with or influence upon Muslims within the USSR, although they are clearly 
aware of its existence and strength... The question that clearly troubles the 
Soviet central Establishment is what will happen if and when the barrier between 
the two forces - at home and abroad - is breached ...2,7
Sufis view Soviet power as the devil incarnate... If the current expansion of 
Islamic fundamentalism is stopped and reversed - which means, among other 
things, the final defeat of the Afghan resistance, a change of regimes in Pakistan 
and Iran, and the liquidation of the Muslim Brothers movement in the Arab 
countries - then it is possible, but not probable, that the same conservative 
radical trends represented by the Sufi brotherhoods will ebb in the Soviet Union.
If. on the other hand, fundamentalism prospers abroad, it is likely to prosper in 
the Soviet Union as well.228
The 1980s have opened under the sign of Islam. They have also opened under the 
sign of a new ideological confrontation. Until now the world was dominated by 
the confrontation between Communism and Liberalism, between East and West. 
At the end of the century, the confrontation has shifted, it pits Islam against that 
which is foreign, against value systems based on materialism and the historical 
experience of the Western world...
The crisis which is rocking the whole of the Muslim world cannot but affect the 
USSR... it also aggravates the national tensions of the USSR. The stand-off 
between Islam and the Western world which this crisis represents and from which 
the USSR profits or tries to profit menaces the USSR and its cohesion just as 
much as it menaces the rest of the world. The USSR can no more escape this 
conflict than can the rest of the world, since it is played out on its own soil, even 
if it is still muffled. The Muslim question of the USSR - which is part of the 
national question of that country - will in the future leave the ranks of the 
exclusively Soviet to become a part of the awakening of the Muslim world and of 
the reconquest of its political and ideological autonomy.2’9
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6.vii) Conclusion
At G orbachev’s accession the majority opinion w as that if  an internal threat to 
the Soviet Union existed, it would come from Central Asia. A combination o f  high 
birth-rates, low mobility, political and economic frustration and distinct identity based 
in Islamic faith created a potentially dangerous situation for the USSR. “It is the 
growing Islam-based m odern nationalist spirit combined with this demographic 
explosion that is the most im portant threat to  M oscow .”240
The few scholars such as Akiner, Lubin or O lcott who in the early 1980s were 
beginning to  question this analysis w ere not yet sufficiently influential to  provide a 
counter to  a view which remained in currency through the break-up o f  the USSR.
W estern thought was unprepared for the fact that as the Soviet political system 
collapsed at the end o f  the 1980s, ethnic interfighting first broke out betw een ‘subject 
peoples,’ Uzbeks and M etskhetians in the Ferghana. Conflict was not betw een 
Russians and M uslims but among Muslim themselves.
It was in the Baltic, a wealthy area in Soviet term s, that economic and cultural 
grievances w ere expressed as anti-Russianism, as Baltic peoples perceived Russians to 
be ‘taking over’ their republics and exporting local wealth to  other regions. Central 
Asia by contrast w as not being ‘sw am ped’ by Russians and was a net beneficiary o f  
Soviet fiscal policy. C ontrary to  expectations, the fact that traditional lifestyle patterns 
had substantially been able to  survive unhindered after sixty years o f  ‘persecution’ 
illustrated less the strength o f  resistance to Soviet norms than that there was perceived 
to  be no inherent conflict betw een the Soviet state and M uslim identity.
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Conclusion - Contexts and Outcomes: 
Towards A Genealogy of Ideas
the facts that are known are often woven into a construct or image of what is held 
to be Islam in the USSR.1
I have traced the developm ent o f  W estern thought concerning Soviet Islam 
during the period from the death o f  Stalin to  the accession o f  Gorbachev, describing 
the “construct or image” o f  Soviet Islam, and arguing that Soviet Central Asia was 
interpreted against the background o f  ideas concerning colonialism and m odernisation. 
Theories o f  Soviet Islam w ere developed within the context o f  an assum ed conflict 
betw een a coloniser and a colonised group. This dichotom y w as initially couched in 
term s o f  nationalism and issues o f  national identity. H ow ever as the national identity 
o f  Central Asians came to  be associated with their Muslim identity, the religious issue 
came to  the fore. The debate shifted from being one o f  the place o f  Central Asians in a 
m ulti-ethnic state to  a discourse about the fundamental conflict betw een the M arxism 
o f  the dominant Russians and the Islam o f  the ‘subject’ Central Asians. These w ere 
seen as irreconcilable ideologies, one o f  which must ultimately destroy the other. I f  
M arx saw econom ic factors as the primary m otivation for political action, most 
W estern scholars o f  Central Asia preferred to  ascribe this to  ideological or even quasi­
spiritual considerations. Only thus could the relative economic disadvantage o f  
independence be reconciled with demands for home rule expressed in W estern 
colonies.
The question remains, why and how  did this particular understanding o f  the 
significance o f  Islam in Soviet society come to dom inate all others? It is this issue 
which I address here.
The process by which an idea or understanding gains currency - assumes a ‘life’ - 
is what I refer to metaphorically as the genealogy o f  ideas. The question to  be posed 
in assessing the dominant image o f  Soviet Islam must be ‘W hat gave this concept life?’ 
‘W hat is its pedigree?’
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; In Islamic doctrine the validity o f  a teaching can be tested by tracing it to  its
source. Thus hcidith are prefaced by a line o f  transmission linking the collator to  the 
Prophet or to  his companions. The accuracy o f  such a line o f  transmission, which 
includes tests o f  the reliability o f  each link in the process, authenticates the hadith.
Similarly the validity o f  a Sufi teaching is authenticated by a process o f  tracing it 
to its source. Sufi bodies possess what could almost be likened to  a ‘family tree’ 
known as the silsile, listing m aster-disciple relationships from  the progenitor o f  the 
teaching to the current Sheikh, thus guaranteeing that this last is the carrier o f  an 
authentic teaching as the pupil o f  his master, who was the pupil o f  his m aster and so on 
to  the source.
Similar ‘family trees’ could be constructed in a W estern academic context. In 
the case o f  the father-daughter relationship o f  Bennigsen and Broxup one can talk 
literally o f  a family tree. It w ould be possible by examining university enrolment lists 
to  determine who studied under whom, and thus to  trace the ‘history’ o f  a teaching. 
Such an undertaking would however be o f  limited value. The purpose o f  the silsile 
and the aim o f  the hadith collators is to  preserve unchanged an eternal religious truth 
for the benefit o f  a tightly defined body o f  people engaged in similar activity. W e are 
here concerned though with the evolution o f  an analysis rather than the preservation o f  
a central body o f  truths, and although chains o f  transmission play a role in such an 
evolution, they are only one o f  the factors to  be taken into consideration if  w e are to 
hope to  understand w hat makes an idea ‘what it is’.
It is this question o f ‘W hat makes an analysis what it is?’ which I hope to  address 
through the concept o f  genealogy. W ithout wishing to  be draw n into the debate 
among behavioural scientists regarding the merits o f  ‘nature’ against ‘nurture’ nor 
wanting to  appear as an apologist for deterministic theories o f  behaviour, I believe that 
the m etaphor o f  genealogy is o f  use as it highlights the im portance o f  background 
influences - often subliminal and o f  the kind that the hadith or silsile are designed to 
screen out - which may be used to  explain the developm ent o f  a particular 
understanding and its preferm ent over alternatives.
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; Events have shown that Cold W ar period understandings o f  Soviet Islam were
substantially faulty, particularly in their predictive aspect. Dallin comm ented that
Logically the source of all such misperceptions and misconceptions can lie (1) 
with the object of our observation. (2) with the observer, or (3) with the process 
or method of observation and analysis. I am prepared to argue that in varying 
degrees all three have indeed been at fault.2
To this ‘what, who and how ’ in the study o f Central Asia might be added as a 
fourth source the way in which ideas are transm itted and how  they are received.
i) Object
At its most basic level, the object o f  study was the ‘M uslim part’ o f  the Soviet 
Union. Specifically, the question most usually addressed was the position o f  this 
‘Muslim p art’ in Soviet politics and society. Some o f  the reasons for this specific 
choice will be addressed under ‘P rocess’ below, since the choice, I contend, depended 
in large m easure on factors independent o f  the object itself.
Precisely how  the ‘Muslim p art’ should be defined - by geography, by ethnicity 
or by quantifiable religious affiliation - is not w ithout difficulty and might depend on 
the use to  which the definition is being put. N ove’s and N ew th’s “ Soviet M iddle E ast” 
uniquely included non-M uslim  areas in its economic analysis. O ther studies 
concentrated on Central Asia or have variously included Azerbaijan, the N orth  
Caucasus and the M iddle Volga. Relatively few studies o f  the period dealt w ith 
specific republics. The area o f  study was somewhat vague and there appears to  have 
been a tendency to  avoid this problem  by ignoring it. The result is that scholars may 
have ended up talking at cross-purposes, by for instance using evidence from  the 
Caucasus to  substantiate a point about Kazakhstan.
Obviously, it w as necessary to  collect data concerning Central Asia before any 
statement could be m ade regarding the region’s historical, political or religious 
development. H ere W estern scholars faced a major problem. A  review  o f  Islam in the 
Soviet Union noted “it is an unfortunate feature o f  the present day that personal
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know ledge o f  the area, derived from prolonged contact w ith it, is still ruled out by the 
restrictions o f  travel,”'’ a difficulty which also affects W estern scholars today. The 
inaccessibility o f  the object presented a major problem  in the study o f  the region. 
B acon was one o f  the few scholars w ho had travelled to  Central Asia specifically for 
research, and her data w ere already thirty years old w hen Central Asians Under 
Russian Rule w as published. D ata had therefore to  be collated from an alternative 
source, namely Soviet publications.
The imperative for data collection provided the m otivation behind W heeler’s 
periodical Central Asian Review , which provided English translations or in some cases 
digests o f  Soviet publications concerning Central Asia. The first (1953) volume 
covered a range o f  information concerning such topics as “Civil Aviation: its use in 
sowing and crop preservation” ; “Culture and Political Training” ; “Shipping on the 
Amu Darya” ; “Ulug Beg, Statesman and A stronom er” ; “H orse Breeding: a new  type 
o f  all purpose animal” ; “Central Asia and the Russian People” ; and “The Position o f  
W om en.” The aim o f  collating this information was, according to  the Review 's  first 
editorial “to  present a coherent picture o f  current political, social and material 
developm ents in the five Soviet Socialist Republics o f  Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, 
Kirghizstan, Turkm enistan and K azakhstan.”4
W heeler highlighted the im portance o f  Soviet sources whilst at the same time 
issuing an essential caveat:
Almost all of my information is derived from Soviet sources... Soviet 
publications - 1 am referring to those directed to the people of the USSR and not 
to external propaganda directed to foreign countries - constitute a very important 
source of comprehensive information... Other sources, such as the reports of 
occasional travellers and of refugees, are limited in scope and are usually biased.
Soviet sources are also biased in the sense that they often conceal relevant facts,1 
but since their policy of concealment varies according to circumstances, it is 
possible by careful and cumulative study of Soviet publications over a period to 
construct something like a coherent picture of the real situation. Unlike travellers 
and refugees, the Soviet authorities do have access to the facts, and it seems to 
me that a source which has access to the facts is potentially more useful than one 
which has not.5
1 The problem of 'disinformation' has also been mentioned by Dallin (1973) p.563.
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Soviet sources, although essential to  researching Central Asia, had their 
limitations. W aardenburg drew  attention to  the “relatively limited num ber o f  available 
facts.”6 W estern scholars relied on a wide range o f  material such as scholarly 
publications, official pronouncem ents and the Soviet Press. Obviously, although a 
substantial body o f  Soviet source material came to  the attention o f  the W est, not all 
did. This could result in confused and often conflicting data, a situation com pounded 
by the inevitable tim e-lag betw een the original Soviet research, its publication in the 
USSR, its export to  the W est and its translation and publication there. This is shown in 
the difficulty in establishing exactly when the Spiritual D irectorates w ere established. It 
is not always clear that the dates proffered actually refer to  the same entity, a confusion 
also evident with reference to  Islamic publishing.
Although it could be argued that there w as a large body o f  data available, N ove 
and N ew th still felt “the facts are seldom unam biguous and are frequently 
contradictory,”7 or as W aardenburg somewhat harshly put it, “the facts that are known 
are often ambiguous and can hardly lead to  any reliable coherent hypothesis and 
certainly not to  a scholarly theory.”8
Even assuming that the available facts w ere reliable, and there was no way o f  
verifying data, facts by them selves are inert. M otyl com m ents that “understanding 
actually precedes the collection o f  data and the ordering o f  facts.”9 W hich o f  the 
available facts are concentrated on, and the significance given to  them, is very much a 
function o f  the observer. Interpretation almost always goes hand in hand with 
collation. It is significant in this regard that one review er criticised Akiner’s Islamic 
Peoples o f the Soviet Union, which attem pted to  re-set the term s o f  the debate by 
presenting facts free o f  value-judgem ents, for its stated aim o f  avoiding politics: “a 
dubious judgem ent... it would in this review er’s opinion, be m ore realistic if  broader 
concessions to  this inextricable ‘political’ element in the Soviet scene had been 
m ade.” 10
The shortage o f  facts forced W estern scholars to  practise ‘reading betw een the 
lines’11 o f  Soviet sources both to  extract data and to  provide interpretations o f  available
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information. The precise nature o f  the reading and the conclusions drawn could be said 
to  have been affected by the personality and experience o f  the scholars themselves.
ii) Observer
Conceptualisation not only proceeds observation but also imparts meaning to the
things observed.12
The conceptualisation o f  an issue, the questions asked o f  it, reflects the 
experiences and usually unconscious preconceptions o f  the questioner. In other words, 
as a result o f  his or her personal interests and experiences a researcher often unwittingly 
sets the term s o f  debate and thereby determines its outcom e. It is partly for this reason 
that studies o f  the U SSR  produced in India differ markedly from those emanating from 
the USA or Pakistan. Imart, w ho was a student in Algiers in the 1960s, directly 
com pared the Central Asia o f  the 1970s to the Algeria he knew, while as late as 1983 
W heeler w as still com paring Soviet Asia to  British India.13
Lem ercier-Q uelquejay warned that Central Asian emigre sources w ere typically 
“resolutely anti-Soviet... and generally lack[ed] objectivity.” 14 M eyer noted defectors 
and refugees w ere “deeply engaged in partisan politics and obviously had axes to  
grind.” 15 W hilst a university-based scholar could legitimately claim a greater degree o f  
objectivity, nobody is free o f  “predispositions in favour o f  certain conceptual schemes 
and resistance to  others” 16 which will be reflected in their work.
It m ust also be noted that research personnel are to  an extent self-selecting - a 
person only becom es involved in research if  he or she has a pre-existing interest in or 
involvement with the topic. The ‘re-skilling’ o f  form er colonial officers as post­
colonial researchers w as referred to  in the Introduction. Such figures inevitably, and 
quite naturally, drew  on their ow n colonial experiences in interpreting the USSR.
Very rarely, a clear stance is taken by a writer. K olarz stated: “Discrimination on 
religious grounds not only diminishes the rights enjoyed by the individual Soviet citizen 
but it is also prejudicial to  the collective rights o f  national groups... I believe that it is an
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essential part o f  this tru th  that religious believers form the new oppressed class o f  the 
Com m unist regime... Throughout the history o f  the Soviet Union religion has remained 
the most visible ideological alternative to  Communism.” 17
M ore often a personal standpoint must be inferred from  the text and an 
understanding o f  the w riter’s background. Bennigsen’s writing evinces a strong 
aversion to  totalitarianism, an understanding o f  the dynamic o f  underground resistance 
m ovem ents, a patriotism  which he seems to  have im puted to  others living under 
totalitarianism, a preference for folklore and folk memory over official statem ents and 
identification o f  language, culture and identity as a single whole. All this is consonant 
w ith his origins in an emigre family, his upbringing in France, his experiences in the 
Resistance, and his travels in the Muslim world o f  the 1950s collecting oral history, 
folklore and epic verse. Ryw kin’s 1963 w ork concentrated on the political structure o f  
Uzbekistan, where he had been exiled during the W ar, and the arbitrary nature o f  the 
Soviet policies o f  which he had been the victim.
The difference in approach deriving from the varied British, French and American 
experiences o f  colonialism and o f  Islam is clear from the preceding chapters. Dallin 
noted that many researchers in the field had prior experience in governm ent or in 
institutions connected to  governm ent. “Such a record is apt to  impart particular 
attitudes and perspectives.” 18 H ostler’s interest in pan-Turkism  and characterisation o f  
Central Asia as a “soft underbelly” o f  the U SSR  (a term  used in the Second W orld W ar 
by US planners o f  Italy in Europe) might be explained by reference to  his time as 
Military A ttache to  the US Em bassy in Ankara, Turkey’s position as the only regional 
member o f  N A TO  and the ‘N orthern  T ier’ doctrine o f  containment, which was itself 
devised by Caroe. His book grew  out o f  his M A  at G eorgetow n University, which he 
attended as part o f  a United States Air Force graduate training scheme.
In fact, the majority o f  scholars in the field prior to  the 1980s, w hen a new 
generation began to  challenge earlier understandings, fell into one or both o f  tw o 
groups.
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On the one hand there w ere form er governm ent employees, many o f  w hom  had 
been involved in colonial administration or had held posts relating to  the Soviet Union. 
These included Hostler, Caroe, Conquest, and W heeler. On the other w ere emigres 
from  Eastern Europe and the U SSR  or their descendants, such as Rywkin, Carrere 
d ’Encausse, Kolarz and Rakow ska-H arm stone. Bennigsen and Hayit fell into both 
cam ps as being both emigres and form er state employees, albeit for different states. 
Thus the object o f  study, the Soviet administration o f  M uslim  regions and M uslim s’ 
reaction to  this, results in part from the amalgam o f  scholars concentrating on the 
region.
W ithin each group certain trends are discernible. Form er colonial adm inistrators 
tend  to  stress the functioning o f  the state with an eye to  the breakdow n or preservation 
o f  the state structure, bearing in mind the experiences o f  o ther multi-ethnic polities. 
The second group often stressed the injustices perpetrated by the Communist regime, 
the intolerability o f  such a situation and the imperative o f  national liberation.
These distinctions are not absolute, since those involved in the study o f  Central 
Asia com m unicated w ith one another and exchanged ideas. French scholars in 
particular often w orked together, to  the extent that it is almost possible to  discern a 
‘Parisian school.’ M any o f  their w orks were translated by W heeler, who was 
influenced by them  and was a frequent speaker at the Royal Central Asian Society, 
where lectures w ere attended by influential members o f  the British Establishment.
Columbia University in the U SA  was another focus o f  Central Asian studies. 
Allworth and Rywkin received their PhDs from  Columbia within a year o f  each other. 
Allworth returned shortly after Bennigsen left Columbia for Chicago, w here W imbush 
w as one o f  the latter’s students. Also at Columbia at this tim e was the geographer 
Lewis, w ho w rote on Central Asia’s demography. Rywkin retained links with 
A llw orth’s Nationalities Seminar, also at Columbia.
The result o f  these circum stances was a tight-knit and mutually reinforcing 
academic comm unity into which dissenting voices might find it hard to  break. The 
degree o f  congruence in the views o f  the different scholars w ho both  led and m oulded
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the debate can often seem rem arkably high. N ew  w orks w ere reviewed in the academic 
press by established scholars in the field, and these naturally tended to  praise works 
which accorded with their own judgem ent. Richard Pierce for instance reviewed 
W heeler’s The Peoples o f  Soviet Central Asia  and Ryw kin’s M oscow's Muslim 
Challenge, which was itself also reviewed by W heeler and by Wimbush.
The person o f  the observer could o f  itself lend weight to  an analysis. Hayit, as a 
form er apparachik, carried authority when writing about Soviet policy. W heeler’s rank 
o f  Colonel w as almost always m entioned in connexion w ith his name. Being a title, like 
C aroe’s knighthood, this is standard etiquette, but it also serves to  bolster the 
authoritativeness o f  “an author with unique com petence in his field.” 19 In one review 
w e learn that “Count Alexandre Bennigsen is a Russian.”20 N either the title nor the 
description is strictly accurate, since Bennigsen’s father held the title at the tim e o f  its 
abolition and the family were Baltic Germans. Although Bennigsen was neither a 
Russian nor a Count the styling lent an air o f  authority to  his writings.
There is one final point to  be made about the ‘observers.’ This is that almost all 
had backgrounds and interests in political science. Their w ork  therefore reflected what 
w as seen to  be the primary political issue o f  the day, that o f  colonialism. The future o f  
colonialism and its relation to  Communism on the one hand and the Muslim w orld on 
the other provides the underlying them e o f  virtually all writing on Soviet Central Asia. 
As political scientists, the interpretations o f  scholars w ere based on political 
understandings. Econom ists w ere relatively rare, as w ere scholars w ith primary 
interests in literature or w om en’s issues ( The Surrogate Proletariat being a notable 
exception). Scholars with backgrounds in Islamic Studies w ere notable for their 
absence. Such issues w ere therefore presented through a political filter, reflecting the 
political tem per both o f  the scholar and o f  the time.
I f  the personal can be described as political, then the very person o f  the 
researcher is a political fact affecting research findings. As M eyer has it, “since all 
social studies are conducted within a political context, they are likely to  express the 
student’s political attitude. Politics and m ethodology inevitably are intertw ined.”21
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iii> Process
By ‘process’ Dallin seems to  have meant m ethodology. This w as not a primary 
concern  o f  the scholars under review who favoured the ‘thick description’ technique o f  
w riting in which m ethodology is implicit in the text rather than being treated  as a 
separate issue. Although the formal discussion o f  m ethodology and the precise 
m eanings o f  term s and concepts enjoyed a vogue in the w ake o f  D errida’s findings, this 
did not com prise a m ajor part o f  the intellectual universe inhabited by the scholars 
reviewed, and the influence o f  such thought appears again to  be waning. In place o f  the 
m ethodological ‘H ow ?’ question, it may therefore be preferable to  substitute ‘W hy?’ in 
o u r examination o f  ‘process.’ In other words, what factors influenced the study o f  
Central Asia such that one interpretation dom inated all others.
N ove and N ew th blamed traditional British fears o f  Russian designs on India for 
creating “some political attitudes which hardened into a tradition which is apt to  look at 
these areas [Central Asia]... from this political-strategic angle.”22
The dom inance o f  the political-strategic approach to  Central Asia, which in part 
arose from the political backgrounds o f  the scholars involved and which continues to 
this day, is clear from  the texts and informs even such ostensibly politically neutral 
w orks as M onteil’s Essai.
Dallin w rote o f  “an empirically observable congruence betw een the political 
tem per o f  the times and the general thrust o f  dominant interpretations by specialists on 
the U SSR,”2’ and it is clear that the study o f  Soviet Islam was strongly influenced by 
the prevailing Zeitgeist.
A lthough there w as a pre-existent tradition for the study o f  Central Asia from  a 
strategic standpoint, as dem onstrated in the first chapter o f  this thesis, this does not in 
itself explain why this tradition should have been continued. Early French scholars 
appeared m ore concerned with the relevance o f  the Soviet model for the continuance o f  
the French Empire, and even after that em pire’s demise w orks continued to  appear 
which did not focus on geo-politics.
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The political fact o f  the Cold W ar pushed geo-politics to  the fore. The perceived 
Soviet threat to W estern interests created “a perm anent demand for data on and 
analysis o f  the Soviet Union”24 particularly with regards the country’s likely political 
development. In this context, the colonial question, and w hether or not the Soviet 
Union had solved it, was o f  param ount importance. In the light o f  the colonial 
experiences o f  Britain and France Central Asia had obvious strategic significance. 
Scholarship o f  the region reflected the strategic concerns o f  its time.
U nger25 has m ade a useful distinction betw een w orks directly commissioned by 
governm ent agencies and those intended for such agencies. N one o f  the w orks cited 
here, with the possible exception o f  H ostler’s, was directly commissioned by the state, 
but there can be no doubt that many were intended to  bear on policy or w ere read by 
policy-formulating governm ent figures, and their authors consulted either formally or 
informally. This is particularly true o f  articles which appeared in the Journal o f  the 
Royal Central Asian Society and Problems o f  Communism. That what M otyl has 
referred to as “policy relevance” had a bearing on the choice o f  them es addressed is 
clear from the pre-ambles to  many o f  the works. M onteil’s Les Musulmans sovietiques 
is prefaced with a personal encomium by Charles de Gaulle. One review explicitly 
recom mended C onquest’s The Last Empire to “the statesmen, teachers and 
administrators o f  new  and emerging nations.”26 Following Stephen Cohen, M otyl 
writes,
policy oriented scholarship, which is designed for political consumption, can 
impose serious intellectual constraints. Complex political history must be 
rummaged for present-day relevance; ‘lessons’ and predictions become primary 
objectives...
These features can be discerned in the texts and often in reviews. One such 
describes the chapter on the Basmachis in M oscow's Muslim Challenge as 
“interesting... for its bearing on today’s guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan.”27 A nother 
review o f  the same w ork  stressed that “it may help to  spread awareness o f  the region’s 
economic and strategic im portance and give an idea o f  its future.”28 A ccording to  
Cohen the outcom e o f  this was that research tended to  becom e “politically palatable in 
findings.”29
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Although by no means all W estern writing on the Soviet Union w as hostile, it is a 
natural hum an characteristic to  favour that which is congenial, and throughout the Cold 
W ar era it w as politically congenial to  view Central Asia as a potential source o f  crisis, 
holding out the possibility that the U SSR  w ould not only be unable to  expand but itself 
risked collapse under the weight o f  its internal tensions. Explicitly criticising the w orks 
o f  Bennigsen, Carrere d ’Encausse and Rywkin, W aardenburg w rote
Such books are primarily addressed to a western public in the context of the 
ideological warfare between the two super powers. They try to demonstrate that 
“the enemy” is threatened by enemies himself, and are meant to sustain certain 
hopes in the West... when, in a number of western studies of Islam in Central 
Asia, political considerations play a role, these studies risk becoming not only 
hypothetical but also expressions of wishfiill (sic) thinking.30
The charge o f  wishful thinking may seem unduly harsh w hen it is considered that 
the interpretative fram ew ork being used in analysing Central Asia, that o f  colonialism, 
suggested that an internal threat to  multi-national states w as inevitable, as described in 
Chapter 2. Further, the conclusions drawn from  this colonial understanding stemmed 
from  the au thors’ own experiences o f  empire.
Those w orks which w ere “politically palatable” and which subsequently becam e 
influential, being cited in footnotes and references, w ere those which stressed the 
colonial nature o f  Russian-Central Asian relations and “ideological aspects o f  Islam and 
its presum ed conflict with atheism,” ’1 putting forw ard the view that Islam presented a 
threat to  the Soviet Union due to  the “ineluctable antagonism ”32 betw een M arxist 
atheism and Islamic theism. This understanding, which focused on ideological 
abstracts, denied the possibility o f  any kind o f  modus vivendi and discounted the kind 
o f  pragm atism  which is a feature o f  actual human interaction. W estern scholars have 
been accused o f  over-simplification in their analysis, o f  reifying Islam into a ‘thing’ 
rather than  a negotiated process.
There is a human tendency to  seek simple explanations for complex issues since 
such explanations are easier both  to  com prehend and to  w ork  with. Simplification can 
how ever lead to  misleading conclusions. A 1984 text m entions “the traditional Muslim
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hostility to  Christianity,”^’ which although congruent with popular opinion o f  the time 
denies Q ur’anic doctrine and the complex historical experience o f  Christians in the 
M iddle East, M oorish Spain and the O ttom an Empire.
Often W estern texts appear similarly to  be using the concept o f  Islam as a kind o f  
intellectual short-hand. Islam could be used as a single unifying theory which explained 
a  num ber o f  com plicated and not always obviously related phenomena, from  an 
unwillingness to  m igrate to  high educational drop-out levels among girls, dem ographic 
trends or the political desire to  create a Russian-based ‘pan-Soviet’ culture. All were 
part o f  a continuum  which could be encapsulated in the single w ord ‘Islam .’ While 
such an approach necessarily denied the variety o f  experience within Soviet Islam and 
within Islam as a whole, it also discounted explanations which did not entail a religious 
dimension. Caution in this regard was liable to  criticism. According to  one review, 
while Akiner “recognises the political overtones o f  the religious-national situation in 
Soviet Islam,” yet “her very circumspect handling o f  both ‘Religion’ and Nationalism  
could mislead the uninitiated reader.”34 The suggestion o f  a complexity requiring 
circum spection is ‘m isleading.’
The position o f  Islam in the Soviet Union was seen as part o f  the “colonial 
question.” In a sense, none o f  the w orks examined in this thesis w as primarily about 
Islam. Rather, they w ere about politics and the role that Islam or rather “Islamic 
identity” played in Soviet politics. Islam often appears less as a religion than as a 
signifier designating ‘the o ther’ which could be turned to  political account. According 
to  W aardenburg,
The authors concerned" say that they do not use [‘Islam’] to indicate a religious 
faith or religion but rather to indicate a group identity of “Muslim” ethnic non- 
Russians over against “non-Muslim” ethnic Russians... this reminds me of the 
dubious implications of the French custom, until the late fifties, of speaking of 
“les musulmans de l’Afrique du Nord” without really knowing much of Islam.
This label served to distinguish North Africans from the French by stressing their 
religion... [They] oversimplify [Islam], approaching it according to certain pre- 
established schemes... [they] have no direct contact with the people concerned, 
who. as a living reality, are completely absent from such descriptions. As a 
consequence there is a propensity to develop complex speculative theories in
1 Waardenburg singles out Bennigsen, Carrere d’Encausse, Rywkin and Hans Braker.
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isolation from the material itself... Consequently such books use the facts to 
present ideological rather than scholarly views.35
In fact a large body o f  w ork was produced detailing Islam precisely as a religion. 
Often how ever the sub-text o f  such studies was to  determine w hether the Islamic faith 
was capable o f  providing a socio-cultural content to  a putative nationalist movement. 
Interest in Soviet Islam as a faith was m otivated by political considerations. In the 
1950s, w hen Islam w orld-w ide was not seen as politically im portant, the religion w as 
largely passed over. By the 1980s, with Islam seen in the W est as a m ajor threat to 
international stability, it assum ed a primary im portance in the titles o f  many w orks on 
Central Asia.
Because Soviet Islam was seen as being o f  primarily political significance, 
scholars o f  the region might be said to  have been predisposed in favour o f  the 
prevailing m ood o f  the 1970s and 1980s w hen Islam began to  be seen as inherently 
political and inherently anti-W estern. Once Soviet Islam had been characterised as 
essentially Sufi in nature such a position was almost unavoidable given the important 
historical role o f  Sufi groups in anti-colonial agitation in N orth  Africa, sub-Saharan 
Africa and, in the 1980s, Afghanistan. As one reviewer w rote, “those readers o f  the 
last issue o f  [Religion in Communist Lands] who rem ember the striking part played by 
the Sufi brotherhoods in the Afghan resistance (see article by Olivier R oy)111 will be 
prepared for the vital part played by the brotherhoods in the life o f  Soviet Islam .”36
It m ust also be rem em bered that the most serious threat to  A tatiirk’s 
W esternisation o f  Turkey came from  a revolt organised by the Naqshbandis, which led 
to  Sufism being proscribed in the Turkish Republic. I f  M uslim states them selves 
regarded Sufism as an anti-W estern political movement, why should not W estern 
scholars also? Scholars o f  Central Asia had already been moving cautiously tow ards a 
position which subsequently becam e unquestioned popular orthodoxy.
"'liCL 12,1 (1984) pp.55-69
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M otyl blamed the media, by which he seems to  have meant the popular mass 
m edia and especially the Press, for the content o f  m uch writing on the USSR, 
complaining o f
The pervasiveness, influence and prominence of the media... their fascination 
with impressions and images, and their disdain for history, complexity and depth 
impress themselves on Sovietology, encouraging scholars to describe bits and 
pieces of events or processes, to seek out the unusual and exotic, and to avoid 
systematization, historical perspective and comparison. Sovietology is especially 
prone to succumb to the media’s blandishments as a result of its politicization by 
and close relationship with the state: just as the modem media tend to set much of 
the political agenda for the state, so, too. a politicized Sovietology is forced to 
draw on the media for much of its own agenda.37
M otyl over-states his case, although media concerns often reflect m ore general 
concerns and elected politicians need to  be aware o f  these. M otyl’s contention that 
scholars o f  the U SSR  only becam e concerned with non-Russians after their “discovery” 
by the media in 1986 is manifestly untrue. Nevertheless, in the treatm ent o f  ‘political’ 
Islam after 1979 a congruence can be seen betw een m edia and scholarly concerns. 
A lthough it is a m oot point w hether the popular press does directly influence the 
content o f  academic work, it undoubtedly both moulds and reflects the environm ent in 
which that w ork is received. In so doing it will have an effect on which analyses gain 
w idespread attention, by predisposing readers to  prefer one interpretation over another. 
M ost people will tend to  favour an understanding which accords w ith w hat they have 
already read or are familiar with over one which challenges this, and because o f  this the 
frequency and media o f  propagation o f  an idea can have a profound effect on its 
reception.
The reception and propagation o f  ideas forms the forth part o f  our ‘genealogy.’ 
In this the identity o f  the scholars involved and the political environm ent in which 
w orks w ere produced combined with such other factors as the anticipated readership 
and the distribution and circulation o f  books in prom oting one understanding over 
others.
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iv) Reception
The imperative for “political palatability” can be illustrated by reference to  a 
review which appeared in Problems o f  Communism in 1967 and which discussed the 
re-issue o f  C aroe’s 1953 Soviet Empire, Bennigsen’s and Lem ercier-Q uelquejay’s 
I'Islam en URSS and N ove’s and N ew th’s The Soviet M iddle East. C aroe’s work, 
described as “a classic,” was assigned thirteen column inches. Bennigsen’s and 
Lem ercier-Q uelquejay’s “book o f  fundamental im portance” received twenty-five 
colum n inches. N ove and New th, who “seem to consider it m ore productive to 
evaluate the m odernisation o f  the ‘Soviet M iddle E ast’ while purposely avoiding 
preoccupation with the them e o f  Russian imperialism,” w ere given just four and a half 
column inches.38
This indicates that there w as a demand for and a willingness to  engage with a 
certain type o f  writing on Central Asia - that which focused on Russian Imperialism - at 
the expense o f  com peting interpretations. This is in part seen in the awarding o f  the 
prestigious Prix d ’A ujourd’hui to  d ’E ncausse’s TEmpire eclate, the essential thesis o f  
which w as the threat Homo Islamicns posed to  the Soviet Union. It is also made clear 
from  available reviews which appeared shortly after the publication o f  m onographs on 
the area. These favour political analysis over texts dealing with other aspects o f  
Central Asia. This is in m arked contrast to  w orks dealing w ith other areas o f  the 
USSR, particularly Russia, w here reviews o f  studies w ith overtly political overtones are 
in the minority. It w as often the m ore partial books which w ere m ost warmly received 
as these tended both to  chime with the political necessities o f  the time and to  accord 
with the views o f  o ther scholars in the field.
H ayit’s Turkestan im XX. Jahrhmidert, which displays a partiality concom itant 
with his emigre status, w as adjudged by Pierce “m ore useful” than C aroe’s book and a 
“supplement” to  T ogan’s39 and is the m ost commonly cited emigre work. Lem ercier- 
Quelquejay considered it a “w ell-docum ented [albeit] polemical w ork .”40 The book ’s 
status was enhanced by Carrere d ’Encausse’s assessment that up until its appearance, 
“effectively nothing has been published in W estern Europe on Russian Islam save
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Professor von M ende’s own w ork [1936], the Essai sur / ’Islam en URSS o f  Vincent 
M onteil and a few isolated articles dealing with problem s since the W ar.”41
In the canon o f  literature on the Soviet Union, books about Central Asia w ere 
comparatively rare.lv This meant that anyone wishing to  read about the area had largely 
to  rely on the w ork o f  a small num ber o f  dedicated scholars w ho were, in M otyTs 
words, “virtually above criticism,” in that they represented the only know ledge-base on 
the region. The relatively small num bers o f  scholars in the field w ere less subject to  the 
scrutiny accorded scholars o f  m ore popular fields. This situation was sometimes 
exacerbated by the scholars themselves, w ho naturally had an interest in prom oting 
their understandings over com peting interpretations.
As late as 1986 W imbush claimed that “little systematic attention has been paid 
by scholars... to the M uslim regions and strategic periphery o f  the U SSR ,”42 staking a 
claim for his contribution to  be regarded as something out o f  the ordinary and therefore 
o f  especial value, although six years earlier Bociurkiw  had stated that “much has been 
w ritten on Islam in the U SSR .”4'1 Whilst W imbush m entioned only his m entor and 
collaborator Bennigsen as a leading light in the field, Bociurkiw  named eight additional 
scholars whose w ork might be co n su lted / A new com er to  the field w ho w as not 
familiar with B ociurkiw 1 s list is thus directed tow ards one particular understanding, 
that o f  Bennigsen and W imbush. Bennigsen himself w rote o f  the “forgotten Islam”44 o f  
the U SSR  as if  to  deny the preceding body o f  work, including his own, although it must 
be admitted that Soviet Islam barely registered in the w ider disciplines o f  either Soviet 
o r Islamic studies.
One result o f  the relative paucity o f  scholars w as that the same people w ere 
regularly consulted and asked to  contribute to journals and collections o f  essays. 
Bennigsen, the pre-eminent authority, had 200 books, chapters and articles published 
under his name. In the period 1952-1985 he w rote 23 contributions to  edited w orks in 
addition to  m onographs and papers published in journals. These included contributions
1V "Comparatively’ because a vast body of literature was generated on the USSR from a number of 
standpoints, but this tended to focus on the Slavic "heartlands’.
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to  the Cambridge History o f  Islam (1970), Religion and Atheism in the USSR and
Eastern Europe (1975) and Islam and Power (1981).
The role o f  editors in propagating a viewpoint is an im portant one, since they can 
to  an extent set the term s o f  the debate both by their pow er to  accept or reject a piece 
offered for publication and by their pow er directly to  commission work. Operating in a 
comm ercial world, publishers are constrained by the need to  sell their product and 
inevitably have to  consider the appeal a particular w ork  may have for a putative 
audience. The editors o f  academic periodicals seldom w ork under the same kind o f  
comm ercial pressure, but here too  the need to  preserve a journal’s reputation as a 
serious scholarly publication may have an influence on what is regarded as acceptable 
material. The judgem ent o f  reviewers in such journals can also have a profound effect 
on the use to  which a m onograph is subsequently put.
In the case o f  publications covering general them es such as the three cited above 
which would not necessarily appeal exclusively to  experts in any particular field or even 
to  specialist students, contributions from recognised authorities are im portant in order 
to  draw  a potential reader to  a work. By contributing, a recognised authority can act as 
a kind o f  m entor for a w ork  as a whole in the way that an introductory essay by an 
established scholar can lend weight to  a m onograph.vl
I f  m entorship in the scholarly environment helps in passing an idea from  one
academic to  another, recom m endation by an established expert can help a book pass 
ideas to  a w ider audience. W heeler regarded Ryw kin’s M oscow's Muslim Challenge, 
as “among the m ost objective which have so far appeared.”45 O ther reviewers 
described the w ork as “one o f  the best books o f  its kind in existence”46 and as “a 
refreshingly up-to-date and stimulating study which fills a sorely felt gap.”47 Such 
com m ents went some way in ensuring the w ork ’s popularity, although Richard Pierce, 
who noted that the text was essentially an update o f  Ryw kin’s’s Russian Central Asia,
v Wheeler, Caroe, Lemercier-Quelquejay, Carrere d’Encausse, Zenkowsky, Kolarz, Allworth, 
Rakowska-Harmstone "and others.’’
Vl cf  Wheeler's introduction for an English-speaking audience of Islam in the Soviet Union (1967). 
Carrere d’Encausse's Reforme et Revolution chez les Musulmans de I ’Empire russe (1966) carried a 
lengthy introductory essay by one of the leading French Islamists of the time, Maxime Rodinson.
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w as m ore guarded. Reviews w ere w ritten by the same group o f  scholars w ho authored 
m any o f  the m ost im portant texts. These naturally endorsed positions similar to  their 
own.
The same assertions or view points appearing in a num ber o f  places gain force by 
repetition. It is only when a large number o f  articles and chapters from  different 
publications are collated and read together, as they almost never are, that the degree o f  
this repetition becom es apparent.
In many cases this is not simply a m atter o f  a scholar returning to  a favourite 
subject or expanding on a them e but o f  the exact replication o f  w ords which had 
appeared earlier. This tendency is evident in W heeler’s w orks o f  the 1960s, sections o f  
The Peoples o f  Soviet Central Asia  repeating verbatim  passages o f  Racial Problems in 
Soviet Muslim Asia , and later in the w orks o f  both Bennigsen and W imbush. In the 
Journal o f  the Institute o f  Muslim Minority Affairs, W imbush w rote
‘"Parallel Islam” is essentially underground Islam; because Islam - at least in its 
Sunnite variant - does not require an institutionalised clerical structure, such as 
one finds in Catholicism or Orthodoxy; for example, almost anyone with enough 
energy can conduct the prescribed Islamic rituals.48
The following year he wrote:
Parallel Islam is. essentially, underground Islam. Because Islam - at least in its 
Sunni variant - requires no intitutionalized (szc) clerical structure to direct 
religious practise, such as is required in Catholicism and Orthodoxy, almost 
anyone with some knowledge of Islamic tradition can conduct the prescribed 
rituals.49
O ther instances o f  such repetition could be cited™
R epetition might be expected for tw o reasons. Firstly, the relatively small 
num ber o f  scholars produced an enorm ous body o f  writing. Several articles on the 
same topic might appear in different places in a single year. It w ould be unreasonable 
to  expect a scholar w ho in many cases has devoted a lifetime’s research to  developing a
v" Compare e.g. Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay (1978) p. 155 with Bennigsen & Wimbush
(1985b) p.21
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thesis to  return to the draw ing-board and produce something entirely new. I f  a position 
bears stating, it bears repeating. Circum stances seldom  change so quickly as to  demand 
a radical re-appraisal o f  a previously held position. There is also the established 
practise o f  ‘testing the w ater’ for a thesis by publishing a paper based on a w ork in 
progress. The findings o f  the paper will then reappear in the finished work, by which 
time they will have gained the strength o f  familiarity.
Secondly, the projected audience has to  be taken into account. A  scholar may 
produce tw o essentially similar articles which are read by discreet audiences. A 
subscriber to  Religion in Communist Lands, which has historically focused on issues 
concerning Christianity and appears to  be primarily aimed at those w ith interests in 
Hum an Rights and M ission, w ould not necessarily read Central Asian Survey, where a 
similar article by the same scholar might also appear. Thus the same information may 
pass to  tw o separate but not isolated communities and an idea can come into general 
circulation and find general acceptance.
Aside from the editorial policy o f  academic journals, potential target audiences 
for scholarly writing can be discerned from the pricing o f  m onographs. Although 
original publication prices can be hard to ascertain and their meaning hard to  evaluate in 
real term s, B ritain’s N et B ook Agreement which required publishers to  print the price 
on the cover o f  books provides some vital clues, as do reviews.
Academic publications are often relatively expensive, but many o f  the m ore 
influential w orks on Central Asia w ere priced at a cost roughly equivalent to  that o f  a 
novel. The Peoples o f  Soviet Central Asia  cost 12/6, and w as as Pierce pointed out 
“designed for a hypothetical ‘general reader’.”50 C aroe’s Soviet Empire cost 18/-, 
marginally m ore than hardback fiction. By contrast, N ove’s and N ew th’s The Soviet 
Middle East was priced at 30/-, indicating a m ore restricted anticipated audience. 
Conquest’s The Last Empire w as priced at 3/6 in paperback, exactly the same as the 
Penguin Classics edition o f  the same year o f  C onrad’s The Secret Agent. A lthough in 
1967 Islam in the Soviet Union was expensive at 50/-, its authors w ere still 
comparatively unknow n in the English-speaking world and needed the imprimatur o f
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W heeler’s introduction. The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State retailed at a relatively 
much cheaper £12.95 in 1983, when Bennigsen was the best-know n w riter in the field.
Perhaps m ost interesting in term s o f  the effect o f  pricing policy on circulation, 
and therefore on w hose voice is heard is the contrast betw een Akiner’s Islamic Peoples 
o f  the Soviet Union (1983) and Bennigsen’s and W im bush’s almost identical Muslims 
o f  the Soviet Empire o f  tw o years later. The form er cost £25 and the latter £18.50. I f  
as one review er contended Muslims o f  the Soviet Empire w as “a must for anyone 
interested in the w orld o f  Islam,”51 Akiner’s must be regarded as aimed at a m ore 
specialist audience who might be prepared to  spend the extra, and indeed the 
“uninitiated” w ere w arned o ff in one review.
In his review o f  M oscow's Muslim Challenge, W imbush recom m ended it as “a 
splendid introductory text to  the subject for both students and laymen” and “a superior 
effort which will find a ready audience among scholars, students, policy m akers and 
laymen.”52 The audience among scholars was assured in part because the w ork dove­
tailed neatly with what had already been w ritten (Islam in the Soviet Union was 
explicitly m entioned in the review). For policy-makers it was im portant since “events 
and trends in Soviet Central Asia are o f  significantly m ore than anthropological 
interest... [they] have implications not only for the short- and long-term  stability o f  the 
USSR... but also for the stability and evolution o f  the entire Central Asian - and by 
extension M iddle East - region.”53 For students and laymen the attraction seems to 
have lain in Ryw kin’s style. He was not “verbose or pedantic” but “lucid, avoiding for 
the most part the hideous language o f  today’s social scientists.”
B ooks dealing with Soviet Central Asia have been for the m ost part highly 
readable, w ritten w ith a fluidity which draws the reader along w ith their argument. 
This in part results from  the ‘thick description’ style o f  writing, and has the undoubted 
advantage o f  m aking such books accessible to  a w ide audience. An argum ent 
persuasively put and which chimes with a reader’s expectations obviously carries 
weight. The disadvantage o f  such writing is that it may discourage critical scrutiny, 
since the argum ent is put so forcefully as to  appear self-evident. B oth  w riter and reader 
may be carried along by rhetoric.
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It is rarely that the w ork o f  one scholar, even when directly quoted, is critically 
analysed for its sources, its use o f  term inology such as ‘colony,’™1 or for the structure 
o f  its argument. Slight changes, or conclusions not adequately supported by the 
evidence, could encroach unchallenged and these could alter the nature o f  the 
argum ent. One o f  the m ost interesting o f  these changes is the way in which the Slavic 
name-suffix -ev/-ov is bracketed or even excised from  Central Asian personal names. 
Som e (e.g.W heeler and Allworth), occasionally replaced it w ith the Turkic -oghli/-uli, 
which as a patronym ic suffix is not strictly speaking cognate with the familial -ev/-ov 
(since the introduction o f  surnames in Turkey, the suffix -oglu has been used in a 
familial sense, and the Slavic -o v  was originally a patronymic). The result was to  
suggest the Central Asians had been less influenced by Russian culture than was 
perhaps the case.
This lack o f  appraisal seems to  show that the general thrust o f  argum ents about 
Central Asia were so readily received and assimilated into the m ainstream  as virtually to  
preclude examination. In a sense, at the time these studies w ere being produced their 
conclusions were regarded as self-evident and not requiring detailed critical appraisal. 
In other w ords their argum ents chimed perfectly with both  their times and their 
audience.
v) Closing Remarks
O ur “genealogy o f  ideas” thus contains a num ber o f  elements - the “genetic code” 
- which influence research outcom es and which explain why the W estern study o f  
Central Asian Islam developed in the way it did, and tow ards the conclusions it 
expressed. These include the difficulty o f  obtaining accurate information, the 
backgrounds o f  and relationships betw een scholars o f  the region, the political and
VUI This is particularly evident in the use of Islamic terms, especially where their Central Asian usage 
varies slightly from the 'norm/ which were often used as if unproblematic in a way which supported a 
particular pre-conception. The use of the terms Dar ul-Islam and Dar ul-Harb to describe relations 
between Russians and Central Asians is typical.
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intellectual environm ent in which they w orked, and the way their w ork w as propagated 
and received.
O f these the m ost im portant must be the political and intellectual environment, 
since this directly affected scholarly reactions to  available evidence and the way in 
which those reactions w ere received by others. I have argued throughout that 
environmental factors have had a profound effect in shaping discourse on Central Asia. 
The greatest o f  these has been the experience of, and reaction to, the colonial period in 
European history.
W ithout wishing to propound a deterministic theory o f  scholarship, that a 
colonialist rubric should have been adopted in interpreting Central Asian Islam might be 
seen to  have been almost inevitable. Colonialist theory m ost readily m atched the 
experiences o f  the scholars undertaking research, it seemed to  be confirmed by political 
developm ents world-w ide, and perhaps most importantly it best answered the political 
needs o f  a time in which it w as almost literally unthinkable that life under Soviet 
tutelage should be less onerous than under British or French.
Dallin remarked:
there is little we can do about the errors of analysis which are due to the nature of 
the Soviet system and the inherent limitations of the state of the art. Other 
blunders, however, have been due primarily to ourselves and to the biases which 
we unwittingly absorb from our political environment. If this is so, then a 
greater awareness of such shortcomings and a greater openness to alternative 
interpretations should be the first conditions for avoiding such failures in the 
future.54
Openness to  alternative interpretations is far easier to  call for than to  achieve. I f  
w e accept the contention put forw ard by G eorge Orwell in 1984 that a concept which 
cannot be expressed cannot be thought, we must ask w hether it w as in fact possible to  
express divergent views. This is not to  suggest that the language to  express such views 
w as lacking, but rather that the environm ent in which they might be put forw ard was 
liable to result in their authors being branded “Communist sympathisers” like Egretaud, 
or to lead to  the accusation that they had, like Akiner o r N ove and N ew th, missed the
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point. In either case, divergent conclusions w ere liable to  be ignored by their peers as 
irrelevant.
In the m odern age o f  electronic databases and com m unication via the Internet, a 
wider range o f  com peting interpretations can be accessed, and m ore quickly, than ever 
before. This how ever is a new developm ent which is only now  beginning to  replace 
personal contact and personal recom m endation, and to  circumvent the natural risk- 
aversion o f  publishers, as a means o f  disseminating ideas. It remains the case that the 
best way o f  becoming know n as an expert in the field is through traditional channels, in 
which the constraints described above continue to  apply. For an idea to  gain 
acceptance, it still has to  conform  with the prevailing mood.
W aardenburg accused scholars themselves o f  wishful thinking, but m ore 
important than this must be wishful thinking on the part o f  an audience in the W est now  
made up largely o f  aid agencies and petrochem icals companies which might show 
themselves willing only to accom m odate certain understandings which further their own 
interests, just as the acceptable analyses o f  the past could be used to  further the political 
interests o f  certain groups. Political palatability remains a strong criterion in 
determining which interpretations o f  Central Asian political and social dynamics gain an 
ascendancy. In a sense W estern scholars may be w orking within an ideological 
straitjacket every bit as real if  less obvious as that o f  their erstwhile Soviet 
counterparts. A lthough a relatively recent coinage, it can be seen that ‘political 
correctness’ has always had an influence in the interpretation o f  data.
A recent example o f  the functioning o f  such ‘political correctness’ can be seen in 
the W est’s reaction to  the W ars o f  Yugoslav Succession. Early on, these w ere ascribed 
to  “ancient ethnic hatreds.” This was m ore politically convenient to  the W est than 
suggestions that the causes o f  the w ars w ere rational, mostly connected with questions 
o f  local political and econom ic pow er and therefore, given the political will, stoppable. 
That the only evidence for such “ancient” hatreds directed at anyone save the departed 
Ottomans had occurred in exceptional circumstances (those o f  the W artim e puppet 
Croatian U stashe state) was irrelevant once the orthodoxy o f  the irrational Balkans 
which itself has a history dating from  the nineteenth century w as re-asserted.
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W ith the benefit o f  hindsight ten years after the collapse o f  the USSR, it might be 
tem pting to  dismiss the books under review as being no m ore than the products o f  their 
time. To do so w ould be a mistake. W here earlier scholars w ere in error in their 
judgem ents or interpretations, they w ere so for very cogent reasons. It is im portant to  
understand the factors which m oulded these earlier w orks in part because they form the 
bed-rock  from which any further scholarship in the field must proceed, and in part 
because future scholarship is itself likely to be affected by very similar factors.
To deny that any objectivity is possible and to  suggest that discourses are no 
m ore than products o f  their age and create a ‘functional tru th ’ serving certain interests 
is to  fall into the trap  o f  relativism. The relativist assertion that “there is no ‘beyond the 
tex t’”, that all discourse is merely a “construct or image” which describes a subjective 
state rather than an observable and comprehensible reality w ould seem to  suggest that 
academic enquiry is pointless and academic discourse essentially fatuous. How ever, 
unless w e are aware o f  the limits o f  objectivity and the underlying causes o f  those 
limits, then objectivity, and w ith it meaningful debate, is itself under threat.
Beyond the theoretical, an understanding o f  the nature o f  these texts and what 
informed them  has a very practical aspect. They are not merely historical documents. 
They continue to  inform much o f  what is understood and w ritten about Central Asia in 
the W est. Furtherm ore, as the new states o f  the region integrate into a W estern- 
dom inated world econom y and seek investment along with both  political and economic 
credits from  the W est, Central Asians are them selves increasingly interpreting their 
Soviet past through this W estern colonial discourse. In the short-term , this ‘meeting o f 
W estern expectations’ in describing their societies has its advantages, but such a 
development cannot but have a profound impact on the long-term  political and 
economic future o f  the region.
Although this thesis has concentrated specifically on Central Asia it is my belief 
that many o f  the factors which, I have argued, have prejudiced the understanding o f  the 
region’s political and social dynamic may also be also at play in other fields o f  the social 
sciences and perhaps even in some branches o f  the natural sciences.
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A willingness to  recognise the constraints imposed upon scholarship by factors 
external to  the research itself, particularly that o f  political palatability which is often the 
least evident, is essential. I f  academic writings are to  m ake any claim to  being able to  
represent the ‘tru th ,’ it may occasionally be necessary to  take stock and re-assess 
earlier contributions. Theories and analyses need constantly to  be questioned, since 
inaccuracy is often unw itting and always hard for its perpetrator to  recognise in himself. 
T ruth in the Social Sciences which claim to have a direct application to  the ‘outside’ 
world, especially those which purport to describe other societies, predict how  they will 
behave and what our relationship with them  should be, has a m ore than purely 
epistemological significance.
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